Essay: Biggest problems of the EU are structural incompleteness & general dissatisfaction

The sheer complexity of the European Union (EU) means that it faces particularly large scale problems. Arguably the biggest of these problems being the ‘incompleteness’ (Jones et al, 2015, P.1026) of the EU’s structure and policy, and the general ‘dissatisfaction’ (Vollaard, 2018) caused by Europe’s economic failings. This ‘incompleteness’ has been argued to have created an EU that is ‘falling forward’ into integration, prompting certain political commentators to perceive the EU as ‘unsustainable’ (Jones et al, 2015, P.1027). By having such ingrained structural failings it compromises the EU’s ability to deal with current crises, like Brexit and the immigration crisis, resulting in ineffective leadership, which will fuel ‘apathy’, making Europe vulnerable to populism (Vollaard, 2018).
The current problematic economic climate of the Europe Union highlights the questionable structure of European monetary policy, and fuels the idea that it is ‘unsustainable’ (Jones et al, 2015, P.1026). Today the EU’s economic integrity is being undermined by; an ‘Italian-driven new euro crisis’ (The Economist, 26/10/18, p.14), Brexit, the implications of the 2008 Euro crisis, and the immigration crisis. Such events, like the 2008 Euro crisis exposed the deeper issues of the EU. The 2008 Euro Crisis was a product of design flaws in the euro, the global financial crisis (2007-2010), and the mismanagement of policy and leadership post-recession (McCormick, 2017). Therefore despite the collapse of US subprime mortgage market being the initial spark, it was the incompetence of Europe that ignited the ‘profound crisis’ (Jones et al, 2015, p.1020). The EU had weak foundation, the ‘financial markets’ had been ‘liberalised’ but their banking regulation policy was lax, which created a possibility for systemic risk and market instability (Jones et al, 2015, p.1018). Thus institutions like the EMU would have to adjust and integrate during crisis. Europe would be failing forward’ (Jones et al, 2015, P.1010). Intergovernmentalists saw issue with Europe’s decision making, for inter-governmental bargaining requires a sacrifice of national interests. ‘Lowest common denominator’ decision making is adopted to make ‘divisive preferences more palatable (Jones et al, 2015, p.1012-26), a prospect that could prompt resentment. Neofunctionalists acknowledge how crisis leads to more economic integration, which  results in a ‘spillover’ of influence (Jones et al, 2015, p.1015-6). In some cases this spill-over was necessary, to manage the complications of mass economic integration, but in other occasions it was a product of Pro-European integration politicians using crisis to promote their political agenda (McCormick, 2017, p.168). Thus EU negligence both contributed to the euro crisis, and prolonged it’s duration. Therefore highlighting the weak foundation of the EU and it’s inability to enact the necessary reform to assure it’s sustainability (Jones et al, 2015, p.1026). Such structural challenges makes economic crisis a huge concern for the EU, for their approach to crisis may stabilise short term politics, but in the long run it is ‘self-undermining’ (Jones et al, 2015, p.1026).
Economic crisis is a huge concern for the EU for it compromises their ability to function effectively. Economic decline tends to exhibit; high unemployment, unsustainable budget deficits, and disruptive inflation, all of which harm society. This is of particular concern for the EU, for it’s independence and international monetary policy system heightens the potential for systemic shocks and ineffective policy. Italy is currently financially struggling. Unemployment has reached 10%, with 20% living on less than €10,000 a year (The Economist, 12/10/18, p.13), and their public debt is the second largest in Europe (The Economist, 12/10/18, p.29), relative to their GDP (130%) (The Economist, 27/10/18, p.31). This has not only contributed to the empowerment of an radical, anti-EU government but has created a political stalemate between the European Commission and the Italian government. The Commission, for the first time in EU history, rejected Italy’s fiscal blueprint, but the Italian prime minister, Matteo Salvini refuses to comply, stating ‘he would not alter the budget’ (The Economist, 27/10/18, p.31). This should concern the EU, for if Italy can not make it’s repayments it could a downgrade in the euro’s credit rating. If such were to be the case, it would make borrowing, and thus spending, more expensive, undermining their ability to spend, be it on the economy, or the immigration crisis. This inability to hold Italy to account, as of yet, shows the EU to be weak, and may result in future disobedience from member states, which would undermine their ability to deal with the immigration crisis. The EU therefore needs to unify it’s member states, and cooperate to manage the influx of immigrants, which will require an acknowledgement of national interests and funds. Money is a large part of the problem, but also the solution. The EU has already invested €3 billion in Turkey, meaning ‘Sea arrivals’ in ‘Greece fell from almost 1mil in the year before to 82,000 in the two-and-a-half years since.’ (The Economist, 3/11/18). This shows the importance of a prosperous economy in assuring societal stability, and why economic concerns are a large problem.
The current economic failings in Europe have wider repercussions, beyond economic hardships, making economic decline particular undesirable. Economic crisis has contributed to a wave of resentment in Europe, a wave that “populist politicians [have] exploited” (Soros, 2018). The EU is not oblivious to the damning political effects of their economic failure, the Europe Commission proclaimed that the Euro Crisis resulted in ‘public trust in EU institutions hitting an all-time low (Jones et al, 2015 ,p.1023). This lack of trust creates an apathetic atmosphere in Europe, compromising the potential for common feeling, as shown in the consistently low electoral turnout (The economist, 3/11/18, p.36). Having a lack of political participation undermines the credibility of the EU government, for it fails to adequately represent the electorate in policy. Vollaard believed this ‘dissatisfaction’ would eventually result in the decline of Europe (Vollaard, 2018). This would not be through a Brexit equivalent or ‘collapse’ but through the gradual rejection of EU values, resulting in a slow sink into ‘oblivion’ (Vollaard, 2018). Rodrik saw this ‘sink’ as inevitable, perceiving economic integration, nation states, and democracy, as ‘mutually incompatible’(Rodrik, 2007). The occurrence of economic crisis thus highlights this ‘inescapable trilema’, and legitimises Rodrik’s assertion (Rodrik, 2007). Therefore the occurrence of economic failings, as a product of structural issues of the EMU, could be argued to be the ‘biggest single problem of the EU today’ for it legitimises the views of Rodrik, and thus fuels it’s demise.
To conclude the biggest single problem of the EU today is structural ‘incompleteness’ (Jones et al, 2015, P.1026) and general ‘dissatisfaction’ (Vollaard, 2018), which are both hindered by Europe’s economic failures. This is not to say that these issues are solely caused by poor economic performance, for they are in part due to issues like the immigration crisis. Although what makes the state of the economy more important is that the immigration crisis can be undermined by economic prosperity via costly diplomacy. Whether this is Europe’s slow sink into ‘oblivion’ (Vollaard, 2018) or ‘the storm… to clear the air’ (Lehne, 2018) we’ll have to wait and see, but what is known is that to ensure greater political and economic unity Europe will have manage it’s economy more efficiently to ensure it’s sustainability.