Essay: Hypotheses on Misperception

Hypotheses on Misperception
Robert Jervis’s article: “Hypotheses on Misperception” explores the idea that actors such as world leaders and state decision-makers formulate national and international policies based on a set of largely unconscious prejudices and biases. This means more than simply following a rigid set of state values; it means being effectively blinded to objective circumstances through the inherent nature of subjective judgment and perception. The greatest strength of the article is the fact that Jervis sketches out a convincing number of specific perceptual biases that blind leaders to an objective interpretation of circumstances and data. The greatest weakness of the article is the fact that Jervis fails to offer empirical solutions. Loosely speaking, Jervis recommends that leaders be aware of the biases and misperceptions outlined in the article, but there is a definite emphasis placed by Jervis on problems, rather than potential solutions.
The basic argument that is presented by Jervis is formulated by combining general psychological principles with historical events. One of the first points made by Jervis is that policy makers and leaders often warp information that they receive to fit the preexisting mental landscape they already possess. Effectively, this means that leaders tend to “perceive what they expect” (Jervis 457). A closely attached observation by Jervis is that leaders are unable to identify authentically new information as such because they are so preoccupied with their established views. Jervis cites a scientific study performed with playing cards where it was demonstrated that subjects could “identify normal (and therefore expected) cards more quickly and easily than incongruous (and therefore unexpected) ones” (Jervis 458). The study also noted that new and unexpected cards were frequently misidentified by subjects as being regular cards.
Boiling all of this down, Jervis asserts that the overall impact of this inability to recognize authentically new data or experiences basically means “that actors tend to establish their theories and expectations prematurely” (Jervis, 459). Of course, as Jervis points out, the need for immediate response or prompt action is frequently present in political situations. That said, it is also the case, according to Jervis, that the majority of the misperception that leaders experience in this regard takes place at an unconscious level. This means that misperceptions by political actors are based not so much on the pressures of time or the presence of unknown factors; it is actually the intrinsic consequence of human psychology.
It is on this point that Jervis is most eloquent and clear. His argument on behalf of the idea that a range of misperceptions cloud actors’ ability to make decisions is quite convincingly presented. Partially, this is due to the fact that he is able to enumerate a number of types of misperceptions in detail, along with the hypothesized underlying psychological influences. Another reason that his argument is so strong is because he is able to cite specific global-political conditions or events to support his argument. The problem with Jervis’s approach is that he spends too much time quantifying the psychological side of the issue while stopping short of offering practical techniques or solutions to the misperceptions he so effectively argues are present in politics and leadership.
That is not to say that Jervis fails to offer solutions. In fact, the second half of the article is structured around this very principle. Jervis lists the ways that leaders should attempt to adapt to the influence of unconscious misperceptions. The weakness of his approach is that the proposed techniques are very generalized in nature and they are more of less focused on changing the mental attitude and orientation of decision makers and leaders. However, what might have been more effective was an examination of organizational systems or safeguards that could provide balance for the potential gaps in perception that are outlined by Jervis. In other words, rather than coaching individual leaders in a general way about the various means they may use to “open” the perceptions to objective data, a system or set of systems should be devised by which a leader or decision maker is “checked” by another stakeholder or administrator.
With that in mind, many of Jervis’s assertions are convincingly made. For example, Jervis notes that “decision-makers should be aware that they do not make “unbiased” interpretations of each new bit of incoming information” (Jervis, 462). While being aware of the misperception is important, simply knowing that they are biased seems an insufficient remedy. Jervis goes on to state that “decision-makers should see if their attitudes contain consistent or supporting beliefs that are not logically linked” (Jervis, 462). This is what Jervis calls an example of “true psycho-logic” (Jervis, 462). In addition to these ideas, Jervis offers a number of more complicated applications. For example, he suggests that “The decision-maker should try to prevent individuals and organizations from [being] tied to specific theories and images of other actors (Jervis, 463-464). This seems like effective advice and it is practical in nature, but again there is no systemic format for the application; merely a personal, cognitive awareness.
Jervis goes on to identify the main impediment to true perception as an individual’s inability to see beyond whatever they are specifically focused on when they receive new information. Jervis writes: “The way people perceive data is influenced not only by their cognitive structure and theories about other actors but also by what they are concerned with at the time they receive the information” (Jervis, 472).  This area of focus and potential distraction is called “The Evoked Set.” According to Jervis, it is the evoked set that provides the main area of distraction that leaders face when attempting to grapple with objective facts. There are hidden ways that a leader’s preexisting views might cloud their perceptions of others or of objective facts. Say for example, that the actions of a specific nation in expanding its borders fulfill the alleged motives of more than one additional state actor. In this case, determining the objective motive is of utmost importance, but the facts as known can be applied to justify more than one viable interpretation. As Jervis notes “actors tend to overlook the fact that evidence consistent with their theories may also be consistent with other views” (Jervis, 478). One of the last suggestions for remedy made by Jervis in the article is that leaders and decision makers should try to surround themselves with many dissenting opinions. A good leader or administrator should seek out those who openly disagree with their positions and have their positions robustly challenged by an informed opposition. This is a good suggestion but falls short of what is actually necessary which is a systemic addition of these very “devil’s advocates” as official positions in management or administration.
 
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