The purpose of this memorandum concerns the proposed invasion of Iraq. It is imperative that we respond with force to our adversaries who have caused us so much pain and destruction and those who continue to threaten us with as much might as possible. Such an endeavor will not only hunt down the people who organized the atrocious terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, but will also act as a deterrence to the real or perceived enemies of the United States. We must demonstrate to our enemies that we do not negotiate to terrorists and we will not be cowed with their demands.
The technical requirements for this initiative will be far reaching. We must take advantage of the anger and frustration of the people and win political support at home and from our allies so that the consequences will be dire for our enemies. To accomplish this goal, you must convince Americans that sending their sons and daughters to punish those who have wronged the nation (on two fronts) would not only strengthen our national security, but benefit the nation as a whole. However, before all these, we must be convinced ourselves that we are just in our actions, and not responding without proper intelligence. We must also be cognizant that invading Iraq has its consequences, particularly because many within the U.S. and the across the globe look towards the our nation for leadership and diplomatic measures beyond our borders. In addition, our ongoing war effort in Afghanistan may not be able to succeed if undermined by such an invasion.
The Problem
On the morning of September 11th, 2001, four American planes were hijacked by foreign terrorists, with the intent of causing panic within our populace and markets. These hijackers scrupulously planned these attacks— possibly with foreign government assistance, and targeted key areas within our borders in the largest attack on our nation’s soil since the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 (DPLA). Around 3,000 innocent American lives were lost to radical Islamic terrorism in these attacks (DPLA). Consequently, the American people turned towards your administration for leadership and guidance in formulating an adequate response to these attacks. Your response came soon after in Congress, with a joint resolution on the use of force “to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States, on September 18th (CFC). The next month, you directed the American military to invade Afghanistan, in order to seek out and destroy those responsible for the attacks, such as Osama Bin Laden (CFC).
Our incursion into Afghanistan, now two years old, has continued to cost American lives and resources. This lack of success has led the administration to be subjected to a certain measure of embarrassment, given the resources we have spent. However, the operation has the potential for success if carried out properly. Recently, the operation is under threat of being subverted by a new threat— Iraq. This threat has culminated since September of last year, when the United Kingdom published an incriminating dossier on Iraq’s potential possession of weapons of mass destruction, supposedly capable of wiping out the United States within 45 minutes (BBC). Since the U.K.’s report, the Pentagon has seemingly began to shift efforts away from Afghanistan and towards Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (CFC). In our defense, there is no way the United States can afford to allow the Hussein regime, especially after our efforts in the Gulf War, to possess weapons with the potential to inflict catastrophic consequences on our nation. But this is not the first time such weapons were perceived to be in Iraqi possession. You may recall that after the Gulf War, Saddam’s regime was subjected to United Nations sanctions on suspicions of their possession on such weapons (BBC). I therefor understand the motivation to seek the validity of the U.K. report, but it must be done carefully.
We must revisit our institutional capabilities and reexamine ways that will help us win these wars against these terrorist insurgency groups. Our failure, in part, cannot be said to arise from our incapacities, but rather a lack of adequate planning. When the U.S. invaded Afghanistan, it did so in less than 30 days following the September 11th attacks (CFC). Whether the invasion was planned before the attacks of not, I cannot independently verify, but the timeframe is wanting because it ostensibly brings into question just how much time we had in planning, and how our reaction was effective. The effectiveness of a plan cannot be hinged on addressing public outcry because we must plan carefully and seek better ways to eliminate our enemies that will ensure success and better utilization of our resources.
For the invasion to be successful, we must go back to the basics. We all agree that the enemies of the U.S. must be punished, but we must plan carefully. We cannot just rush to invade Iraq because we must take into account two critical factors: how this incursion will benefit the U.S. and how it will impact Iraqis. We ought to be cognizant that we owe a responsibility to the people of Iraq to protect their lives because while their leader Saddam is a threat to the U.S., Iraqis must not bear responsibility the responsibility for the actions of his regime. Saddam is a single entity, and while he is the head of the Iraqi government, we must consider that he does not represent the will of the people. Many Iraqis detest him, due to his desire to be ranked among the great leaders of history. He even ranks himself with ‘heroes’ such as Nasser, Castro, and Mao Zedong among others (Post). A good reason why Iraqis detest him is because Saddam genuinely sees himself as one of the greatest leaders of history, ranking himself with heroes such as Nasser, Castro, and Mao Zedong among others (Post). While we may acknowledge such high detesting for Saddam even within his own country, we must also consider that there are those who hold him in absolute reverence. As a result, we ought to plan our response looking for alternatives to military invasion, but hold our cards closely.
Your government has various agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency, which have expansive resources which may be used to eliminate Saddam covertly, without necessarily hurting the common people of Iraq. Inflicting damage on these people would subject the nation to international protest and pressure. While we boast the world’s foremost military, which would almost certainly eventually eliminate Saddam’s regime, I urge caution in doing so. It is imperative to also consider the support of our allies because the United States is as strong as the support it receives from its allies, meaning our allies must be in support of our actions. I advocate for a tactful elimination of Saddam without invasion as this will pre-empt various consequences that would arise.
Framing the Solution
We can take the situation regarding the invasion of Iraq, and figure a solution which does not involve invading the country, by taking into account my following suggestions. First, you would serve best to realize that war is not the only means of success no matter how threatened we are, for instance, our invasion of Afghanistan has not yielded as much as we had expected. I am not saying that we should not be prepared for war, but that following a possible false flag narrative is dangerous to your administration and the American image. Americans must see that war is not the only means of success, but a means to an end. War should be the final option and we ought to keep it at that. Secondly, as we have seen before, it is not difficult for outside threats to bring the U.S. into war. While we are a powerful country, we must always explore all possible pathways before entering an additional war. Thirdly, we must take notice of what our international allies and their position(s) on the issue. We cannot go into such an operation alone, as we are already fighting the war in Afghanistan, and in the process of stabilizing the country. Lastly and most importantly, counterinsurgency warfare is ugly; it can lead to atrocities, war crimes, and other forms of abuse (Ucko).
Sir, your approaches should be based on two overarching angles. First, we should consider toppling the government from within and minimize the consequences that we might incur in terms of taking responsibility or even the cost in terms of the loss of military personnel. On the reverse, you should consider non-military intervention. Non-military intervention is a long and uphill task that if pursued, and we must be willing to handle the situation with patience as we verify the credibility of the presence of WMD(s) in Iraq.
Making it Work
A non-military intervention in Iraq must be tabled alongside a full-scale invasion plan in case of diplomatic failure. We must always recognize that as much as we are willing to engage in dialogue or depose a dictator, there are still consequences that might arise out of our actions. To make this proposal work, you must designate certain individuals at your discretion who will form a task-force in addressing the possibilities of WMD(s) in Iraq, directing them to come up with ways through which non-military intervention will work. The task-force work ought to be secretive and involve only the most qualified analysts who currently serve our nation’s defense. These individuals will be tasked with the technicalities regarding the collection of pertinent information, including the capability of conducting field work. The task-force will be tasked with training, mobilizing, and executing actions meant to deter the use of WMD(s) and also provide credible evidence beyond mere speculation that can be used as hard evidence if an invasion is eventually needed. While the initial composition of the task-force may be minimal, it is important that it be supplied with vast resources as it is meant to metamorphose as it develops. It remains unclear how vast this task-force will turn out to be and how long the non-military intervention will take. However, I urge you to table a timeline of say one year for the task-force to come up with tangible solutions to the threat of WMD(s) in Iraq.
Political Hurdles
Given the breadth of federal resources that will be involved in this initiative, it may attract controversy when it becomes public for what many people may see as a waste of resources. Knowing this, you must bring in the heads of the Republican and Democratic parties in both Houses and brief them of the actions and seek their support as this will minimize any falling out that may occur later. Secondly, given that some people might prefer a militaristic action against Iraq versus diplomatic measures, certain domestic pressures from lobbyists and those within your administration may arise. It is imperative you commit to a plan, and see it through. Do not let these internal actors cause you to change course, for it may subject the nation to further embarrassment.
Recommendation
I am imploring you sir, to consider an alternative approach to invading Iraq, as we do not possess enough credible information regarding the actual existence of WMD(s) within Iraq. Invading the nation of Iraq without the necessary credible information would undermine the invasion’s legitimacy, and ultimately violate the sovereignty of Iraq. You must also take into consideration that some of our allies have resolved to veto our decision within the United Nations Security Council, meaning that the support we had when invading Afghanistan. I urge you to call your security council into session and debate on this recommendation. I am confident you understand the implications both domestically and internationally, of conducting these operations without adequate and proper intelligence. I would be happy upon your invitation to come and share some of my thoughts and or strategies on the matter.