Essay: The Bay of Pigs conflict

The fluctuation of international politics, problematizes the underlying and implicit stance that International Relations theorizes. By examining foreign policy within a domestic and international political framework, one will be better equipped to understand the actions of a state when implementing foreign policy options. Foreign policy assess the international and domestic political environment in order to engage in proper action when dealing with global issues. In foreign policy making pathologies, ideology and institutions bridge a gap between the disparity of theory and practice. Although policies may be intuitively designed to avoid most negative outcomes, realistically policies will continue to have unintended consequences that a nation must take into consideration ‘after the fact.’ Moreover, foreign policy engages moving facets that prompt the forging of new thought and approaches to varying global matters. In this essay, I will discuss how shifts in pathologies permeate institutional and ideological factors that ultimately impact the way leaders and nations interact in the global arena.
According to Jarvis, ______(READING NAME), he hypothesizes that theory has a greater impact on an actors decision making. In his initial hypothesis, decision makers base their decisions images and cultural linkage in order to determine actions they wish to pursue. In doing so, decision makers fit new information into their old tendencies by perceiving what one expects instead of what something actually is. The impulse to cherry pick information enables the distortion of perceiving realistic factors objectively. The lack of rejectioning one’s personal views creates room for error leading to the second hypothesis of Jervis’s argument. Jervis describes, leaders to be cemented in personal views creating logical connection that do not exist. Since it is easier to identify false information if it comes bit by bit, instead of all at once. The inadequacy to information permit decision makers to view states as more hostile than they are — perceiving states as centralized and more coordinated than they are in reality. The hypothesis of misperception, provide clarity as to why states can misperceive the intentions of other states’. In the case of the Bay of Pigs, actions of groupthink display the effectiveness of implementing policy on the basis of perceived state intentions.
During the Bay of Pigs conflict, there had been a classical approach taken that encouraged  statesman to be responsible for policy. Yet, the lack of separation between an individual leader and the overall organization created limitation of the President’s capacity to process information. In other words, one ‘man’ can’t save the world or make the right decision without understand all the facts. On April 1961 a group of Cuban exiles, trained by the CIA, were issued to invade Cuba from an inlet called the ‘Bay of Pigs.’ The United States had sugar, cattle, and mining interests in Cuba with the help of Fulgencio Batista. The former authoritarian leader, Batista, in Cuba had strong ties with the United States that partook in US capitalist schemes. However, Castro, a leader of the communist revolution, recruited farmers and other civilians to spread Marxist Utopian ideology. Castro quickly became the leader of Cuba after expressing the need to nationalize, avoid colonization of Cuban riches and the proclamation to self determination to all Cubans. Soon after becoming the leader of Cuba, Castro nationalized industrial companies and began to initiate relations with the Soviet Union. In response to Castro’s grand gestures, former President John F. Kennedy urged for the secret operation to overthrow Fidel Castro that would sever ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the CIA and trained Cuban exiles to enter Cuba in attempt to begin a coup against Fidel Castro. Despite actions taken for the covert operation, the US officials and Cuban exiles were immediately stopped through the collective effort of citizens and Cuban government forces. The fight ended within 2 days, ultimately strengthening the position of Castro’s administration. The United States failed in this instance because of the administrations assumptions about Cuba. By assuming that Cuba was solely a rational actor, it initiated a generalizable explanation of decision-making policy that predetermined a particular course of action. In order to achieve maximal gain one must view a particular course of action in differing angles.
Former President John F. Kennedy challenged the framework of IR theory by addressing organizational dynamics that dealt with complex factors needed to implement action. In the case of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy was misinformed regarding the Cuban military capabilities, ability to keep the US operation secret, the morale of Cuban exiles, and the support that the US would receive from local civilians. During the deliberation process leading up to the Bay of Pigs operation, group pathology ushered confusion and disorganization despite the presence of rational thought from lower ranking individuals. Pressure to achieve unanimity between groups enabled one group’s opinión to be prized versus the other. When discussing next steps to pursue, experts and other organizations that were learned about Cuban were excluded or  silenced. Though, foreign policy making often deals with time constraints, increasing the illusion of unanimity and invulnerability often suppressed personal doubts.  The structural fails of impartial leadership and homogenous members are susceptible to groupthink symptoms. Symptoms of stereotyping, pressuring dissenters, unwavering belief of one’s morality, and censorship of new information prompted an embarrassing outcome during the Bay of Pigs.
In response to the faulty situation, John F. Kennedy pursued vigilant appraisal tactic when tackling the Cuban Missile crisis. Kennedy changed the institutional process of assessing information in the face of  conflict. During the Cuban missile process, John F. Kennedy enacted a naval blockade around Cuba to deter the Soviet Union from delivering additional missiles to Cuba. In order to neutralize the threat to national security, John F. Kennedy shifted the way that the organization made decisions. Particularly, Kennedy created leaderless meetings, refused to have meeting agendas in order to accommodate rapid changes, widened groups to have access to information, and placed ‘devil’s advocate’ to each meeting. The deliberate changes to these meetings assured that actions similar to the Bay Pigs wouldn’t repeat itself. The United States willingness to use military force, if necessary, generated a public fear that these hegemonic powers were on the brink of a nuclear war. However, through the internal changes the Kennedy administration were more prepared for  how respond to threats better than before. Instead of making path dependent decision making, breaking unauthentic decision making aided to untwine the potentiality of approaching foreign policy.