Essay: Leadership removal (targeted killings of leaders)

Leadership removal has many aims, one of them is the intention to generate psychological effects for those in the attacked group, thus resulting into a distinct behavioural change. Specifically, as Entous (2009) states, leadership decapitation is designed to discourage militant members from fighting, cause fractures in the group and provoke internal feuds. The former consequence is broadly grounded in the basis of deterrence theory, an old concept that is identifiable in nearly all human interactions. According to George and Smoke (1974), at its core, deterrence concerns influencing an individual’s behaviour by changing his cost-benefit calculus. Deterrence theory is based on the strategic interplay between rational actors that assess their future actions against the expected reactions of their adversaries (Huth and Russet, 1984). Therefore, with respect to the Taliban, US decapitation strikes are intended as (Luft, 2003) argues, to provoke fear in “those next in line for succession take a long time to step into their predecessors’ shoes”. Thus generating a void in leadership, in turn a functional deficit due to lack of group direction. As Clausewitz once stated, there is a great importance of “killing of the enemy’s courage than the enemy’s soldiers”, and this perspective is clear in the US counterinsurgency strategy as Major General Richard P. Mills, indicated that in May 2011, the targeted killings objective was to force the Taliban to “go back to their old way of life and put the rifle down and pick up a spade”. This passage aims to expose that this psychological objective is not achieved with respect to the Afghan Taliban, in fact it highlights that the psychological effects induced are counterproductive to the wider counterinsurgency aims.
The success of the inherent deterrence factor in leadership targeting is noticeable in some instances. For example, the former commander, Eidi Mohammed from Baghdis discontinued fighting due to fears that “American operations are very effective: the night raids, the airstrikes and ground attacks [made him concerned, stating,]… I was afraid they would kill me too” (Cowper-Coles, 2011, p.278). This fear translated in him later seeking amnesty under the Afghan government’s reconciliation program (Ahmed, 2013). In particular, it highlights an instance whereby the decapitation attack forced a Taliban leader to carry out the desired wishes of the counterinsurgency forces. Essentially demonstrating the success of the strategy that US official Kandahar David Marsh describes as “bringing out the less committed Taliban and getting rid of their tier one” leaders (cited in Amad, 2007). This discourse and shift in allegiance delineates a clear instance where a mid-level leader has been affected psychologically.
Furthermore, the prominent emotive response that followed the 2007 decapitation of the charismatic commander Mullah Dadullah Akhund, the “Taliban’s foremost operational commander” (Shah and Gall, 2007) further illustrates a change in the Taliban’s morale and motivation. Asia Times’s Shahzad (2007) describes that “amid the demoralisation” shortly after the precision strike in the Helmand province that removed Dadullah, “the entire Taliban leadership left Helmand, Uzuzgan, Zabul and Kandahar and sat idle in … Quetta, Pakistan, for several weeks”. The geographical relocation of the group directly following this strike seemingly indicates a prominent impact on the organisations sense of insecurity, forcing them to seek refuge in the safe haven of Quetta.
This relocation due to the perception of insecurity induced by the targeted killing was just one of the side effects that followed Dadullah’s demise. As Wilner (2010) highlights, the psychological effect of Dadullah’s death generated issues relating to group trust. His removal is noted to have prompted extensive amounts of “spy mania” within the Taliban ranks. Suspicion amongst members of the Taliban regarding infiltration, creating tensions in the ranks, as stated by Yusufzai (2007). This distrust manifested in the gathering of suspects to be tortured, and beheaded, despite many reported to have little contact with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This flagrant exhibition of diminished trust and transformations in group behaviour corroborates to some extent the conceptual aspects linked with deterrence by punishment, signifying the empirical realisation of Entous’ (2009) projection that leadership removals can generate internal feuds. Therefore, pronouncing what can be regarded as an effective leadership decapitation removal as it caused internal destabilisation.
However, these aforementioned responses are largely anomalies with respect to the routine reactions of Taliban leaders facing the threat of decapitation strikes. Instead, for instance Taliban commander Mullah Yunis, with recognition of his position on the US Kill/Capture list in his region, still fought and lead his fraction. His determination and courage for the Taliban cause is bounded in his following rhetoric, that “if you kill us, we become stronger, and the number of our attacks will just increase as times passes” (Channel 4 Dispatches, citied in Dear, 2013, p. 304). Therefore, indicating that the demoralisation of Taliban leaders is not a unanimous sentiment, but to some extent this preceding discourse signifies a contrasting effect of targeted killing, suggesting that it initiates a more motivated force.
In addition, if the cost-benefit analysis was truly appreciated and recognised by the Taliban, there should be multiple vacancies in their leadership structure.  General deterrence as stated in Gibbs (1975), is designed to stop crime in the general population due to the state’s punishment of offenders. Therefore, in relation to decapitation strikes, it is intended to deter future leaders due to their witnessing of the infiltration of pain and ultimately death inflicted upon previous leaders. An insight into the Afghan Taliban’s shadow governance and military structure therefore is critical in assessing this dynamic of leader decapitation. However contrary to theoretical expectations, there has been instead an increase in shadow governors across the county, there are no apparent vacancies in the military structure and the Taliban’s operations cover a vaster area since 2001(Witte, 2009). These findings suggest that the Afghan Taliban militants are not dissuaded from taking positions within the Taliban leadership structure despite the ever-increasing attrition rates. This judgment is shared by US intelligence agencies, having stated that the Taliban have a capability to rejuvenate and re-establish quickly, within a few days after a leadership removal (Smith, 2010). Suggesting that whilst potentially delivering short term damage to the group, the Taliban’s ability to reunite is relatively unharmed. Therefore, this strategy has seemingly failed in delivering the necessary, art of coercion, intimidation and deterrence; aspects that Schelling (1966) identifies as central to any counterinsurgency strategy.
Furthermore, the continued expansion of the group compounds the above stated claim that the strategy has been unsuccessful psychologically. Considering the intentions of deterrence theory, an area that logically would be affected if leadership killings were effective in discouraging fighters, is the organisation’s recruitment and retention rates.  But with estimates of active members in the Taliban consistently on the rise each year according to research conducted by Stanford University (2018), it has been unproductive. US intelligence estimated 7000 Taliban forces in 2006 (Al-Jazeera, 2009), 6000-10000 in 2008 (Giustozzi, 2009), 25,000 in October 2009 (Al-Jazzera, 2009), and a staggering 36,000 in March 2010 (Kabul, 2010).  Whilst the size of the Taliban can only be stated as simply estimates due to the difficulty inherent in ascertaining the size of this militant group that predominantly operates in small units, it does suggest that leadership decapitations have not inhibited future fighters from joining. Instead what these statistics depict, is the opposite, whilst these findings do not indicate a direct link between leadership removal and the Taliban’s expansion, it does show that in terms of decapitation’s ability to successfully deter, it is has been ineffective. Taliban forces largely appear emotionally resilient to this decapitation strikes as the movement continues to grow.
The shortcomings of this strategy are to some extent based on the policy’s psychological foundations in Rational Choice Theory. Rational Choice Theory posits that states and individuals alike make judgements on a cost/benefit basis in order to ascertain the best means to achieve their goal (Browning et al, 2000). Fundamentally, the psychological aims of this strategy are not empirically satisfied because the continuous pursuit of Taliban leaders is theoretically misguided in its underlying assumption that humans, and in particular the Taliban, make decisions rationally; guided by this cost/benefit analysis of any given action. In carrying out decapitation strikes, conceptually, the US suppose that they can increase the cost of fighting to a level that it exceeds the benefit of continued insurgency conduct, and thereby result in a change in behaviour. (reconciliation program?) However, primarily, the human decision-making process is far more complex than this reductionist conception proposes.
Consequently, leadership killings will not wholly deter due to the fact that this approach appears to overlook the causes that drive these insurgents to fight. The counterinsurgency deterrence effect implies that individuals prioritise the sanctity of their life over the group’s goals. However, as Louis and Taylor (2002, pp. 87-100) state, like many insurgent groups, as the Taliban continue to pursue ends through aggressive means, their aspiration to be accepted leads to a need to enhance group goals over individual ambitions. This understanding explains commander Mullah Yunis’ previous exclamation demonstrating disregard toward the leadership targeted killing campaign. The group is concerned primarily with their collective grievance that they are unable to address. The Taliban’s goal is to ultimately establish a Sharia government, and to overturn the current ‘democratic’ system (Rashid, 2010). Therefore, Taliban insurgents can be regarded as an activist fringe representing a more widely felt grievance (Moghaddam, 2005). The threat that leadership decapitation poses is almost negligible to dedicated members of the Taliban that, according to Louis and Taylor, have prioritised the success of their unified ambition above personal interest.
Additionally, the concept of deterrence is futile in countering radical individuals within the group. This is primarily because the cost-benefit analysis is irrelevant to excessively violent individuals, such as those that joined the Taliban during their open-door recruitment period in 2003 (Abrahms and Meirau, 2017). Killing leaders will not deter the psychopaths, but will aggravate the socially motivated fraction, and potentially assist them in gaining support from those who sympathise with their aims. Therefore, acknowledging the importance and centrality of winning the hearts and minds of the civilians, this strategy can have considerable counterproductive effects. General McChrystal (2009) explains how many civilians were displeased when seeing a leader or insurgent targeted who they did ‘not necessarily think… [was] … killed because they were doing something wrong’. Therefore, not only is this strategy ineffective in discouraging radicalised members, but also, can produce disadvantageous counterinsurgency effects such as the swaying of public support and popular opinion in favour of the insurgency.
Targeted killings of leaders as previously noted, seeks to create fractionalisation and infighting. However, psychological studies show that out-group pressures increase homogeneity of views within the group, instead of generating the counterinsurgent’s hopes of disunity (Louis and Taylor, 2002). Consensus of views furthers “group think, a process whereby groups come to distorted consensus opinions based on prevailing attitudes and/or the confidence of particularly vociferous individuals in the group (Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, 2011; Sageman, 2008). Studies of group think show how opinion positions have social value, and the more committed to a view point an individual is, the more influence they will have within a group. Those with extreme opinions will have disproportionate influence, as holders of such views rarely balance their argument by acknowledging any weaknesses (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). In this way, targeted killings can aid insurgent consensus and risks radicalising insurgents further as group think clouds discussion of future tactics under a new leader, whose clarity of purpose, driven by simplistic extremism, may hold great appeal to a group unified under pressure and searching for confident direction”