Essay: The 2011 United Nations intervention

The 2011 United Nations intervention in Cote d’Ivoire characterizes a new form of humanitarian intervention in which the line between peacekeeping and forced regime change is blurred. The 13-year tenure of the United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) is often hailed as a success in restoring stability, as an example for peacekeeping operations around the world. However, the 2011 intervention of the UNOCI after failed presidential elections should be understood as part of a trend of increasingly militarized peacekeeping operations that has set a precedent of UN-enforced regime change under the guise of humanitarianism. This over militarization and direct involvement in regime change in the country countered the initial goals of the UNOCI, rather than advancing them. The intervention in 2011 reignited a past civil war, and ultimately caused a greater number of civilian deaths than would have occurred if intervention had not taken place.
The presence of UN peacekeepers in Cote d’Ivoire began during the First Ivorian Civil War in 2002 with a 6 month initial monitoring mission. After a fragile ceasefire was established, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter with the mandate of overseeing the peace and ensuring that the ceasefire was not violated. The 2002 Civil War began with a successful coup and contested electoral victory of Laurent Gbagbo, ultimately culminating in a de facto partition of the country into a rebel held North and a government controlled South. The period from 2004-2010 was characterized by various unsuccessful peacetalks, but an enduring division within the country. Overtime, the UNOCI expanded into an “institution-building effort” and a testing-ground for new “modern innovations within UN peacekeeping,” such as a sanctions monitoring cell, regional troop redeployment among peacekeeping operations in Western Africa, and a quick reaction force. Simultaneously, UNSC resolutions dramatically expanded the UNOCI’s official mandate. This process came to a head with the presidential elections of October 31, 2010; the first elections held in a decade, two candidates declared themselves the winner, ultimately sparking widespread violence and the UNOCI’s intervention in the political structure of Cote d’Ivoire.
The 2011 UN intervention in Cote d’Ivoire is significant because it contributes to the foundation of a precedent that allows intervention in a sovereign state’s civil war under the umbrella of humanitarianism. Additionally, the UNOCI is widely considered a successful peacekeeping operation that should be used as a framework for future UN missions. However, this paper will argue that the 2011 intervention ultimately led to a greater number of civilian deaths. To demonstrate this, I will analyze the net humanitarian impact of this intervention, and compare the humanitarian outcome of the conflict with intervention to that without intervention. Rather than saving lives, the actions of the UNOCI in 2011 prompted the Second Ivorian Civil War and created an opening for increasing levels of violence within the country.
Background
Felix Houphouet-Boigny became the first president of an independent Côte d’Ivoire in 1960, ruling until 1933. Under Houphouet-Boigny’s ‘open-door’ policy, Côte d’Ivoire became the economic powerhouse of Western Africa and the world’s leading cocoa producer. Houphouet-Boigny encouraged migration to cocoa producing regions in the southeast of Côte d’Ivoire from elsewhere in the country, as well as from the neighboring states of Guinea, Mali, and Burkina Faso. In the 1960s and 1970s, immigration into southeastern regions increased dramatically, creating a development gap between the North and the South of the country. The North fell more and more behind as the bulk of foreign investment and agricultural and commercial wealth became centered in the South, largely around the economy capital of Abidjan. By 1985, over half of the country’s poorest 10% were in the northernmost regions of the country, although less than 1/5th of the total population lived there.
The immigrant populations that settled in the southeast became important political bases for Houphouet-Boigny. The amount of antipathy felt by groups indigenous to the southeast during this time is debated; however, as the economy declined in the early 1990s, support for Houphouet-Boigny’s immigration policies rapidly declined among those who considered themselves ethnic Ivorians. Tensions were coming to a head when Houphouet-Boigny died in 1993.
Houphouet-Boigny was succeeded by Henri Konan Bedie. Bedie and Houphouet-Boigny belonged to the same ethnic group, Baoule, and was a member of the same party, the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI). Around this time, divisions were emerging within the PDCI, and Houphouet-Boigny’s former Prime Minister, Alassane Ouattara, formed an opposition party, the Rassemblement des républicains (RDR). The RDR quickly became the party of the younger generation within the PDCI, as well as those who were not represented by the Baoule ethnic group- particularly Northerners. Ouattara himself was from the North, increasing his popularity in Northern regions. To counter the potential power of the new RDR Party, Bedie and the PDCI attempted to block Ouattara’s participation in politics by supporting the idea of ivoirité: a type of nationalism that was centered around the exclusion of those deemed ‘foreigners’ from the voting process and from the political leadership of the country. The PDCI, a party that began with strong political support from immigrant communities, had reversed its ideology completely.
In the midst of the development of the iviorité movement, a bloodless military coup by General Robert Guëi overthrew Bedie. Guëi came to power on December 24, 1999, initially providing optimism for the reformation of Ivorian politics; he promised that he would replace the old guard of the PDCI with a new representative democratic government. He seemed to follow through on this promise during the first year of his presidency: democratic elections were scheduled for a transition to civilian rule, he restored Ouattara’s citizenship, and attempted to restore positive relations with immigrant communities. However, as it became clear that Ouattara was a real threat to his political power, and a contender for the 2000 election, Guëi quickly held a constitutional referendum immediately before the election. This led to the passage of Article 35 to the Ivorian Constitution, which required that in order to run in a presidential election, both of the individual’s parents had to have been born in Cote d’Ivoire. This was clearly introduced as a way to block Ouattara from the elections; his father was born in Burkina Faso.
Guëi’s attempt to block the opposition by regressing back to ivoirité politics was ultimately unsuccessful. Laurent Gbagbo, from the Front populaire ivorian (FPI) won the 2000 presidential election by using ivoirite himself. Gbagbo declared himself the protector of ‘ethnic-Ivorians,’ especially those in the southeastern cocoa-growing regions of the country. In response, Guëi dismantled the National Electoral Commission that declared Gbagbo the winner, cancelled remaining elections, and declared himself president. Immediately, thousands of protestors flooded the streets of Cote d’Ivoire, causing the military and the police to abandon Guëi, taking the only source of legitimacy that he still had. On October 24, 2000, Guëi fled to the neighboring country of Benin, and Laurent Gbagbo declared himself president the following day. Opposition parties petitioned for new elections in which every party’s candidate could run, but the FPI refused.
In January 2001, a failed coup occurred called the “plot of the black Mercedes.” Violence against Gbagbo’s opponents increased, and many of pro-RDR Ouattara supporters were imprisoned, tortured, or killed. On the night of September 19, 2002, factions of the military from the North, the Forces Nouvelles (FN), mutinied and launched simultaneous attacks across the country. The sixth attempted coup less than three years ultimately led to the outbreak of civil war.
At the onset of violence, the FN quickly gained control of the North, effectively controlling 60% of Cote d’Ivoire’s territory. The FN, led by General Guillaume Soro, established their base in Bouake, the region in which President Felix Houphouet-Boigny was from. From their base, the rebels garnered substantial local support in the North, and among Northerners and immigrants living in the South. Ouattara himself fled to the French Embassy in Yamoussoukro as fighting continued throughout the country. Various attempts at peacetalks and a ceasefire failed, but in January 2003, the parties successfully met in Linas-Marcoussis outside of Paris and negotiated peace. Gbagbo was to remain president, while members of opposition parties would fill the roles of Minister for Defense and Minister for Interior. A ‘peace line’ was established and maintained by French forces, and all sides agreed to reform the requirements for citizenship. The “End of War’ declaration was signed on July 4, 2003. The United Nations established the UNOCI on February 27, 2004 to oversee the ceasefire. The French Operation Licorne troops, who had been in the country since 2002, altered their mandate to focus on supporting UNOCI troops.
The peace of Linas-Marcoussis did not last. By March 2004, opposition parties were no longer participating in the transitional government, and Gbagbo forces continued to violently repress political opposition. On March 18, Gbagbo issued a presidential decree that banned political demonstrations. This led to widespread violence on March 25 following a demonstration, in which 120 civilians were killed. Following this violence, the Accra III Talks began in Accra, Ghana, meant to reaffirm all parties’ commitment to the Linas-Marcoussis peace. However, this agreement was broken in November 2004 when Gbagbo ordered the aerial bombardment of rebel forces in Bouake, hitting a French base instead. Whether intentional or not, the death of nine French soldiers and an American humanitarian worker prompted large scale violence between Gbagbo forces and French forces. On November 15, UNSCR 1572 was passed, placing an arms embargo on all parties in Cote d’Ivoire.
Several more peace agreements were negotiated from 2005-2010, notably the Pretoria Agreement in 2005 and the Ouagadougou Agreement in 2007. However, the UNOCI peacekeepers continually had difficulty maintaining peace in ‘neutral’ areas, especially in the west of the country. Elections that were supposed to be held in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 were postponed each time. Finally, elections were held on October 31, 2010.
Alassane Ouattara won the 2010 elections 54.1% to 45.9% according to the Independent Electoral Commission, defeating incumbent Laurent Gbagbo. The Constitutional Council, in support of Gbagbo, attempted to overrule the commission by annulling the election results in nine northern precincts, declaring Gbagbo the winner with a 51 to 40 percent margin. Both Ouattara and Gbagbo were separately sworn in as president, formed separate governments and appointed separate cabinets, and attempted to secure control over all political institutions. As a result, Cote d’Ivoire “found itself in the extraordinary position of being a state with two governments, one established by the ‘self-proclaimed presidential elect,’ and the other by the ‘internationally recognized presidential elect.”
Immediately after the election, widespread violence and human rights abuses plagued the country, including destruction of property, abductions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, sexual violence, denial of the right to peaceful assembly, and killings. On December 18, Gbagbo demanded all foreign peacekeepers leave the country immediately, which was immediately rejected by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The UN Human Rights Council condemned large scale human rights abuses in a special session called on December 23, 2010. Throughout December 2010, the African Union, the European Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Central Bank of West African States all recognized Ouattara as the legitimate president, and urged Gbagbo to step down. Early January 2011 saw the largest outbreak of violence as a result of the election, causing the UNSC to authorize the addition of 2,000 troops to the existing strength of the UNOCI. Leaders of ECOWAS and the AU attempted to negotiate various settlements in early 2011, but failed to secure peace. Throughout February 2011, violence against civilians continued, and Gbagbo forces cut UN radio stations from the country. On March 3, 2011, the UNSC issued a press statement in which it “condemned the threats, obstructions, and acts of violence by Gbagbo’s forces against UN personnel and violence,” and urged the UNOCI to “use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, in particular to protect the civilians.” This authorization was repeated in UNSCR 1975, passed on March 30, 2011, urging the UNOCI to “use all necessary means” to stop Gbagbo forces from using heavy weapons against citizens. Additionally, UNSCR 1975 imposed targeted sanctions against President Gbagbo, his wife, and those closest to him, while also demanding an immediate end to the recent surge in violence against civilians. These actions dramatically increased the UNOCI’s presence in Cote d’Ivoire. This paper will analyze the net humanitarian impact of this post-election intervention.