To a greater extent, because without the external influences, apartheid in South Africa would undoubtedly have continued into today’s times.
For 30 years, from 1960 to 1990, sanctions were imposed on South Africa, the aim of which was to influence the South African government to abolish apartheid.
The intent of international pressures was not to influence the ruling parties in South Africa to begin a negotiation process, but instead to bring apartheid to a complete end. The British government, under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, used their position of friendship with FW De Klerk, the South African President, to encourage him to start talks with the African National Congress. At the end of the 1980s the Soviet Union and other African governments also encouraged the African National Congress to enter into negotiations to find a resolution to the ongoing conflict. Positions of white people, particularly those in the business sector, who understood the importance of transformation, were strengthened by sanctions.
They were, in all probability, a support structure for negotiations among whites who were fed up with international isolation. They were most definitely a support structure for the ANC, who valued them for the influence that had during negotiations.
A resolution was taken in 1962, by the United Nations General Assembly, that apartheid was in contravention of South Africa’s duties under the United Nations Charter, and that it threatened international security and peace.
This resolution also opened the door for voluntary boycotts, where Member States were asked to stop trading with South Africa, referring particularly to exportation of arms, and denying passage to South Africa aircraft and ships.
The resolution’s request for the imposition of sanctions was rejected by most Western governments. They also ignored the new committee. Yet the Anti-Apartheid Movement, based in London went ahead with cries for sanctions, amongst which were economic sanctions.
In 1965 an academic boycott was started by a collection of British varsity staff, where students in South Africa had their access to research restricted, as well as their opportunities for international publication, and engagement with fellow students abroad.
This boycott was not much of a barrier, as it was easy to work around it. It was also very controversial, as there were those who argued that it undermined academic freedom. Yet many supported the boycott, including Archbishop Desmond Tutu, saying that it raised awareness in white academies that they were not excluded from a part in the demolishion of the apartheid rule.
In the 1980s cultural sanctions were put in place, which required foreign artists not to work with South Africa. White SA artists were forbidden to tour the world, and any artists not from South Africa, were shunned should they have performed in South Africa.
The boycotting of sports was the most effective international influence. This was origionally started because the government followed a strict apartheid policy in sport.
In 1961 FIFA expelled South Africa from international football, in 1964 South Africa was removed from the Tokyo Olympics, and in 1970 South Africa was cast out of the Olympic Games, because nearly 50 countries were threatening to boycott the Olympics should South Africa be allowed to participate. We were also banned from most of the test cricket matches.
Those campaigning also put pressure for South Africa to be excluded from tennis and rugby. The protesting came to a head at the Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand in 1981, where thousands protested, and ended the tour. With sports a big part of South Africa, being excluded from international games hurt more than the economic, cultural and academic sanctions.
Not only were campaigners looking to isolate South Africa, they also wanted to damage its economy. A number of ideas were implemented, like an oil ban, which was first initiated in 1963 by the UN. This did not make much progress, until the Arab governments initiated a ban in 1973. This movement was thwarted when the government was successful in obtaining help from global companies, who continued to supply.
The US government under Ronald Reagan combatted sanctions, but implemented a limited ban on exporting. This move was defeated though, as the US legislature enforced the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, which banned new US investments and bank loans, sales to military and police, and also certain constraints against a variety of goods. However certain minerals, diamonds and gold, South Africa’s greatest exports, were not included in the ban.
Campaigners also urged companies to implement the ‘Sullivan Principles’, which meant that businesses functioning in South Africa were to ensure that all employees were treated as equals. This made operations very difficult due to the apartheid laws.
Campaigners also urged institutional investors, like pension and endowment funds to draw back investments from South-African based organisations, and for US organisations to divest from SA interests. This strategy became a focal point of campaigns at American universities, with more than 26 US states taking some or other type of economic action against organisations doing business with South Africa. At the end of 1980 most of the largest companies in the world had pulled out of South Africa, partly due to the fear of having their reputations damaged, and partly due to the fact that investing in South Africa had become too risky.
South Africa found itself in a financial crisis because of the investments deteriorating. From 1983 there were uprisings, strikes and consumer boycotts. This, together with the ANC’s plan of economic warfare, industrial sabotage and attacks on government brought the country to a halt. In response, the government withdrew certain apartheid laws and in 1985 imposed a national state of emergency. Chase Manhattan Bank, and other institutions either withdrew or did not renew credit and short-term loans. This resulted in a liquidity crisis, because South Africa’s economy was extremely reliant on foreign lenders.
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were high profile opponents to the introduction of sanctions. Their constructive engagement policies were debated.
‘Having been offered many carrots by the United States over a period of four-and-a-half years as incentives to institute meaningful reforms, the South African authorities had simply made a carrot stew and eaten it. Under the combined pressures of the seemingly cataclysmic events in South Africa since September 1984 and the dramatic surge of antiapartheid protest and political activism in the United States, the Reagan Administration was finally embarrassed into brandishing some small sticks as an element of American policy. The Reagan sanctions, however limited, are an important symbol: a demonstration to the ruling white South African nationalists that even an American president whom they had come to regard as their virtual saviour could turn against them.’ (Ungar and Vale, 1994).
Sir Robin Renwick, British ambassador to South Africa played a vital part in convincing FW De Klerk to release Mandela, and also facilitated negotiations, because of the fact that he was a representative of a government who had not imposed sanctions.
In the 1980s there was extreme pressure on the government. In an attempt to remedy this, the National Party created the Tricameral Parliament. The Tricameral Parliament allowed representation of Coloureds and Indians, but excluded Blacks. This was done in an attempt to dissolve the alliance between the two groups and the African nationalists. The Tricameral Parliament was in existence for about 11 years.
At this point, the government was locked in talks with Nelson Mandela, who was still in prison, and with the ANC. White members of opposition parties, and also the government began travelling to Lusaka to participate in talks with the African National Congress. President Botha had a stroke in January 1989, FW de Klerk was chosen by the NP to be the new leader. In August of 1989, he became the President. In this capacity he unbanned the African National Congress, and other organisations, and South Africa began negotiations towards democracy.
Since all the goals of the CAAA were met, the sanctions would have been said to be successful. The effectiveness of sanctions can be measured by how much economic damage is inflicted on the country. The trade sanction cost of 0.5%, although not very large, is not very minimal either.
Even though the impact of the sanctions that governments imposed was quite small, you can say that they were the proverbial straws that broke the camel’s back, making conditions impossible and forcing political change.
There were many statements from South Africans that linked the economic conditions and political change, but they were usually followed by denials of the role of sanctions. These denials might however have been a ploy to discourage international governments from imposing further sanctions.
Statements in favour of sanctions were made by prominent black leaders, such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Reverend Allan Boesak, and Nelson Mandela. On his release from prison, Nelson Mandela made an important statement, saying ‘To lift sanctions now would be to run the risk of aborting the process toward ending apartheid.’ (Mandela, 1990).
Sanctions indicated the degree to which South Africa was isolated internationally. Cultural sanctions had the same effect, but sending the strongest message was the imposition of trade sanctions. There was a delay between the imposing of sanctions and the alteration of the laws, but change could not have been expected to be instant.
One of the strongest movements to end apartheid took place in the United States in the 1980s. Images of the violent clashes and struggles to bring about an end to apartheid were broadcast on television. Support was also shown for the United States anti-apartheid movement.
“Challenging apartheid in South Africa became a logical next place to go.” (Dellums, 1980).
Congressman Ron Dellums exposed the struggle of black South Africans, and also the cruelty imposed on them by the white minorities. South Africa’s blacks along with the injustices carried out by the white minority government. Ron Dellums also brought in anti-apartheid legislation, and was in the front line at many demonstrations.
“They went out there to put themselves on the line to say, ‘Look if South Africans could be beaten and jailed the least we could do is go out there and experience some discomfort ourselves and be one with our sisters and brothers in the struggle to liberate them.” (Dellums, 1980).
Director of the Howard University Library, Howard Dodson recalls protesting outside the SA consulate in Atlanta.
“The anti-apartheid activities in the United States actually reverberated around the world leading other people to develop their own demonstration activities and that was probably as critical to the overthrow of apartheid as anything else that was going on.” (Dodson, 1980).
There were also protests by students on university campuses ‘ where they called on organisations to disinvest with SA.
Tukwini, Mandela’s granddaughter says the United States anti-apartheid movement, and other movements, assisted in changing international opinion of the apartheid government.
In 1994 apartheid came to an end. Nelson Mandela became president of South Africa. On visiting Washington he expressed his gratitude to the Americans for their support.
“You have no idea how your involvement in the anti-apartheid struggle in our country actually helped to facilitate the transformation.” (Mandela, 1994).
This has been a very interesting assignment. My knowledge of apartheid and the international influences has been broadened. I have learnt that if it were not for pressures put on the South African government by international communities, apartheid might never have been dismantled. I also learnt about what sanctions are, the different kinds of sanctions countries can impose on each other, and how these sanctions negatively impact on the target country. I have seen how countries can come together to force change in another country. I have also seen how sanctions affect not only the country, but also the psychological effect they have on individuals, for instance professional sportsman not being able to participate internationally. It was also clear to me that imposing sanctions on a country is not a quick fix, and that change is a process that takes time. I determined that not all countries will always share opinions as far as sanctions go. Some may decide to rather take a more passive approach in the hopes of using friendship as a tool to convince a country that change needs to happen. Lastly I learnt that countries do not suffer everlasting effects from sanctions, once the sanctions are lifted, countries can recover.