Because of strikingly different historical security concerns in different Continents, Europe and Asia, as well as of the EU’s very weak actorness in South Korea, there were sceptical prospects on the security cooperation between ROK and EU progressing further than a mere economic partners. Through Social constructivists’ intersubjective identity and the Copenhagen School’s securitisation idea, new analysis tool for constructivist security studies was suggested in this research: Domestic-Intersubjective Identities; Convergence of Security Interests; Politicization-Securitization. This thesis addressed the three main questions relating to the ROK-EU relationship in high politics, the logics of actors and the EU’s engagement in Northeast Asia. By studying the intersubjective identities of South Korea, EU, and the actors concerned’the DPRK and Japan’, this thesis witnessed a different degree of securitisation toward actors concerned and explained it based on different intersubjective identities. South Korean intersubjective identities are Danil Minjok, Confucianism, post-colonial and resistant nationalist while those of the Union are imperialist, Eurocentric, normative actor as well as a model of the world. In the most likely case, DPRK’s nuclear and human rights security issue, this thesis analysed that the ROK and EU have shared the very similar problem recognition and have securitised it. In contrast, the least likely case, Japanese historical disputes, this thesis found that the EU has saved its breath on the issues also falling under the Union’s norms. European silence could deteriorate its position as normative actor by Northeast Asian countries. Therefore, this thesis proposed for the EU to say more on the specific issue under its norms, to reconsider its approach to East Asia whether it is appropriate for gaining the Asian partners’ sympathy based on intersubjective identity. When the EU strategically changing its approaches with understanding of East Asian identities in the historical context, it will be easier to gain and elevate the more credible recognition of EU in Northeast Asia.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 QUESTION RAISED
The start of the EU paying serious attention to Asia was situated in certain official documents, for example, ‘European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World’ in 2003, ‘2007 East Asia Policy Guidelines’ which is updated in 2012, and the Strategic Partnership with China, India, Japan, and South Korea. After publishing those documents, the EU has sought to enhance its recognition with hope to be seen as important, normative, and international actor as a whole. However, it seems that the European strategy seems not very well fitted with very weak recognition. Without speaking of the security and political cooperation, the EU could be always considered as a peripheral actors by being forgotten on the table when Asian countries are talking about ‘serious’ issues. Therefore, this thesis will figure out to what extent the EU and South Korea shared the security issues and how the EU can enhance its recognition by participating to the Northeast Asian security issues.
South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK) and European Union (EU) have deployed the ROK-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which came officially into force on 11 July, 2011. For both actors, this was the most important commitment in ROK-EU relation since the European regional integration was started after the two World Wars (Kelly, 2011). Despite this successful trade cooperation, the further relationship between ROK and EU faces suspicions in high politics such as security cooperation.
Kelly (2011) provided a very sceptical prospect about South Korea and EU cooperation in security and politics. He focused on the traditional irrelevance of the two actors. South Korea has been strongly influenced by the United States (US) in almost every area, after its independence from Japan in 1945. South Korean main security concerns are DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), the Northeast Asian security, and the possible downturn of US (Ibid.), however, these are not relevant to the EU. Europe’s relations with the ROK was mainly ‘semi-imperial contract of traders’ in the early nineteenth century and, after the World Wars, it has focused on its own integration by strengthening the Union and the long-standing transatlantic alliance. For the EU, Kelly (Ibid.) argued that there is not much security pool to share with South Korea because its main security concerns have been its peripheral regions: the stabilization and integration of Southern and Eastern Europe, the future of Russia, terrorism, relations with Islam and the Middle East (Ibid.). His sceptical view seems to gain more voice by the research of the Koreans attitude toward the EU in 2014 as follows.
Despite of Union’s efforts, the research on ‘South Korean Attitudes on the European Union: A Book of Charts’ showed the Koreans’ weak recognition with positive prospects about the EU (J. Kim & Karl, 2014). 61% of Korean respondents are ‘uninformed’ or ‘don’t know’ about the EU. Furthermore, the majority of those in the 20’s age group who is highly exposed to the international news via the Internet, were ‘not informed’ or ‘don’t know’ about the EU to a figure of 67%. However, Koreans expressed the desire for strong leadership of the EU in World affairs by 61% of respondents, followed by US (67%), and expected the future importance of relationships with the EU by 77%. They are also strongly favour the EU’s further engagement in North Korean human rights issue (76%) (Ibid.).
Is this Korean’s uninformed but favourable attitude of Koreans toward the EU necessarily positive? It itself is neither definitely a good nor a bad sign for Brussels. Depending how the EU approaches, this image could gain a more positive or a far negative one in Koreans’ mind. Thus, the EU’s next step must be under the deep insight into security concerns in East Asia.
1.2 RESEARCH DESIGN
1.2.1 Purpose of study and Research Questions
Two sceptical views on the ROK-EU cooperation in high politics triggered my interests to observe to what extent (the level), what kinds of (the sorts), why (the reason) and how (the way) the security concerns have been shared by two actors. And what it can offer to the EU for enhancing its influence in Northeast Asia. This thesis is aimed to answer three main questions with sub-questions as follows.
1. Relating to the ROK-EU relationship in high politics, have the ROK-EU relations had only mere economic interests? Can the ROK-EU relationship go beyond a mere economic partnership, and has it already done so? What kind of security concerns ROK and EU have shared?
2. Relating to the logic of actors, how the logic behind actions of the ROK, of the EU and of the targeted actors of securitisation in Northeast Asia could be understood? How do the two actors understand the targeted actors of securitisation and vice versa?
3. Relating to the EU’s engagement in Northeast Asia, how and to what extent EU can engage more in East Asia by sharing the security issue of the ROK? What is the missing part for EU to engage in North eastern security issues?
1.2.2 Research Methods: Qualitative research method
The Qualitative research method allows researchers to understand how the world is constructed by various participants in the various context (Lather, 2006). This is not just describing what researchers observe by when, where, who and what questions, but analysing what researchers examine by why and how questions. This method is useful because this thesis is not for just describing the ROK-EU security cooperation but for analysing it in-depth with why and how questions. Thus, this thesis includes the following qualitative research methods.
Process Tracking is a method through observation of primary and secondary document analysis to understand the meaning and role of established regularities, and can help to suggest a way to uncover the link between factors (Vennesson, 2008, p. 233). It focuses not only what is happened but also what makes it happened. In particular, it helps researcher to avoid just describing a phenomenon. It provides a way to learn and to evaluate empirically the preference and perception of actors, their purpose, their goals, their values and their specification of the situation that they face (Ibid.).
Case study is for intensive studying ‘where the analyst can achieve in-depth knowledge of one or few units by constructing many observations’ (Gerring, 2007, pp. 20, 21). According to Yin (2009, p. 1), ‘case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘why’ or ‘how’ questions are being posed [and] when the investigator has little control over the events’. The security cooperation between South Korea and the EU cannot be controlled by researchers, therefore, the limited number of case studies is valuable. The choice of case is crucial for conducting both meaningful and unbiased research (See 4.1 Overlapped Security Interests). I would find the most likely and lest likely cases of security issues suggested by ROK and EU during the Four summits between 2009 and 2013.3
Discourse Analysis is one of the most frequently used methods for conducting the foreign policies. The discourse is one of the main foreign policy communication methods amongst the international actors. It is made by rhetorical and purposeful political language to convince, inform or influence others. The purpose here means that the discourse is not always causal but rather political with specific target. It is a gesture to encourage or discourage its target to carrying out its interests. This is absolutely important for this research especially to understand the process of securitisation (see 2.2 Copenhagen School of Security Studies).
1.3 OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH
This research is composed of five chapters. The Chapter 1 Introduction above told us why this research started to question on the ROK-EU security cooperation against two sceptical views and what is the purpose of this researches under classified questions. At Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework, this research would study the social constructivism as IRs theory and the Copenhagen School of security study to complement the former theory. Here, the amalgam of theories would be suggested for conducting the following research. At Chapter 3 Identity, this research will observe the main intersubjective identities of South Korean and the EU, which has been constructed in pre- and post-Wars period. Based on and comparing two actors intersubjective identities to the target actors for security issue, the DPRK and Japan, Chapter 4 Case Studies will conduct two case studies. It is for answering what kinds of security issues were shared by South Korea and the EU from 2009 to 2013, why they cooperate or not against targeted actors, what is the logic behinds securitisation of the two actors, how was it concerted during the chosen period. By following the footage of two actors against two targeted actors, this thesis can see the different level of securitisation and why it is happened. Chapter 5 Conclusion will cover the whole research contents and provide us the answers for the research questions suggested in Chapter 1.’
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
2.1.1 Wendtian Constructivism
Social Constructivism recognises that society is not a structurally ‘given’ situation, but actors who constructs within the society are ‘making’ it through the active interaction between actor and structure (Wendt, 1999). Ideas and beliefs lead the actor’s direction with resulting actors’ intersubjective identity in the international relations (IRs). This identity became the base of its behavioural logics and of the recognition of the World. It is flexible and changeable according to circumstance and time (Jackson & S??rensen, 2007). The actor’s identity is the window to see the World. Ergo, the main significance of constructivism is the restoration of actor in the IRs. The actor has not passively sank within the structure but is actively interacting and constructing the structure (Doh, 2013).
However, Wendt (1999) doesn’t disregard the importance of the material factor (i.e. weapons) but argued that the material factor is not enough to fully understand the IRs. It is only a part of the picture. Often, the actor’s consciousness is surpassing the material factor: ‘500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons’ because ‘the British are friends and the North Koreans are not’ (Wendt, 1995). The British nuclear weapons are accepted differently by US and North Korea because of their intersubjective identity with England.
2.1.2 Hopf’s Constructivism
The major weakness of Wendtian constructivism is to overlook the domestic politics. Wendtian constructivism is ironic because the identity of the state can hardly be apart from its domestic factors. It is true that the actor’s identity could be ‘formed’ through historical events vis-??-vis ‘other actors’, however, it could be ‘maintained’ and used as a tool of domestic politics by leaders. In this sense, Hopf’s constructivism is merited to bring here.
Hopf (2000) underlined the domestic environment as part of constructivism by noting that ‘Wendt [‘] appreciates the need to develop a constructivist theory of international politics that theorizes the domestic identities of states’. According to him, the understanding of subcultures is very important because the state’s collection of identities can also form the state’s intersubjective identity regarding other actors.
2.2 COPENHAGEN SCHOOL OF SECURITY STUDIES
Even though the constructivism became one of the important theories of IRs, it is still under construction. It provides us a meaningful alternative for understanding a phenomenon with each actor’s identity without undermining material factors. However, it still does not tender a clear analysis framework, especially for the area of security. Therefore, the ideas of the Copenhagen School of security studies will be helpful to develop an analytical framework for this thesis.
Buzan expanded the traditional narrow definition of security through ‘Security: a new framework for analysis’ (1998). By doing so, we can respond to wider security issues in globalized and diversified threats which is different from those of Cold War period. He defined five types of security: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental security (Ibid.). This expansion is especially meaningful for the EU, who doesn’t possess a single unified military force, headquarters, nor the autonomous right to start military action at EU level.
Non-Politicized Politicized Securitized
– The state does not cope with the issue.
– The issue is not included in the public debate. – The issue is managed within the standard political system.
– It is ‘part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely some form of communal governance’. – The issue is framed as a security question through an act of securitization.
– A securitizing actor articulates an already politicized issue as an existential threat to a referent object.
Table 1 Securitisation process
NOTE: Contents from Ralf (2013)
Securitization is a chain of movement from the recognition of one phenomenon to be secured and to be dealt with an exceptional action. It is ‘the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics’ (Buzan et al., 1998). In this context, ‘securitization’ is a ‘more extreme version of politicization’ (Ibid.). According to Copenhagen School (Ibid.), ‘any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized, politicized to securitized stage’ (see Table 1 Securitisation process).
Securitization has three characteristics. First, the securitisation is self-referential (Ibid, p. 33). Not all external threats are treated as an issue to be securitized. One actor may securitize it while the other doesn’t. Second, the securitisation is an intersubjective process (Ibid.). One action of one actor is considered differently by each actor. Third, the securitizing movement and securitisation are separate concepts (Ibid.). The former is where one actor sets one issue up as a security issue while the latter is where an audient actor is convinced by one actor’s speech and also set up that issue to be securitised. Therefore, the successful speech that acts to share the understanding between two actors are essential for successful securitisation, where one actor gained the legitimate rights to adopt a way surpassing normal political solutions.
2.3 ANALYSIS TOOL FOR CONSTRUCTIVIST SECURITY STUDIES
According to the studying as above, I set the analysis framework for my thesis as follows:
1) Domestic-Intersubjective Identities;
2) Convergence of Security Interests;
3) Politicization-Securitisation.
By studying the ‘Domestic-Intersubjective identities’ of ROK, EU and the other actors concerned will help us to understand the logics of the two actors towards one security issue. By studying ‘Convergence of security interests’, this thesis will define the overlapping security targets of both the ROK and the EU. If they share the same understanding on the same issue, it could call an extraordinary cooperative action to cope with it. The studying for the degree of ‘Politicisation and Securitisation’ makes us observe the currencies of security cooperation between the two actors. When this thesis can define the cooperative politicization and securitisation of both actors, we can say that the ROK and the EU have a security cooperation.
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3 IDENTITY OF THE ROK AND THE EU
ROK EU
Pre-Wars Danil Minjok
Confucianism Imperialism
Eurocentrism
Post-Wars Post-colonialism
Resistant nationalism Normative power
Model of the world
Table 2 ROK’s and EU’s intersubjective identities
Source: me
This chapter will discover the South Korean and European identities to define how two actors see the World . The definition of group identity is ‘the psychological relations that individuals have in the certain category of the society’ (D. Lee & Samsung Life Public Welfare Foundation, 2007) i.e. gender, race, ethnic, class and nation. It doesn’t appear suddenly at some point, however, produced and ‘cumulated’ through the speech exchange, sociological practices, and continuous renegotiations after certain times in history (D. Lee & Samsung Life Public Welfare Foundation, 2007). Shin’s remark (2014), ‘No nation is immune to the charge that it has formed a less-than-complete view of the past’ well displays the undetachable relationship between actor’s history and identity.
3.1 ROK’S IDENTITY
The Korean peninsula ‘was’ as well as ‘is’ the living and breathing evidence of the World Wars and the Cold War. For East Asia, the history is actively influencing over politics, cultures, foreign policy as well as the consciousness of its people. Accordingly, understanding the ROK without historical consideration is meaningless and impossible. Here, the only certain identities of pre and post World Wars will be presented.
3.1.1 Danil Minjok & Confucianism
National identity in the sense of Western ‘modern nation’ doesn’t have a long history in Korea. It started with the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1950. However, the ROK had more than a thousand years of history before its establishment, within comparatively stable geographic limits, by developing and sharing the common historical heritages as well as the same language under the name of ‘One People, One Country’ (Danil minjok, a homogeneous nation).
Korean Collectivism has its foundation largely on the Confucianism. Before the Japanese invasion, the Joseon Dynasty had ruled the Korean peninsula with adoption of Confucius philosophy from China. It was the way of living and the education. The core virtue of Confucianism was Ren ("benevolence," "humanity," ‘human connectedness’, and ‘comprehensive virtue’) realised through Xiao (the filial piety) (Hongsik Park, 2007). Xiao is the practice to express the endless respect and appreciation towards my parents, my family, extending until the sincere and veritable loyalty to my king. One famous Confucius phrase said ‘cultivate oneself, manage one’s family and govern the state, then the person will bring peace to the world’ . It doesn’t divide the individual from the family and the state, however, for they are connected in the same line as an extended form. This is the core of Korean collectivism. Even though the modern secularized Koreans don’t treat Confucianism as a ‘religion’, however, it is still deeply embedded in Koreans as a ‘lifestyle’, for example, a strong hierarchy values, community-directed values, familiy values, and practices of commemorative rites for ancestors .
3.1.2 Post-colonialism & Resistant nationalism
Both the World Wars and the Cold War didn’t impair the Korean identity as well as its cultures and languages, but strongly contributed to the strong, unique and exclusive identification of Korean cultures and politics against external threats (Bleiker, 2001). It was a watershed for forming the modern Korean identity. Based on the resistant nationalist identity, the Koreans have shared the anti-Japanese emotion, the severance of North-South Korea, and the Pro-American tendency.
Korean nationalism was formed as a means of resistive retroaction against the Western and Japanese imperialist engagements. Despite Western nationalism , many non-Western countries, in particular who had colonial experience, tried to block the Western imperialists’ expansion and to protect their own country from them by forming resistant nationalism. In the Korean peninsula, it is used as a way to get over the colonial trauma deeply wounding Korean’s mind and body, to pursue the modernisation, and to compensate their colonial complex and feeling of marginal man far from the core of the World (Yoo, 1998). Indeed, Korean nationalist schools have focused on the history of the 1945 independence where the Korean resistance struggles (Yoo, 1998).
The division of the Korean peninsula was a side effect of resistance nationalism and of domestic politics. Resistance nationalism brought the ideational dichotomy inside Koreans, Democracy vs. Communism. Accordingly, the Independence followed by Cold War locked Korean division up without time to suture. However, two Koreas have also used this division as a political tool to grasp the power in its Korea. Unlike Germany where people hunted and punished pro-Nazis Germans severely, ROK entered into the American umbrella, missing a chance to punish pro-Japanese Koreans strictly. High-level pro-Japanese Koreans caught this opportunity and changed themselves into pro-American Koreans without losing their high positions. In reality, many major Korean politicians were pro-Japanese Koreans or the collaborators’ descendants. High level Korean politicians who had not had the legitimacy to blame Japan, they turned their face to North Korea instead. Over sixty-years after Korean War, the cold-war-like words ‘anticommunism’, ‘the Reds’, ‘red-hunting’, ‘DPRK sympathizers’ are used in the Korean media and among Koreans to legitimate its political opinion.
Pro-American culture in Korea is the substitution symbol against Japan (Yoo, 1998). Koreans had the hatred of Japanese as well as the desire to become an actor recognized by Japan. Externally, it is true that, under the American influence, Korea accepted the Americanized-social system, politics, culture, languages, and military power, however, internally, it cannot be ignored that this strong influence was possible because of Koreans’ desire to accept them without refusal or resistance. This ‘Americanization’ or ‘Korean internalization of American culture’ was based on Koreans support. The US became the first place to go for business success, academic continuation and cultural knowledge for Koreans. The personal connections, built in America among Koreans, makes new influence in Korean high classes while the passion to learn English is going to be especially pronounced withn the Korean education system.
3.2 EU’S IDENTITY
Unlike Korea, the geographic limits of ‘Europe’ are not clear. Korea maintained over a thousand years within the limits of Korean peninsula, however, the EU, started with six original members in the ‘core’ of Western Europe, which was expanded to twenty eight member states over the last decades with efforts to find common heritages and to fill up the democracy gap. In this process, unlike the earlier definition of identity which emerged ‘naturally’, the European identity ‘politically’ came up and has been completely a ‘constructing’ process (Duchesne, 2008).
3.2.1 Imperialism & Eurocentrism
To overcome ambiguity of geographic identity, European elites tried to find common heritages of European history. It is the effort to distinguish ‘We’ from ‘the Others’: Judeo-Christianity in Jerusalem; Democracy and Hellenism cultures in Athens, Pan-European legal order in Roman empire; Imperialist order through Renaissance and the Enlightenment; Integration process of the EU from the common memories about the WWII (Yoon & Park, 2012).
Christianity is the essence of European identity. Romano Prodi (2000), former President of European Commission, stressed that Europe can’t be separated from its ‘Christian roots’. When Roman Emperor Constantine accepted it as the established religion, it made the dichotomy between ‘Christians’ and ‘the Others’. In this process, Roman Empire was divided by Western and Eastern Roman Empires by developing different cultures of Christianity: Roman and Orthodox Church (Yoon & Park, 2012). This division still remained after the collapse of both Empires and continued until the mid-14th century medieval period resulting the developed dichotomy: ‘Rome’ and ‘the Other’, ‘Greco-Rome’ and ‘the other’, or ‘Christians’ and ‘pagans’.
Through Renaissance and the Enlightenment, European created ‘the Civilized’ and ‘the Others’ dichotomy, and this gave the legitimacy of ‘European Imperialism’ and ‘Imperialist invasion’ to Europeans. During the Renaissance, Europeans had experienced the adventures to newly discovered Continents and Oceans, the scientific and technological development, the rational, and the elaboration of mathematical techniques. ‘Eurocentrism’ came from these fertile soils. They developed the dichotomy of ‘civilized world’ and ‘barbarians”including Americans and Asians’and formed the ‘conceptual pioneer’ idea that European development and ideas would save ‘the Others’ from their barbarian status.
Baptise Duroselle’s work, Europe: A History of Its People, published in 1990, was part of forming European identity under the support of the early EU. The main idea penetrating this book is defence of colonisation in the perspective of eurocentrism and imperialism of the ‘great white race’. It well presents what kind of consciousness Duroselle as well as EU had only twenty years ago from now . It advocated the colonisation by legitimating the economic development and skilled labours who educated European techniques and are ‘beneficiaries’.
3.2.2 Normative Actor & A Model of the World
After the World Wars, European scholars and elites have developed a concept of normative actors for a common and collective European identity to support the EU integration process. It focused on the promising future, not the pathetic past, by developing the ethical norms which can be more easily agreed upon by pan-European countries.
Manner (2008) defined the nine European core norms as well as the three ways to promote such principles. The nine European norms are sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance. Such values are the basis of EU legitimacy and the goals to pursue when cooperating with interior and exterior actors on the level of EU. The three ways to promote such values are ‘by virtue of the principles of ‘living by example’; by duty of its actions in ‘being reasonable’; and by consequence of its impact in ‘doing least harm” (Manners, 2008).
Europe’s strong willingness to be a normative actor can be found in the Treaty of European Union (TEU), enacted in Lisbon, 2009. According to Article 21(1) TEU, ‘The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles [‘] : democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.’ Furthermore, when EU forms a relationship with a third country, international and regional organisations, they must ‘share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph’, ‘shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems [‘] in the framework of the United Nations’ (Ibid.). This is not only for diplomatic relations but also for economic and trade relations.’
4 CASE STUDIES (2009-2013)
4.1 OVERLAPPED SECURITY INTERESTS
For choosing the cases, which strikingly display the most likely and the least likely ROK-EU cooperation in security, this chapter analysed the security interests discussed through four Summits’2009 Fourth Summit, 2010 Fifth Summit as Strategic Partnership announcement, 2012 Sixth Summit, and 2013 Seventh Summit'(Council of the European Union, 2010, 2012a, 2013e; EU Directorate-General External Relations, 2009).
Figure 1 Security Targets mentioned during Four ROK-EU Summits (2009-2013)
Source: me from research of the Four ROK-EU Summits (Council of the European Union, 2010, 2012a, 2013e; EU Directorate-General External Relations, 2009)
As a result of research over topics and targets, the eight actors and regions were mentioned as a security target during four Summits from 2009 to 2013: DPRK, Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Somalia, East Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. The DPRK was proved as the most frequently mentioned security target by both members, seven times (See Figure 1). The least mentioned targets were East Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, only one time each. Except for non-Asian targets, East Asian is the only target falling under the Asian continent. Therefore, I would compare the most likely case, the DPRK target, to the least likely case, the East Asia target. The next chapter will answer how and why different levels of ROK-EU security cooperation exist between two targets, what is the role of intersubjective identity for those different levels of securitisation and what could make the ROK-EU security cooperation stronger. ‘
4.2 CASE STUDY 1: DPRK WITH NUCLEAR AND HUMAN RIGHT ISSUES
4.2.1 Domestic-Intersubjective identities of DPRK
DPRK ROK EU
DPRK Independent regime
Military conqueror Puppet state
Traitor Booty offerer
The manipulated
Table 3 DPRK’s intersubjective identity regarding itself, ROK and EU
Source: Me
4.2.1.1 DPRK’s Domestic Identity on Itself
The modern DPRK’s identity was formed under the Korean peninsula’s annexation by Imperial Japan from 1910 to 1945. Kim Il-Sung had organised several anti-imperial/anti-Japanese resistance and Korean independent movements in Manchuria. The Juche ideology, the national belief system in North Korea, strongly confirms the state’s Chajusong (independence) of the country against ‘the pressure of imperialists and dominations’ through the implementation of ‘self-reliance and self-defence, defending the country’s sovereignty and dignity firmly’ (Juche 100, 2010).
The origin of this idea is similar to the restrictive nationalism of the South Korean identity. This idea came from the colonial humiliation by the Japanese invasion which could have been prevented if the DPRK had possessed strong military powers. Ergo, the nuclear programs are a life and death matter for DPRK to prevent the recurrence of humiliation in the past. When the Communist countries, especially the USSR, had collapsed in 1990s, the DPRK turned its attention from conventional weapons to nuclear weapons to overcome the lack of economic support and to maintain its military power against its enemies (C. Lee, 2012, p. 43).
4.2.1.2 DPRK’s Intersubjective Identity on Others
DPRK’s intersubjective identity toward ROK can be summarized in two ways: pathetic ‘puppet state’ and vicious ‘traitor against its ethnics’ (Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, 2012). The former is related to the Seoul’s close relationship with Washington, especially the American Army situated in South Korea. North Korea saw it as ongoing colonialism under the US. It is a ‘pathetic’ blood brother who is still manipulated and brainwashed under a fake democracy and greedy capitalism. In contrast, North Korea has developed its own military power to protect its own Chajusong against outsiders. Outsiders can’t manipulate North Korea due to its nuclear possession unlike South Korea. Also, for Pyongyang, The ROK is a vicious ‘traitor against its ethnics’ (Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, 2012). Pyongyang presented the South Korean actions ‘sickening’, and ‘shameless’ (Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, 2012; Uriminzokkiri, 2011, 2013). It also expressed that their people feel strongly betrayed by the cooperation of Seoul with other third parties against North Korea, by trying to get rid of nuclear arms and to destroy its historical blood brother (Uriminzokkiri, 2013). In this sense, the DPRK is the only legitimate country, remained as ‘legitimate’ Korean blood without betraying its blood brother.
DPRK’s intersubjective identity toward EU has expressed two different attitudes toward the EU. Firstly, when it comes to humanitarian aid by the EU, Pyongyang projected ‘booty giver’ image onto the EU. Pyongyang said that ‘EU sincerely hopes to support the food for Pyongyang’ as a means of booty. The EU’s humanitarian aids is not the ‘help’, but more close to ‘booty’ emerging from the fear of Pyongyang’s nuclear possession. Second, relating to human rights issue, Pyongyang projected a victim’s image under American manipulation onto the EU. Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) (2014a) described that the European Parliament ‘is instigated by the US to adopt the resolution supporting the COI’s recommendation to investigate DPRK’s human rights situation’ and ‘carried out impudent and base anti-republic hostile action by adopting such ridiculous ‘Resolution’, getting on the bandwagon of American anti-peninsula hostile policies’. DPRK assessed the EU’s human rights investigation as ‘human rights scheme’ (Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, 2012).
4.2.2 Convergence of Security issues
Following the above part ‘4. Overlapped Security Issues research’, there are mainly two security issues discussed on the table of ROK and EU Summits from 2009 to 2013: Nuclear programme and Human rights problems. Logics of these concerns came from the reality as follows.
Nuclear programme is the most enduring and outstanding problem in East Asia. The first uranium-based nuclear bomb ‘Little boy’, which was used in reality for the Hiroshima bombing 6th August 1945, exploded with an energy about 16??2 kt of TNT (Glasstone & Dolan, 1977; Kerr, Young, Cullings, & Christy, 2002; D. Kim, Ahn, Lee, & Jeon, 2013; Malik, 1985). According to studies of Korea Institute for National Unification in 2010 and 2013, currently, the DPRK possibly had extracted plutonium about 40??5kg (roughly TNT 66??5 kt possible as whole) while extracted uranium at least more than 100kg (roughly TNT 45 kt possible as whole) from 2011 to 2013 with capacity to extract annually 40~120kg of uranium (D. Kim et al., 2013; Hyungjoong Park et al., 2010). Furthermore, it possesses various types of systems for carrying the nuclear weapons, however, the most threatening missile is Scud D (Scud ER) SRBM covering more than 700 km distance of fire (C. Lee, 2012, p. 218). It allows it to retain its capability to attack Seoul as well as Camp Humphreys in Pyeong-taek (Ibid.).
Societal security with Human rights issues. According to findings collected during one year of investigation period by UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) and its Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 25th Human Right Council recognised that the ‘systematic, wide spread and grave violations of human rights’ had been committed in DPRK. In this report, COI listed the ‘nine specific substantive areas of human rights violations’:
‘Violations of the right to food; The full range of violations associated with prison camps; Torture and inhuman treatment; Arbitrary arrest and detention; Discrimination, in particular in the systemic denial and violation of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms; Violations of the freedom of expression; Violations of the right to life; Violations of the freedom of movement; Enforced disappearances, including in the form of abductions of nationals of other States’ (UN Human Rights Council, 2014).
4.2.3 Securitisation process
As 2.2 suggested, the securitisation process went through three stages: non-politicised, politicised, and securitised stage. Here, the following parts will observe how each actor individually or together addressed to the DPRK’s security issues (‘politicisation’) and how it results to adopt an unexceptional tool to deal with this problem (‘securitisation’).
4.2.3.1 Politicisation
4.2.3.1.1 Korean Politicisation
North Korean Nuclear programme is always the main South Korean security concern. During the timeframe, South Korea’s government has changed from President Lee (2008-2013) to President Park (2013-present). Both governments saw the nuclear issue as a very serious challenge, a dangerous provocation, and a threats to the Korean peninsula. However, the nuance of Lee and Park is slightly different. Although both Cheonan warship sinking (26 March 2010) and firing on Yeonpyeongdo Isalnd (23 November 2010) occurred in Lee’s government, he used smoother wording than Park.
President Lee used words ‘blood brother’ and ‘ready to cooperate’ with nuance of understanding and stroking gesture to DPRK. He highlighted ‘ethnic’ cooperation by saying that ‘ROK is ready to talk about and resolve all problems, sitting face-to-face with DPRK’ but will maintain ‘our unperturbed clear principles’ (M. Lee, 2009a, 2009b, 2011b). He tried to convince DPRK by saying that ‘the only country who is really worrying for and desired to help DPRK is only the ‘same blood’ (M. Lee, 2009a), which means ‘the Korean ethnic’ (M. Lee, 2009c, 2011b) who ‘shares same history, language, and customs’ (M. Lee, 2009d, 2011a). He strongly ‘demands’ and ‘calls’ the compliance to international society because nuclear arms will ‘threaten itself, not only the others’ and ‘block its further development in the future’ (M. Lee, 2009b, 2009c, 2009e, 2010).
President Park also used similar wordings to President Lee. North Korea will be the ‘biggest victim of its behaviour’ (G. Park, 2013a, 2013b), should stop to ‘squander its resources’ to nuclear programmes (G. Park, 2013a, 2013c) and must choose the ‘right decisions’ (G. Park, 2013b). South Korea is ‘ready to open the peaceful dialogue if the DPRK abandons its nuclear programmes’ (G. Park, 2013d, 2013e). She expressed a strong message to give up the nuclear arms to DPRK without retreating ROK’s basic principles as Lee mentioned above.
Vis-??-vis Human rights situation in DPRK, President Lee was firstly concerned about the situation of North Korean human rights through the official statement in 2012 (M. Lee, 2012a). Lee recognised it as ‘a very urgent and important issue’, ‘together with nuclear problems’ in North Korea (M. Lee, 2012b). Park only once mentioned about this issue in the context of North Korean refugees in South Korea (G. Park, 2013g). Thus, strictly speaking, this was the concern for South Koreans who escaped from DPRK, not really for the North Korean people themselves. Based on this logic, Lee recognised this a few times while Park hasn’t yet since one year of her Cheongwadae (the Blue House) residence.
South Korean restrictive measures against DPRK have been based on the concerted efforts with the UN and mainly with the US under the ROK-US mutual assistance system. South Korea typically follows the American measures against DPRK with close consultation. South Korean autonomous measure were implemented with the ‘5.24 Measure’ directly after the Cheonan Warship case in 2010, however, it didn’t have any direct link to the nuclear programme. It is covering a comprehensive economy-based measures as retroaction of the Cheonan Warship case .
4.2.3.1.2 European securitising movement
The speech acts or official statements and documents released by the EU had been mainly focused on the nuclear programmes vis-??-vis the concerns about human rights violation which is addressed relatively later.
Regarding nuclear security concerns, the European official documents and statements became more emphatic later. The EU ‘strongly condemns’ (Council of the European Union, 2009b), ‘expresses its serious concerns’ (Council of the European Union, 2009a), ‘deeply concerned’ (Council of the European Union, 2012c; European Union, 2010, 2012b, 2012c), ‘simply cannot allow people to die of hunger’ (European Commission, 2011). the EU’s articulations became more critical in 2013 as following statements: the EU ‘condemns in the strongest possible terms’ (Council of the European Union, 2013a, 2013b; European Union, 2013a, 2013b) while depicting North Korean action as ‘dangerous and destabilising action’ (European Union, 2012d), ‘a clear violation of [‘] international obligations’ (European Council, 2012), ‘a further blatant challenge’ (European Union, 2013a), a ‘serious threat (Council of the European Union, 2013b; European Union, 2013a)’, ‘new provocative act’ (Council of the European Union, 2013a; European Council, 2013). The regime has been described as ‘the most isolated country in the world and one of the most hostile to its neighbours’ who ‘squanders resources on a large military and on developing sophisticated offensive weapons’ (European Union, 2013b).
The Human rights violation issue came relatively later to the table, during this period, firstly mentioned in the Remark of Barroso (2012). It describes the situation of human rights in North Korea as ‘appalling’, ‘simply incredible’ and ‘lack of respect of human dignity’ (Ibid.). In following year, the Proceedings of 3222nd Foreign Affairs Council Meeting also took a note about the North Korean human rights issue as a part of nuclear missile concerns. ‘The EU will reinforce its calls on the government of the DPRK to urgently improve the human rights situation in the country. (Council of the European Union, 2013a)’.
However, the human rights issue got more and more attention in the speeches later on. The EU High Representative and Vice-President (HR/VP), Catherine Ashton, firstly made official recognition of it in the context of squandering resources to nuclear programmes ‘while the people suffer’ (European Union, 2013b). She described the DPRK where ‘its people, apart from a small elite, suffer daily deprivation’ with ‘insufficient food supply’ (Ibid.). Another remark of Ashton is about the North Korean refugees who were expelled from Laos to North Korea. Roughly about 100 to 300 North Korean refugees are being expelled a week, which could be 5,000 to 10,000 or more per year only by China (Cohen, 2007). Ashton’s remark is valuable as a first recognition about the issue.
‘The High Representative calls on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to abide by international humanitarian and human rights standards and ensure that the nine individuals concerned will not be subjected to the death penalty, torture or any cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. (European Union External Action, 2013)"
European Restrictive measures, which has practiced several times with several forms, are all against nuclear tests during this period. They translated the full implementation of UNSC Resolutions and additional European autonomous measures, targeting at the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the DPRK. They include ‘prohibitions on the export and import of arms and goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missiles related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Additional measures ‘ including in the trade, transport and financial sectors ‘ have also been taken, both by the UN and autonomously by the EU. The EU last strengthened its measures on 22 April 2013, giving effect to the measures of UN Security Council resolution 2094 (2013)’ (European Union, 2013c).
4.2.3.2 Securitisation
Through the four ROK-EU Summits and one upgraded ROK-EU Framework agreement, ROK and EU have achieved securitisation on DPRK Nuclear programmes as well as Human rights issues.
North Korea’s nuclear programme has always been one of the main overlapped security interests of the two actors during this period. In 2009 and 2010 Summits, both parties underlined the importance of multilateral approach such as Six Party Talk (SPT) with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 1718, UNSC Presidential Statement, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as bilateral inter-Korean dialogues and cooperation through two Summits. Furthermore, Ashton’s statement expressed the support for inter-Korean dialogues and commitments. Through 2012 and 2013 Summits, the main instruments against DPRK remained as multilateral level such as IAEA, NPT, UNSC resolutions and Six-Party Talks, however, for the Trust-Building Process, designed by the ROK, reopening the Kaesong industrial complex and the reunion of separated families were also mentioned as bilateral and trilateral approaches with support of the EU. This signifies that South Korea and the EU are sufficiently in agreement with a need of unexceptional tools to deal with this issue on a bilateral level as part of a multinational level.
DPRK’s human rights issues gained the attention after 2010 ROK-EU Framework agreement (FA) upgraded from 1996 FA. It demonstrated the aims of cooperation under the major European norms such as democracy, the rule of law, respect of human rights, and good governance (M. Kim, 2010). While the 1996 FA just slightly mentioned in passing the ‘democratic principles and human rights’, the 2010 FA listed the clear bases of cooperation following the Union’s norms . These changes explained that the EU understood ROK as a partner, sharing the critical principles pursued by the EU and acting in a similar way to cope with the same issues.
At the 2012 6th Summit, the two actors dealt with the human rights in specific ‘bilateral’ level although it was usually discussed in the level of rather vague ‘regional’ or ‘global’ levels before. This development can be explained as a European effort for seeking alignment of its newly adopted Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy in June, 2012 . Based on the 2010 FA and the joint announcement of strategic partnership, the EU wanted to bring these issues to the table of the Summits.
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4.3 CASE STUDY 2: JAPAN AND THE HISTORICAL DISPUTES
4.3.1 Domestic-Intersubjective Identity of Japan
Japan ROK EU
Japan Victims of Wars
Strong Japan Development helper
Threat West in Asia
One of Them
Table 4 Japanese Intersubjective identity regarding itself, ROK and EU
Source: Me
4.3.1.1 Japan’s Domestic Identity on Itself
Japan is the only country who used an Asian version of western imperialism, totalitarianism, fascism as well as its excuse of colonisation mixed up with extreme Japanese nationalism (Fran??ois, 2013). After their victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the Great Japanese Empire was emerged with a new name and a great imperial ambition.
When it was defeated by two atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan developed two different identities: Pacifist and the desire for a Strong Japan. On one hand, Japan accepted its destiny as ‘economy giant and military dwarf’ under the Peace Constitution , especially including Article 9 Renunciation of War which almost castrates its autonomous military power except for Japanese Self-Defence Forces. Based on this article, Japan successfully changed successfully its international intersubjective images from Fascist to Pacifist, from war criminal to one of the biggest donor countries. It seems that Japan deeply regrets the war crimes of the past and wants to take responsibility for a peaceful world.
On the other hand, Japan longs for a Strong Japan. Externally, it accepted its war crimes, however, internally, two atomic bombs provided Japan the justification to think itself as a ‘victim’ not an ‘assailant’ of WWII. The defeated collective memories remained as a trauma”Weak Japan”calling again the need of the ‘Strong Japan’ to overcome its injured pride. This glorification of Japanese history has been expressed in its relationship with former Asian Japanese colonies. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), through statements ‘Processing of debt in Korea (March 1949)’ and ‘Statement that relates to the process of economic and financial matters relating to ceded land (December 1949)’ , expressed that colonisation was Japanese ‘efforts for neighbour’s economic and industrial development’ under the ‘bilateral’ commitment with its colonies, not by Japanese ‘invasion’ (Ota, 2012).
4.3.1.2 Japan’s Intersubjective Identity on Others
Vis-??-vis the two Koreas, the first Japanese intersubjective identity is a glorious pioneer. Japan was a saviour to get them out of their savage cultures. Tokyo shows the capricious historical interpretation regarding ‘colonisation’, ‘Nanking Massacre’, and ‘Comfort Women’. The glorified Japanese invasion has been repeated a myriad of times by statements of high Japanese figures . Osaka Mayor Toru mentioned that ‘there is no evidence saying the Korean Comfort women were forced, threatened and taken by the Japanese army (2012).’ Second, South Korea together with China are threats to Asia by illegally occupying Japanese territories. The ROK does so for Dokdo/Takeshima Island while China does so for Diaoyudao/Senkaku Islands. Furthermore, Japan is a victim of nuclear bombings at the end of WWII, which allowed Japan to repay its war crimes. Japan, which is one of the biggest donors and promoters of World peace, wants the peace which is already ’embedded’ in the Japanese.
Concerning the EU, Japanese intersubjective identity is ‘West in Asia’. Europe is one of the Japanese Western role-models after the US. After Commodore Perry of the US navy opened Japan’s closed doors to the West, many European merchants also sought new markets for European goods with the idea of European ‘civilisation’ under the mission to spread its benefits (Suzuki, 2012). During this period, the Japanese ‘standard of civilisation’ was set up with a desire to gain an equal status by fulfilling European standards (Suzuki, 2012). Japan invited the West to make Japan as strong as Europe . Japanese strong eager to ‘be’ or ‘be accepted’ as developed country resulted a concept of ‘West in Asia’, which identifies Japan with Europe (Ibid.). This culture can be founded on the famous Japanese war slogan Datsu-A ny??-?? (Leaving Asia and entering Europe) as well as from Wada Haruki’s remarks in 2005, ‘During the modernization of the 19th century, Japan constructed a national identity as non-Asian. To this day, Japanese society retains a deep vein of anti-Asianism’ (Korhonen, 2014). Even during the post-war period, this desire still remained with the term ‘one of them’ (Suzuki, 2012). Japanese exceptionalism has separated Japan who is part of the ‘Western camp’, ‘Free World’, and ‘the Occident’ (Ibid.) from other Asian countries who are seen as deadly inferior. Japanese PM Ikeda desired the Japanese accession into the OECD accession seen as ‘a salon of advanced countries’ including the most of ‘Western Europe’ (Suzuki, 2012). Japan has found itself always one step behind of its desired role model, Europe.
4.3.2 Divergence of security interests
Many scholars prefer to declassify the Northeast Asian security issues by historical and maritime territorial disputes, however, the fundamental root of all these controversies came from the different historical experiences, interpretations and attitudes. The key is ‘history’ itself. The seeds of disputes were already implanted after American occupation in Japan. There is incredibly low attention paid to Japanese war crimes in comparison to the enthusiastic research for Nazi war crimes, even though the brutal sum of casualties by Japan greatly exceeded those of Nazi .
The EU and the ROK don’t have much to share about the historical disputes concerns against Japan. As this research was witnessed at the 4.3.1 Japanese Domestic-intersubjective identities, there are somewhat similar intersubjective identities between the EU and Japan’the memories of imperialism’in contrast to other Northeast countries. Based on these common memories, the EU and Japan recognised each other as the ‘civilized’ countries’the ‘Civilized’ Asia and the ‘Civilized’ Europe within their own ‘Civilized’ league’more than last half of century.
However, this shared historical view of the EU and Japan could harm or undermine Brussels’ attachment to the normative actor due to European silence even where the historical disputes requires its boastful normative actions, i.e. the military sex slaves, the butcheries, et the illegally gained territories won by Japanese war criminals. The EU’s silence toward these issues make the European core principles vague and obscure, calling the Northeast Asian countries’ doubts on the authenticity of the Union’s values’especially peace, freedom, human rights, and rule of law’. Furthermore, at the moment where the EU has sought to expand its influence in Asia, this silence renders the EU into questions: Does the EU really have interests in Asia? Does the Union really want to engage in Asia? Whether or not it is just one of the rhetorical claims for not becoming irrelevant from the core of the future IRs, G2 order?
The European norms of peace, freedom and human rights values could be ‘said’ in Northeast Asia. The ROK together with China face the controversies of ‘Comfort women (Military sex slave)’, ‘interpretation of Japanese history in the textbooks’ and ‘recognition of Japanese war crimes’. Through 1993 Kono Statement, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono admitted its forceful sexual abuse of Korean/Chinese women (Kono, 1993). Two years after, Japanese PM Murayama announced the ‘On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end’ by owning up to its imperial colonisation of neighbour countries. However, recently, Japanese PM Koizumi as well as PM Abe resumed visiting the ‘Yasukuni Shrine’ where the top-ranking war criminals have been honoured. Furthermore, Abe officially reversed two previous statements: ‘definition of aggression has yet to be established in academia or in the international community’ (Kirk, 2013). His actions provoked extreme boycotts from its neighbors. Chinese and Korean Foreign Minister strongly protested by saying that if Japan intentionally continues to exacerbate tensions and antagonism, "China will surely keep it company to the end (NPR, 2013).’ Accordingly, the current South Korean President has refused to meet him in the bilateral setting.
Regarding the European peace and rule of law values, the ROK and China face the totally different Japanese attitude towards two different territories, ‘Dokdo/Takeshima Island’ and ‘Diaoyudao/Senkaku Islands’ . Its attitude is strikingly different depending on the Japanese preoccupancy of the tera nullius. When it comes to the Dokdo/Takeshima Island dispute, Japan argued that the preoccupation of the terra nullius by South Korea is illegitimate while disregarding the same reasoning of China toward Japanese preoccupation of Diaoyudao/Senkaku Island disputes . Even though they share similar controversial backgrounds, the Japanese government showed the disparate attitude depending on its interests undermining the rule of law and peaceful commitments of disputes.
4.3.3 Securitization process
4.3.3.1 Politicisation
4.3.3.1.1 Korean Politicisation
Korean securitizing movements could be largely addressed by two topics, the Comfort Women (Military Sex Slave) and Dokdo/Takeshima Island. President Lee initially put up the ‘Silent Diplomacy’ and ‘Mature Partnership’ with Japan from 2009 to late-2011. He avoided the official remarks on both issues while concentrating on strengthening the economic partnership in the environment of global economy crisis. However, from mid-2012, he broke from diplomatic trend and started to confront these problems. It was his last year of incumbency at the late-2012 when the ROK-Japan discord ran to the climax. President Park has refused to meet Japanese PM Abe in bilateral meetings since her entering into Cheongwadae.
The comfort women problem was not on the table from 2009 to late 2011 under Lee’s Silent diplomacy setup. However, in 2011, Lee strongly argued about Comfort women problems during ROK-Japan Summit by highlighting ‘[‘] victims are 86-years-old on average and 16 victims passed away only this year [‘] ROK could lose the rest of its victims in a few years. If we don’t resolve this problem now, if we lose all 63 victims who have suffered from the deepest sorrow of their entire life, their voice will be gone with them’ (Cheongwadae, 2011). Under Lee’s and Park’s governments, ROK brought this problems to the 66th, 67th and 68th UN General Assembly as well as 19th, 22nd and 23rd UN Human Rights Council for politicizing this issue as ‘systematic rape and sexual slavery under the armed conflict’, ‘crimes against humanity’, victims ‘who were forced into military sexual slavery’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Republic of Korea, 2011, 2012d)
Dokdo/Takeshima Island issues, at least on the diplomatic level, had not come on the table from 2009 to 2011 during three ROK-Japan Summits. However, on 10 August 2012, Lee became the first ROK president in the history to visit Dokdo/Takeshima Island . Furthermore, he brought the ROK-Japan historical disputes to their climax by demanding Japanese emperor’s apology to Korean independence fighters (Ahn, 2012). He expressed that there is no more hope for Tokyo because of Japanese lack of willingness to resolve these problems. From this moment, Seoul announced that the ROK will ‘firmly handle’ the Japanese provocation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Republic of Korea, 2012a), ‘protest in the strongest possible terms’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Republic of Korea, 2012b), ‘strongly request the immediately withdraw’ of and ‘will never accept’ Japanese statements (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Republic of Korea, 2012c). ROK-Japan’s Bilateral diplomatic relation de facto disconnected after 2012, and Park has shown the same attitude as Lee on the basis that ‘repeated Yasukuni shrine visits show Japanese distorted historical recognition as well as its will to not change its attitude’ (C. Kim, 2013). Her statement shows how the ROK is regarding this issue: ‘Guarding the Dokdo Island is guarding ROK’s pride’ (G. Park, 2013f).
4.3.3.1.2 European Securitising movement
Historically, EU has saved its breath on the historical disputes in Northeast Asia until 2013, but mentioned the Northeast regional community under the multilateral governance at odd times.
The first recognition on Northeast Asian historical disputes was in the 2010 EU-Japan Summit by the statement of Van Rompuy , the president of the European Council. He didn’t clearly designate the Northeast Security disputes, however, proposed an ambiguous solution”call for East-Asian Community’ for ‘clear end to a long history of conflict”while disconnecting it from the EU affairs’the disputes among ‘your peoples”(Rompuy, 2010). The second remark was made in the 2013 EU-Japan Summit, regarding the maritime territorial disputes. Both leaders underlined the ‘importance of upholding these principles on the basis of international law [‘] with regard to the South China Sea’ (Council of the European Union, 2013c).
The third recognition as well as the first direct statement regarding the historical disputes, targeting Japan, was made through the ‘Statement by the Spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherin Ashton on the visit of Prime Minister to Yasukuni Shrine’ in 2013. However, in this statement, Ashton (2013) urged ‘the countries involved’ to make a peaceful arrangement without clear designation of ‘Japanese’ action .
4.3.3.2 Securitisation
Among bilateral meetings, North-eastern historical disputes were discussed only once in the context of North eastern regional cooperation. During 2013 ROK-EU Summit, regarding the regional level, the East Asia Security Situation was newly adopted by both parties in 2013 with the instrument of President Park’s Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative and the promise of ROK-EU Joint Seminar 2014 to facilitate regional cooperation in Northeast Asia (Council of the European Union, 2013d). These instruments were especially welcomed by the EU, specifically by European scholars and politicians, who have shown a strong support for the Asian regional cooperation and institutionalization for ASEAN, implicating its know-how from the long history of integration of the EU. This participation in Asian integration has got the limelight in a way of Europe’s smart pivot in Asia (Solana, 2013). ‘
5 CONCLUSION
This research started from questioning the two tendencies: sceptical opinions by scholars on the ROK-EU further relations in high politics; uninformed but favourable Koreans toward the EU. It overviewed the ROK-EU security cooperation cases under a fixed period from 2009 to 2013, two years before and after the FTA came into force. This paper brought the ideas of Social constructivism and Security Studies of Copenhagen School to design a new analytic framework. The former provides us the meaningful alternatives of the traditional theories of IRs by focusing the actors’ intersubjective identity and its role to form the IRs vis-??-vis the others. The latter provides us the analytical process of a security issue, ‘securitisation’, by categorising three steps of security cooperation between two actors: non-politicised, politicised, and securitised stage. New analysis tool for constructivist security studies were suggested as follows: 1) Domestic-Intersubjective Identities; 2) Convergence of Security Interests; 3) Politicization-Securitization.
As a result of studying South Korean and the European Union’s pre and post Wars intersubjective identities, South Korean identities are Danil Minjok & Confucianism and Post-colonialism & Resistant nationalism. The former has its roots in the Confucian collectivism, which underlined the society as an extended line with the individual. The later has root in the resistive retroaction against the Western and Japanese imperialist engagements. The Union’s identities are Imperialism & Eurocentrism and Normative actor & a Model of the world. The former is from the elite’s efforts to find a common heritage of European history through Christianity, Roman Empire, Renaissance and Enlightenment which shaped the ‘conceptual pioneer’ idea in Europe. The latter is from the political efforts of European scholars and leaders for enhancing the integration process through the setup of the identity of normative actor to easily get the commitment from pan-European countries under the memories of WWII.
Through the case studies of the ROK-EU securitisation against two targeted actors’the DPRK and Japan’, this paper has answered the three main questions and their sub-questions as follows.
First group of questions is as follows: Relating to the ROK-EU relationship in high politics, have the ROK-EU relations had only mere economic interests? Can the ROK-EU relationship go beyond a mere economic partnership, and has it already done so? What kind of security concerns have ROK and EU shared? They answered by witnessing the two actors have shared strong security interests on the North Korean nuclear and human rights problems. They have agreed on the significant common values to act together regarding the DPRK securitisation in the multinational as well as bilateral frameworks, surpassing mere economic partners. The ROK-EU already had and currently enjoy a security cooperation.
The second group of questions is as follows: Relating to the logic of actors, how the logic behind actions of the ROK, of the EU and of the targeted actors of securitisation in Northeast Asia could be understood? How do the two actors understand the targeted actors of securitisation and vice versa? The study witnessed that a motivation of security cooperation is depending on the actors’ intersubjective identities as to an actor concerned. Regarding the DPRK, the ROK and the EU shared similar intersubjective identities, therefore, the securitisation could be easily agreed and smoothly done. However, regarding Japan, Korean intersubjective identity (post-colonial identity) is strikingly in contrast to the Union’s and Japanese intersubjective identity (imperialist identity). Ergo, Seoul and Brussels couldn’t easily meet a meaningful securitisation in the Northeast Asian historical disputes.
The third group of questions is as follows: Relating to the EU’s engagement in Northeast Asia, how and to what extent EU can engage more in East Asia by sharing the security issue of the ROK? What is the missing part for EU to engage in North eastern security issues? The EU has engaged in Northeast Asian security to the extent which the EU could easily agree under its identity, such as DPRK’s issue. However, the EU overlooked the Northeast Asian historical disputes also falling on the European norms. European silence could harm or undermine its norms by calling the doubts of Northeast Asian countries on the authenticity of the Union’s values’especially peace, freedom, human rights, and rule of law’. In particular, at the moment where the EU is seeking a way to engage more in East Asian countries and to increase recognition by them, the EU must examine again whether the Union’s approach and intersubjective identity fits with its goals and norms. By doing so, the EU could strategically change its approach by presenting itself as a more credible international actor who acts within its values and principles.
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