The differences between Hamas and Fatah and the consequent diametrically entrenched positions represents a huge impediment to any concerted, enduring and holistic solution to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. The underpinning factors behind the gulf in positions between these two parties even threatens the future and the present aspiration for independent Palestinian statehood (Gopin and Sarah, 2011). Increasingly, the deep-seated division and further alienation of the two sides bears a striking semblance to and in essence is a microcosm of the frustrations and views of the wider Arab world on the Israeli- Palestinian question. The roots of the Hamas-Fatah divide are historical as well as a reflection of the ever-changing tide of political events and realities of the people. Fatah, in the wake of the travails and travels of its exiled leadership under the late Yasser Arafat renounced violence in 1988 and sought a peaceful resolution to the lingering conflict with Israel. However the intervening years was mixed largely ‘still’ flux of botched peace agreements and largely unfulfilled promises on all sides. Hamas largely benefitted from this seeming failure of Fatah and strengthened by Israel’s seeming belligerence, Hamas threw itself up as the defence force of the Palestinians and tapped into that sentiment of frustration of the Palestinians and galvanized the rage against Fatah which culminated in the war between both parties in 2007 and the resultant split in the Palestinian political and in deed administrative framework. Following this split, several attempts have been made at reconciling both positions but all have thus far achieved less than a modicum of success. This essay will try to explore the reasons for this increasingly intractable crisis, prospects for its resolution and the emergence of a united Palestinian authority inclusive of both parties if possible and the possible ramifications of both prolonging the crisis or its solution on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Primarily, the Fatah-Hamas conflict could be viewed as an ideological one, with the former (Fatah) founded in 1958 by Yasser Arafat and seeking to liberate Palestine lands and the establishment of an independent democratic, secular and multi-religious state (CJPME, 2011). Initially, it sought to achieve this through an armed struggle but significantly supplanted this strategy with a peaceful approach in December, 1988 with a public renunciation of violence and an acceptance of the right of the state of Israel to exist by its founding leader, Yasser Arafat. Upon the return of its leaders to the Palestinian Occupied Territories (O.P.T.) in1996 (the return was one of the gains of the Oslo Peace accord with the United States of America as chief mediator), Fatah won elections in the territories and became the pioneer leaders of the Palestinian Authority which was also a creation of the Oslo accords (CJPME, 2011). The latter (Hamas), however differs in its approach to the Israeli question; it has its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and was founded in 1988 at the time of the first Palestinian uprising (Intifada). It officially opposed the Oslo accord, refuses any negotiations with Israel and even explicitly seeks the destruction of the state of Israel. Their position was emboldened by their sweeping elections victory in 2006 when they claimed the majority in the Palestinian parliament thereby unseating Fatah who had its newly elected leader Mahmoud Abbas as president of the Palestinian Authority after the death of Yasser Arafat (CJPME, 2011).
The electoral successes of Hamas marked a watershed moment for Palestinian politics with reverberations around the whole region. According to a Washington Post report at the time, Hamas’s arrival in the Palestinian Authority as ‘a nearly equal partner’ was a perceived severe complication of Mahmoud Abbas’s efforts at engaging in negotiations with Israel under the USA-backed peace plan tagged ‘road map’ (Bronner, 2014). An attempt at a unity government in 2007 fell through and after violent confrontations, Hamas seized control of the Gaza strip, a state of emergency was declared by Abbas and the Hamas prime minister was sacked ending a three-month long coalition. Subsequent decrees by Abbas only served to consolidate Fatah’s grip over the West Bank while leaving Gaza to Hamas which in effect created two distinctively separate Palestinian governments with each side retaining a ‘monopoly of force’ in their domains. (Johanssen et al, 2011).
Also, not totally disconnected from the imbroglio is the regional and international interest it attracts, both sides have been in a race to win the right albeit depilatory to be the ‘true voice’ of the Palestinians. A closer look at the dynamics and the swaying factors that enforce or determine both positions reveal undercurrents that are not internal to the Palestinian people but more representative of the foreign supporters or benefactors of both Fatah and Hamas. According to Tamara Wittes (2014) of the Brookings Institution, due to Israel’s recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Authority as the only representatives of its people which was one of the salient outcomes of the Oslo agreement, Fatah in effect became the more internationally accepted political party and this further isolated Hamas. At the time, Hamas opposed the Oslo accord and with the support of regional allies like Iran and Syria sustained its violent campaign against Israel. The United States of America and most western powers regard Hamas as a terrorist organization while according the acceptable status to Fatah. However, Brown et al (2014) of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argue that with Israel’s attacks on Gaza and the horrific depictions of the plight of the ordinary people of Gaza on Arab television networks, Hamas appears to have surged in popularity both within the Palestinian territories and the Arab world. This has become a major challenge for Fatah and its foreign partners as it is increasingly viewed as having lost touch with ordinary Palestinians.
Crucially, the Fatah-Hamas split has not been insulated from the consequences or impact of the tide of popular protests and uprisings (Arab Spring) which has swept through the region. In a workshop summary for the Middle East and North African Programme (Chatham House, 2011), participants at the Chatham House Rule event posited that due to the crisis in Syria which is a supporter of Hamas, the group’s structures in Damascus (Syrian capital) were evacuated and their officials relocated. The internal turmoil that Arab countries faced meant that the Palestinian issue was relegated to the background except in countries like Jordan with a huge Palestinian refugee population. This may have significantly informed the 2011 reconciliation deal between Hamas and Fatah as both had to grapple with domestic street protests that were not against Israel but the perceived autocratic rule of both parties. The deal lacked unanimous endorsement because even though the political leaders of each party agreed to some major issues like recognizing Mahmoud Abbas and empowering him to engage in negotiations with Israel, elements within the Fatah revolutionary council and Hamas’s militant wing, the Al- Qassam brigades opposed the new alliance. It was also seen as a political metamorphosis for Hamas and one akin to its forbear The Muslim brotherhood in Egypt (Chatham House, 2011). The peace deal was short-lived and Hamas even accused Fatah of collusion with Israel in its assault on Gaza that year.
From the foregoing, it is evident that there is a yawning deficit of trust on both sides which has thus far jeopardized any true reconciliation. Neven Bondokji (2014) of the Brookings Doha Centre in Doha opines that recriminations openly encouraged and expressed by leaders and members of both factions and often directed at rival leaders distorts one of the pillars of forgiveness which is acknowledgement and accountability. She draws parallels with countries like South Africa and Cambodia where these values were emphasized to forge national reconciliation. It is disturbing to see the abhorrent levels of mutual disparagement on the websites and publications of both parties.