Why do states go to war when they do? The tenets of neorealism may be able to give us some semblance of an answer. We live in an anarchic world society marked by brutality and strength. Conflict is inherent in the International Relations system because states must constantly be securing themselves against threats and posturing themselves to not be harassed by other states. Because there are no rules it’s a free for all where the most militarily powerful states try to attain power. Even comparatively weaker, smaller states are incentivized by this violent chaos to try and increase their standing in the world’s military hierarchy.
Defensive neorealism asserts that aggressive expansion as promoted by offensive neorealists upsets the tendency of states to conform to the balance of power theory, thereby decreasing the primary objective of the state, which they argue is ensuring its security. While defensive realism does not deny the reality of interstate conflict, nor that incentives for state expansion do exist, it contends that these incentives are sporadic rather than endemic. Defensive neorealism points towards “structural modifiers” such as the security dilemma and geography, and elite beliefs and perceptions to explain the outbreak of conflict. In theory though it seems like states are constantly incentivized to, if not commit offensive violence commit defensive security actions. But at what level is an action still considered defensive rather than offensive.
How do we reconcile why states act the way that they do? It would definitely depend entirely on who you asked as many thinkers have different conceptions of what each of these terms. Granted, there are several unifying factors within these theories, but at least in the case of Realism, there is a lot of diversity in implementation of these ideas throughout the ages.
What is it about these ideas that we find so appealing and relatable? Is it the fact that it allows what we do to be neatly labelled and explained away? Realism gives us a rather pessimistic view of the world, but one that we can relate with and understand rather easily. If the only thing states and by extension their leaders are interested is power, then it’s somewhat easy to understand why they do the things that they do. This is a fairly easy concept to wrap your head around, and one we can think of at an individual level. If everyone around you is acquiring power then it is in your best interest to acquire as much power as possible.
Realism has very old roots. We can actually trace it back to the pelopennesian war. It truly gets expanded upon by Machiavelli in the Prince however. Machiavellian realism makes the statement that the state is the most important actor, no institutions are anywhere close. It also states that all states are in fact founded in violence, by annexation or conquest. While one might protest and claim that some states were created by treaties, treaties happen at the end of the violence. “Every state is founded on force” says Trotsky at brest-litovsk If no social institutions existed which knew the use of violence, then the concept of ‘state’ would be eliminated. Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence. Hence, ‘politics’ for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state.
While defensive realism does not deny the reality of interstate conflict, nor that incentives for state expansion do exist, it contends that these incentives are sporadic rather than endemic. Defensive neorealism points towards “structural modifiers” such as the security dilemma and geography, and elite beliefs and perceptions to explain the outbreak of conflict. As Kenneth Waltz asserted in his seminal defensive neorealist text Theory of International Politics, defensive realists argue that the anarchic nature of the international system encourages states to undertake defensive and moderate policies. They argue that states are not intrinsically aggressive and that “the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system”. This is the crucial point of departure from offensive realism, which instead argues that anarchy encourages states to pursue aggressive territorial expansion to ensure security through increased state power, as “the world is condemned to perpetual great power competition.”
Defensive neorealism is a structural theory that is part of structural realism, also known as neorealism, which is a subset of the realist school of thought in International Relations theory. Neorealism therefore works from realism’s five base theoretical assumptions as outlined by offensive neorealist scholar John J. Mearsheimer in “The False Promise of International Institutions”. These assumptions are:
- The international system is anarchic.
- States inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the ability to hurt and possibly destroy each other.
- States can never be certain about the intentions of other states.
- The basic motive driving states is survival.
- States think strategically about how to survive in the international system.
These five assumptions drive neorealism’s belief that state survival is attained through “self-help”. However, neorealism departs from classical realism’s other main assumption that it is the flaws and complexities of human nature that drive the international system. Instead, neorealists assert that the anarchy inherent to the structure of the international system is the driving force of international politics. It is on these key neorealist assumptions that defensive and offensive neorealists base their competing understandings of state behavioural patterns.
Defensive realists identify a number of problems regarding offensive realism’s support of aggressive state expansion. Building on Waltz’s balance of power theory and the assumption that “balancing is more common than bandwagoning”, defensive realists assert that states which strive to attain hegemony in the international system will be counterbalanced by other states seeking to maintain the status quo. While offensive realists believe states inherently desire hegemony, defensive realists argue that states are socialised and aware of historical precedent, which defensive realists assert, generally displays state aggression and expansion to fulfil the aim of hegemony as attracting resistance from other states. Aggression is therefore argued to be self-defeating in achieving the aim of security, which defensive realists posit to be the state’s primary objective. According to Alexander Wendt, “Security dilemmas are not given by anarchy or nature” but, rather, are “a social structure composed of intersubjective understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each other’s intentions”.
In 1979 Waltz wrote that in the nuclear age the international bipolar system, based on two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—was not only stable but likely to persist (176–7). With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent disintegration of the USSR this prediction was proven wrong. The bipolar world turned out to have been more precarious than most realist analysts had supposed. Its end opened new possibilities and challenges related to globalization. This has led many critics to argue that neorealism, like classical realism, cannot adequately account for changes in world politics.
Neorealism, defined by Kenneth Waltz in 1959, holds that states are unitary rational agents acting in their perceived self-interest within a system wherein each state seeks to ensure its perpetuation and maintain a balance of power. Structure is the defining feature of the theory, with states the main actors competing within an anarchic system to maintain their power and stability. The modern East Asian regional complex has security dynamics very similar to those that prevailed in the Cold War during the second half of the 20th century.
The realist response came most prominently from Kenneth N. Waltz, who reformulated realism in international relations in a new and distinctive way. In his book Theory of International Politics, first published in 1979, he responded to the liberal challenge and attempted to cure the defects of the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau with his more scientific approach, which has became known as structural realism or neorealism. Whereas Morgenthau rooted his theory in the struggle for power, which he related to human nature, Waltz made an effort to avoid any philosophical discussion of human nature, and set out instead to build a theory of international politics analogous to microeconomics. He argues that states in the international system are like firms in a domestic economy and have the same fundamental interest: to survive. “Internationally, the environment of states’ actions, or the structure of their system, is set by the fact that some states prefer survival over other ends obtainable in the short run and act with relative efficiency to achieve that end”
Despite defensive realism’s significant contribution to international relations theory and its number of prominent proponents, such as Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Van Evera, and Charles L. Glaser, it has been criticised both by offensive realists and other scholars. A major point of contention is the difficulty states face in accurately assessing the offense-defense balance. This is because of war’s uncertainty and because at a more basic level, the military equipment used to wage war is inherently ambiguous. Equipment is neither solidly defensive nor offensive in nature and its ambiguity only increases as the equipment’s sophistication and capability develops. This is further compounded when state policies, strategy and relations are considered. Depending on the political context and history between the state(s) assessing and the state(s) assessed, some pieces of military equipment could reasonably be determined to be for offensive or defensive use, regardless of the reality. Defensive realism’s critics assert that this entrenched ambiguity, even in the face of the realist assumption that states think rationally and strategically about how to survive, is too great a risk for states to chance. They assert that states will naturally assume the worst-case scenario to ensure their own security in the “self-help” environment, which realists assume dominates the anarchic international system. This view is summarised concisely by Stephen Walt: “If states cannot measure the offense-defense balance or distinguish between offensive and defensive capabilities, then security-seeking states cannot escape the security dilemma and cannot signal their peaceful intention in a convincing manner.”[20] Assuming the proposed dearth of clear signalling between states is as prevalent as defensive realism’s critics would suggest, this clearly then, contests defensive realism’s validity.
It is important to note also, one of defensive neorealism’s main criticisms that it is unable to theorise and make assumptions about the policies of specific states as offensive neorealism can.[21] While this does not invalidate defensive realism’s proposed ability to explain past state behaviour, it limits its application and influence.
Finally, Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou contends that defensive neorealism as outlined by Waltz, only explains the impact external forces have on state behaviour and ignores the impact of internal forces.[22] This is particularly problematic as these external forces are largely absent in the current unipolar world where the United States is the sole military great power. Also, intrastate warfare, conflict and international terrorism is becoming increasingly prominent, while traditional notions of interstate conflict are receding: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”
My theory is that defensive neorealism and offensive neorealism are one in the same and that incentives for countries to engage in conflict are ubiquitous and endemic. I propose the sheer amount of conflict happening through proxy wars of the cold war prove that any actions taken to promote defensive security is no different than promoting offensive force and both result in a security dilemma.
Criticisms of neorealism: questionable if all states desire power, it also ignores the fact that states have an inherent interest in the wealth and welfare of its people, not just their security. The theory also fails to explain long term state cooperation, especially in light of the concerns regarding the security dilemma. Building on the offense-defense ambiguity, it has also been suggested that it is impossible to accurately gauge when a state has attained a satisfactory level of relative power. This can combine with unfavorable structural modifiers such as geography to contradict the idea that states can afford to wait for definitive signs of attack.
The United states decision to enter Korea can be seen as the United States navigating within the anarchic world system. Since communism was spreading out from the Soviet Union, there was no overarching governmental system to quell that spread. The United States noticed the increasingly communist satellite states and decided to step in. The United States saw the world as anarchic and in that realized the only choice was to stop the monolith of the Soviet Union before it spread out and engulfed all of the rest of Europe and Asia. As Waltz suggests in theories of international politics, states acting in this anarchic system must practice self-help by securing themselves militarily acting defensive.
CASE STUDY
The Korean war marked the first war of the nuclear age and also the first proxy war of the Cold War. The Korean war led to 35,000 American deaths with no victory declared and a tense armistice. President Truman greatly feared the spread of communism throughout the world and felt that unless he did something, the whole world might fall under Soviet Control. US politicians feared communism and claimed it was a direct subversion of democracy. In reality, The US needed a strong market-oriented Europe, and to a lesser extent Asia, to find buyers for all of the goods we were producing. The United States was also dealing with governing a newly free Korea along with the Soviet Union whom we were in competition with after World War II.
At this time McCarthyism had taken ahold in the United States and the Red Scare was in full force. In the 1930s and 1940s there was a small American Communist Party and during World War II some of these people actually spied for Russia; nonetheless, the group was quite small. Spurred by a network of fear mongering press and politicians, the campaign greatly overstated the threat of communism in the US. The FBI began collecting data on supposed communists, and Congress would force thousands of law-abiding citizens to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee as suspected communists or risking jailing for contempt. Many people had their lives destroyed by the government for holding any views slightly left of center. This sort of paranoid thinking also spread to the rest of the country and many employers began questioning employees to see if they were at all sympathetic to the soviet regime. This public outrage, coupled with ambitious politicians who used the fear of communism to promote their own careers, led to one of the most subversive times in our country’s history.
Korea had been under Japanese control since their annexation in 1910 after the Russo-Japanese War until 1945. In August 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Imperial Japan, as a result of an agreement with the United States, and liberated Korea north of the 38th parallel. The 38th parallel is 38 degrees north on the Earth’s equatorial plane and marks the division between South and North Korea prior to the Korean War. On August 8, 1945, two days after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Soviet troops advanced rapidly, and the US government became anxious that they would occupy the whole of Korea.
As a funny aside, on August 10, 1945 two young officers, Dean Rusk and Charles Bonesteel, were assigned to define an American occupation zone. Working completely unprepared, they used a National Geographic map to decide on the 38th parallel. They chose it because it divided the country approximately in half but would place the capital Seoul under American control. No experts on Korea were consulted. The two men were unaware that forty years before, Japan and pre-revolutionary Russia had discussed sharing Korea along the same parallel.
For the next few years, the United States and Soviet Union were actually in lock-step. From 1945 to 1947, the US and North Korea worked together to create a functioning, unified government. However, due to increasingly deep divides within the respective countries, and because the cold war was becoming more imminent, negotiations fell apart. The UN passed a resolution on November 14, 1947, declaring that free elections should be held, foreign troops should be withdrawn, and a UN commission for Korea, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), should be created. The Soviet Union boycotted the voting and did not consider the resolution to be binding, arguing that the UN could not guarantee fair elections. In the absence of Soviet co-operation, they decided to only hold election in the south. This lead to uprisings and protests as many Koreans thought it was wrong to hold elections without a unified country. It is estimated that tens of thousands of South Koreans were killed by their own government during that time
Things finally escalated on June 25 into open warfare when the North Korean forces, who were supported by the Soviet Union and China, pushed passed the 38th parallel and attacked South Korea. On 27 June, the United Nations Security Council authorized the formation and dispatch of UN forces to Korea to repel what was recognized as a North Korean invasion. In his speech announcing plans to support and lead UN forces in Korea, Truman highlighted the international threat of Korea and communism “The attack upon Korea was an outright breach of the peace and a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. By their actions in Korea, Communist leaders have demonstrated their contempt for the basic moral principles on which the United Nations is founded. This is a direct challenge to the efforts of the free nations to build the kind of world in which men can live in freedom and peace. We have the resources to meet our needs. Far more important, the American people are unified in their belief in democratic freedom. We are united in detesting Communist slavery. (Truman, 1950)” Here Truman is calling for US led UN forces to enter Korea and reunify the country, stopping the spread of communism further.
Truman may have worked to keep the war from escalating, but when northern troops descended into the south it seems he felt that the United States had no other option but to stop the spread of Soviet Forces to the south. Truman thought that if Korea fell to communism, so would Europe and says as much in his autobiography:
“The last and worst of the lot was Korea. But if we had not persuaded the United Nations to back up the free Republic of Korea, Western Europe would have gone into the hands of the communists. We inaugurated the Atlantic Pact, the Latin American Agreement, and the Pacific Defense Agreement, all for the defense of the free world and to strengthen our friends and allies so as to prevent their invasion by Russia. All these events required momentous decisions by the president of the United States. He made them, and with but one idea in mind — eventual peace in the world.” (Truman, Ferrell 102)
The Korean war was a war of competing ideas and values, taking place on the international stage with many countries ultimately having a role to play. The many battles, skirmishes and lost lives were due in large part to ideological differences between the south and the north and were only part of the overall damage done to the world during the Cold War. Not one particular thing led directly to the war, however the north’s attack on the south can be something we can point to. It was more of an increasingly hostile environment on the world stage between the United States and Soviet Union that made open battle seemingly inevitable.
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