The United States of America
Six-Party Talks Briefing Report
I. INTRODUCTION
The Six-Party Talks involve the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation and the United States. The talks were implemented in August 2003 following North Korea’s admittance of its uranium-enrichment programs and withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The dominant purpose of the Six-Party Talks has remained the complete, verifiable denuclearization of North Korea in a peaceful manner.
II. ISSUES REGARDING THE SIX PARTY TALKS
The US has many concerns regarding North Korea and the re-instigation of the Six-Party Talks. The overarching concern of the US remains the nuclear status of North Korea and its involvement in the testing and proliferation of nuclear technology and missiles.
Since 1989, the US has suspected North Korea of breaching the terms of the NPT and engaging in the development of nuclear weapons. From this time, North Korea was acting insubordinately and refusing to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors to inspect their nuclear facilities.[1]
In addition to its production of nuclear weapons through plutonium-enrichment and uranium-enrichment programs, North Korea has engaged in the development and testing of missiles, nuclear tests and proliferation activities.
The first test on October 9, 2006, was met with nearly undisputed international denunciation and the imposition of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1718. Subsequently, the surrounding region suffered significant negative economic effects.
On May 25, North Korea conducted a second nuclear test and an attempted launch of a short-range missile. These actions blatantly violated UNSC Resolution 1718 and “directly and recklessly challeng[ed] the international community.”[2]
President Barack Obama condemned North Korea’s provocative actions, claiming they pose a great threat to international peace and security.[3] The UNSC unanimously backed this claim and instigated Resolution 1874 which imposed heavy sanctions on North Korea.
North Korea’s behavior was seen by the international community to increase Northeast Asian tensions and undermine the stability within the region. With significant proportions of US trade occurring in the Asia-Pacific region, regional stability is of paramount importance to the US.
Proliferation of nuclear and missile technology from North Korea is another substantial issue from the US viewpoint. The US has suspected North Korea’s involvement in numerous proliferation activities with various nations including Pakistan, Iran and Syria. Proliferation of illegal weapons directly endangers US National Security and Foreign Policy.[4]
The US also maintains many concerns over human rights violations in North Korea. The guarded nature of the North Korean regime has made it difficult to gauge the extent of human rights breaches within the nation. International organizations such as Amnesty International have criticized North Korea for the treatment of its people.[5]
From 1995 to 1998, the North Korean people faced severe food shortages due to the occurrence of natural disasters in conjunction with agricultural and economic hardships. The resulting famine claimed the lives of an estimated 600,000 North Koreans.[6] Famine related deaths began to cease with large shipments of food aid through the World Food Program however, North Korea refused aid shipment at the end of 2005.[7]
North Korea’s human rights infringements oppose US beliefs and remain another hurdle to the normalization of relations between the two nations. Normalization, in the current circumstances, could suggest that the US condones the state of affairs in North Korea. The US is in strong opposition of the conduct of North Korea and it unwilling to engage in normalized relations with the current human rights concerns.
III. OBJECTIVES
From the initiation of the Six-Party Talks, the US’s dominant focus has been “the complete and verifiable elimination of all of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs, as well as its past proliferation activities.”[8] This objective has been reinforced by South Korea, Japan, Russia and China as the dominant role of the talks.
In the past, issues have arisen over the definitions of ‘denuclearization’ and the exact verification protocol required. The US is very strong on its positions regarding these often indeterminate terms. The US is definite in its view that it will never acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.
With respect to the denuclearization of North Korea, the US requires a process that would include the removal of all fissile material and explosive devices from the country. US policy seeks the complete and verifiable dismantlement of the Yongbyon and Pyongyang facilities and North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program. Denuclearization also includes the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, surrender of all plutonium, halting the development of missiles and ceasing any missile related exports.
The verification of the denuclearization process remains another issue that previous talks failed to agree upon. Again, the US requires strict and definite measures of verification to be satisfied of North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization.
The verification measures required by the US involve the return of IAEA monitors to North Korea, site inspections, document confirmation, discussions with technical employees and on-site sampling.[9] These measures must include all nuclear facilities, including Pyongyang, Yongbyon, any uranium-enrichment facilities, and include the civil nuclear energy facilities.
Previously, the IAEA has worked on an intermittent basis in North Korea, with North Korea expelling inspectors at various times when they felt the US had not adhered to its promises. The US is highly committed to verifiable denuclearization and requires a lasting safeguards agreement with the IAEA to “verify the declared nuclear materials and activities as well as provide assurance as to the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in North Korea”.[10]
In addition, the US requires North Korea to return to the NPT and sign and implement the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention. While the Obama administration has acknowledged the right of states to use peaceful nuclear energy, he states that, “nations with nuclear weapons have a responsibility to move toward nuclear disarmament.”[11]
North Korea has, at times, been adamant about the importance of its peaceful nuclear energy program. It is the sovereign right of every state to use peaceful nuclear energy. During certain stages of the Six Party Talks, North Korea has agreed and taken some action towards the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programs. North Korea has continuously rejected any suggestions of also ceasing its nuclear energy program, claiming it is only for peaceful civilian use. However, the US feels that North Korea uses its energy program as a cover for its weapons programs.
IV. STRATEGY
Throughout the Six-Party Talks, the US has taken a hard-lined approach towards the full and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. President Obama has emphasized his desire for “sustained, direct, and aggressive diplomacy” with respect to North Korea.[12]
North Korea has been uncompromising in regard to the eradication of its nuclear capabilities. Consequently, the US must utilize its alliances within the Six-Party framework to their full extent to provide a united front against North Korea’s nuclear programs. In addition, the US will need to offer substantial incentives for North Korea to give up their nuclear weapons and threaten strong international action should they revoke their promises.
Bilateral Incentives
North Korea maintains its stance of unwillingness to denuclearize unless certain concessions are met by the other five parties within the Six-Party Talks. The dominant concern of North Korea in denuclearizing is its perceived threat from the US. Believing its collection of nuclear weaponry to be its only guarantee of survival and deterrence from US attack, North Korea demands certain security measures to be taken by the US.
In past negotiations, North Korea has insisted upon a security guarantee from the US, assuring non-intervention by US nuclear or conventional weapons. This guarantee is of high importance to North Korea and can be used by the US as a major incentive to drive denuclearization.
The imposition of sanctions by individual states and the UN have had a dramatic toll on North Korea’s economy and trade. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has pledged that “if North Korea is genuinely prepared to completely and verifiably eliminate nuclear weapons, the Obama Administration will be willing to normalize bilateral relations, replace the peninsula’s long-standing armistice agreement with a permanent peace treaty and assist in meeting the energy and other economic and humanitarian needs of the (North) Korean people.”[13]
Since North Korea withdrew from the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War in May, a peace treaty between North Korea, South Korea, the US and China has been advocated by some states. A peace treaty of this kind would provide further security assurances from the US to North Korea in addition to assisting the normalization of relations.
North Korea strongly desires normalized relations with the US and this would provide a strong incentive for North Korea to renounce its nuclear weapons capabilities. Normalized relations with the US would provide the impecunious state of North Korea with access to international financial aid and dramatically improve its trade and economy. As part of the Obama administration’s desire for “tough and direct” diplomacy, the US will agree to bilateral talks with North Korea to achieve these ends. [14]
Other incentives offered to North Korea by the US to motivate its denuclearization include the provisions of substantial aid. Since 1996, the US has provided over 2,086,694 Metric Tons of food aid to North Korea, to an estimated value of US $403.7 million.[15] The US has committed to providing 500,000 Metric Tons of food aid and 500,000 Metric Tons of Heavy Fuel Oil to North Korea in exchange for denuclearization. With the current food shortage crises and electricity in short supply, these aid provisions, in conjunction with those provided by the other five nations, provide a sizeable incentive to North Korea.
Relations with Other Parties
The Obama administration acknowledges the importance of the other five parties presenting a united front against North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. Thus far, conflicting national interests has greatly challenged this aim and has repeatedly destabilized the success of the Six-Party Talks.
The US works closely with its allies, South Korea and Japan to encourage North Korean denuclearization and deter its adherence to agreements. The three allied parties remain united with goals of ensuring North Korea rejoins the NPT, allows IAEA monitors to return to the country with increased access, ceases all production, testing and proliferation of nuclear and missile technology and the eventual full and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea.
On November 17, President Obama and Chinese President Hu released a joint statement on the strength of their relations and common commitment to the global non-proliferation regime and North Korean denuclearization.[16] The major point of disagreement between the two parties remains their differing views on the imposition of tough sanctions on North Korea. While the US strongly advocates sanctions, China believes that alternate measures and positive incentives are more appropriate.
Sanctions and Pressure
Sanctions form a very dominant part of the US policy toward North Korea and provide vital influence to pressure North Korea to take concrete actions towards denuclearization. President Obama has affirmed his commitment to following the Bush administration’s partiality for the imposition of unilateral and UN sanctions.
Following North Korea’s May nuclear test, the US strongly advocated tough sanctions through the UN Security Council which resulted in the passing of Resolution 1874. This Resolution prompted significant arms embargoes, inspections of North Korean cargo and the prohibition on state assistance to North Korea except for humanitarian purposes.
Obama has pledged to follow the Bush administration’s policy of using the lifting of sanctions as substantial incentives for North Korea to renounce its nuclear weapons programs. Additionally, Obama has taken a hard-line approach by asserting the rapid re-imposition of any removed sanctions if North Korea doesn’t meet its obligations.[17]
Current US policy dictates that tougher sanctions will be imposed on North Korea if they fail to meet agreed commitments or engage in further “blatant defiance[s]” of international law and “provocations” such as the May nuclear test.[18][19]
V. EXPECTED OUTCOME
Following the cease of the Six-Party Talks in September 2007, North Korea has continued to act in a provocative and belligerent manner. On April 5, North Korea continued with its pronounced satellite launch despite adverse international pressure. On May 25, North Korea conducted its second underground nuclear test in violation of international laws. The UN Security Council condemned both tests and consequently imposed Resolution 1874.
It is the hostile stance of North Korea that has posed so many obstructions to the success of the Six-Party Talks. While the US maintains a reasonably hard-lined approach to North Korean denuclearization and emphatically refuses to acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, various analysts believe little success will be achieved.
With the North Korean perspective in mind, the US will not make concessions outside of national interest. The hard line approaches of both the US and North Korea has been a significant obstacle throughout the process of the Six-Party Talks.
US policy requires concrete steps towards denuclearization from North Korea before any provisions of aid, the lifting of sanctions or the conferral of a security guarantee can be made. North Korea retains objections to the US requirement of ‘irreversible’ denuclearization and disagreements have previously occurred over the verification procedure.
As shown through the past six rounds of talks over four years, very little has ultimately been achieved and agreements have always fallen through. It is likely that some agreements will be tentatively made with respect to action towards denuclearization in exchange for significant US aid, security guarantees and a chance of normalized relations. However, it is unlikely these talks will result in the complete eradication of the threat North Korea poses.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Six-Party Talks have been changeable, with various points of success. However, by the conclusion of the sixth round very little had ultimately been achieved. North Korea remains as equipped with nuclear and missile weaponry as it was at the commencement of the talks. Similar issues have been repeatedly raised throughout the talks, with very few reaching a definite agreement between the parties.
The US has many concerns in entering another round of talks including North Korea’s current nuclear capabilities and history of non-adherence to international laws. North Korea’s production, possession, testing and proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles pose a threat to the national security of the US and regional security within Northeast Asia.
The dominant objective of the US, and the other four parties involved in the talks, is the irreversible and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In conjunction with this overarching goal, the US also aims to convince North Korea to re-join the NPT, adhere to IAEA safeguards, cease development and exports of missiles and missile technology, sign and implement the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxic Weapons convention. In the final stage, the US would like to engage in normalized relations with North Korea and increase trade relations in the region.
Optimizing relationships with South Korea, Japan, China and Russia is critical to any success within the talks and striving to present a united front against North Korean nuclear activities. The US also endeavors to provide considerable incentives to North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons programs. In the event that North Korea rejects its obligations the US strongly advocates the strengthening of sanctions.
Allowing for North Korea’s history of non-adherence to international laws and treaties, it is likely the process of the Six-Party talks will be as complex as past rounds. The Obama administration follows a similar hard-line approach as previous US policies and national interests remain paramount.
VII. REFERENCES
Amnesty International (2004) Starved of Rights: Human rights and the food crisis in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [online], available: http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=3A85FB1357C97BA080256E1B00478D0B&lang=e [accessed 16 Nov 2009].
Branigan, T. (2009) North Korea Turns Down US Food Aid [online], available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/18/north-korea-us-food-aid [accessed 16 Nov 2009]
Ellis, J. (2008) “McCain and Obama on North Korea,” The New York Times [online], available: http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/mccain-and-obama-on-north-korea [accessed 19 Nov 2009]
Debimski, M. (1995) North Korea, IAEA Special Inspections, and the Future of the Nonproliferation Regime [online], available: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/dembin22.pdf [accessed 18 Nov 2009]
Global Security Newswire (2009) U.S. Selects North Korea Envoy [online], available: http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090220_8722.php [accessed 18 Nov 2009]
Kim, I. (2009) Issue Brief: The Six-Party Talks and Obama’s North Korean Policy [online], available: http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_six_party_obama_north_korea.html [accessed 18 Nov 2009]
Obama Biden (2008) Barack Obama and Joe Biden’s Plan to Renew U.S. Leadership in Asia [online], available: http://obama.3cdn.net/ef3d1c1c34cf996edf_s3w2mv24t.pdf[accessed 18 Nov 2009]
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2009) Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to North Korea [online], available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Continuation-of-the-National-Emergency-with-Respect-to-North-Korea [accessed 18 Nov 2009].
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2009) Foreign Policy [online], available: www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign_policy [accessed 17 Nov 2009]
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2009) Joint Press Statement by President Obama and President Hu of China [online], available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/joint-press-statement-president-obama-and-president-hu-china [accessed 17 Nov 2009]
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2009) Remarks by President Obama at Suntory Hall [online], available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-suntory-hall [accessed 19 Nov 2009]
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2009) Statement from the President Regarding North Korea[online], available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-from-the-President-Regarding-North-Korea [accessed 18 Nov 2009]
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2009) Tougher Sanctions for North Korea[online], available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/Tougher-Sanctions-for-North-Korea [accessed 19 Nov 2009]
USAID (2008) USAID Assistance to North Korea [online], available: http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do?_program=/eads/gbk/countryReport&submit=submit&output=3&unit=N&cocode=2PRK [accessed 17 Nov 2009]
VIII. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bajoria, J. (2009) The Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Denuclearization [online], available: http://www.cfr.org/publication/13593/ [accessed 15 Nov 2009]
Hecker, S. (2008) Denuclearizing North Korea [online], available: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22161/064002011_0-1.pdf [accessed 16 Nov 2009]
Kim, T. (2008) Obama and North Korea [online], available: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/11/167_34496.html [accessed 17 Nov 2009]
Klinngner, B. (2009) Securing US Objectives in North Korea [online], available: http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/sr0037.cfm#_ftn2 [accessed 15 Nov 2009]
Wit, J. (2009) US Strategy Towards North Korea [online], available: http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/NKreportOCT09Wit.pdf [accessed 16 Nov 2009]
[1] Debimski, M. (1995) North Korea, IAEA Special Inspections, and the Future of the Nonproliferation Regime [online], available: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/dembin22.pdf [accessed 18 Nov 2009]
[2] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2009) Statement by the President Regarding North Korea [online], available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-from-the-President-Regarding-North-Korea [accessed 18 Nov 2009]
[3] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2009) Remarks by the President on North Korea [online], available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-North-Korea [accessed 18 Nov 2009]
[4] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2009) Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to North Korea [online], available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Continuation-of-the-National-Emergency-with-Respect-to-North-Korea [accessed 18 Nov 2009].
[5] Amnesty International (2004) Starved of Rights: Human rights and the food crisis in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [online], available: http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=3A85FB1357C97BA080256E1B00478D0B&lang=e [accessed 16 Nov 2009].
[6] Ibid.
[7] Branigan, T. (2009) North Korea Turns Down US Food Aid [online], available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/18/north-korea-us-food-aid [accessed 16 Nov 2009]
[8] Obama Biden (2008) Barack Obama and Joe Biden’s Plan to Renew U.S. Leadership in Asia [online], available: http://obama.3cdn.net/ef3d1c1c34cf996edf_s3w2mv24t.pdf[accessed 18 Nov 2009].
[9] Kim, I. (2009) Issue Brief: The Six-Party Talks and Obama’s North Korean Policy [online], available: http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_six_party_obama_north_korea.html [accessed 18 Nov 2009]
[10] Ibid.
[11] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2009) Remarks by President Obama at Suntory Hall [online], available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-suntory-hall [accessed 19 Nov 2009]
[12] Obama Biden (2008) Barack Obama and Joe Biden’s Plan to Renew U.S. Leadership in Asia [online], available: http://obama.3cdn.net/ef3d1c1c34cf996edf_s3w2mv24t.pdf[accessed 18 Nov 2009]
[13] Global Security Newswire (2009) U.S. Selects North Korea Envoy [online], available: http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090220_8722.php [accessed 18 Nov 2009]
[14] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2009) Foreign Policy [online], available: www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign_policy [accessed 17 Nov 2009]
[15]USAID (2008) USAID Assistance to North Korea [online], available: http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do?_program=/eads/gbk/countryReport&submit=submit&output=3&unit=N&cocode=2PRK [accessed 17 Nov 2009]
[16] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2009) Joint Press Statement by President Obama and President Hu of China [online], available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/joint-press-statement-president-obama-and-president-hu-china [accessed 17 Nov 2009]
[17] Ellis, J. (2008) “McCain and Obama on North Korea,” The New York Times [online], available: http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/mccain-and-obama-on-north-korea [accessed 19 Nov 2009]
[18] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2009) Statement from the President Regarding North Korea[online], available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-from-the-President-Regarding-North-Korea [accessed 18 Nov 2009]
[19] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2009) Tougher Sanctions for North Korea[online], available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/Tougher-Sanctions-for-North-Korea [accessed 19 Nov 2009]