This case study will analyse the circumstances surrounding the catastrophic disaster in Bhopal, India on December 3rd 1984 involving Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) and its subsidiary Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) in which a leak of toxic gas from the manufacturing plant of the latter mentioned, killed and injured thousands of Indian nationals. First I will give a background on the development of the Bhopal incident from its initial occurrence to present day issues. Secondly, discuss the criminogenic nature of transnational companies (TNC) operating in developing countries according to the Routine Activities Theory. Thirdly an analysis of the facts of the incident will be compared to the techniques and characteristics of white collar crime will be done. It will demonstrate the numerous omissions and commissions of the state and corporation which enabled the disaster to occur, including the failure of regulation and enforcement. In conclusion, my analysis of the circumstances will show that regardless of the direct cause of the leakage – sabotage, failure of safety mechanisms etc, two parties are generally liable for the extent of the disaster – The Union Carbide Corporation and the Government of India (GOI) (Eckerman, 2005).
My research methodology for this essay required gathering relevant data from the specified documents in various databases in order to analyse the material and arrive at a more complete understanding of the Union Carbide Corporation Bhopal Disaster, as such I essentially used secondary data.
A TNC is a company which has its headquarters and assembly or production facilities, called subsidiaries situated in different geographical locations. Coca Cola, Nike and BP are examples of TNC’s. Businesses move operations to foreign countries for many reasons including to increase their market share, cheaper infrastructural costs and labour, to avoid taxes or trade barriers in their home countries and some may receive special foreign government grants or even subsidies to set up business in the new location. These ventures bring both benefits and disadvantages to the host countries. In the host country when a TNC moves in the government benefits from revenue earned from corporate taxes, improved infrastructure and technology. Citizen’s benefit from the local infrastructure built to service the entity, employment which allows higher wages for an improved living condition and training in new technologies and or skills set.
The entry of TNC’s into developing countries is not without its problems though some have significant power and influence on the legal and political climate of host countries (Michalowski and Kramer, 1987). Others violate laws resulting in serious economic losses to consumers, governments as well as injury or death to thousands of citizens and employees such as in the manufacture and sale of unsafe drugs and other products, unsafe working conditions and pollution (Clinton and Yeager, 1980). These violations underpin the broad topic of Corporate Violence, a form of White Collar Crime. There is no single definition for white collar crime as practitioners and criminologists are still undecided. There are basically two ways in which it can be defined, either offender based or offense based.
Sutherland’s (1983) offender based definition states that it is a crime committed by a person of respectability with high social status in the course of his occupation. For the purposes of this essay and ease of reference I will use the offender based definition because it includes the social status of the offender – in this case senior executives in TNC’s who are the decision makers, the location of the offences in the offender’s occupation – the TNC or subsidiaries and finally because they include non-criminal acts – most forms of white collar crime are not catered for under the criminal law instead they are listed under Environmental laws, Anti Trust legislation etc. (proof?). White collar crime can manifest in different ways. Corporate violence is one such form and can be defined as behaviour producing an unrealistic risk of physical harm to consumers, employees or other persons as a result of deliberate decision making by corporate executives or culpable negligence on their part (Monahan, Novaco and Geis, 1979).
Reconstruction or Explication of the facts: 1400 words
UCC was an American company headquartered in Danbury, Connecticut, USA. In 1934 it acquired Fifty one percent (51%) of shares in Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL), a diversified manufacturing company located in the Madhya Pradesh region of India. Other shareholders of UCIL included the GOI, financial Institutions and other private investors from India (Union Carbide, 2015). In 1984 UCC recorded sales of Nine and a half billion dollars ($9.5 billion USD) and was one of the largest industrial companies in the world. UCIL operated under UCC’s Hong Kong based international division – the Union Carbide Eastern Division (Shrivastava, 1992) and was 50 years old at the time of acquisition. UCIL operated fourteen (14) plants, organized into five (5) operating divisions employing a total of nine thousand (9000) persons. The subsidiary manufactured amongst other things, the pesticide called SEVIN. The main raw material for production was methyl isocyanate was (MIC) which was imported from the United States of America (USA).
The Bhopal plant, whose design was similar to the UCC’s plant in Institute Virginia, USA, was operated by Indian locals who operated on a system adapted from the parent company. All major decisions on company operations and even the design of the plant were made by directives originating from the UCC Management Committee in Danbury, Connecticut and transmitted down the line of authority to the local Indian management (Baxi and Paul, 1986). UCC personally had a presence in India in the form of project managers, engineers and safety personnel for audits even up to the time of the incident. UCIL was the next largest employer in the area besides the GOI. In the Madhya Pradesh area, Bhopal was an industrialized city growing too quickly for the government to properly control and organize enough proper basic infrastructure. The amount of poor uneducated citizens moving en masse to the area seeking jobs and a better standard of living in addition to the lack of housing and basic infrastructure created a chaotic environment. Squatter slums and shanty towns started to develop two of which – Jaya Prakash and Kenchi Chola were located right next to the plant (Shrivastava, 1992). Overtime the tenants of the slums were given land ownership by the government (proof?)
Around 1956 the GOI promoted an agricultural scheme to encourage locals to grow their own food in an effort to become self-sufficient, this caused the demand for pesticides to increase. UCIL was primarily a manufacturer of batteries and the decision was made by the UCC Management Committee to diversify in an attempt to increase profits and market share. Over time, increased competition in the growing pesticide industry forced prices of UCIL’s product to decrease. Soon, environmental conditions and poor crops caused many farmers to lose money, so they opted to purchase a cheaper form of pesticide causing sales to drastically drop at UCIL. UCC Management decided to employ a “backward integration” strategy to improve the profit margins and increase competition therefore the decision was made to manufacture MIC at the Bhopal plant. Higher GOI officials, overruled and objection by lower government officials and granted the corporation the license (Shrivastava, 1992). The domestic manufacture of MIC commenced shortly after.
UCIL’s performance still did not improve, UCC top management eventually decided to sell the plant. Downsizing and cost cutting initiatives mostly in the area of safety and labour were employed (Gupta, 2002). As a non-profitable area UCIL did not receive support or management attention for its operations and eventually reports of poor maintenance, high employee turnover, minor accidents with untrained employees occurred but these were all ignored by the parent company in the USA (Punch, 1996). Selling the factory proved difficult so an alternative decision was then made by the UCC management committee to dismantle the factory and ship it to either Indonesia or Brazil. Orders were sent via the Head of the Hong Kong Division to UCIL to prepare feasibility and cost reports on 29th November, 2015. The mission was deemed near impossible and expensive because of the heavy corrosion of the plant (Baxi and Paul, 1986).
At around 12.40 am on December 3rd 1984, three days after the feasibility report, several plant workers at UCIL tried feverishly to solve a problem – pressure was building in a storage tank that stored the dangerous chemical MIC (Shrivastava, 1992). Fighting through absolute fear and panic they tried numerous times to solve the problem by turning on several safety devices which all failed. They tried switching on the refrigeration system to cool the tank but that failed. They also tried flushing the pipe system with water. That failed. The blow down valve of TANK 610, which stored the MIC was malfunctioning and was left open. Water along with catalytic material (iron, rust etc.) entered the storage tank through the open valve and mixed with approximately forty two (42) pounds of MIC causing an exothermic reaction. This resulted in high temperatures and pressure in the tank causing gases to form. The toxic gas escaped into the atmosphere between approximately 12.15 am and 2.30 pm (Chouhan, 2005). The workers fled the plant in terror. The alarm to warn the residents of danger was turned off not to alarm them. (cite) Public officials and emergency services were notified quite some time after. There was no evacuation plan for the residents of the area, emergency and medical services were not properly briefed and trained for a situation like this.
Residents in the densely populated slums and shanty towns were instructed to run for their lives by emergency personnel. Approximately 200 000 men, women and children fled scared into the darkness of night, running from an invisible death. Those who tried to escape the unseen terror, barely survived and were converging en masse into the local hospitals on a bewildered medical staff who knew nothing about the “killer gas” or even antidotes to treat the problem (ICMR, 2010). The head of medical department of Union Carbide Dr Loya, when contacted stated he did not know any antidote and the gas was a minor irritant. Medical staff received information that the gas may have been a type of cyanide therefore sodium thiosulphate was unsuccessfully used as an antidote (Bisraya and Puri, 2005). Emergency personnel could not reach to the area or contact affected residents properly because there were no proper roads, lights and telephone communication lines.
Morning found death strewn all over a stunned city with bodies of animals and residents laying on sidewalks, streets, railway platforms, slum huts, bus stands and waiting halls (Shrivastava, 1992). UCC’s website claims that approximately 5,200 persons died that night and several thousand others suffered permanent or partial disabilities (Union Carbide, 2015) which pales in comparison to reports to other organisations who estimate the death over a period of three days to be from 7000 to 15 000 (Amnesty International, 2004) with thousands more surviving but suffering long term health problems. No accurate record was kept by government officials of the dead because authorities were inundaunted with the magnitude of bodies arriving which was a health hazard, numerous citizens who left the limits of Bhopal and whole families died so there was no one left to give and verify information. Cite. After the accident UCC sent a team of seven (7) engineers and scientists to UCIL to dispose of the remaining MIC stored in underground tanks, for which the plant had no long-term permission from the government to store (Bisraya and Puri, 2005). They also were mandated to do an internal investigation by UCC.
Government seized control of the factory and did not allow any involvement by external UCC staff (Browning, 1993; Kalelker, 1988). Shortly after the incident UCC commenced a public relations campaign and strategically refused to divulge information on the leak to stakeholders. This hindered the timely administration of possible counteractive medical treatment to treat the thousands of other ailing victims of the catastrophe. Surviving victims commenced legal action against UCC in the American courts. The GOI passed a law and took upon itself the responsibility as plaintiff in the matter on behalf of the affected citizens in order to manage compensation. The matter in the US court was transferred to the Indian Supreme Courts for various reasons and UCC and the GOI settled for Four hundred and seventy million dollars ($ 470 000 000) based on the claim that only Three thousand (3000) persons had died and One hundred and two thousand were injured as a result of exposure (Kumar, 2004; Punch, 1996). To date thousands have died from complications and generations are suffering health related complications because of exposure to the chemicals. Numerous claims from citizens have not been settled and the GOI has rejected thousands of claims. There is inadequate medical assistance for the survivors and victims’ especially since the exact composition of the gas was not released by UCC (Amnesty International, 2004). The polluted area surrounding UCIL has not been cleaned up by the UCC, its agents neither the GOI. The land and water aquifers remain polluted to this day. Thus far no one has been held accountable.
Criminal Opportunity and Corporate Violence: UCC in India
In this section I will firstly evaluate this case according to the opportunity structure for commission of White Collar Crime manifested as corporate violence using the Rational Choice Theory. The properties and characteristics of White Collar Crime demonstrated will be discussed to gain an understanding of what occurred and the enabling factors. I will use investigative reports and court documents from Union Carbide Corporation, other interested parties and subject matter experts. It must be noted that no official documentation is available from the Government of India because no official efforts were made to collect and distribute same (Dinham and Sarangi, 2002).
Bhopal was not an accident or sabotage as concerned entities would like the public to believe. It is what many criminologists would deem a “corporate crime”, a “crime of the powerful” involving states and corporations who commit illegal acts with far greater economic, physical and social costs that those associated with conventional crime…(Tombs and Whyte, 2003). The issue with corporate crime is that whilst it may not be a criminal act many of the offences are illegal in that they breach regulations however the legal status of the term is still developing. Thousands of lives were lost, the environment polluted and many persons continue to suffer years after as a result of exposure, due to Union Carbide Corporation’s disregard of local laws, regulations, and the compromise of health and safety regulations; deliberately placing citizens and workers in harm’s way in their quest to maximize profits. Additionally the failure of the GOI to ensure proper infrastructure was in place and its measures for enforcement or compliance for breaches will also be examined as these were enabling factors.
Criminal opportunities are recognized as an important cause of crime (Felson, 2002). According to the Routine Activities Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) a criminal opportunity arises when there is a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian. In this case the suitable target was UCIL factory, Bhopal in the then developing country of India. Most multinational companies seek countries that have suitable conditions for operations like the lowest corporate taxes, lax laws/regulations and a huge, cheap labor force. Multinational companies create employment and pay better wages than most local companies so most employees in a society with high unemployment rates, would not risk losing their employment by complaining to authorities about substandard working conditions. Additionally, Transnational companies benefit host countries like India by increasing the employment and income levels, earning the government revenue from taxes imposed. Most MNCs command assets worth more than the national income of their host countries, therefore they are perceived to be more powerful (Ahaikpor, 2015).
The GOI was aware of safety and pollution issues at UCIL but was hesitant to enforce sanctions on the struggling industry because it feared the economic effects of the loss of such a large employer, in the event that UCC decided to shift operations to another country where there was no government interference (Baafi, 2009; Broughton, 2005). UCIL was the largest employer in that area besides the GOI. The country had pollution and industrial laws in place (NPC, 1981) but the focus was not on pollution and industrial safety rather on deforestation which was much cheaper financially to monitor and control (Shrivastava, 1992). All of these factors I posit contributed to the GOI absconding from their duties (absence of a capable guardian).
Legitimate access to the location where the crime was committed, 2) spatial separation from the victim and (3) an appearance of legitimacy of the offenders actions, are the three properties of white collar crime (Benson and Simpson, 2009). Not all white collar crimes experience all three characteristics, some would have interaction between the victim and offender. I will now illustrate how UCC satisfied these three properties in Bhopal. The GOI had strategic plans for the country to become self-sufficient in producing food, as a result the demand for pesticides grew and UCC seized the opportunity for production to increase their market share and diversify. The GOI would also benefit in the form of lower unemployment rates and taxes. UCC opened a new Agricultural Products Division in 1969 to initially formulate the chemicals not manufacture therefore there was no great risk posed to the community or workers at large. However in 1974 they applied for and were granted an industrial license to begin manufacturing ultra-hazardous products in order to take advantage of economies of scale. Local authorities in the Madhya Pradesh region objected to the production and cited legitimate safety reasons but it was over ruled by higher GOI authorities, UCC soon commenced the domestic manufacture of MIC (Shrivastava, 1996) at the UCIL Bhopal plant. This license gave UCC legitimate access to produce the chemical in the country and an appearance of legitimacy.
In making a case for spatial separation, after the incident UCC commenced a public relations campaign which repeatedly stated that UCIL was a subsidiary which was locally designed, owned, operated and maintained by Indian nationals in an effort to shift culpability (Broughton, 2005). UCC owned Fifty one percent (51%) of UCIL’s shares which made it a subsidiary. Subsidiaries are companies which are wholly owned or majority controlled by another company called the “parent.” The parent and subsidiary are separate entities and independent of one another but a deciding factor for liability is the amount of control from the parent company. It is a strategy used by large businesses to expand business operations and spread liability risks (Hudson, 2015). They further tried to separate the company from liability by stating the GOI had strict stipulations on the employment of foreign nationals and the ownership of the land and factory and at the time of the accident UCC had no employees on active duty there (Browning, 1993; Baxi and Paul, 1986). This was an attempt to show that UCC had no level of control over UCIL which meant both companies operated independently. However, this claim can be disputed in that the majority of corporate decisions from the design of the UCIL factory, decisions on products to manufacture, safety audits and other strategic decisions were made by UCC management committee in USA. One such example is (decision to manufacture MIC and
Now we will examine the three techniques used to perpetuate white collar crimes namely (1) deception, (2) abuse of trust and (3) concealment and conspiracy (Benson and Simpson, 2009). Any one or combination of these techniques may be used to commit the offense. The primary technique used in the offense is deception which occurs when one individual or organisation causes another to experience a discrepancy between appearance and reality. It is a relational occurrence, in that it describes the context of the interaction between the two parties – the deceiver and the deceived (Rue, 1994). In order to determine that deception occurred two elements must be satisfied – (1) the deceiver must knowingly intend to deceive another and the other party must have been misled.
Firstly, UCC management informed UCIL workers and the GOI that the Bhopal plant was designed and built on the basis of 20 years’ experience of manufacturing MIC in the West Virginia, USA plant. Iinvestigations after the accident revealed vast structural differences between the plants in terms of emergency safety features, the Bhopal plant was inferior in structure to the USA plant. It was not built to handle such high degrees of risks (Chouhan, 2005). Secondly, when UCC decided upon a ‘backward integration’ strategy by to manufacture MIC in Bhopal it never informed stakeholders of the potential dangers of the chemical. In so far as shortly after the accident there were no emergency plans in place by city officials and medical institutions because no one knew what chemicals used at the factory had affected the citizens and how it should be treated. Had the company informed relevant stakeholders about the true dangers of the chemicals no reasonable thinking individual/agency would not have granted a license to manufacture or continued the risk of allowing dwelling houses around the perimeter of the factory. Finally after the accident, UCC deliberately deceived medical and emergency personnel by withholding information concerning the exact composition of leaked gases most likely in an attempt to decrease liability. The unavailability of information about MIC Toxicity and detoxification / therapeutic intervention hampered treatment efforts (ICMR, 2010).
The second characteristic – Abuse of Trust or violation of trust occurs in an ‘agency relationship’. This happens whenever an individual or organisation (agent) is authorized to “act for” or “on behalf of” another individual or organisation (principal). The agent provides the principal with a specialized good or service that the principal cannot do itself. Also these relationships varied in terms of control (Shapiro, 1990). In some instances the Principal would exert a certain amount of control over the agent which would reduce the principal being taken advantage of. For example a woman with working knowledge about transmission engines going to get her fuel injected car repaired by a mechanic. Alternatively, there can be a balanced interaction between the two parties. UCC and UCIL was a perfect example of an agency relationship. It was mandatory that all serious and fatal accidents at UCIL be reported to UCC Management Committee. Several safety inspections were done at UCIL by staff of the USA Institute plant who flew to India to conduct such inspections. One such audit occurred in May 1982 by three (3) technicians who submitted a report to UCC headquarters’ outlining major safety concerns and possibilities for “personnel exposure” at the plant. The information was never relayed to UCIL management in India to make corrections (Baxi and Paul, 1986, Shrivastava, 1992). There was an implied expectation of trust from UCIL that UCC as the parent company would have executed its duties in good faith.
The last technique, Concealment and Conspiracy. For ordinary street crimes an offender may do reconnaissance of a business to get information on the movements of staff and money to plan a robbery. In actually carrying out the act he many hide his face to conceal his identity, dispose of any weapons used after or destroy CCTV recordings. If caught he will offer an alibi as a defense to negate criminal liability. In White Collar Crime it is different. Concealment and conspiracy are used to ensure that the element of deception is achieved (Benson and Simpson, 2009). One of the many examples are of UCC refuting claims that the gases released were harmful and contained no long term effects, it never revealed the exact composition of the gases released stating that it was a trade secret. Trade secrets are not usually disclosed to the public. Owners of trade secrets seek to protect such information from competitors by instituting special procedures for handling it, as well as technological and legal security measures, but this usually varies by jurisdiction (Elbaum, 2011). In the Browning (1993) report UCC stated that studies by India’s Council of Medical Research stated serious lung injury was limited to a small percentage of the population and that there were no serious residual eye disease also no evidence exposure to the gases caused cancer, birth or any other delayed health defects. Additionally it tried to substantiate its claim by stating the U.S. National Institute of Health amongst other scientific agencies conducted tests on the effects of MIC and concluded that no latent long-term problems were expected.
However, the ICMR report (2010) stated otherwise. It stated that in tests conducted over a ten (10) year period on deceased victims and survivors, that MIC and its derivatives were present in the tissues, organs and blood samples. Various independent studies have shown when MIC is exposed to 200° heat, it forms degraded MIC which contains the more deadly hydrogen cyanide. Additional evidence showed temperature in the storage tank reached this level and the cherry-red color of blood, characteristic of acute cyanide poisoning also supports this theory (Mangla, 1989 cited in Broughton, 2005). Medical records from treatment over the years have revealed an increase in an array of health issues like respiratory illnesses, immune system impairment, neurological and neuromuscular damage, cancer, gynecological disorders, high rates of miscarriages and mental health problems amongst other ailments experienced by survivors and their off spring (Amnesty International, 2004).
In most businesses labour costs are high and impact overall profitability hence there is always incentive to reduce labor costs whenever possible. One way of doing this is by skimping on safety in the process endangering workers (Benson and Simpson, 2009).
During the period 1980 to 1984 at UCIL at least six serious accidents occurred as a direct consequence of compromising safety, one resulted in the in the death of an employee (Gupta, 2002). In subsequent interviews with former employees including a mechanical engineer in charge of safety, who had left the plant one year before the accident, he stated, “On the day of the tragedy, not a single safety mechanism was in place”, additionally staff were unqualified to work in the MIC plant (Pareek, 1999 cited in Gupta, 2002) since most employees were new, having been transferred from other divisions operated by the subsidiary. To hide the fact that safety was compromised and further try to eliminate culpability UCC proffered a series of conspiracy theories about the nature of the incident.
Stories varied from a “water washing theory” by public relations firm Arthur Little Inc, which stated a disgruntled employee directly introduced water into the MIC tank, an attempt to divert attention from the fact that all four safety mechanisms failed due to negligence and/or serious cost cutting measures. Another theory stated that employees tried to cover up unwarranted transfers of MIC between tanks by forging documents (Kalelker, 1998). Particularly interesting is the fact that in the same Arthur D. Little report an “independent investigation” and the Browning report penned by the former Vice President of Union Carbide Safety, both funded was funded by UCC, contradicted statements made by company attorneys during court proceedings who claimed to have had a sworn affidavit that a group of Sikh extremists called ‘Black June’ claimed responsibility for the accident (Shrivastava, 1986; Browning, 1993; Kalelker, 1998).
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Bhopal gas tragedy in India will remain as the worst industrial accident to occur in history. It is a classic example of corporate violence perpetuated by a powerful actor resulting with little to no sanctions or accountability by company executives whose pursuit of profit was the root cause. GOI contributed to the disaster by their unwillingness to enforce compliance with its environmental laws and regulations for fear of the economic effects of UCC ceasing production in the country. White collar crime is a problem globally and only through the enforcement strict laws and regulations which are adapted periodically will such activities be lessened. Construction of these laws and regulations would need participation from global stakeholders to ensure compliance and ensure enforcement so that no individual in the world would suffer indefinitely because of a company’s relentless and inconsiderate pursuit of profit.
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in here…