Regarding R v Rita, the issues are whether Rita is liable for a homicide offence and whether she has any defences. Gross negligence manslaughter provides an offence where the defendant, despite not consciously risking any harm towards the victim, acts in a severely negligent manner, resulting in death (the most serious harm of all). The prima facie elements of negligence are duty; breach; causation; and damages.
Rita had a moral duty to take care of her sister, Jenny. Rita knew that Jenny had a history of anorexia; those who are familiar with eating disorders would be aware of the fact that since they are a mental illness, they never truly go away; the disordered thoughts simply ease with time and hard work. This indicates that Rita wanted to cause Jenny harm, or at the very least sabotage her career in ballet; it could be argued that Rita had the mens rea for murder due to her actions prior to Jenny’s cardiac arrest and subsequent death – ‘praising her daily’ for her weight loss when she knew of Jenny’s predisposal to anorexia would inevitably lead to a dangerous amount of weight loss which could lead to cardiac arrest and then death, which anyone who had any knowledge of anorexia would know.
Murder can be caused by an omission, if the defendant has a duty of care imposed on them. However, there is a distinction between murder and manslaughter, and there needs to be an actual withholding of food in order for the verdict to be that Rita would be liable for murder. Rita put a lock on the fridge, withholding food from Jenny, and encouraging her not to eat, thereby triggering her anorexia again. The withholding of food caused Jenny grievous bodily injury, which, as a result of, she went into cardiac arrest. If she had wanted to prevent any such occurrence as a cardiac arrest, Rita would have encouraged Jenny to eat, and would not either have locked the fridge, nor ‘praised her daily’ for her weight loss. Regardless of whether or not she desired grievous bodily harm to occur, such as with the case of GIBBINS V PROCTOR 1918, she did not interfere and is therefore guilty of murder.
Although Rita did not administer the shot of adrenaline to Jenny’s eye, Jenny was in that position where it was necessary for her to have a shot of adrenaline as a direct result of Rita’s acts. Such as in the case of R V MITCHELL 1983, there was a chain of causation between the defendant’s actions and the victim’s death; in R v Mitchell, the defendant’s action of pushing an elderly man led to the death of an elderly woman, whom the elderly man fell on. Despite there being no direct contact between defendant and victim, the death would not have occurred had it not been for the defendant pushing the man – the situation was predictable. Likewise, the result of Jenny not eating due to Rita’s encouragement and withholding of food – cardiac arrest – was a very likely consequence. Therefore, it can be assumed that Rita’s acts were calculated to harm A, giving Rita the mens rea for murder, and therefore regardless of whether or not the shot of adrenaline was given by her, Jenny’s death was ultimately caused by her, as the chain of causation was not broken.
Charles, the paramedic, owed a duty of care to Jenny as her paramedic, and the fact that he had 20 years of experience in the field indicates that he should be well-informed and not suddenly procure a fear of the sight of blood, leading to him administering the shot in her eye as opposed to her heart, which was a clear breach of duty, and gross negligence. However, for Charles to be convicted of any sort of manslaughter – in this case it would be gross negligent manslaughter – the negligence must have caused the death in and of itself – in this case, that is not the case. Since Charles was a third party, he carried less liability; due to the situation Jenny was left in that Rita was responsible for, it was foreseeable that a paramedic would need to see to Jenny. This activity affecting Jenny would not arise ‘but for’ the original negligence by Rita, and therefore Rita remains liable unless an unforeseeable third party were to intervene. In conclusion, Rita is liable for murder. She is not liable for gross negligent manslaughter, despite her owing Jenny a moral duty to take care of her as they were sisters, and her breaching this duty, leading to the death of Jenny; since Rita, in my opinion, had the mens rea for murder, manslaughter is not an option.
With regards to R v Martin, the issues are whether Martin is liable for a homicide offence and whether he has any defences. Intoxicants can lower people’s inhibitions and encourage behaviour that is both unpredictable and immoral. The defendant’s behaviour whilst intoxicated will not necessarily be an accurate reflection of said person when they are sober, however, this is no defence to a criminal offence, especially when the intoxication is voluntary.
The intoxicants in question (primarily focusing on the 5 vodka shots drunk after the 3 pints of beer) could be considered as a known ‘dangerous’ intoxicant since vodka is a spirit, and known to bring out aggressive sides of a person. Whether or not Martin had the mens rea for murder, he still had the intent to lock James’s body in the boiler room, and left him there, knowing that he was either dead or going to die, and a drunken intent is still an intent. Similarly, in R V KINGSTON 1994, Kingston was drugged without his knowledge, and engaged in sexual acts with an unconscious boy, and was charged with indecent assault on a child. Regardless of the fact that Kingston was drugged without consent or knowledge, he did intend to commit the offence, and ‘a drugged intent is still an intent’ (judge directing the jury at the trial). As pertains to this, Martin still acted in the way he did out of choice, and therefore he had the necessary mens rea for the offence.
It was a crime of basic intent; Martin did not appear to have an ulterior motive or mens rea for the crime he committed. However, as stated, intoxication cannot be relied on as a defence, since a drunken intent is still an intent; as held in DPP V MAJEWSKI 1977, if it is a crime of basic intent then intoxication cannot be relied on as a defence, when the intoxication is voluntary. Martin chose to run the associated risks.
In R V THABO MALI 1954, in which the defendants struck the victim over the head and, believing him to be dead, rolled him off a cliff, which was what actually caused his death. The offence was not reduced to a lesser offence simply due to the defendants’ misapprehension; regardless of this, they were still guilty of murder. Similar to this is Martin’s situation – despite his misapprehension as to James’s state, there is the requirement of coincidence (actus reus and mens rea) – Martin, whether or not murder was intentional, still locked James in the boiler room, and believed he had killed him.
As was held in THABO MELI, ‘it was impossible to divide up what was really one series of acts; the crime was not reduced from murder to a lesser crime, merely because the appellants were under some misapprehension for a time during the completion of their criminal plot; and, therefore, the appellants were guilty of murder.’ In this vein, Martin was guilty of murder or at the very least involuntary manslaughter (reckless manslaughter) – he was voluntarily intoxicated, it was a crime of basic intent, the intoxicant could be classed as ‘dangerous’, and Martin lacked mens rea due to the intoxication. Therefore Martin was guilty of murder despite lacking mens rea while committing it.
With regards to R v Ben, the issues are whether Ben is liable for a homicide offence and whether he has any defences. Where the defendant has not completed every element of the offence charged, he does not need a defence as he has not committed the offence.
Unlike with most defences, a defendant cannot raise issues of intoxication or insanity without providing clear evidence that shows that either the circumstances or condition applied at the time of the alleged offence. While intoxication provides some moral alleviation, it is not a defence for a criminal offence. However, if the defendant is unaware of the dangers of the intoxicant, and has been, say, prescribed them from a doctor and not been told of any side effects, intoxication will not replace the missing mens rea, and can act as a defence. As a denial of offending, the rule of insanity rationalises the lack of the defendant’s mens rea on the basis of ‘insanity’ as ruled by law – for example, any medical condition which leads to the defendant misunderstanding the quality of their acts. Mental illness is covered under section 16 of the Criminal Code. Diminished responsibility is a partial defence to murder that reduces the defendant’s liability to voluntary manslaughter. If the defendant is not sound of mind, and this abnormality is due to a medical condition, and it impairs the defendant’s ability to form rational judgement and understand what they are doing, then this provides enough excuse to explain the death.
Ben’s intoxication was voluntary, however, due to extenuating circumstances (his mental illness). He lacks subjective mens rea for any offence against Stacy. Due to his mental illness impairing his mind, he relied on drugs, and therefore, due to the combination of the two, was unable to comprehend the criminal act at the time. Grieving the loss of someone close to you can have severe psychological consequences, which are equally as debilitating as a physical illness, often leading to drug use. Furthermore, due to Ben’s new antidepressants, he was having hallucinations – while Ben was using drugs at the time of Stacy’s death, he was likely unaware that the combination of heroin and his medication would lead to such intense hallucinations and urges. Furthermore, Ben was not aware of the potential dangers (hallucinations) of his medication, and therefore, although it was a crime of basic intent, his intoxication would not replace the missing mens rea.
In conclusion, Ben is liable for voluntary manslaughter under the defence of diminished responsibility; he committed the murder, however, due to his mental state at the time – because of both his depression and the combination of heroin and antidepressants – was not wholly responsible for his acts. He could argue the defence of intoxication also, due to the fact that he was unaware of the potential side effects.