Factor Deduction Conclusion
Russian Federation Armed Forces (RFAF) getting in control of Crimea (March 2014).
• Continuing access to the naval base of Sevastopol
• Warships and support vessels formerly part of the Ukrainian navy could enter into the Russian Fleet
• Securing the military benefits and regaining influence over Ukraine’s future direction. • Avoid further degradation of the crisis in Ukraine
• Continue to implement assurance measures
• The possible “integration” of Ukraine to the West (EU/NATO) is much less attractive by the Russian presence in Crimea.
• The presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol (Crimea)
• Modernisation of that fleet (advanced supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, air defense systems and torpedoes; the coastal defence system armed with Yakhont anti-ship missiles. )
• Presence of Iskander mobile ballistic missile systems in Crimea The Black Sea Fleet (after its modernisation ), shall provide Russia with substantial operational capability in the region:
• to control the Black Sea basin
• to ensure the security of its southern borders
• to project power in and around the Black Sea
• to carry out Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) operations throughout the region. • Continue its intelligence collection efforts, its investments in and deployment of missile defence systems and submarine detection systems
• Undertake negotiations on non-proliferation
• Increase its presence in the Black Sea by ‘show the flag’ operations, also being deterrent at the same time
• Support Turkey’s surveillance of the Turkish Streets.
Crimea as an operating base for future military action against Ukraine :
• Naval means
• Advanced combat aircraft • Russia can threaten Ukraine on three fronts now (northeast, southeast and south)
• Potential naval blockade against Ukraine’s southern ports and potential amphibious operations at selected coastal targets
• Deep operations inside Ukraine to strike strategic targets or provide ground support for Russian forces and interdict Ukrainian troop movements • Avoid further degradation of the crisis in Ukraine.
• Start negotiations with the Russian Federation.
• In order to change the relationship of distrust to a normalised one, NATO should involve the Russian Federation instead of excluding them from their operations.
• Air defense capabilities upgraded
• Integrated air defense system (S-400 area defense platform installed) • Significantly enhancing Russia’s air defence capabilities on its southern flank.
• Deterrence • Increase its presence in the Black Sea by ‘show the flag’ operations
• Capabilities needed to counter deterrence
Relative geographic isolation of Crimea
Very difficult for enemy forces to retake it (easy to defend). Crimea: a lost “case” for Ukraine
=> The Alliance should start diplomatic negotiations with Russia (improve their relationship and solve the crisis).
Sevastopol serves as headquarters to the newly constituted Mediterranean Task Force (MTF). • Russia‘s reach extended and its prestige enhanced. (again a major power in the Black Sea)
• Sevastopol: potential SPOE (strategic projection) • NATO should show its presence in the region like they already do in the Baltic States
• Intelligence collection on the MTF
In Crimea, all the prerequisites to apply the new operational concept in an effective way were present. Russia’s strategy is to maintain a sphere of influence in former Soviet states and at the same time disrupt EU and NATO involvement in the area.
The Russian annexation of Crimea (March 2014) was the result of a combination of military tools and state tools to reach its policy goals:
• Covert use of Special Operations Forces with subterfuge (civilian self-defence forces)
• Combination of non-military, covert and subversive asymmetric means (hybrid warfare)
• Gradually transitioning from “little green men” and self-defence forces to clearly marked high readiness forces • Confronting Russian military power in the future will require an expanded toolkit for NATO Allies. (confrontation with an asymmetrical approach – hybrid warfare)
• Intelligence collection to anticipate on Russian military actions
• Effective implementation of assurance measures
The EU and NATO are increasing their sphere of influence more towards the East and in this way they encounter Russia. Increased dominance of anti-Western sentiment in Russia and amongst ethnic Russian minorities in former Soviet States; the conviction that the West intends to bring about regime change in Russia • Strategic Communications to deny false accusations by Russia, inform the population in former Soviet States
• Enhance the relationship with Russia
• Involve Russia in their operations
Overall vast offshore oil and gas resources of Crimea in the Black Sea. Nationalisation of oil and gas companies by Gazprom. (figure 1) • Increase its presence in the Black Sea by ‘show the flag’ operations
• Ensure freedom of movement in the Black Sea
The Black Sea is a huge economic thoroughfare from the Caucasus region and the Caspian Sea to central and Eastern Europe. Traffic on the Black Sea accounts for 300 ships a day. Russia has started to re-shape its territorial sea and the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the northern Black Sea (figures 2 and 3), putting Ukraine in an even more vulnerable state economically, militarily and politically.
Ukraine is worried about losing very large shale gas fields as well as 45% of its national coal reserves in the eastern region due to the separatist conflict. Risk for Ukraine to lose more natural resources if there would be an expansion or degradation of the crisis in the eastern regions. • Increase its presence in the Black Sea by ‘show the flag’ operations and avoid further degradation of the crisis in Ukraine.
• Start negotiations with Russia
For its agricultural and industrial activities, Crimea remains dependent on water and electricity from Ukraine. • There are frequent blackouts and disruptions.
• The closure of the North Crimean Canal, the main irrigation source for Crimea’s interior dry steppe lands, has adversely affected agriculture, with numerous crops failing. • NATO should closely monitor the situation in both Ukraine and Crimea.
• Avoid further degradation of the crisis in Ukraine
• Comprehensive approach
• The total population of Crimea is 2.3 million with 58% ethnic Russians, 24% Ukrainians and 18% Tartars.
• Concerning the native language, this is the 2014 situation: 84% Russian, 7.9% Crimean-Tatar, 3.7% Tatar and 3.3% Ukrainian (figure 2). • The protection of ethnic Russians living in Crimea in a time of political changes in Ukraine should be seen as a symbolical act. President Putin sent troops to Crimea to protect the interests of the majority of ethnic Russians.
• Crimea can serve as a symbol to encourage pro-Russian factions in Ukraine to support Russia. • With strategic communications, NATO should counter the false accusations of wanting to destabilise the Russian Federation by the approach to former Soviet States.
• Effective intelligence collection should allow the Alliance to anticipate on military actions (annexation of Crimea, clandestine support to Ukrainian separatists in the East)
The ethnic Tatars (18% of Crimea’s population) always remained a reliable pro-Ukrainian and pro-Western bloc. They were seen as ‘the’ enemy to Russia. Since the annexation: persecution with their freedom and rights having been attacked repeatedly Monitoring of the rights of the minorities in Crimea is needed, maybe by cooperation with the EU or the OSCE.
Crimean Tatars and other Muslims in Crimea have come under new jurisdiction; they also have a strong affinity with Chechens. • Islamic organisations with transnational connections designated or banned as terrorist organisations.
• Islamic literature closely monitored, publications banned as ‘extremist literature’ and ‘unregistered mosques’ closed.
By addressing the ethnic Russian-minority (through means like media), Russia emphasizes their Russian heritage based on language, history and unique Russian culture. These narratives enhance
• the minorities’ feelings of marginalization by their government
• a sense of self-worth belonging (honour) and pro-Russian popular sentiments
• a perception that ‘Mother Russia’ has more to offer than the native country (interest) • NATO needs to get in depth view (by intelligence collection) on the Russian minorities in possible target countries.
• NATO needs to tackle the causes that lead to the sentiment of reunification; by strategic communication it can try to influence the view of the ethnic minority.
• This should be part of a comprehensive approach as “military” means alone won’t be able to influence that view.