1. Training, acceptance and Moral courage. The first failing was in assessing Sir Malcolm’s present suitability for the role of DLO; by both the MoD and himself. Sir Malcolm stated ‘I don’t believe I was qualified to do the job, for want of a better word, fully’ but he never felt he was able to share this point prior to taking up the role of CDL. On the part of the MoD, even a wavetop assessment of the current state of the DLO and it’s transformation programme would have either yielded a plan to extend Sir Sam Cowan’s tenure or to seek out the most qualified person possible based on previous experience and training. There are many roles in the RAF which people take up feeling under prepared due to lack of provided training (normally due to tight timelines involved in postings, or lack of available courses) – this needs to be addressed. The pressure to accept a job once offered at Air Rank seems to have been very evident in this case. Sir Maclom stated on this issue ‘I don’t think I could have done that to the House of Commons Defence committee…”Thank you very much for this great honour, Sir, but I am not taking the job”’.
On realising the gravity of the job he had inherited (described as a ‘Poison Chalice’ and a ‘hospital pass’ in the Haddon-Cave report) Sir Malcolm could have applied moral courage in a number of ways. A complete reassessment of the present status of the DLO transformation and it’s progress may well have annoyed a few people, notably those who were involved with the McKinsey review, but may well have given him the evidence to challenge the strategic objective that had been set – 20% cut in operating costs. Both the assessment and challenge would have required immense amounts of moral courage and personal fortitude, but empowering the individual IPTs and members of the DLO to provide these assessments (rather than external agencies) would have not only showed strong leadership but also given Sir Malcolm the confidence to take the assessment to the Defence Committee. A senior officer, even at Air Rank, is at the will of the Government, and challenging this will has ended badly for many Generals (CLM case study 3 for example); but the ability to present specific facts regarding the present situation, along with a proposed ‘get well’ roadmap, is a skill senior leaders should aim to hone. To not tell the Emperor he is not wearing any clothes is not acceptable in todays military; it demonstrates poor followership. His acceptance of the task (which in itself was assumed rather than specifically given), and lack of flexibility in the face of a changing backdrop (increased operational tempo with the beginning of Op TELIC) could be connected back to his lack of training and experience. Sir Malcolm felt the need to attend only a 2 week course at the IMD business school in Switzerland and had only 5 months of previous relevant experience as AOC logistics command.
2. Safety Cases. Another failing highlighted in the paper which could be traced back before Sir Malcolm’s time, but not addressed during it, is that of the failing nature of Defence Safety Cases. Again, a lack of formal training, and a reliance on out sourcing, was highlighted. A leader needs to ensure that their people are trained in what they require them to do. In this case the individual IPTs and indeed the hierarchy above them, were lacking in Safety Analysis training. The restructuring put forward by McKinsey was not challenged to the point that maybe it should have been; in order to do this the person challenging it must be coming from an informed position. Sir Malcolm was not able to challenge the current process of Safety Cases; which had become expensive, lengthy paperwork exercises that were not operator focussed or in any way ‘living’ documents.
2.2 LT GEN RICARDO SANCHEZ, AS COMMANDER OF COALITION GROUND FORCES IN IRAQ, JUN 03-JUN 04
1. Preparing for war, the role of a General. Throughout many military teachings and commentary, the failing of preparing for the next war by assuming it will look like the last one is well noted. In the case of the 2003 Iraq invasion this prophetic analysis once again came true. The Generals who should have been advising the policy makers on the ways and means of a successful invasion of Iraq failed in their job and displayed a lack of moral courage by not advising truthfully. Congress, in appointing or not objecting to the appointment of Gen Ricardo Sanchez also failed. Gen Sanchez was under qualified as well as not being the right personality for the position handed to him. No one in the relevant positions were willing to stand up and say this. His relationship that developed with the senior civilian in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer III, was toxic. The contempt held for each other led to a lack of communication in both directions; Gen Sanchez had lost focus as to the role of the General within the civilian military construct.
2. Arrogance as a shield. The arrogance of Gen Sanchez, evident throughout ‘The Generals’ by Thomas Ricks, could be said to be misplaced. This arrogance was most probably fostered by a belief that the plan was unclear, experience was lacking and failure was a real possibility. In displaying this to both his superiors and subordinates, Sanchez succeeded in alienating people in both directions. If people under his command were succeeding, by either not implementing his orders or by adjusting them to the situation they found themselves in, they were scorned (as demonstrated in Sancez’ visit to Ramadi as directed by the new CenCom chief, Gen John Abizad). With a lack of agility, Sanchez failed to analyse both the current situation and the probable effects of Bremers plan (to delay elections and oust everyone who had been affiliated with the Ba’ath party) which led to a rapid deterioration of relations with the Iraqi people and a vacuum which was filled by insurgents.
3. Strategic issues, tactical problems. If a General is to keep the respect of his people, then he must display sound ethical guidance, but also be wiling to take responsibility for all that ‘happened on his watch’. In the case of the Abu Ghraib prison revelations, Sanchez seemingly displayed neither of these virtues. Maj Pryer in a 2009 review of the Generals performance it was noted that ‘Lt Gen Sanchez approved two interrogation policy memoranda that were, at best, poorly considered and poorly written’. This could never be directly attributed as the cause of the abuse at Abu Ghraib, but may be an indication of the lack of ethical guidance offered by Gen Sanchez on a larger scale. His inability to accept that these things had happened under his direct command, and his later dissent towards the policies and objectives of the administration displays, at best, a lack of followership and integrity, and at worst a complete delusion as to the events that had occurred and the reasons for them. The tactical problems that this kind of toxic leadership creates are varied and heavily dependant on the situation. In the case of Iraq, the troops, who were very well trained for the war they were not fighting, did not have the command guidance they required and so took on the attitude of doing enough to stay alive and get home as soon as possible.