Should civilians intervene intrusively in military decision-making? What are the arguments for and against a civilian hands-on approach?
If democracies like other states depend on an organized coercive power, the military requires sufficient autonomy to perform their duties while remaining subordinate to the state and be submitted to the principles of accountability (Cruz and Diamint, 1998, 120). Thus, the armed forces’ ‘’dedicated autonomy’’ allows the military areas of expertise while harnessing institutional prerogatives (Cruz and Diamint, 1998, 120). In the 1960’s and 1970’s, the military released themselves from the principle of ‘’dedicated autonomy’’, driving Latin America to darkness. After two decades of military rule, Latin America embarked in the democratic transition in the 1990’s: Argentina in 1983, Peru in 1985, Brazil in 1985 and Chile in 1990. However, the fragility of these democracies is still at stake (McSherry, 2018). Even with civilian governments at the head of most Latin American states today, the military coups in Venezuela (2002), Honduras (2009) as well as the failed coup attempts in Bolivia (2009) and in Ecuador (2010) demonstrates the military’s strength and ability to be a decisive actor in state politics (Skaar and Malca, 2014, 1). How to create and preserve a military that is subordinate to the authority of a regime’s political leaders but strong enough to fulfill its functions? (Croissant and Kuehn, 2017, 1). I argue in this essay civilians should intervene in military matters1 to restore efficient democratic institutions and effective military subordination. By intervening intrusively, I mean engaging in a hands-on approach into the military sphere that in an era of post-authoritarian rule has grown to disproportionate size and political involvement while balancing the approach against the state’s particularities (the risk level an of external threat and taking into account the presence ‘enclave’ military rule vestiges in certain areas). If scholars debate how to achieve military subordination to the democratic government while retaining military effectiveness, I will present the following five themes: a re-calibration of Latin America constitutions and a scholarly advising theory that should take into account historical institutionalism, holding the military accountable of past human rights abuses through ardent political will, intruding in military autonomy over traditional debates around budget and post-allocation supervision all in the aim for a well-rounded policy and stable democracy.
I) The need to reform Latin American states’ constitution
Who is the military an agent of (Feaver, 2003, 97)? If this question is largely settled in the case of the US, it remains problematic in new democracies. Indeed, in Peter Feaver’s (2003, 97) principal-agent framework he assumes that both the civilian government and the armed forces share the idea that the civilian is supposed to be superior to the military. However, when dealing with new democracies it is possible the military views himself as an agent of a ‘’disembodied society’’ rather than a civilian government, impacting on the military’s perception in the capacity of civilian power to delegate authority (Feaver, 2003, 97). In Wiarda and Collins’ view, ‘’the Latin American constitutions elevated the armed forces into an almost fourth branch of government, with special obligations and responsibilities’’ (2011, 8). Indeed, ‘’in Latin America, while one constitutional article may proclaim, that the armed forces are “nonpolitical, non-deliberative, and totally subservient to civilian authority,” another will say they have a special responsibility, even an “obligation,” to intervene under certain circumstances: if the country is attacked, if internal order is upset, or if the political system is gridlocked’’ (Wiarda and Collins, 2011, 3). If the constitution of the US and the Goldwater-Nichols act states military requirements and its sphere of intervention (Bennett, 2010, 3 and Garamone, 2001) the coup that overthrew President Zelaya in Honduras in 2009 shows that even when the United-States and the Organization of American States (OAS) pushed for democracy, the Honduran constitution is more paradoxical, a concept harder to grasp for Americans who find it hard to conceive (Wiarda and Collins, 2011, 8). In another example, directly quoting Chile’s current constitution, we see that again: ‘’the armed forces are obedient, non-deliberative, professional, and disciplined; their only constitutional roles are to defend the motherland and safeguard the political order during elections” (Wiarda and Collins, 2010, 5). Here, the constitution semantics blur the lines between civilian and military roles where the armed forces could be drawn into politics: ‘’who would decide when the “public order” needed defending, by what means, and for how long?’’ (Wiarda and Collins, 2011, 5). In the current context of leading regional economic power, Chile’s democracy seems unlikely to suffer from a coup (McSherry, 2018). If coups occur when civilian leadership is weakened or broken down, the very phrasing of its constitution makes a military coup an endeavor with constitutional legitimacy (Croissant and Kuehn, 2017, 1). Wiarda and Collins (2011, 15) establish that in 12 Latin American countries (60 percent of the continent’s states), the armed forces have a constitutional role usually revolving around an ill-defined term of maintenance of internal order and the exercise of emerging power. To resolve this, either the OAS charter or the 12 constitutions should be rewritten, a lengthy process that will stimulate controversy (Wiarda and Collins, 2011,16).
De Vore (2009, 12) argues there is no perfect model for civilian control of the military. In his analytical framework the ‘’civil-military legacy theory’’, De Vore ‘’links past civilian-military relations with systemically different patterns of defense policy-making, which in turn, give rise to distinct comparative advantages in how states generate military power’’ (2009, 12). With the Latin-American case, Galleguillos’s model agrees with the ‘civil-military legacy theory’ (1998, 1). By taking Chile as an example, Galleguillos argues General Pinochet’s rule of sixteen years profoundly changed Chile’s institutions1, barring Chile from going back to a similar institutional framework as of Salvador Allende’s socialist presidency before the coup of 1973 (1998, 1). Thus, one cannot answer normative questions regarding civilian-military relations if the scholar uses tools that correspond to another era or context (Galleguillos, 1998, 2). Certain scholars argue that the military is well entrenched in politics and perform various roles and responsibilities (McSherry, 2018). For example, Gregory Weeks argues that during democratic transition, the Chilean military consistently circumvented the political institutions in order to achieve their goals, accentuated by a civilian inability to impose costs punishment (2001, 344). In 1994 under Eduardo Frei’s presidency, Chile’s defense minister conservative Christian democrat Edmundo Perez Yoma whose father was killed by left-wing terrorists in 1969 (Weeks, 2001, 337). Perez Yoma directly negotiated with the army who extracted concessions in favor of General Manuel Contreras accused by the Chilean Supreme Court of murdering socialist Orlando Leletier, who served under President Allende as the foreign affairs and defense minister (Weeks, 337). If the Ministry of Defence’s role is to mediate military-executive relations, it should not have any jurisdiction over the judicial system but Yoma directly challenged the court’s authority (Weeks, 2001, 337). Thus, in this situation neither is the autonomy or concentration of authority by an institution very pertinent where ‘’a focus on institutions requires that soldiers not have the capacity or at least the desire to repeatedly disregard official channels by fulfilling their wants outside of them’’ (Pion-Berlin and Arneceaux, 1998, 636). Over time, institutional leverage can change in favor of the citizens, where the civilian government must convince the military to use formal channels for prerogatives (Weeks, 2001, 345).
II) Military Autonomy and remaining ‘guardian structures’
Controlling the military’s autonomy is an important feature of civilian control over the armed forces (Skaar and Malca, 2014, 11). Classical theorists such as Huntington advise civilians a more hands-off approach to give more autonomy to the armed forces in their spheres of expertise to avoid undermining the latter’s ability to fulfill its mission and functions (Feaver, 1999, 228). In Huntington’s view, objective control and professionalization of the armed forces to reduce their tendency to intervene in politics (Skaar and Malca, 2014, 11). However, scholars argue for a different reality in Latin America where ironically military professionalization provided them with the required knowledge to assess the performance of the civilian governments and to intervene when the civilian governments were seen as not protecting the national common good (Skaar and Malca, 2014, 11). Retaining power in the form of public image for governments is a vital factor, where events in the 1990’s allowed Chilean democratic leaders to show the public that professionalism under Pinochet (who retained power as Commander-in-Chief until 1998) had been corrupted (Galleguillos, 1998, 16). For example, in 1992 the broadcast of a taped conversation of right-wing presidential candidate Sebastien Pinera’s private phone by the army’s destroyed Pinera. If the government tried prosecuting members of the armed forces, the military muscle showed its strength by responding in ordering troops, leading the Chilean state in a state of red alert (Galleguillos, 1998, 16). Against this backdrop, several civilian officials express the desire to alter the constitution concerning the right and autonomy of the army. As commander-in-chief, General Pinochet appeared in Congress to contest the constitutional changes which would have restored the presidential prerogative to approve military promotions, appoint or remove military commanders. where Pinochet’s legacy ‘’went a long way in linking his fate and that of his regime to the institutional survival of the military’’ confirmed by the lack of reforms undertaken after the 1992 events (1998, 17). If more recent studies indicate today the most evident military ‘guardian structures’ were gradually eliminated, ‘’political personnel from the dictatorships, their civilian collaborators, and security forces remained a powerful presence in state and society after the transitions’’ (McSherry, 2018). Yoma’s illegal dealings shed lights remembering that if civilians should be involved in military matters, it is essential they respect the formal channels of interaction between military and civilian (Cruz and Diamint, 1998, 214). Furthermore, civilians must not lack the political will and pro-actively engage in military issues to avoid ‘streamlining’ military establishments or otherwise induce a very limited civilian capability to control the armed forces but also impacts on civil society’s ability for social change (Cruz and Diamint, 1998, 214). Indeed, ‘’to retain some influence over the shape of their institutional roles and the boundaries separating the spheres of action, domestic political leaders must have a clear sense of their core responsibilities and prerogatives’’ (1998, 125).
III) Military accountability: Past Human Rights Abuses
Within eight years into the democratic transition process, Cruz and Diamint (1998, 120) note already the positive institutional accomplishments in the case of intervening in military autonomy However, if an intrusion in military matters is a clear positive improvement, the continent is showing some distressing signs, requiring civilian involvement (1998, 120). Indeed, holding accountable past military forces for human rights abuses remains a very sensitive and complicated process in Latin America, thus a major component of civilian power (Jaskoski, 2017, 76). In the 1990’s, scholars brought to the attention the danger of prosecuting the armed forces that could push the fragile democracy into jeopardy if friction with the military became too intense (Skaar and Malca, 2014, 10). However, civilian courageous endeavour lead to famous trials such as retired Commander-in-Chief Pinochet in Chile, President Fujimori in Peru, Foreign Minister Bianco in Uruguay, all demonstrating that it has been possible for the judiciary system to prosecute even (former) head of states for human rights abuses without the consequence of a coup (Skaar and Malca, 2014, 10). For example, the prosecution was accomplished in Peru by engaging in fierce legal re-structuring to prosecute army personnel in civilian courts (Jaskoski, 2017, 76). This can be identified as a clear step forward and evidence that the civilian government was able to intrude successfully into in military affairs successfully where in the case of human rights prosecution is a necessity for social justice while enhancing citizen allegiance to the current government (Skaar and Malca, 2014, 11).
IV) A hands-on approach for reasserting a classical distinction
Apart from addressing past human rights abuses, a concern of a civilian hands-on approach in civil-military matters is the question of effectiveness. The majority of researchers who have concerned themselves with military effectiveness confirm the positive effect of active involvement and strict civilian control in defense and military issues (Croissant and Kuehn, 2017, 9). To ensure effectiveness, reasserting the distinction between the inward-looking public safety and the outward-looking national security needs to be addressed as the military ‘’thinly spread among so many security fronts, […] may appear to be sapped of their capability to provide for national defense’’ (Cruz and Diamint, 1998, 127). In Latin America, the way civilians could take on making those changes would require professionalizing the police, strengthening the judicial system and reforming the local government institutions, particularly at a municipal level (1998, 125). However, for civilian leaders to respond to those demands it is essential to shift budget allocation towards institution-building rather than sophisticated weaponry (Battaglino, 2013, 82). Indeed, because transition agreements are usually associated with more military power in the consolidation phase, civilian governments should pay close attention in the defence budget due to the nature of the negotiated transition path revolving in the acceptance by civilian leaders to military-run authoritarian enclaves, certain prerogatives or military leverage over budget allocation negotiations (Domingo, 2009, 43). Many states have engaged in reducing the military budget and engage in transparent budget allocation (Jaskoski, 2017, 78). Peru’s example shows how a civilian hands-on approach was successful in steadily decreasing military costs from 14.4% of national spending in 1989 to 8% in 2006 and having public access on the internet of details on military spending (Jaskoski, 2017, 78). If scholars argue that the argument of fear in military low performance is routinely used by military elites in Latin America to defend their prerogatives against greater civilian control (Croissant and Kuehn, 2014, 219), Cruz and Diamint warn of certain pitfalls in going overboard with budget costs (1998, 121). In Argentina, the army is recruited by private actors such as managers or petroleum companies in Colombia, protected formally or informally by the ministry of defense (Cruz and Diamint, 1998, 121). This not only enhances the armed forces sphere of action but also due to their advantageous position, the military is more able to extract information, concessions, and patronage from the state (Cruz and Diamint, 1998, 121). Those independent channels allow soldiers an independent source of revenue making them less dependent on the state. Indeed, in the face of budget cuts, the military has even turned to illegal drug trafficking in Argentina, Brazil or Bolivia (Cruz and Diamint, 1998, 122). For many scholars, military ‘entrepreneurship’ in Latin America soldiers’ self-interests no longer clashes with the etiquette of professionalism and thus civilian government cannot rely on professionalism as a guarantee for subordination (Domingo, 2009, 43). However, due to the economic transformation of the continent, the national security question is changing (Battaglino, 2013, 89). Chile purchased more weapons than the rest of Latin America in absolute terms in relation to its defense budget and GDP, equating to USD 4.4 billion worth of weaponry from 2000 to 2011 (2013, 86). If Chile has seen its regional inter-state threats decline with Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia, the demand for an increased military budget also comes from the political desire of acquiring the NATO status in a new strategic concept as a leading economic force in Latin America (Battaglino, 2013, 89).
Looking more closely at public safety and the continent’s society, Galleguillos points out how civilian society has changed in Latin America, a potential area of friction between the military increasingly challenged by civil society due to globalization and free-market economics increasing societal sectors such as social injustice (Wiken, 2015). The danger of a hands’ off approach is the armed forces capable of responding to the state’s need for public order and protection (1998, 123). Indeed, when the military engages in ’civic action’, this pushes them to develop clientelist bases of support, impeding on the civilian government’s ability to command the loyalty of social groups (1998, 123). In Peru, the army is both involved in a new social mission of fighting against poverty and in the creation of mass political organizations (Cruz and Diamint, 1998, 125). This creates a problem of public discourse where these civic action projects modify socio-economic problems and collective action where population dislocation or environmental concerns are judged as a threat to national security (Cruz and Diamint, 1998, 125). Re-establishment the classical distinction between public safety and national security also opens an opportunity for a joint intervention between government and the civil society, a joint effect of public pressure pushes the government to hold accountable and increase subordination of the military with the civil society support in the form of cuidadanizacion, enhancing democracy and civilian rights (Domingo, 2009, 43).
Conclusion:
In this essay, I have argued that civilian leaders should engage in a hands-on approach over military matters in re-structuring institutions: the constitutional framework and re-evaluate the military budget needs and improve their post-allocation transparency. More specifically to the Latin American continent, the civilian government should adopt fierce policies and intrude military affairs to prosecute military members involved in past human rights abuses. Finally, re-asserting a clear distinction between national security and public safety will help make clear decisions about the level of threat the country faces for an adapted military force and focus while also ensuring public safety from further military abuses while boosting democratic public support.
1Civilian control of the military is: the distribution of decision-making power between civilian leaders ‘’the president, the Congress, the ministry of defence and so on’’ (Feaver, 2003, 98) and the military under which ‘’civilians make all the rules, and they can change them at any time’’ (Kohn, 1997, 142 in Croissant and Kuehn, 2017, 3). Areas of civilian control include public policy, internal security, national defense and military organization ‘’where civilian control requires institutions that effectively transfer exclusive decision-making power over pertinent political matters to civilians (Croissant and Kuehn, 2017, 3).
2 An institution is ‘’a collection of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate action in terms of relations between roles and situations […] making the actors’ scope of action well defined and fairly predictable in any given situation. If institutions are ineffective, then all involved in political decision-making know the roles of all political participants and the manner in which those decisions will be reached and ultimately implemented’’ (Weeks, 2001, 332).