On May 21, 1982 the 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment (2Para) led by Lt Col Herbert Jones landed at San Carols Bay after almost a month of travelling by ferry. Immediately upon coming on shore, the unit moved south to secure the highland. Initially 2Para was tasked to conduct a raid on Goose Green, but due to weather preventing air support from bringing in projected artillery support the mission was cancelled. On May 25, 1982, following the air attack on the Naval carrier, Atlantic Conveyor, that destroyed ten Wessex and four Chinook helicopters Brigadier Julian Thompson was ordered by Northwood to attack the Argentinean forces at Goose Green. 2Para was ordered to conduct the attack, and on May 27, 1982 the unit staged at Camilla Creek House.
The battle of Goose Green, the first land battle of the Falkland Islands war, was politically driven. Brig. Thompson, unaware of what hinged on the battle of Goose Green and having to split his troops, sent 2Para into battle with minimum support. Often times leaders, no different that Lt Col H Jones, are sent into battle under less than ideal circumstances. It is up to the leader to take all factors into account and utilize mission command and sound judgement to ensure the best possible outcome. The battle of Goose Green was ultimately a success under the leadership of Maj Chris Keeble, however it was not without unnecessary struggle and loss.
Lt Col Jones failed to utilize the mission command principles outlined in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0: Mission Command. His failure to create a shared understanding, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, and accept prudent risk had negative impacts on his subordinates as well as the mission. Examples of these failures can be seen in decisions and interactions throughout the battle.
Creating a shared understanding is defined in ADRP 6-0 as “creating a shared understanding of their operational environment, the operation’s purpose, problems and approaches to solving them”. The definition also states “through collaboration and dialogue, participants share information and perspectives, question assumptions, and exchange ideas to help create and maintain shared understanding, resolve potential misunderstandings, and access the progress of operations”. While Lt Col Jones spent “27 May perfecting his blueprint, his subordinate commanders had been kept completely in the dark about even its generality”. He failed to include his subordinates, thus eliminating the opportunity for them to provide different perspectives or approaches to the problem. He did all the planning on his own and had no dialogue with the subordinate commanders.
When Lt Col Jones did brief his subordinates his operation order, he was agitated and impatient. Captain Allan Coulson, the intelligence officer, was rushed when briefing enemy forces as Lt Col Jones felt he was taking too long. Captain Benest who was also present at the brief stated “he was doing a good job and giving plenty of information; but was ‘under pressure from the CO to give [the intelligence briefing] as fast as he could…he rattled off grids like nobody’s business'”. This left leaders without pertinent information about the enemy they were fighting, to include all of the known locations and their disposition. By rushing through the enemy forces section, it could indicate to the subordinate leaders that the information is not valuable or worth noting.
At the conclusion of the order, there was no time allowed for the subordinate leaders to ask questions or time to process all the information that had been briefed. “Chris Keeble, Jones’ 2i/c, was left with the impression that none of those at the O group really understood it. He was left thinking despite quantities of intelligence on enemy locations, 2Para didn’t start the battle with a very clear idea of the defences”. Lt Col Jones spent much time and effort to make a plan, however without input and collaboration for his subordinate leaders he failed to create a shared understanding. By not providing a warning order, rushing through critical enemy forces information, and not providing an opportunity for his subordinates to process the information received in the order and ask questions, 2 Para started the mission with leaders how did not have a clear understanding of the operational environment or the mission they were to conduct.
Not only did Lt Col Jones brief his order without allowing time for his subordinates to plan, but the order he briefed was a very detailed and complex six phase mission. According to ADRP 6-0 “mission orders are directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them”, “plans and orders should be as simple as possible”, and “commanders set the conditions for success,.., by allocating resources to accomplish assigned tasks”. The resources that should be provided include time and information. By creating a detailed and complex plan, he failed to meet criteria for successful use of mission command orders.
Lt Col Jones, in his order, specified locations in which his units would attack. His plan “was firmly positionalist- geared entirely to ground features (‘known’ enemy positons), rather than to functions or roles such as ‘protect the left flank'”. The plan was focused on the who, when, and how, and failed to provide the subordinate leaders with the why or the purpose. The issue with focusing on the enemy positions was, as mentioned previously, during the brief the enemy forces section was rushed through and locations and details were missed by many of the subordinate leaders. As a result, his plan did not survive the first move, as the units took heavy fire. Without having a clear idea of where the enemy were and a plan of their own, they were operating under darkness, with limited information, and no flexibility should they take contact or stray from the original order. This was a result of him failing to provide them the critical resources of time and information, that could have greatly affected how the mission was conducted at the lower levels.
During the mission, Jones wanted to maintain control and he did this by micromanaging his subordinate leaders. When A Co was stalled by heavy resistance and machine gun fire in the narrow gorse gully outside of Coronation Point Lt Col Jones moved up the gully. He was impatient and demanding to know what the holdup was. When the A Co commander tried to explain the situation and was working to regroup and find a viable solution that was not endangering lives unnecessarily. Lt Col Jones did not like this and took the matter into his own hands. He led an attack on the machine gun position but was shot in the back by a sniper and killed before he could reach the position. Had he trusted his A Co commander, and allowed him to act in confidence without having to take charge, his life could have been spared and the unit would still have their leader to continue the mission.
By Lt Col Jones failing to provide a simple plan, focusing on enemy locations rather than the tactical task, and micromanaging his subordinate leaders, he failed to use mission orders correctly. This caused confusion on the battlefield with leaders who were not allowed initiative to take charge and lead in an environment that was constantly changing. It also cost the loss of lives that could have been avoided.
Lt Col Jones’ authoritarian approach did not only apply to his orders. His need to maintain control and power at all times led him to deny his subordinates the exercise disciplined initiative during the battle. “Disciplined initiative is action in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise. Commander rely on subordinates to act.” Lt Col Jones not only denied his subordinate leaders the opportunity to exercise disciplined initiative through his specific order, but also denied officers when they attempted to act without orders as the situation changed.
D Co commander, Maj Phil Neame, had noticed Argentineans moving from positions the unit had bypassed in darkness moving along the western shoreline attempting to get back behind their lines. Maj Neame assessed that this would be a safer alternative to moving over open areas with the vantage point from Darwin hill, he called to Lt Col Jones. Lt Col Jones replied curtly and instructed him to stay off of the net. Activity of the enemy forces continued along the shoreline so once again, Maj Neame requested to move. Once more Lt Col Jones stated that he was busy and to stay off of the net. Lt Col Jones did not allow his commanders any flexibility to make decisions as they saw fit on the battle field. He did not rely on his commanders to act, instead his subordinate leaders had to wait for him to make a decision before they could act, potentially placing them in harm’s way while awaiting a decision.
It is clear in Lt Col Jones’ interaction with both A and D Co Commanders it s clear that he wanted to maintain control, and by doing so he failed to exercise disciplined initiative or allow his subordinates to. If he had followed the principle as stated in ADRP 6-0 he would have provided his subordinates with clear guidance and allowed them to take initiative as the situation changed. By doing this he would have been able to focus on higher level takes, orchestrate all units, and provide guidance as needed. Unfortunately, he failed to do this and both he and his leaders were unable to effectively lead their units.