Abstract
The rise of homegrown extremism and terrorism have started to blur the lines between Homeland Security and Homeland Defense. The individual efforts and regulations governing both have been in question after the mishaps of September 11, 2001. Although the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and increased interoperability has modified intelligence sharing, the United States of America has still failed to address the need to amend regulation to fully utilize untapped resources in our fight against a foreign sponsored homegrown threat. As the metamorphosis of terrorism continues, the balance of civil liberties and protection appear on the forefront in the court of public opinion.
Homeland Defense, Homeland Security and Critical Infrastructure
Homeland Defense
Homeland Defense (HLD) is the Department of Defense (DOD) initiative to protect the sovereignty, territory, domestic population and critical infrastructure of the United States against external threats and aggression, as directed by the President of the United States (JP 3.26, 2018, p. 7). The DOD is the Lead Federal Agency in all matters of foreign aggression and threats to national security (Goss, 2006). Although it assists in securing U.S. territories, in addition to and emergency preparation and response, it’s overall responsibilities are not limited to the prevention and mitigation of terrorist attacks.
These matters include but are not limited to Air Defense, Land Defense, Maritime Defense and Ballistic Missile Defense. The DOD also takes an active role in Civil Support operations, named Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA), which provides support in matters of domestic emergencies and law enforcement activities. MACA is broken into three areas: 1. Military Support to Civil Authorities, which provides support for natural or man-made disasters, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, 2. Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement, which supports local law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism, narcotics operations, special events and critical infrastructure security, and 3. Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances, which is support directed by the President to suppress insurrections, rebellions and domestic violence to maintain law and order (JP 3.26, 2018).
In addition, the DOD assists in the countries Emergency Preparedness (EP) by ensuring resources are put in place in cases of National Security Emergencies. It provides tiered support to planning and preparation by contributing to three subcomponents of EP: 1. Continuity of Operations that ensures continuity of the national military strategy, 2. Continuity of Government, which ensures the minimal continuous function of the country’s legislative branches and includes the protection of vital records, resources, and facilities, and 3. Other, which highlights the ability of the President to direct the DOD to intervene or partake in additional EP missions (Goss, 2006). The DOD is responsible for HLD and applies a layered approach that relies on sharing valuable intelligence. It is responsible for international deterrence, providing a military solution to acts of aggression towards the U.S., foreign allies and U.S. global interests (JP 3.26, 2018).
Homeland Security
Homeland Security (HLS) was created in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) denotes a major shift in interoperability between Federal, Local and State resources in the fight against domestic terrorism and National Preparedness. The five missions of HLS are: 1. Prevent terrorism and enhance security, 2. Secure and manage U.S. borders, 3. Enforce and administer U.S. immigration laws, 4. Safeguard and secure cyberspace, and 5. Strengthen national preparedness and resilience (DHS, 2014).
Created to bridge the gap between Local and Federal organizations, the DHS enterprise inherited over 200,000 people from over 20 organizations and an initial budget of $37 billion. It’s first major initiative was the “Ready Campaign,” aimed at educating citizens in matters of natural disaster preparation and response. Soon after, its focused on border, transportation and port security. This emplaced federal screeners and employed the use of federal air marshals in aviation (DHS, 2006).
Upon publication of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8: National Preparedness, issued in December 2003, responsibilities of DHS included creating a National Preparedness Goal. The purpose of this was to coordinate efforts of Federal, State, local, and private sector organizations, and encourage citizen participation. This was also done to thwart the stovepiping of intelligence information within each organization (DHS, 2011; DHS, 2014, p. 11). DHS orchestrates a mission to combine intelligence collection efforts of federal agencies with state and local law enforcement. It’s resources are focused on matters of border protection, domestic terrorism, and national preparedness. “An effective homeland security strategy, first and foremost, requires the military to ‘team-up’ with civilian intelligence, law-enforcement, and, for specific missions, with emergency service and public health agencies as well” (Morag, 2006, p.1).
As the sliding scale of terrorism continues to fluctuate, the need for interoperability between agencies becomes more important. The term Enterprise highlights each agencies necessary level of commitment in order to achieve success. My definition of HLS is the combined effort of Federal, Local and State forces to protect our nation’s borders, infrastructure, and citizens in the face of terrorism, extremism and national emergencies. These entities working in unison, intervening at the lower level when necessary, and uninhibited by regulation (i.e., Posse Comitatus Act) is our nation’s greatest hope.
Critical Infrastructure
There are a total of sixteen critical infrastructure sectors identified by the President of the United States. The U.S. Patriot Act defines Critical Infrastructure as “systems and assets, physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health and safety, or any combination of those matters” (Moteff, 2015, p. 2). The sixteen critical infrastructures are: Chemical Sector, Commercsial Facilities Sectors, Communications Sector, Critical Manufacturing Sector, Dams Sector, Defense Industrial Base Sector, Emergency Services Sector, Energy Sector, Financial Services Sector, Food and Agriculture Sector, Government Facilities Sector, Healthcare and Public Health Sector, Information Technology Sector, Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste Sector, Transportation Systems Sector, Water and Wastewater Systems Sector (DHS, 2013).
The DHS was named the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for eleven of the sixteen above recognized critical infrastructures. This responsibility obligates the agency to provide “institutional knowledge and specialized expertise as well as leading, facilitating, or supporting the security and resilience programs and associated activities of its designated critical infrastructure sector in the all-hazards environment” (DHS, 2013, n.p.). The DOD, Department of Energy, Department of Treasury, Environmental Protection Agency, and Department of Human Services are the five remaining SSAs. They remain obligated to coordinate with the DHS and other federal agencies in order to collaborate with the owners and operators of the critical infrastructures. The DHS is also responsible for the creation of the two national critical infrastructure centers. These centers serve as the point of information for critical infrastructure partners to receive intelligence and situational awareness that helps protect the physical and cyber aspects of critical infrastructure (DHS, 2013). The increasing reliance on cyberspace creates a growing threat to both the physical and cyber aspects of critical infrastructure. This highlights the importance of interoperability between the two because of the shared vulnerabilities they possess (DHS, 2012; DHS, 2013).
Infrastructure Protection Efforts. Our Nation’s Critical Infrastructure Plan focuses on the protection of critical infrastructures and key assets from acts of terrorism that aim to: 1. Hinder the federal government’s ability to perform essential national and homeland security missions, and ensure public health and safety, 2. Undermine state and local government capacities to maintain order and to deliver minimum essential public service, 3. Damage the private sector’s ability to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy and the delivery of essential services, and 4. Undermine the public’s morale and confidence in our national economic and political institutions (Executive Office, 2003).
These goals are a collaborative effort between the DHS, Federal Agencies, Private Sector and the Local State Law Enforcement Agencies, each given specific roles. The DHS provides focused leadership for national-level protection coordination and planning. It serves as the primary liaison for interoperability among federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector. The DHS must construct and maintain a current and accurate assessment of national critical assets, systems, and functions, as well as determine vulnerabilities and protective postures for the critical infrastructure sectors (Executive Office, 2003).
Federal Departments and Agencies utilize their resources and skills to enhance the physical protection of HLS. They develop relationships with foreign governments and agencies to create information sharing. The Department Of State, specifically, assists in the development and implementation of protection initiatives by establishing protective agreements with U.S. international allies (Executive Office, 2003). U.S. states have established HLS liaison offices to assist in managing their counter-terrorism and infrastructure protection efforts. The states’ responsibilities include promoting the joint coordination of local and regional protective and emergency response activities, and resource support.
Importantly, local government forces are the communal proverbial boots on ground — first responders and the face of public services. Their existing knowledge of the human terrain, landscapes, and critical public health services is crucial for ensuring safety and maintaining order. Public trust starts with the involvement of Local authorities in its perspective community. Establishment of these relationships enables effective planning of the allocation of resources to protect citizens, respond to emergencies, and re-establish order in times of crisis (Executive Office, 2003).
The Private Sector, owners of 85-percent of all critical infrastructure, are the investors of the security deemed necessary for each of their locations. They are the first responders at each of their facilities. Coordinators are to increase interoperability with Federal and Local agencies to identify, promote, and share industry-specific best practices. Sector coordinators rely on these relationships to help develop continuous protection planning and investment, and for indications and warning development. They work with their Federal, State and local counterparts to integrate and to achieve private sector interoperability (Executive Office, 2003).
The National 3 step strategy is: 1. identify and assure the protection of our most nationally critical infrastructures and assets, 2. provide timely warning and assure the protection of infrastructures and assets that face a specific, imminent threat, and 3. foster an environment in which all stakeholders can better protect the infrastructures and assets under their control. Our Federal government has utilized this strategy to create a template in the mission to protect U.S. critical infrastructure. Key component to accomplishing this mission are interoperability and intelligence/information sharing (Executive Office, 2003).
Conclusion
After reading The National Strategy for HLS, the Private Sector poses a glaring concern. The Private Sectors lack of understanding and willingness to properly secure critical infrastructure is troubling. As a non-governmental agency, the intelligence and sense of urgency does not exist in the boardrooms controlling areas of critical infrastructure if it does not meet their bottom line of increased revenue. It is possible that this lack of awareness plays a critical role in decision making. Yet with the battlelines now existing within our borders, it takes a closed mind not to see the importance of internal security. My solution would be to revisit partnership agreements with a strong message from the Federal Government demanding compliance. This and the creation of policy for future infrastructures to abide would help set the tone for any future relationships.
I would also consider structuring future critical developments to be co-located with military facilities, or possibly on unoccupied governmental land. These locations are usually chosen for proximity to federal resources. The focus The National Strategy must gradually move from protection to resilience. With an ever adapting adversary that identifies weakness in protective measures, attacks will become harder and harder to intercept. Thus, the need for more structured, and stronger, partnering between the government and private sectors is critical.
References
Department of Homeland Security. (2006). Civil Defense and Homeland Security: A Short
History of National Preparedness Efforts, Government print Office. Retrieved from
http://www.iaem.com/documents/DHSCivilDefense-HSShortHistory.pdf on June 8, 2018.
Department of Homeland Security. (2011). Presidential Policy Directive 8. Retrieved from
Department of Homeland Security (2012). Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan.
Retieved from https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-strategic-plan-fy-2012-2016.pdf
on June 8, 2018.
Department of Homeland Security. (2013). Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience. Accessed from-https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-secu
ity-and-resilience on June 8, 2018.
Department of Homeland Security. (2014). The 2014 Quadrennial homeland security review
report. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
Department of Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force. (2006). Civil defense and
homeland security: A short history of national preparedness efforts. Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office.
Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council. (2001).
Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 196 /Wednesday, October 10, 2001 / Presidential
Documents. Retrieved from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2001-10-10/pdf/01- 25677.pdf on May 8, 2018.
Executive Office of the President of the United States. (2003). The National Strategy for The
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets. Retrieved from
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Physical_Strategy.pdf on June 8, 2018.
Goss, T. (2006). “Who’s in Charge?” New challenges in homeland defense and homeland
security. Homeland Security Affairs 2(1). Retrieved from https://www.hsaj.org/
articles/173 on June 8, 2018.
Joint Publication 3.26, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security, dated 26 March 2004. Retrieved
from http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_27.pdf?ver= 2018-05-10-164327-3 on June 8, 2018.
Morag, N. (2006). The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism: An
assessment. Homeland Security Affairs 2(2): pp. 1-14. Retrieved from
http://www.hsaj.org/?article=2.2.7 on June 9, 2018.
Moteff, J. D. (2015). Critical infrastructures: Background, policy, and implementation.
Congressional Research Service. Report RL30153. Accessed from https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/homesec/RL30153.pdf on June 8, 2018.