During the Second World War, the United States’ Manhattan Project invented, developed and tested the ‘atomic bomb’. When two nuclear weapons were deployed in 1945 over the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they signalled to the world what would become a new era of warfare. A single bomb could now cause catastrophic destruction as never seen before in seconds. The demonstration of their destructive power in Japan arguably brought the Second World War to an end and left the United States, at least initially, with a monopoly on the most powerful weapon ever seen. Since 1945, eight other countries have acquired nuclear weapons: Russia, China, the UK, France, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. However, it is estimated that, since 1945, a total of 39 countries have made attempts to acquire nuclear weapons (Müller & Schmidt 2010: 124; Pelopidas 2011: 306).
For the purposes of this essay, “acquisition of nuclear weapons” means that a non-nuclear state develops, obtains and maintains nuclear arms (Guthe 2011: 481). Whereas, “non-acquisition of nuclear weapons” will be defined as the decision to abandon activities and ambitions related to nuclear weapons’ acquisition. This essay will conclude that, although varying aspects of a pattern can be discerned, it is difficult to establish an explanatory theory that could be specifically applied to any state. Given the heterogeneity of states and their differing internal and international circumstances and dynamics, the motivations underlying acquisition and non-acquisition differ greatly. The only pattern that can be identified relates to the overlap and merging of prominent motivational factors, the circumstances of which will vary on a case by case basis. These cases will be discussed further below.
Theorists have attempted to provide a general explanation for the motivations underlying nuclear acquisition and non-acquisition. Quester proposed a three-part model that saw nuclear proliferation as primarily a result of (1) military, (2) political and (3) economic motivations (Quester 2001). Conversely, Sagan’s three-part model for the motivations for acquisition focused on (1) security, (2) domestic politics and (3) international norms (Sagan 1996: 54-56). Cirincione argued that motivations were primarily driven by (1) security, (2) prestige, (3) domestic politics, (4) technology and (5) economics. (Cirincione 2007: 47) On the other hand, Potter and Mukhatzhanova analysed motivations and focussed on the four categories of (1) security, (2) international institutions, (3) international norms and (4) domestic circumstances (Potter and Mukhatzhanova 2010: 3-9).
These theoretical groupings focus on different aspects, but there is arguably an overlap. In other words, all the above-mentioned theories focus on states’ security circumstances as well as their stances on security, their capabilities, their domestic situations, and on the scrutiny applied by international rules, norms, and perceptions regarding non-proliferation. In line with this overlap, this essay will discuss the pattern that emerges regarding acquisition and non-acquisition in the context of a state’s (1) security, (2) capability, (3) international scrutiny and (4) domestic politics.
1. Security
One of the primary motivations regarding the question of acquisition or non-acquisition relates to the security circumstances of a state. From this realist perspective, the acquisition is desirable as it is believed that it will provide guaranteed security through a strong deterrent. Realists argue that the international arena can be characterised as an anarchical situation and that states can be considered as rationally acting ‘units’ or even as ‘conflict groups’ (Waltz 1981: 11; Gilpin 1984) which will invariably pursue their self-interest.
The realist position defines what it believes to be the actual reality of international political conduct by ‘the limitations which the sordid and selfish aspects of human nature place on the conduct of diplomacy’ (Thompson 1985: 20). Morgenthau elaborates that ‘[r]ealism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states’ (Morgenthau 1985: 9). One important reason for this apparent immoral behaviour from a realist perspective is the absence of an international government which could impose universal norms, morals, or ethics.
Structural realists place a particular emphasis on international anarchy and see International Relations as a pure prisoner’s dilemma or zero-sum game (Waltz 1979: 62–3). Thus, a tendency towards self-help and the search for power maximisation would exist for the structural realist ‘even in the absence of aggressivity [sic] or similar factors’ (Herz 1976: 10). In an intrinsically anarchical and competitive system with mutual suspicion, actors fear each other and increase their ability to protect themselves. Yet, each such step is seen by the other actors as a confirmation of their suspicion resulting, arguably, ‘in a spiral of illusory fears and ‘unnecessary’ defences’ (Snyder 1997: 17).
To seriously engage militarily with a nuclear power could result in mutual annihilation. Sagan argues that ‘one can envision the history of nuclear proliferation as a strategic chain reaction’ (Sagan 1996: 58). Incidentally, the weapon itself becomes the deterrent, and its destructive power ensures stability between countries with nuclear weapons’ capacity. When faced with this security dilemma during the Cold War, nuclear powers had to follow the logic of this zero-sum game and subsequently built up nuclear arsenals large enough to outlast the enemy’s arsenal and allow a final strike. In the anarchical international situation, is stated that have particularly intense and longstanding security pressures and consequently aspire to acquire nuclear weapons. This insecurity and its resulting fears were the motivating factors for rapid nuclear acquisitions during World War II. Although the weapon itself had yet not been successfully conceived and realised, the United States and the United Kingdom knew that Germany was researching nuclear weapons’ technology (Sagan 1996: 58).
The United States “won” its arms race against the USSR due to tremendous investment and technological successes, but the Soviet Union soon followed. The Soviet Union kept a close eye on American nuclear weapons development through an intricate network of spies, also drafting German scientists who had been involved in nuclear or ballistic missile research in the past (Craig and Radchenko 2008: 34-62). The realist balance of power had been fundamentally disturbed by the nuclear monopoly of the United States.
Immediately following the demonstration of nuclear power in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Stalin argued:
“A single demand of you comrades…Provide us with atomic weapons in the shortest possible time. You know that Hiroshima has shaken the whole world. The balance has been destroyed. Provide the bomb – it will remove a great danger from us.” (Sagan 1996: 78)
States that have the potential technological and financial capacity but chose non-acquisition also face intense security threats. States will weigh up the risks of choosing or foregoing nuclear acquisition to ensure security. An Acquisition may provoke regional political instability, regional military tension or a build-up of opponents’ arms (Cirincione 2007: 54).
Paul explains that states ‘under certain circumstances may prudently forgo military capabilities that other states see as threatening’ (Paul 2000: 5). The insecurity of non-nuclear states becomes mitigated through security alliances with nuclear powers. The underlying cost-benefit analysis and the evaluation of risk remain, but by being guaranteed security under the protection of a nuclear power, the state may find it in its interest to opt for non-acquisition and to avoid associated costs and political turmoil (Bleek 2010: 178; Sagan 1996: 57).
Arguably, security alliances offer security to non-nuclear states, as in the example of Canada mentioned above. Nevertheless, from a realist perspective placing a heavy emphasis on security concerns as the primary motivating factor for nuclear acquisition, it is questionable whether security alliances can really be relied upon in the long run. Sagan also points out that:
“[for some states,] acquiring a nuclear ally may be the only option available, but the policy inevitably raises questions about the credibility of extended deterrence guarantees, since the nuclear power would also fear retaliation if it responded to an attack on its all”’ (Sagan 1996: 57).
In an anarchical society in which the search for power and self-interest dominate, self-reliance becomes a necessity. Hymans, therefore, argues that because ‘friends today may become enemies tomorrow… the dominant strategy of states is to go for the bomb themselves and thus, avoid any unpleasant surprises’ (Hymans 2006: 456). Therefore, when the credibility of security alliances comes under question, states will resort to self-help and self-reliance to ensure their security and national interest. When, faced with the growing nuclear military threat posed by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France realised that the protection ensured by the nuclear weapons of the United States may no longer be guaranteed as the Soviet Union could now retaliate against the United States.
“National leaders will continue to ask themselves: ‘Would the President of the United States risk Washington to protect my capital city?’” (Cirincione 2007: 54).
Those theorists who emphasise the anarchical self-help structure of the international system and the security concerns that follow from this are correct to point out that security concerns have been an important factor of motivation for nuclear acquisition. With Soviet power on their borders, France and the United Kingdom also pursued a nuclear acquisition (Wendt 1992; Waltz 1981). Sagan argues that:
“London and Paris are seen to have built nuclear weapons because of the growing Soviet military threat and the inherent reduction in the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to NATO allies once the Soviet Union was able to threaten retaliation against the United States” (Sagan 1996: 58).
China soon followed with nuclear acquisition because its alliance with the Soviets came under pressure during the 1950s and 60s. China’s support for North Korean factions made it a potential target of a nuclear attack by the United States, but the Soviet Union proved to be a reluctant and opportunistically. By the beginning of the 1960s, China’s relations with the Soviet Union had soured, and it was firmly set on nuclear acquisition to achieve ‘robust and affordable security’, which it achieved in 1964 (Goldstein in Sagan 1996: 59). The ‘strategic chain reaction’, proposed by Sagan, continued with India. Having fought China in 1962, and with Chinese nuclear power on their borders soon thereafter, India followed suit in proliferation in 1974 (Sagan 1996: 59). The chain reaction continued with Pakistan, which acquired in 1998.
Throughout the Cold War, the world was bipolar, but when the security guarantees of the Soviet Union and the United States respectively lost credibility, states having faced long-running security threats moved towards acquisition and created a multi-polar distribution of nuclear weapons capacity. This pattern became even more apparent with the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, with North
Korea and Iran attempting acquisition (Mearsheimer 1990: 5-8). It is of little wonder, therefore, that realism gained much credibility as a political theory during the Cold War.
Therefore, in line with the realist doctrine, security considerations constitute an important motivational factor for nuclear acquisition and non-acquisition. Yet, as was the case with capability, security concerns alone cannot explain many states’ decisions to not acquire nuclear weapons. States that have the potential to proliferate may choose to abstain after a thorough risk assessment given the unlikely occurrence of an actual nuclear conflict and the continued preponderance of conventional warfare. Paul labels this type of state behaviour “prudential realism”, which acknowledges that ‘[s]tates are security-conscious entities, but their military policies are driven by ‘most probable threat’ assessments, as opposed to the worst-case assessments offered by hard realism’ (Paul 2000: 5).
2. Capability
Throughout the Cold War, it was assumed ‘that all countries would like to have nuclear weapons’ if possible. Given this presumption, Meyer argued that ‘the only determining factor becomes technology’ (Meyer 1985: 10). In view of the difficulty of developing nuclear weapons, a state must have considerable technical expertise and considerable financial resources. For some theorists, this proves that motivations for acquisition and non-acquisition are linked to the levels of economic and technological development of a state. For Bleek, there is “robust evidence” that ‘more highly developed countries proliferate more readily [whilst] less highly developed countries do so less readily’ (Bleek 2010: 178).
Cirincione argued that the considerable resources and technology needed would prevent less developed countries from achieving nuclear acquisition (Cirincione 2007: 74-76). This argument certainly applies to some of the poorest and least developed nations. However, technological and financial capabilities cannot be considered as the primary determining factors for acquisition. India, North Korea and Pakistan, all of which were developing countries when they set out to establish their programmes, have managed to acquire nuclear weapons. This proves that even countries with limited technological and financial capabilities can achieve nuclear acquisition if they are willing to devote a large number of their limited resources at the cost of other social goals.
The above also explains why some countries that clearly did have the technological and financial capacity for nuclear acquisition chose not to pursue this path. Even countries with potentially sufficient technological and financial capabilities often choose to develop their ballistic missile programmes instead, which are often considered to be a more cost-effective security solution compared with the costly and politically fraught nuclear option (Erickson 2001: 42-50).
In the years following World War II, Canada chose non-acquisition in the end due to a combination of various considerations about cost-effectiveness and widespread public moral distaste. The country also saw itself as having a strong security alignment with the United States based on mutual trust. Urban argues that ‘Canadian decision-makers so trusted the US that they did not even consider acquiring the most powerful weapon in history, even when it was offered to them’(Urban 2014: 332). Müller and Schmidt point out:
“[E]conomic factors are almost completely irrelevant for the initiation of nuclear weapons activities. Rather, it is a question of political willingness to devote a considerable share of state’s resources to the military sector instead of, say, strengthening the public welfare program”. (Müller & Schmidt 2010: 141)
Müller & Schmidt (2010) also argue that there ‘is no indication at all of a technological pull’. Therefore, it is evident that a certain degree of resources and capabilities are necessary to mobilise nuclear proliferation, but these factors alone do not provide a sufficient explanation.
3. International Scrutiny
Decisions leading to acquisition or non-acquisition are not only affected by concerns over security and considerations of capability, but also by the norms that underlie behaviour in International Relations. In order to prevent opposition, states may attempt to behave appropriately within the context of international law and related treaties. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970 (NPT) is an example of a legally binding international norm relating to the use and acquisition of nuclear weapons; this was adopted under the auspices of the United Nations (van der Meer 2011: 37-39). Hymans explains that:
“Most states think of themselves as and want to be seen as, good international citizens. Thanks at least in part to the non-proliferation regime, there is today a widespread acceptance by states that good international citizens do not build nuclear arsenals. Therefore, the overwhelming majority of states have in fact not gone nuclear” (Hymans 2006: 458).
Arguably, international norms can have a significant impact on state behaviour. Müller and Schmidt claim that, before the NPT, 40% of states that possessed potential capability pursued nuclear weapons programmes. After the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, this number shrank to as little as 14%. They also point out that 70% of states that had nuclear weapons programmes in 1970 abandoned them (Müller & Schmidt 2010: 146-148). The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty subsequently created an international regime grounded in multilateral treaties and backed by United Nations resolutions.
The international scrutiny created by this regime fundamentally changed states’ risk assessments as well as the considerations that underpin their various cost-benefit analyses. In view of the regimes’ close scrutiny of imports and exports relating to nuclear technology and materials – and because of the NPT’s multilateral support – it became increasingly difficult to acquire nuclear weapons technology. It also created domestic pressure as groups opposed to acquisition became emboldened. Müller and Schmidt, therefore, believe that state behaviour has changed significantly in relation to what is considered appropriate conduct regarding nuclear proliferation. Even when faced with security pressures, developing nuclear weapons was considered inappropriate and not ‘what states do’ (Müller & Schmidt 2010: 155).
In spite of the above, North Korea and Iran signed the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This did not, therefore, prevent some states from pursuing acquisition. From a realist perspective, one could argue that it is difficult to prove that norms on nuclear non-proliferation did deter states from acquiring nuclear weapons, especially in relation to North Korea (Dunn, 2009: 148). States may choose to proliferate for factors that outweigh the role of international norms. The acquisition of nuclear weapons can, for example, elevate a state’s status, its power of negotiation and its diplomatic impact to achieve long-term state “values”. There is arguably a ‘symbolic’ claim to the nuclear acquisition because it denotes sovereign power, modern technological capability and prestige (Hymans 2006: 455; Sagan 1996: 73).
Whereas the Cold War had created “the nuclear myth”, the era following non-proliferation treaties created “the nuclear taboo” (Frey 2006: 4). The function of such myth-making can be illustrated with the following anecdote of an American reporter visiting North Korea. The words of a belligerent North Korean guard who addressed him reveal the status which the symbolic value of nuclear acquisition brings with it: “We’re a nuclear power. We’re not like Iraq, Yugoslavia, or Afghanistan. We can defend ourselves. We will turn the U.S. bases in South Korea into ashes. No U.S. base will be safe in Guam, Japan, Hawaii. Even the mainland United States won’t be safe.” (Guthe 2011: 482). Yet, in spite of the nuclear taboo, the perceptions created by nuclear acquisition can arguably increase a state’s standing and the attention it will receive from the international community, thereby benefiting its political and economic circumstances. Even if a state merely signals that it is interested in acquisition it will be treated with exigency and urgency (Brito & Intriligator 1993: 303).
4. Domestic politics
A further factor that forms an important aspect of the pattern of nuclear acquisition is the domestic political circumstances of a state. One could argue that an authoritarian or totalitarian regime is more likely to engage in the acquisition. Dissidents in Iran feared that nuclear acquisition would only embolden the government, lend it legitimacy and lead to more aggressive domestic and foreign policies (Guthe 2011: 483). Similarly, Sherril points out that the Iranian regime desires nuclear acquisition primarily to cement its autocratic status domestically and internationally (Sherril 2012: 31-32). Thus, autocratic leaders may well desire nuclear acquisition to maintain and extend their domestic control, and the NPT sometimes fails to stand in their way.
Yet, some theorists claim that democracies are inherently more stable and less likely to misuse their nuclear arms. This relates to a prominent liberal theory in International Relations put forward by Doyle, which argues that we are witnessing an expanding zone of liberal peace amongst democracies and that democracies generally do not engage in warfare against other democracies. It is arguably correct that no two democratic nations have engaged in warfare against each other. Doyle’s argument, however, does not rule out that democratic nations engage in warfare with undemocratic nations (Doyle 1986: 1151, 1162). It is from this perspective that Müller & Schmidt argue that:
“Abiding by international law and its established norms is, by and large, normal behaviour in the international society of states. However, some non-democracies are more likely to end up in the minority that deviates from this normalcy. Totalitarian states with a power-seeking or paranoid leadership are more likely to breach their obligations openly or clandestine[ly]” (Müller & Schmidt 2010: 156-157).
This link between democratic government and non-acquisition becomes problematic upon closer analysis. The recent rise of populism (i.e. Duterte in the Philippines, Erdogan in Turkey, Orban in Hungary, Sisi in Egypt, Trump in the United States) has demonstrated that political leaders are increasingly pandering to a nationalist crowd and that these leaders increasingly claim to speak in the name of the people. Even in democracies, it is not inconceivable that such populist leaders may try to bolster national pride and their popularity – as well as divert uncomfortable attention – through nuclear acquisition or through increasing or modernising their arsenal.
Indeed, Trump’s rhetoric and his withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action related to Iran’s attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, in addition to his intention to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia, indicates that the elected leader of a democratic country does not need to shy away from bellicose rhetoric if it suits his domestic agenda and creates distraction or increases his popularity with his base voters (BBC 2018a, 2018b and 2018c).
“[Trump’s] behaviour has given U.S. allies less reason to trust Washington on future deals or to take U.S. interests into account. He has thrown away a hard-nosed nuclear deal that set a new standard for verification, and he punched a hole in a highly effective web of sanctions and international consensus that made the Iran deal-and future deals like it possible” (Sherman 2018: 197).