Introduction
US intelligence failure to predict the Iranian Revolution of 1979 is a learning experience for the US intelligence community as it exposed the vulnerabilities and biases of its intelligence apparatus. The US failed to predict the Iranian Revolutionof 1979 because it adopted a laidback intelligence attitude in Iran.There are several reasons for US laidback intelligence attitude in Iran. One of the major reasons is that Iran was not a priority or concern of the United States(Moscoe, 2014). It has successfully installed the Shah during the 1953 coup it helped to orchestrate which made the US feel secure about the state of affairs in Iran (Gasiorowski, 2012). US intelligence also did not fully understand Islamic ideology as a uniting force and as such, downplayed its significance. Because of US laidback intelligence in Iran, it became lax in human intelligence collection where its information no longer reflects the reality of Iran. The US intelligence inability to grasp the internal political atmosphere of Iran was evident with US President Carter statement about Iran during his New Year Eve visit in 1977 where he remarked “Iran . . . is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, your Majesty, and to your leadership, and to the respect and the admiration and love which your people give to you” (Smart, 2004). Iran was anything but a country of stability and so was the Shah. The Shah was also anything except being admired and loved by the people. He was in fact hated where the Iranian’s disgust against him led to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. How U.S Intelligence Contributed to the RevolutionIt can be said that the root cause of the 1979 Revolution is US intelligence meddling of Iran’s internal affairs. The US helped orchestrate the 1953 coup that installed the Shah into power. Once in power, US intelligence helped the Shah to cement his power by pouring in money for economic and military aid (Gasiorowski, 2012). US intelligence even went as far as sending CIA experts to set up Iran’s intelligence agency called SAVAC (Sharp, 2004). Eventually, SAVAC became the Shah’s secret police whose brutality fueled the anger of the people against the Shah eventually lead to the 1979 revolution.The Iranian revolutionHistoryAfter the Shah was installed as the emir of Iran, the country experienced moment of success with the aid poured into the coffers by the United States. The years 1963 to 1973 was relatively stable until the Shah became autocratic (Gasiorowski, 2012). He lost his grasp on public issues and thought that it is him alone who could lead his country. Such, he began shutting down the opposition. Opposing political parties were shut down, and the press was closed, parliament became his puppet. Government through its SAVAC interfered into all sphere of life in Iran causing dissent to rise.What Lead Up to It? The Shah is already unpopular with the people because he was rightfully perceived to be an American puppet. This perception alone may not be enough for people to take action against the Shah but when he became autocratic, his rule suffocated his people and made them want to change. But there was no room for them to seek political change. They cannot even articulate their grievances against the government except in the mosques whom the government and its secret police did not suspect to harbor political opposition(Sharp, 2004). Such, the mosques became the breeding ground of discontent against the Shah.The mosques and Islamic ideology provided an ideal platform for Iranians not only to articulate their grievance but also to have a vehicle of reform that is genuinely Iranian. It must be noted that Shah is already perceived as a US puppet which made the people more want to have a political vehicle that is authentically Iranian and the Islamic ideology addressed such need(Moscoe, 2014). Moreover, the US intelligence community did not fully understand Islamic ideology and was generally dismissive of the significance of religion as a platform for launching a revolution. As such, revolutionary cause against the shah thrives in the mosques.U.S. IntelligenceUS intelligence in Iran is not only characterized by its inability to understandIran’s domestic policies but is also in the state of denial of the significant factors that led to the revolution. As a Washington security official Gary Sick would say, “In the past, we’d had a tremendous capacity to read Iran’s domestic politics. We basically gave that up so that wewere no longer looking at Iran’s internal problems. This had huge implications which affected everything that we did from that point on” (Sharp, 2004). The laidback intelligence attitude towards Iran marked the breakdown of US intelligence efficacy in predicting the revolution.Intelligence in Regard to the Iranian RevolutionThe US intelligence laidback attitude towards Iran caused it to fail in all phases of intelligence cycle from tasking, collection, processing, and analysis. TaskingIran is the least of US priority of the Carter administration caused limited tasking that ultimately led to the inadequate collection of intelligence data causing the failure of US intelligence to predict the 1979 revolution. During the reign of the Shah, US priority was to broker SALT II and the Israel-Egypt peace treaty simultaneously (Moscoe, 2014). It was also more preoccupied in stopping communism so radical Islam was not yet in its understanding. Having these priorities in the background, US scaled backed its intelligence tasking in Iran whose inadequate data collected led to its out of touch assessment of its internal politics (Sharp, 2004). This laidback intelligence attitude in Iran can also be attributed to its previous success in the previous coup in 1953 that installed the Shah as its puppet. CollectionThe inadequate tasking led to an incredible lack of data about the internal politics in Iran, especially about its opposition. The failure of data collection of US intelligence in Iran that should havecreated actionable intelligence is a product of various factors. According to Moscoe, intelligence collection failed due to the “failure of diplomatic reporting, a lack of human intelligence (HUMINT), or an overreliance on the Shah’s intelligence service” (Moscoe, 2014). The US intelligence utter failure in intelligence is so blatant that they have not raised any concern about the vulnerability of the Shah’s regime until two months before the revolution happened. In contrast, intelligence agencies of other countries have already raised concerns about the failing health and growing dissent against the Shah indicating how badly the US intelligence fared in data collection.Perhaps, the biggest blunder all of US intelligence cycle in data collection is the failure of its human intelligence or HUMINT. Its failure is twofold. First, it failed to ascertain the obvious which was the growing demonstrations and dissent around Iran which led to the revolution. US intelligence failed to appreciate the extent of the people’s hatred against the Shah and underestimated the power of nationalism (Sharp, 2004). Instead, US intelligence basks on its previous success of installing the Shah which explains it laidback attitude on Iran. US intelligence also failed to notice the obvious where other intelligence agencies have raised concern –the failing health of the Shah. Rather than taking it into account in its report, US intelligence dismissed it as insignificant. As the US intelligence could not even understand the obvious, it was expected that it could fathom the ideology of Islam which was used as a platform of the revolution(Froscher, 2010). Islamic militanism which not yet in US intelligence vocabulary until after the Iran revolution. The US intelligence communities’ overreliance on the intelligence agency it helped create SAVAK also led to its failure to collect actionable intelligence. This dependency on Iranian intelligence made them blind to the failing health of the Shah and the increasing support for Khomeini as SAVAC did not provide any information about these important intelligence concerns. The result is obvious. US intelligence was practically unaware of what was happening in Iran until two months before the revolution.ProcessingUS intelligence community failure in data collection is exacerbated by its secretive attitude about intelligence information. The CIA, State and Defense Department of the United States rarely cooperate or share intelligence information about Iran which made them believe their laidback and biased intelligence which is far from what is happening on the ground (Moscoe, 2014). Effective processing in the intelligence cycle could have checked and even compensated US intelligence’s failure in data collection. Had US intelligence shared intelligence with other intelligence agencies, it would have led to check its own intelligence and realize the inaccuracy of its data. Since it kept information to itself, US intelligence community just fed and reinforced its own inaccurate intelligence which failed to predict the impending revolution.AnalysisIntelligence analysis involves connecting the dots. To effectively interpret intelligence information, the analysis must be free from bias and intelligence noises. As it turns out, US intelligence analysis was filled with the following faulty assumptions which explain its failure;
a)The Shah would crack down –the first assumption of US intelligence is that the Shah would crack down with the growing political pressure in Iran(Froscher, 2010). When he weathered the political pressure, US intelligence assumed that the situation is not really that bad. US intelligence believed that the Shah could deal with the growing instability through its SAVAC. But since he did not, US intelligence took it as an evidence that the Iranian situation is not that bad. They gather that the shah’s decision not to use its loyal military and draconian intelligence service as a signal that the demonstrations were not that significant to be dealt with massive government force.b)The Shah has mass support and would be decisive in its response –it would be safe to argue that US intelligence wallowed in its success when it believed that the Shah they installed has mass support due to the relative success of economic and social reforms he implemented with the help of US aid (Gasiorowski, 2012). They believe that his mass support coupled with decisiveness would effectively quell any threat to the regime. As it turns out, these assumptions were incorrect as whatever gains that the shah earned in the periods 1963 to 1973 was eroded with his increasingautocracy. US intelligence also failed to account that the Shah was never popular with the masses as he was rightfully perceived to be a US puppet. c)US intelligence incompetence to assess the internal politics in Iran became more evident when it concluded the shah’s decision not to deploy troops to quell the demonstrations to be a sign of stability in Iran(Moscoe, 2014). Washington was encouraging the Shah to use force coupled with maintaining its liberalization
Why Intelligence for the War FailedThe fundamental cause why intelligence failed to predict the 1979 Revolution in Iran is because the intelligence community could not overcome their biases in Iran. Intelligence judgments were based merely on plausibility where alternative possibilities were not seriously considered (Froscher, 2010). Its analyst did not understand political opposition and the religious dimension of the revolution which was incidentally used as a platform for the revolution. Their assumptions were also faulty and contradictory that while the CIA is encouraging the Shah to take action against demonstrators, this policy also goes against Washington’s own advice to implement democracy and reform. The intelligence community’s attitude adopted the “disconfirmable” attitude which is to believe its judgments until proven to be false (Froscher, 2010). The combination of these policies, assumptions, and attitudes led to the failure of the US intelligence to predict the 1979 revolution until two months before its happening which is considered too late.What Could Have Been Done BetterThere are many things that US intelligence could have done that would have avoided their intelligence lapses. They could have strengthened their human intelligence gathering to have credible actionable intelligence(Moscoe, 2014). This means doing their own intelligence and not relying on SAVAC which provided them with no intelligence. Their failure in human intelligence gathering made them overlook even the obvious such as the growing dissent of the Iranian population and the failing health of the shah. Part of US intelligence failure in Iran’s 1979 is its inability to overcome its own bias in intelligence analysis. US intelligence community is so enamored with their success in the 1953 coup that they came to believe that Iran is stable despite the growing resentment among the general population. They believe that the security apparatus they help build in Iran could quell the demonstrations. They also interpreted revolutions under the lens of the west where religion could not spark a revolution. Such, they ignored the growing popularity and support of Ayatollah until itis too late.ConclusionThe failure of intelligence in Iran’s 1979 Revolution is definitely a learning experience for the US. It showed how their laidback attitude towards Iran had led them to erroneous assumptions about Iran’s internal affairs. This lack of priority in Iran caused a failure in human intelligence that caused US intelligence to overlook even the most obvious developments that led to the revolution. In a way, US intelligence shared the shah’s lack of grasp of reality as it also believed that the situation is not dire in Iran. It wallowed too much on its success in the 1953 coup that it overlooked the signs leading to the revolution. The US only realized that the revolution is already impending only two months before its happening which is considered to be too late.