Essay: Walzer – Just and unjust wars

Walzer establishes that, since states possess rights similar to those of individuals, the international system can function like a society of individuals.  While these two societies have equivalencies, the application of similar moral principles to the framework for violence is plausible in only some circumstances due to deficiencies in the analogy.  In simplified cases the comparison holds.  For example, it is morally wrong to violate another person’s individual rights like it is wrong for one state to violate another state’s sovereignty.  This fits with Walzer’s interpretation, which prioritizes state sovereignty along the lines of the legalist paradigm, that war is only justified as self-defense of an unjust war.  For example, if an armed man robs a house and the person inside the house shoots him, it would be a justified act of self-defense, as the robber had no just reason to enter the house.  This analogy fits with one state invading another for unjust causes, and that state defending itself against this invasion.  In these basic circumstances involving violating sovereignty and using self-defense, the analogy fits.
Complications occur when we look towards the viability of an analogy between states and civilians.  First, we might assume that most individuals are acting of their own accord, as an independent entity.  States, however, interact on varying levels and therefore do not always have one unified directive.  There are different levels of responsibility for one’s actions in a state which prevent a direct comparison.  We might also question the clarity of motivations, as Walzer claims that “no war can be just on both sides” (59).  While we might objectively name a just and unjust side in a war, it is most likely the case that both sides feel that they are just in fighting the war.  This can be seen in circumstances surrounding many wars in history, including the American Civil War. On the other hand, crime in a society of individuals is much more straightforward regarding right and wrong, as there are clear laws spelling it out.  For example, someone mugging somebody on the street is not questioning whether it is morally right or not; the answer is clear.  These questions of right and wrong disrupt the analogy.
In a similar vein, while in a society of individuals there is a clear enforcer (e.g. police) defending a clear set of laws that apply to everyone within that society, on an international scale there is no equivalent.  Walzer notes that the international system lacks the “rivets of authority” and proposes that states must rely on each other to uphold their rights, “[distributing] police powers…among all the members” (59).  This is unrealistic, and does not occur in a society of individuals.  Individuals do not automatically respect the rights of everyone around them.  On an international scale, supranational organizations like the UN or the EU attempt to regulate these relations, but do not have the jurisdiction to enforce an equivalent set of rules to those in a society of individuals.  A UN Resolution is generally considered to be non-binding, like the UN Security Council Resolution 1835, which failed to convince Iran to halt its uranium production.  In other words, such measures hold influence rather than true power.
Finally, there is no direct comparison between war and a crime in a society of individuals. War is only considered on one level, whereas in society we differentiate between crimes of varying severity.  For example, robbery does not hold the same consequence as murder in a society of individuals.  War is also more disruptive to the international system than crime is at the individual level.  Walzer acknowledges these differences, but fails to establish an analogy that allows for them.
In the end, while Walzer’s analogy can be used to establish that states have sovereignty similar to that of individuals, his ideas leave room for questions regarding its application in circumstances of international relations due to faults in the analogy regarding the intention, enforcement, and perception of interactions on these varying levels.