Policy-makers need a “certain measure of agreement on what is just and unjust” (TJ, 6) to coordinate their policies efficiently, meet expectations and grant stability in society. Answering the normative question “Should policy-makers listen to political theorists?” involves a judgment about the relationship between them to evaluate what impact contemporary political theory should have on policy-makers.
In what follows I shall focus entirely on Rawls’s Theory of Justice (TJ) and Nozick’s Anarchy, State, Utopia (ASU). Due to the essay’s limited scope, it will not elucidate whether policy-makers should listen to say natural scientists or economists. I furthermore assume that political theorists and policy-makers are two separate parties and will not consider whether the former should be identical with the latter.
Suppose that Rawls and Nozick view policy-makers as the actors of their political theories. Suppose their role is to design laws, introduce reforms or maintain the rules of the game. Suppose that these duties can only be completed by following certain principles and ideas. Rawls and Nozick provide normative concepts about justice, so to what extent should they be relevant for policy-making in a democracy?
Before elaborating on this question, I will briefly define my notion of “listening”. One, listening to ideas presupposes an awareness of political theory. Secondly, it shapes beliefs and opinions. When policy-makers listen to theory it influences their behaviour, they act accordingly. Thirdly, the mode of listening should be characterised by a competition of ideas, not one single contention. By exemplarily analysing TJ and ASU a contestation which enriches political discourse shall be given (Conolly, …).
In doing so, we first need to understand what it is that policy-makers should listen to. Rawls and Nozick address fundamental political, economic and social questions and essentially shape the contemporary debate on justice, liberty and equality. Having similar starting points, they develop opposing arguments about the welfare state. TJ is concerned with the basic societal rules, whereas ASU focuses on how individuals interact (Meadowcroft, 191). Both reject utilitarianism because of the separateness of people (TJ, 20; ASU, 33): “Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons” (TJ, 24).
Rawls proposes a theory of justice as fairness. For him, “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions” (TJ, 18). This uncompromisable notion is manifested via consensual, rational deliberation in the original position (OP) where individuals do not know who they are. Rawls emphasises the importance of impartially reached agreements and claims that under the veil of ignorance in the OP everyone obtains the same opinion about the organisation of society (TJ, 118). This is because rational individuals who have the liberty to decide regardless their background select basic structures and fair equal opportunities since they do not know whether they would benefit from particular policies or lose. This contention of a social contract explains the choice of two just principles: the liberty and the difference principle (ib: 13). The first question I will briefly address is, what the concept of the original position implies for policy-making. Under the veil of ignorance, people deliberate “solely on the basis of general considerations” (Rawls, 1999: 118). Simply put, policy-makers would assume ignorance about interest groups, party affiliation, distribution of income. Imagine every individual born into society agrees with the existing institutions and signs a contract confirming them. As tangible as this might sound, however, the conditions for the OP are most abstract for practical policy-making processes. In economic terms, if the costs of listening to Rawls’s theory, of entering the OP appear to be high if not unrealistic, why should they listen?
Rawls makes a powerful case that a well-ordered society is based on social cooperation because “a shared conception of justice establishes the bonds of civic friendship; the general desire for justice limits the pursuit of other ends.” (TJ, 5). Moreover, listening to the concept of the OP should allow policy-makers to justify their designed policies, referring to Rawls’s theory. Should applying justice arguments go hand-in-hand with policy-making? Definitely from a normative point. Empirically, though, the current trend to “realness” in politics involves justification by emotions and pressing practical problems rather than normative concepts. Rawls’s concept of policy-making individuals is too idealistic. Although the claim that policy-makers should normatively justify their policies is valid, they might hardly ever practically do so. However, rhetorics in contrast to moral arguments lead to short-lived policies which are quickly reversed by the next elected policy-maker. This ineffectiveness in coordination is an appeal to listen more to political theorists. As Rawls states, justice as primary normative foundation of policy-making underpins the consensual basis of society and thus effects long-term policy-making.
Nevertheless, examining the construction of the OP closely, Rawls’s“general considerations” for evaluating principles might not be a sufficiently convincing mode of action (see TJ, 121). Although policy-makers should act according to their rationality and cultural specificity is neglected, I claim that they must have some minimal cultural consciousness (e.g. a common language) in the OP. Suppose the chosen policies are solely a result of well-intentioned and just planning, but their real outcome is the (unforeseeable) contrary due to cultural conditions. For Rawls, there cannot be many deviations from the outcomes deliberated upon in the OP. However, observing unjust policies today, how should these be evaluated and improved, assuming they abode by Rawlsian standards of fair deliberation? This leads to a more general question of the “factual accuracy” of TJ (Campbell, pp. 70-72). The complete rationality Rawls ascribes to his actors seems empirically untestable, at the cost of a morally relevant and sound theory. Designing and legitimising policies involves culture, irrationality and history. This explains why some rules work in some countries, but not in others. They are subject to specific cultural perceptions and cannot be reduced to a rational plan of policy-making – how ever deliberately reached. This is also the case for essentially contested concepts like liberty, justice and equality.
Nozick remarks that Rawls’s egalitarian liberalism directly follows from his theoretical construction of the OP, which disconnects people from their history and entitled properties (ASU, 202). The difference principle which prioritises the least advantaged is unanimously chosen in the original position and therefore legitimises a just welfare state which corrects arbitrary natural endowments (TJ, 219). Nozick argues that this is inherently unjust because a non-minimal state eventually violates individual rights (ASU, 149). For him, wealth creation is essentially individualist and individuals are justly entitled to holdings, if the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer hold (ASU, 149-150 or 186). If not, rectification takes place, but central distribution is flawed because it limits individual liberty: no authority possesses enough information to assess whether a complex, overall outcome is just (ASU, pp. 204-206). Besides it contradicts the liberty principle that talents which are developed over time and form an essential part of individual dignity and autonomy have no place in the OP (ASU, 214). This is further complicated by the only non-ideal assumption in TJ, regarding the incentives productive people need in order to contribute to society (TJ, 142). Rawls seems to suggest that different members cooperate and share differently. Hence, how would practical policy-makers know how their interventions impact society, that is how their chosen incentives change the basic structures (see ASU, 204-205)? This touches upon issues which are too extensive to be systematically examined in this essay. In Nozick’s words: “If processes are so great, Rawls’ theory is defective because it is incapable of yielding process principles of justice.” (ASU, 208). What follows from this is that if policy-makers listened to Nozick, they would work on a micro-level, not interfering with distributive justice, but instead evaluating whether institutions justly deal with natural entitlements (ASU, 206).
Rawls’s theory of just- ice is the product of a series of assumptions that frame the ques- tion of justice in a way that produces Rawls’s desired outcome. (Meadowcroft, ?)