Essay: ‘Russia a divided nation’ and ‘Russia as guardian of international order’

Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian government has published numerous doctrines and programs for foreign policy. Just a few days ago President Putin announced yet another new approach to foreign relations in his Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly. The need for continuous updates and development of Russian position on the international arena, is due to the identity vacuum that the country had found itself in after the collapse of the 70 year old system, with one of the most distinct national identities. As for all states, national identity is constructed according to it’s place in the international system, in relation to the ‘other’ and how they self-perceive its role in the global affairs. In order to step away from the Soviet inheritance, the government had to propose a legitimate alternative. Although I cannot say the Russian government has been successful at creating a new distinct and clear identity, it is definitely clear which ideas and narratives of national identity can be traced in Russian foreign policies.
In order to limit the scope of this essay, I will analyse only the most important ‘identities’ that in my opinion are central in Russian foreign policy discourse: ‘Russia a divided nation’ and ‘Russia as guardian of international order’. The former notion roots from the collapse of the USSR when many Russians have found themselves in other countries. Based on ideas of ethnicity and language being uniting factors, partition scholars have proposed a notion of ‘compatriots’. This narrative is often used to justify Russian policies in the post-Soviet space and refer to ‘responsibility to protect’ Russian citizens and their compatriots. The latter idea is based on respect for international law and sovereignty, and is in line with most Russian policies regarding the West. It is built on the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’, which was widely promoted as distinct Russian ideology in 2006.
I will also address the issue of contradictions between those identities and certain Russian policies which demonstrates that these identities do not dictate foreign policy for the Kremlin, rather are used as tools to justify certain strategies post factum.
‘Russia a divided nation’ – compatriots, repartition and the Russian World
The slogan ‘Russia a divided nation’ originated from the nationalist thought and developed into a foreign policy tool. Inspired by the work of A. Solzhenitsin, the Russian nationalist movement laid roots in 1991 with the creation of Congress of Russian Communities (KRO). Lead by Dmitri Rogozin, who is one of the few ‘original’ nationalists remained in power and joined Putin’s administration. The congress was based on cooperation between Russia, Moldova, Estonia and other ex-Soviet states.  Their aim was to provide legitimate basis for defending the interests of ‘compatriots’ who were left abroad after the new borders were put in place. They professed “the right of the Russian nation to be unified in a united state on its historical territory, to the rebirth of the fatherland’s great power, to wellbeing, and to the development of all the peoples of Russia.” Although massive ‘passportization’ program was set off in disputed areas on Georgian border, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early 2000s, the officials did not credit KRO for the idea, thus keeping the movement down, whilst benefiting from its instrumental value. This policy made possible future manoeuvres in the area, due to the majority of population being Russian, which was the justification behind 2008 war. .
Despite KRO having difficulty in finding popular support, the movement was revived in 2003 and reformed into a political party called “Rodina”. Due to the format of an official political entity, the movement was able to promote its position on the need to restore Russian influence in the near abroad, and even approach the actual foreign policy decision making process. The more formal structure of a parliamentary faction allowed Rodina to “structure previously disparate individual actions and nationalist discourses”. Despite their electoral failure, Rodina’s ultranationalist slogans triggered a new debate in the media, and the movement was perceived as independent of Kremlin, defenders of Russian people from migrants attacking the Russian society. The anti-migrant narrative and particularly targeted the North-Caucasus ethnicity, and translated into a radical lobby lead by skinheads. Rodina was the first political entity to introduce xenophobia into Russian public debate, which played a role in shaping Russian national identity.
In particular Rodina’s efforts later were adopted into a state repatriation program and legislation on protection of compatriots in the post-Soviet space. A “State Assistance Program for Voluntary Repatriation of Compatriots to Russia” was put in place in 2006, with the purpose of entitling former Soviet citizens to free movement in the post-Soviet space, and eased regulations on naturalisation process in Russia. Such deregulations were supposed to facilitate the return of compatriots, “those educated in the traditions of Russian culture, the possession of the Russian language, and not wanting to lose their relation with Russia.” This is argued to be KRO’s an Rodina’s only real impact on policy.
Interestingly the two successful narratives “Russia is for Russians” and “Russia a divided nation” were developed simultaneously, while being quite contradictory. The former translated into a radical nationalist movement, elevating anti-immigrant sentiments against anyone non Slavic. Already such sentiments in a multi-ethnical country as Russia can be extremely dangerous, simply due to the sheer spectre of nationalists that Russia encompasses. Furthermore, this was completely opposite to the compatriot return program that was developed meanwhile, and was particularly in conflict with ‘passportisation’ of the peoples living in disputed areas at Georgian border.
The narrative of repartition resurfaced in light of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, during which Kremlin’s position was interesting in a few ways. In relation to the Eastern part of the country – Novorossia, the Kremlin rejected separatist claims of independence or pleas for integration into Russian Federation, however did not stand in the way of Russian nationalist insurgent groups and militias being involved in the conflict. Nationalist groups dominated the media debate on the issue, were very active with humanitarian efforts and involved in direct fighting on the frontline.
In light of this, the idea of ‘Russian World’ gained momentum during the crisis, and implies much wider philosophical and ideological connotations than the notion of ‘compatriots’. It implies a global network of Russians around the world, identifying with Russian culture and language. Promoted by the Russian Orthodox church, calling for “spiritual unity for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus” and stretching the arm of Orthodoxy as far as Moldova and Kazakhstan (despite the lack of linguistic or ethnic commonalities) with Russia being the centre of this ‘civilisation’. This imperialist and ethno-nationalist discourse was quickly securitised and put to use. In the summer of 2008 Medvedev introduced ‘civilisational dimension’ to the global politics discourse, claiming a niche for the Russian ‘unique civilisation’. Using the civilisational framework to explain the Georgian crisis and Russian military attack, supplied the policy with ‘doctrinal legitimacy.
If before 2014 the idea relied on a self-perception framework, after the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, it was merged with nationalist rhetoric and later reinterpreted as justification for aggressive behaviour towards its neighbours for the benefit of Russians abroad – compatriots.
However Crimean policy was much clearer, the protection of compatriots and repartition ideas were invoked, and followed through the whole process of Crimean integration. President Putin claimed that after the fall of the USSR “the Russian nation became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders” thus justifying Crimean re-unification with Russia, and officially consolidating the partition idea into the national identity.
Moreover according to Marlene Laruelle, this claim suggests that Putin recognises the difference between Russia’s ‘territorial body’ and its ‘cultural body’, which he intends to maintain, in a way as a sphere of cultural influence, however the Crimean scenario with the nationalist justifications can only be expected if the state does not play by Russia’s rules. Examples of Georgia and Kazakstan confirm this claim. In 2008 war with Georgia, Russia used the pretext of ‘responsibility to protect’ Russian citizens, the same Western concept used in Libya, however that wasn’t the cause of the war. Georgia’s estrangement from Russia, and rapprochement to obtaining NATO membership would be the more likely cause, along with unsettled disputes on the border, and radical nationalistic attitudes and discrimination towards Georgians in Russia in the previous years.
Historical significance has been widely quoted during the Crimean debate, and Putin numerously referred to historical ties, recalling the Crimean War of 1853 and delegitimising Khrushchev’s decision to make Crimea a part of Ukraine. When announcing Crimean addition to the Russian Federation, he called it “an issue that is of vital, historic significance” and an “outrageous historical injustice” said that to explain the event “it is enough to know the history of Crimea and what Russia and Crimea have always meant for each other.” In fact he mentioned historical significance 18 times in that speech, which became the central argument for Crimean integration.
‘Russia as guardian of international order’ – sovereignty, international law, legitimate government
The second part of this essay will focus on the characteristic of Russian national identity as a ‘guardian of international order’ which is based on appreciation for international law and sovereignty. This idea particularly plays well with the notion of ‘sovereign democracy’ put forward by Putin’s aid Vladislav Surkov in 2006. This proposed ‘ideology’ relies on democratic principles and practices, while emphasising the importance of sovereignty and independence. It is a crucial aspect of statecraft for modern Russia, for all institutional developments and new legislation to be authentic and created specifically for the Russian model, rather than borrowed from Western countries. In this line of thought, respect for sovereignty prevails, and means than in foreign affairs Russian doctrine is to never intervene unless asked by the legitimate government. For example Russian military intervention in Syria is explained as a request from President Bashar al-Assad for support in his fight against terrorism and rebels. Prior to intervention, Russia vetoed any proposal for intervention or Assad’s resignation since the fighting broke out in 2011.  Despite Washington efforts, Moscow always insisted on negotiations with Assad’s government.
The second pillar of this identity is respect for international law, which the Russian government especially likes to refer to when Western policies are breaking it. According to Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov the only guiding principles of foreign policy Russia follows are “common sense and the supremacy of international law” – this was said following the conflict with Georgia in 2008. During the same time President Medvedev emphasised that Russia shares Western values, despite frequent misinterpretations. Despite contradicting his own ‘civilizational’ line of thought, Medvedev benefited form instrumental use of  switching to ‘Westernizer’ narrative. By doing so the Kremlin gains legitimacy as a rightful actor in the international system and can demonstrate a degree of appreciation for international norms, in spite of usual criticism. In addition, this discourse gives Russia a bargaining chip when it comes to justifying their own questionable actions, and makes NATO look hypocritical if they condemn those. Moscow in particular likes to remind the world of Kosovo bombings or intervention in Iraq, as both were carried out without an official UN mandate and thus in violation of international law. Russian officials tend to urge their American counterparts to co-exist within the international order that is the same for all actors in the system, and resect the set of rules that are in place, same for everyone.
In his article following the war in Georgia, Lavrov compared Russian military operation to NATO’s actions in Afghanistan, calling it “an evident abuse of the UN mandate” which has cost many civilian lives. Similarly he refers to the 1999 bombings of Kosovo, pointing to the unfair judgement of Russian actions in an akin situation. He justified Russian actions as ‘necessary’ and “within the international law, including the right for  self-defence”, referring to Article 51 in the UN Charter. In addition he stressed that above anything Russia defended “most sacred human rights – right to life, right to development” of South Ossetian and Abkhazian people.
It is almost ironic how Russian politicians call out their Western colleagues on breaking Western norms. By using Western terms and values, Russia not only maintains it’s position as an ‘equal partner’ with Western liberal democracies, it also discredits Western criticism of Russia based on those same values and norms. However nor those norms, nor the national characteristics Russia identifies with and promotes, are the drivers of foreign policy decision making process. I believe strategic interest and pragmatism are the true guiding principles behind Russian policies. Because the national identity narratives only come into play in order to explain a certain action, after the decision has already been made. Therefore, although Russian foreign policy often falls in line with its national identity, it cannot predict Russia’s behaviour in future, as there are many examples when Russia acted against its own ‘national values’.
Overall I believe there is a correlation between Russian foreign policy and the national identity Russia seems to present to the world. However I do not think that these identities guide the foreign policy decision making process, as in many cases Russian policies were contradictory to the values they attempt to propose as Russian national identity. For example manipulating gas and oil prices for political interest or hindering another state’s sovereignty by intervening in domestic elections during the Colour Revolutions. I believe that pragmatism and national interest are the main drivers of Russian foreign policy. While these national identities have been successfully constructed in order to be instrumentally implemented, which is what we can observe in the examples I have analysed above. In my opinion these identities work, because they were based on significant historical experiences and real vulnerabilities the state inherited from the collapse of the Soviet Union. ‘Russia a divided nation’ narrative is relatable to millions of families who have been separated by new borders in the 90s; ‘Russian unique civilisation’ evokes historical pride and nostalgia of the Tsars who carried the tittle of “Protector of the Slavs” and the Great Russian empire; “Russia guardian of the international order” installs hope to regain their place at the top in the international system and right all the wrongs the West has caused in smaller, weaker countries.
The rest is up to the interpretation Russian officials decide to use, depending on the context.