"During this election, I had promised on many occasions that I will build a consistent, predictable, and sustainable cross-strait relationship" said Dr. Tsai Ing-wen as she cruises through victory on a mid-January evening, embraced by supporters of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party. On January 16, the results of the Presidential and Legislative Elections ushered a new ruling administration following Tsai's landslide victory to become the first female President of the Chinese-speaking world, as well as her party winning two-thirds of the seats in the Legislature Yuan, Taiwan’s unicameral federal legislative body. This is the third transition of power experienced by Taiwan's fledging democracy where the island's 23 million people, merely 100 miles off the coast of Mainland, vehemently chose a new direction of leadership that show sharp political contrast to the incumbent administration – the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party).
The electorate's main complaints were on socioeconomic and domestic issues, including volatile property prices in urban areas, stagnant wages, and reduced worker benefits. As a nation haunted by memories of the Chinese Civil War and under the persistent military threat of unification from the Communist government in the Mainland, cross-strait issues remain an indelible area of concern, especially to many of Taiwan's now vocal youth who fear more Kuomintang controls means sacrificing Taiwanese interests to strengthen ties with Mainland China. Febie, a woman in her late 20s despite witnessing the positive economic impact on her café in central Taipei, is fearful of the increasing economic dependence spearheaded through a series of unprecedented cultural and economic rapprochement based around the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) passed in early 2014 by a then Kuomintang-controlled Legislature. Cultural identity of Taiwan is marked deep in Taiwan’s youth, and the DPP’s pro-independence ideals resonate with their beliefs. Without doubt, a new poll conducted by Thinktank named Taiwan Braintrust show that nearly 90 percent of Taiwan's population would identify as Taiwanese rather than Chinese given the two choices.
As for Tsai whose job is to lead Taiwan at least the next four years, the soft-spoken, Cornell-educated lawyer has remained ambiguous on her stance on the 1992 consensus especially throughout the election season. A term used to describe the mutual cross-strait agreement of the One-China principle, the 1992 consensus has been rejected by the DPP such as the last time they were in power from 2000-2008 when former President Chen Shui-bian was described as a "troublemaker and saboteur of cross-strait ties" in the eyes of the PRC government.
Tsai's win was not a surprise to experts studying the Asia-Pacific region, including Richard C. Bush, senior fellow at the Brooking Institution who has outlined various scenarios and preferential plans during speculative periods of the election. Because presidential elections in Taiwan "produce new leaders, and often, new policies towards China," Bush believes these elections are the main variable in the level of cross-strait tension. He lays out three scenarios for Beijing's reaction to Tsai's coming to power.
Firstly, in face of an administration less China-friendly than the Ma administration for the past eight years, China may or may not "ignore its own principles for the sake of continuity and good relations". The second scenario is the deterioration of cross-strait relations, fueling the PRC government's intent to deprive Taiwan economically. Thirdly, Beijing is likely to bluff an attack and increase military build-up against the island nation which it considers a rebel province. Just yesterday, the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan (MND) reported Chinese deployment of advanced surface-to-air missile system in Woody Island in the South China Sea, in addition to the five hundred short-range missiles the PRC has aimed at Taiwan. However, the prospects of forceful engagement seems unlikely, and Taiwan's leverage for its own National security rests on the responsibility of the US State Department, who has once protected the ROC for military threats in the 1990s accompanied by continued arms sales.
At the same time strengthening Taiwan, whose defense budget is less than 10 percent of the Mainland's, the US State Department focuses on peace and stability, and denies support Taiwan independence. Since Tsai's election, apart from monitoring China's military activities, there has not been major policy changes to the cross-strait region. Bush advises the use of Dual Deterrence, or strategic ambiguity that emphasizes accountability for either side of the Strait if either intends to promote political strife. The purpose of Dual Deterrence is to "exercise restraint and flexibility and warning against a unilateral change in the status quo by either side".
As for the question on Taiwan’s own defense, Taiwan must establish its own policy of Credible Deterrence to give teeth to Dual Deterrence, thereby securing support from the US as an ancillary objective. The first job that needs to be done is boost the public image of Taiwanese armed forces, especially in the eyes of able-bodied Taiwanese youth, many of which do not view joining the armed forces as a viable career path. Currently, the Act of Military Service System has been conscripting male young adults born before 1993 to safeguard homeland security. Recently legislation including a Provisional Act to transition from mandatory conscription of young males towards a Voluntary Military System poses grave challenge on the upcoming DPP administration to reform the military’s image and “refine Taiwan’s veteran affairs policies by boosting support for service member education, offering civil-military dual employable jobs at the Ministry of National Defense, and integrating veterans hospitals, homes, and care facilities into an overarching network.” Many youth are dissuaded from a military career due to limited mobility and reduced educational opportunities, values central to Taiwan and Confucian ideology. The quick answer is to raise the salary of servicemen, but that proposal may place undue burden on a limited defense budget.
Apart from the logistics of military defense, Dr. Tsai must “realign action and mission.” Although the Ma administration fostered economic camaraderie between Taiwan and the Mainland, this has led to a lack of attention to defense strategy and equipment. Taiwan’s defense draws heavily upon its navy and air force, and has not sufficiently bolstered its army and marine corp, down almost 50% in personnel compared to four years ago whose amphibious capabilities are too “mechanized, and not particularly mobile.” In terms of defense doctrine, Taiwan needs to adopt denial strategies instead of control strategies, where the navy and air force whose goal is to reject any potential attack points rather than blindly controlling entire areas where it would never size up to the Chinese forces at face value. In essence, guerilla-esque denial of offense rather than conventional blatant defense is more fiscally productive.
Purchasing the right equipment also needs to be put into thought: anti-subamarine technology by the Mainland could counter Taipei’s persistent focus on indigenous submarines. A better strategy that echoes the doctrine of denial is to target Chinese military weak points by purchasing anti-surface and anti-submarine aircrafts. Any next moves that Tsai makes needs to be convincing to the US that Taiwan is serious about its defense. In the rare incident of war, Deterrence through Protraction may be Taiwan most salient choice. A recently study headed by the Vice President of Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments suggests the MND adopts Hard ROC 2.0 where the ROC must de
flect incoming attacks by gaining good sense of maritime and airspace environment in the event of war. Novel operational approaches based on this principle by placing premiums of “delay, resiliency, furtiveness and deception” will buy time for the international community most likely led by Washington to act against China’s anti status-quo moves.
As the incoming administration witnesses that lack of change from State Department policies towards Taiwan, acts to promote deterrence on Taiwan’s part must aim to change Beijing’s decision matrix. Tsai’s balancing of the internal pressures from the now powerful pan-Green coalition and a sensible rethink on defense strategies is key to Taiwan’s standing up to her biggest bully. Even with the ostensible improvements of Taiwan-China relations by the Ma’s administration, six decades of enmity may be a greater challenge for Tsai whose party is stereotyped as separatist and mercurial. But as the party leader whose political values are distinct from DPP’s early days, her engagement with Taiwan’s international allies begins with self-reform.
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