Hosni Mubarak had to resign following the popular protests, which broke out on 25th January 2011. A referendum for the new Constitution on 19th March 2011 and parliamentary elections on 28th November 2011 was conducted. Mohammad Morsi gained 51.73% of the votes and won the presidential elections held on 16- 17th June 2012. Nevertheless, economic growth rates could not be improved, national and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was not attracted, as a result, markets couldn’t be stabilized. The Morsi Government couldn’t take necessary steps to cope with unemployment, especially among the youth, and improve social justice. Therefore, anti-governmental protests restarted on 30th June 2013 and the Egyptian military ousted the Morsi government with a coup d’état on 4 July 2013.
The popular protests in Libya, which was supported by NATO intervention led by France, started on 17th February 2011 and ended when Qaddafi was slaughtered on 20th
October. On 23rd October, National Transition Council was established and 7th July 2012, democratic elections were held. However, conflicts between tribes are still going on and the unity of the state is at risk 5.
In Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen anti-democratic governments were toppled as a result of the protests while some economic and soc ial rights were granted to nations in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Bahrain 6. In Syria, the death toll exceeded one hundred thousand from the beginning of the insurgency till July, 2013 7.
There is no doubt that Arab Spring has been affecting Turkey. “Zero problem policy with neighbouring countries”, which was conducted by Turkey in its relations with Iran, Syria and Iraq before the conflicts broke out, is not applicable any more. However, it helped relations between Turkey and Arab Union gain new dimensions and become stronger. The sensible and responsible warnings made by Turkish politicians to their Syrian, Egyptian and Libyan counterparts since the beginning of the popular protests enhanced the sympathy and interest among those peoples towards Turkey 8. Because of its liberal, Islamic, democratic and secular outlook, Turkey has become a role model for those countries 9.
Arab Spring weakened the obvious dominance of the USA in the region. USA considered revising its policies in the region leaving its unquestionable support for Israel
and improved relations with regional powers like Turkey. As in Libya, USA shared leadership and responsibility in humanitarian intervention with its allies in Europe.
Future prospects for political change
The effects of the Arab Spring on nations over the MENA area have been fluctuated, reflecting the substantial diversity that portrays the region 10 (Anderson 2011). The revolution that happened in Tunisia and Egypt has not been effectively imitated in Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. While worldwide military powers are supporting rebels in the civil war in Libya, Saudi military backing has helped the Bahrain administration to stifle protest. In any case, even in states, for example, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, which have so far opposed revolution, the force of the state has been constrained 11.
A great part of the accessible writing on the Arab Spring is pertain with the future prospects of the Arab Spring and the degree to which it is liable to spread or be maintain. Numerous pundits contend that the fall of regimes in Bahrain, Libya, Syria and Yemen is unavoidable in the long haul 12. Most pundits concur that oil-rich Gulf States, for example, Saudi Arabia will remain resistant to major political change, utilizing a mix of suppression with hand-outs to keep up their hold on influence 13. Those Arab nations that have some experience of democratic institutions (Palestinian Territories, Kuwait, Iraq and Lebanon) represent the pitfalls of imperfect democracy in the Arab world. In each of these cases factional infighting has prompted delayed periods instance, gatherings are currently required to have equal number of men and ladies in
their electoral records. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is holding dialog about incorporating ladies in their Consultative Council, although no ladies sat on the commission to change the constitution 14.
Regional Power Relations
In spite of the fact that the Arab Spring has profoundly affected the political settlement in numerous nations of the MENA region, it has evidently failed to achieve any real change in regional power structures. This absence of change can be ascribed to various components: the oil supply is secure, Israel proceeds with its occupation, and there are much more ways at the disposal of the US and European states to keep governments tuned in to western interest than in times of US-upheld dictatorships' While numerous observers made examinations with the third wave of democratization in Eastern Europe in 1989, US influence in the area is not disintegrating similarly the Soviet Union's influence over Eastern Europe came apart during that region's democratic transition 15.
Experts have distinguished various developing patterns in regional power relations.16 contends that the Arab Spring is liable to prompt the re-emergence of Egypt as a main Arab power'. A few analysts contend that advancements in Egypt will significantly affect more extensive area, either giving an outline to change in different regions if the transition is fruitful, or empowering anti-democratic opposition if the transition stalls 17. While there are signs that the military are uniting their position in Egypt, the choice of government keep previous President demonstrates proceeded with power of protest 18.
Impact on the West‘s approach to the region
The West's 'stability paradigm' – the thought that concern could be exchanged for thought has been severely disputed by the advancements of the Arab Spring. However, stability is liable to remain the West's essential policy objective. The obligation to protect' doctrine that has been raise in Libya will be tried in the West's dealing of the uprisings in Yemen and Bahrain 19. To date, neither the EU it’s hard to make due in the long term without external support 20. Nor the US has completely embraced protest movement and these movements might find
Islamism
Although some Islamist groups, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt or al-Nahda in Tunisia have been included in the protests, the Arab Spring has to a great extent rose above Islamist politics issues. Bayat describes the uprisings as post-Islamist' revolutions, where religious talk is to a great extent missing and where the protestors ‘central point is to establish a democratic government 21.
Despite the fact that these groups were underestimated from the initial uprisings, most observes concur that current Islamist movements, particularly the well-organised MB in Egypt, are prone to be real players in the post-uprising political scene of the Arab world. Their part will differ essentially from nation to nation. Islamism is best comprehended as a catch-all term that includes a scope of positions, from a belief in religious government to the thought that Islam ought to be a source of values 22.
Role of Youth and Civil Society
Although online networking understand youth assumed a vital part in driving the protests in many nations, their part is prone to decrease as political moves play out in the region. Youth movements need pioneers and policy stages to drive their agenda. The way that formal civil and political society assumed such a negligible part in the protests (except for Bahrain) has suggestions for the long term direction of the Arab Spring. While the unmistakable quality of online networking and young people united differing social and political groups, the nebulous way of these groupings imply that they will be hard to support 23. Youth movements should connect with moderate voters in rural area who constitute most of the
electorate in numerous MENA nations.
In Egypt, these new political movements stand minimal possibility of having the capacity to construct focused party structures in time for the planned September elections 24. The difficulties confronting Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are especially different. While Egypt and Tunisia will concentrate on building political establishments (constitutions, political parties and electoral system), Libya should develop a civil society starting afresh with no help 25.
Impact on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States
As specified over, the Arab Spring has had a generally restricted consequence on the governance and inward governmental issues of the Gulf States, because of their capacity to utilize oil cash to dampen dissent 26. The two states with the minimum oil cash (Bahrain and Yemen) have seen the greatest dissents. Saudi Arabia has seen its
position in the Arab world debilitate as a consequence of the Arab Spring, losing its most vital associate in Hosni Mubarak. A few elites in Saudi Arabia see playing the sectorian card as the most ideal approach to limit what they see as developing Iranian impact in the region. Saudi Arabia's essential objective remains keeping up existing conditions and guaranteeing proceeded with stableness and accordingly it has kept up an even minded position towards its neighbors. It supported President Saleh in Yemen until his position got to be untenable and a risk to solidness 27. It is presently liable to attempt to confine the rise of a united and more autonomous Yemen by inciting inward divisions inside of Yemeni elites.
Israel/ Palestine conflict
The Arab Spring started dramatic protests on the Israel's northern borders, in Gaza and the West Bank. Protests energized a compromise understanding in the middle of Fatah and Hamas, the two principle political parties in the Palestinian Territories, by presenting both parties to developing prominent pressure for change 28. The agreement sees a progressive end to the split inside of the Palestinian authority and shows obscure proposals towards change of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. If subsequent elections are conducted in a relatively orderly fashion, this could reinforce the Palestinians ‘position in any future peace chats with Israel. To date, progress on forming another solidarity government has been slowed down by differences about who ought to lead it 29. The agreement makes a prompt resumption of the peace process impossible since Israel has expressed unequivocally that it won't negotiate with a government that incorporates Hamas. The understanding does, in any case, put the Palestinians in a more grounded position to push for a United Nations vote on statehood in September 30 .
Government relations with the military have risen as a basic element in determining out if or not an administration survives popular protest. In Libya, Yemen and Syria, Security powers and praetorian watchmen have demonstrated better armed and resourced over the primary armed. They are firmly controlled by presidents or their nearby families and have been willing to contend energetically to keep up their position. Larry Diamond has contended that the military in Egypt might attempt to block a democratic transition by turning a blind eye to crime and sectarian brutality, making an unstable environment that will encourage outsiders to back a strong hand 31. In that capacity, the military remains a noteworthy obstruction to genuine democratic transition in various nations in the region.
Sectarianism
At the point when dictatorship split, fundamental social conflicts that have been repressed frequently gone to the fore. Although sectarian talk has been generally absent from the majority of the late uprisings, the danger of sectarian conflict poses a potential
threat over various nations and specific those, for example, Bahrain and Syria which are ruled by an ethnic minority group. The Economist Intelligence Unit rates the danger of internal division as high' in Yemen, Libya and Bahrain and high' in Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Kuwait, the Palestinian Territories, Syria and Tunisia 32.
Terrorism and Al-Qaeda
The Arab Spring has uncovered Al-Qaeda's insufficiency as agents for political change. Revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia have been driven by youths motivated by freedom and peaceful activity, as opposed to safeguarding Muslim lands from stay in force, security
services will be liable to confer less resource to handling jihadists, centring their energies on supporters of democratization. 33. Contends that opportunities for jihadists have been improved in Libya where civil war has broken out and Western powers have mediated militarily.
Economic and development dimensions
Economic impacts
In the short term, the economic consequences of the Arab Spring support the oil-producing nations that have encountered the slightest unsteadiness. Egypt and Tunisia require external backing to shore up suddenly fragile fiscal and balance of payments positions 34. This setback has been caused by steep short-term reductions in production, exchange and services. Egypt has additionally endured a 45% drop in traveller landings, which it has been evaluated might prompt a 1.2% decrease in GDP this year. These patterns might be mostly repeated in other significant traveller destinations in the region, for example, Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan 35.
Economic Impacts of Arab Spring Insurgencies throughout the region brought about failures in macroeconomic balances 36. Changes in countries’ economic growth rates are seeing in Table 1.
According to the data in Table 3, these states’ economic growth rates have been affected negatively during the unrest. While in 2011 Libyan economy declined by 62%, it grew by 104% in 2012, the base year. Recent data for Syrian economy has not been published because of the civil war; however, it is assumed that the situation is no different from Libyan economy.
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) contends that various nations including Libya, Syria and Bahrain might suffer from a large decline in foreign investment, although late research by Grant Thornton recommends that all around just 10% of businesses say that they were currently less likely to do business in the MENA region37. Over the long term, the EIU and the World Bank attest that democratization ought to deliver critical economic advantages: A speeding up in economic growth under this situation would significantly narrow, and could even kill, the region's gap with world normal salaries by 2050 '38. Riordan refers to World Bank assumes that anticipate GDP development of 3.5 – 4% for the area in 2011-12, which, although sensible is still marginally underneath pre-Arab spring projections 39.
In spite of the fact that the economic reform in the MENA region is less actually difficult than that confronting Eastern Europe in 1989, it might demonstrate all the more politically disagreeable 40. While Eastern Europe had an unmistakable model for change in Western Europe and the objective of EU member, there is a less clear way to economic reform in the MENA region. In Egypt, the new government has extended subsidies and state employment. Most nations in the area are likewise cursed by kleptocratic imposing business models, substantial regulation and massive state subsidies. Vested interests are also likely to resist changed. Handling corruption will be one of the focal difficulties confronting the region during the following period of the transition. New governments in Egypt and Tunisia should seek after a sensitive harmony between handling vested interests and corruption from one viewpoint, and the need to stay away from capital flight and to guarantee some level of political stability on other.
The issue of bread and fuel subsidies is especially touchy. Despite the fact that these endowments can yield quick political advantages to the governments that circulate them, they have negative long term impa
cts on public finances and may be unfairly distributed because of corruption. One of the key difficulties confronting policymakers in the MENA region will be the question of how to design new policies that reach targeted groups more effectively 41(Saif 2011).
Arguments
The Arab spring case gave this argument a main agitate to move forward. Although some researcher debates that Rich countries have committed substantial financial resources to supporting pro-democracy movements in North Africa that lead to revolutionary consequence on political field. Other scholars are somewhat doubtful of this. The aim of this work is to Identify and analyse the consequences of the Arab Spring on the MENA region, from is soonest substantial use in 2008 through the events usually mentioned to as the Arab spring.
The wave of pro-democracy protests and uprisings that took place in the Middle East and North Africa beginning in 2010 and 2011, challenging some of the region’s entrenched authoritarian regimes. Demonstrators expressing political and economic grievances faced violent crackdowns by their countries’ security forces.
This consequence brought about the argument of MENA, on average, within country inequality is stable over time or changes too slowly to make a significant difference in poverty reduction. However, country and regional studies such as those of Kanbur and Lustig (1999), have looked beyond the 'average' and refuted the initial cross-country evidence, arguing that large increases in income inequality in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Central Asia over the 1990s, increased by between greatly exacerbating the consequence of negative growth on poverty 42.
Conclusion
In this study Arab Springs and its consequence on MENA regions in economies and political shifts it brought about the study of international relations. As a result, it is considered that Arab Spring has changed is balances to a large extent. International organizations such as UN, Arab Union and Organization of Islamic Conference must support peoples’ aspirations and help insurgencies end at once so that democratic transition is embedded in MENA region. It is vital for world peace that the region be stabilized through diplomatic means without a need for military intervention. However, in doing so, the unique inner structures of each country should be carefully studied.
After stability is secured, there is a need for practices to raise national incomes, to improve employment rates and to balance income distribution. Otherwise, the expectations of these peoples will not be met and counter revolutions as well as other methods will threaten the democratization process like in Egypt.
So as to help improve Egyptian economy, investments in agriculture and irrigation ought to be made in the rural areas so that poverty and employment could be overcome 43. Tourism, which provided employment for one out of seven people in Egypt, is of great importance for Egyptian economy. With the onset of the unrest, the tourism revenues declined by 80% 44. Moreover, natural gas export stopped after the sabotages to pipelines in Sina peninsula. The problems mentioned above had a negative impact on employment and led to a decrease in national income 45. Tourism revenues and natural gas export could rise, after security and stability is provided in the country. Transparency on how revenues out of oil resources are utilized must be improved. Otherwise, international pressure and sanctions must be applied.