Elite rule is the form of rule we should strive for. The basis of elite rule is the concentration of power in the hands of the few, bringing with it stability of government and ‘protection-against-tyranny’ (Held, 1987). There are three main strands of elitism: classical, democratic and modern elitism. Democratic elitism is the most desirable form for government and is associated with Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter. They argue for the constant competition between elite rulers and groups which results in the emergence of a competent ruling class. Constant elite competition is the central concept of Democratic elitism, as it is the reason for many of the benefits. These include producing the best leaders and ensuring a system of checks and balances between elites. This constant competition makes the process democratic and accountable, ensuring there are no abusive forces at play within the state. Elitism focuses on the distribution of power within the state, taking an arena based approach. In contrast, Democracy is associated with individual rights, liberties and freedoms, such as freedom of speech, and the ability to affect change. Although the initial aims of democratic elitism are not to provide the rights that democracy does it can still, and does, produce those rights. Therefore, I shall be arguing that the competitive nature of democratic elitism provides benefits but also produces the aspects of democracy that people value highly, without the chaos and instability of a democracy, producing a system of rule that is unparalleled.
Firstly, one of the main benefits of democratic elitism is that it selects the ‘most competent’ (Held, 1987) leaders to ensure ‘effective political… leadership’ (Held, 1987). This occurs through the competitive element of the theory, as Schumpeter (1944) argued for a system in which there is a constant struggle between leaders and parties for the people’s vote. This process would essentially mean that the best leaders would rise to the top, creating a situation where those best qualified to lead would do so. Democracy, therefore, was highly restricted and not concerned with ‘liberty, equality, [and] participation’ (Schumpeter, 1944). Democracy was not about the personal freedoms and liberties that classical democratic theorists argued. Schumpeter would argue it was a process of ‘weed[ing] out the weakest’ (Held, 1987) candidates. This constant struggle envisaged by Weber and Schumpeter would ensure that those in power would only remain there if they were good enough. This is because if it became evident that those in power were not fit enough to lead they would be removed the people at the next election as the only role for the people in this was system was ‘accepting or refusing the men who rule them’ (Schumpeter, pg. 284-5). Therefore, although the role of the people and the view of democracy was limited the people still held the power to be able to decide who was fit to govern. As Etzioni-Halevy (1993) summed it up: the people had no control over those they elected, they could only ‘refuse to re-elect them’. This process of getting elected, due to its nature as a difficult challenge, meant that only those who came out on top did so because they were ‘competent’ (Held, 1987) enough to rule. An example, is the gruelling 18-month process of winning the US Presidential Election. This process is widely believed to be a test of any hopeful candidate and that if they survive and win they have done so due to their ability to lead.
A second line of argument in favour of democratic elitist rule is that it provides stability and protection, whereas democracy breeds chaos. Etzioni-Halevy (1993) argues that under democratic elitism there is a ‘consensus… [on] basic values and on the rules of the political game’. This was prevalent in the UK after Tony Blair took control of Labour in the 1990s. There became an alignment with the Conservatives on major economic policies, supporting the free market and abandoning the party’s natural nationalisation tendencies. This provided business with certainty and the knowledge that there would be stability in economic policy so they had the confidence to invest, generating a stable and growing economy. Gore Vidal summed up the general consensus among political leaders and parties when he said that ‘America has one-party, the Property Party’ (Vidal, 1970s). Such is the stability created by elitist rule and consensus that it has been said that only ‘responsible [elites] collude’ (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987) to create a consensus. This system works because the people have a limited role in the process of selecting leaders and creating political debate. Held referred to it that democratic elitists view the people as ‘weak, [and] prone to strong emotional decisions’ (Held, 1987) when faced with political questions and debate. This is advanced by Etzioni-Halvey (1993) who claimed that Weber did not believe in the sovereignty of the people and their ability to make decisions. Whilst Evans argued that the relationship between the people and the governing elite was ‘passive’ (Evans, 2006) at best. Therefore, elite theorists argue for a limited role for the people in this type of system meaning there is stability.
The stability discussed above leads on to my next point that when elite rule breaks down chaos and populism ensues as the people are given power to intervene. The breakdown of elite rule allows the people to have a say and threaten the stability created by it. This occurs when an elitist group abandons the general consensus among elitists and pursues easy votes at elections to simply ‘win one election’ (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987). But this attempt to win over the ‘most susceptible voters’ (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987), threatens the ‘monopoly of coercion’ (Held, 1987) that the state has in manipulating the voters. This leads to their monopoly to fail, allowing the whole system to be ‘vulnerable to crisis’ (Held, 1987), allowing populism to breed as the voters are not able to make responsible decisions. Therefore, where there is a system of elitist rule with a general consensus amongst elites and a limited role for the people, populism and radical ideas are kept at bay. When the general consensus amongst elitist parties is abandoned and the state’s ability to manipulate the people fails, the people then make poor decisions as they are not trusted in the eyes of Weber and Schumpeter to make rational decisions, meaning populism can rise. This is because the party that seeks to ‘win one election’ (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987) targets the vulnerable voters allowing radical ideas to spread. For example, the result of the EU shows this as there was a split amongst key figures within the Conservative Party allowing the state’s ability to manipulate the people to fail. Vote Leave targeted people’s fears over immigration to get votes, allowing that fear to completely overshadow the economic costs of leaving the EU. This highlights the devastating effects when the people are allowed to make decisions in an environment where this a lack of consensus or abandonment of the consensus by elite figures. The instability created as a result of the Brexit vote highlights the need for elite rule, as the Prime Minister resigned and the value of the pound nose-dived.