Essay: Three different perspective in an attempt to create a picture of Détente

Introduction
Détente marked a significant change from the ordinary course of events of the Cold War, as during this period cooperation between the Communist and Capitalist Blocs was at its highest. Thus, many historians and political theorists alike still study this period in order to understand the reasons for the change in the relationship, as well as its outcomes. This essay will analyse three different perspective in an attempt to create a picture of détente.
Despite the fact that détente was a multidimensional process of relaxation of tensions involving a multitude of countries, this essay will mainly concentrate on the Soviet-American détente, as the two states were the leading powers within the Communist and the Capitalist blocs respectively. Thus, other states, such as China, will be referenced only in as much they are relevant to the process.
The first perspective outlined in this essay is an analysis of the American policies towards détente by John Gaddis, Professor of Military and Naval History at the University of Yale, who argues that détente is a continuation of the US policy of containment. Another perspective is an analysis of the Soviet détente by Roger Markwick, Professor at the University of Newcastle specialising in modern Russian and Soviet history, who argues, similarly to Gaddis, that the origins of détente lie with the peaceful coexistence, a Soviet policy implemented in the 1950s. And finally, Steve Weber, Professor of political science at the University of California, in his article Realism, Détente and Nuclear Weapons looks at détente from the theoretical ground, arguing that nuclear proliferation altered the system of international relations thus forcing the two superpowers to cooperate.
analysis of the American policies
Gaddis in his article in Foreign Affairs provided an interesting account of détente as part of the US strategy. To understand the perspective offered by Gaddis, one must look at the administrations of the US and their approaches to the economy. This is particularly important as the author argues that détente is just the continuation of containment, which evolved due to the different perceptions of ‘costs’ of the policy by the US administration. Secondly, in order to understand the outcomes of détente and whether it was a successful policy, one must look at the aims it was meant to fulfil.
First and foremost, before looking at the outcomes of détente, one must look at the reasons for it, as it will help to determine the aims it was meant to fulfil. According to Gaddis, the dispute about the causes of détente derives from the misunderstanding of containment which itself served as a basis for détente. As was pointed out above, the policy of containment, introduced by Kennan, evolved over time to suit the current circumstances. In particular, containment, as any other policy, ‘can never be divorced from the costs of implementing it’. In other words, for any policy, including containment, to be successful it has to take into account the link between its objectives and the resources needed to implement it.
The relationship stated above can be traced throughout the history of containment and détente. The original policy,  implemented by Kennan between 1947 and 1949, was selective in the interests it sought to defend due to the fragility of the domestic economy caused by high inflationary pressure. And indeed, fiscal policy and demobilisation of that time were aimed at reducing spending to prevent an inflationary spiral. Therefore, the US carefully chose its battles and reduced the number of interests in order to lower costs of the policy.
However, the reluctance of the US to show the initiative resulted in the spread of Communism to China. Moreover, the development of the nuclear weapons by the USSR increased the danger posed by Soviet expansionism and made the West seem vulnerable. Thus, as Gaddis argues, in order to secure its flanks, the US introduced NSC-68, which significantly broadened the range of the US interests. Not only was this in the US political interests to ‘rollback’ Communism following its expansion, but it also stayed in line with Keynesian economic policy, whereby deficit spending would stimulate the economy.
Although this policy may have been beneficial politically, economically it proved to be a significant burden on the US. This was especially visible in the Korean War, where the US, although didn’t lose the conflict, had to pay a major cost both in terms of money and lives, with 36,568 casualties. This forced the US to change its approach to containment. Hence the Eisenhower administration sought to reduce the costs of containment. This was achieved through a reduction in the deployment of conventional forces and the greater reliance on the nuclear deterrence of nuclear weapons, which were relatively cheap to produce comparing to the deployment and maintenance of conventional forces. The problem with this approach was that it significantly limited the ability of the US to respond to minor threats, such as the Taiwan Crises of the 1950s, as the US couldn’t be expected to fire its nuclear weapons in response to such a small conflict.
Thus, similarly to the late Truman administration and the principles of NSC-68, Kennedy reverted to Keynesian economics, which neglected the negative impact of budgetary deficit, and committed to the policy of ‘flexible response’ whereby the US would be prepared to respond to any danger whenever it occurred. Similarly to Korea, Vietnam exposed the weaknesses of ‘flexible response’, whereby by merely responding to threats the US lost the initiative, thus losing ‘the ability to make real decisions to the commitment and disposition of one’s forces’.
In further attempts to make containment more efficient at a lower cost, the Nixon Administration embraced détente. Although there were events similar to détente under Kennedy, such as the establishment of a hotline between the US and the USSR after the Cuban Missile Crisis in order to regulate conflict, it was not until Nixon when it became an official policy. Despite the fact that the ease of tensions, as the name implies, was part of the policy, it was never the core aim. Instead, Nixon sought to ‘maintain the balance of power in a way that would be constant with available resources.’
In order to do that, as Gaddis argues, Nixon sought to do three things. First, he tried to reduce the US interests in order to avoid overcommitment, thus resulting into the distinction between vital and non-vital interests. Secondly, in contrast to the early version of containment under Truman, ideology alone no longer ensured hostility, which reduced the number of potential enemies. This can be seen in the Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. And finally, Nixon sought to consistently engage with the Soviets, which would help to reduce tensions through diplomacy, thus further lowering the number of threats. Not only was this beneficial to the US, as it reduced the costs of containment, but it was also beneficial to the Soviet Union as now it was treated as a great power, as it wanted, as was highlighted in the SALT I or Helsinki agreements. Therefore, for the US détente was a continuation of containment, which ‘defined not friendship, but a strategy for a relationship among adversaries’.
Now, once the origins and aims of détente were established, one can also look at the extent of success of the policy. Détente was successful in defusing the tensions between the two great powers through treaties, such as the Helsinki Accords, where the First Basket secured current European borders, thus promoting the status quo. Not only did this help to reduce tensions, but it also served the US economically as with détente trade with the Communist states increased, which allowed the US to influence the Soviets through trade, as well as suggests of more pragmatic leadership in both states. Furthermore, Nixon Administration succeeded in reducing the cost of containment, as can be seen in the fall of defence spending by 3.5% of GDP by 1977 comparing to 1969. Therefore, as Gaddis put it, détente ‘sought to provide mechanisms for managing conflict among adversaries, thereby lowering the dangers of escalation and overcommitment without at the same time compromising vital interests’.
Despite the numerous successes of détente, which were outlined above, it was still considered a failure by both the Soviets and Americans. This is largely due to the wrong expectations from détente, such as the improvement of human rights in the USSR or the elimination of the arms race. This can be clearly seen in Leonard Salter’s article, whose argument states that détente was a mistake. He points out that it largely undermined containment of the USSR as the foreign trade greatly benefited the Soviet economy, while the Soviets didn’t keep their side of the bargain, such as the violation of the Third basket of Helsinki Accords concerning the human rights, thus making détente a ‘one-way street’ for the Kremlin. However, as Gaddis argues, détente never intended as a policy that will resolve human rights issues and eliminate the arms race. Instead, the Third Basket served purely political purpose in that it helped to maintain support for détente in the US itself. The loss of popularity of détente caused by the widespread of views similar to Salter’s led to the downfall of the pragmatic governments and the rise of more active policy against the Soviets, leading to the fall of détente.
analysis of the soviet policies
Similarly to Gaddis, Markwick doesn’t view détente as a period that ‘came out of the blue’. Instead, he argues that détente was founded on the principles of peaceful coexistence under Khrushchev, which, in turn, stayed in line with the Soviet policy throughout its existence due to the Soviet desire to maintain the status quo. Therefore, in order to understand the Soviet position on détente, peaceful coexistence should be analysed as well.
The origins of peaceful coexistence, and thus détente, don’t lie with Khrushchev, as it can be perceived, but with Stalin, as Markwick argues. This can be clearly seen in Stalin’s ideology – ‘socialism in one country’, which doesn’t follow the classical Marxist ideology of ‘permanent revolution’, as suggested by Trotsky. Instead, the existence of a Socialist state implied that Stalin no longer viewed international relations from a Marxist position of a class struggle, but from a realist state-centric position. This can be clearly demonstrated by the Wartime Alliance, whereby a Socialist state joined forces with Capitalist states in order to defeat a common enemy, which was  ‘founded not on casual, transitory considerations, but on vital and lasting interests’. This shows that some form of peaceful coexistence based on geopolitical interests has already existed under Stalin.
Although Markwick argues that Stalin was the first Soviet leader to introduce the concept of peaceful coexistence, some historians, such as Jerzy Pawlowicz, Professor at the University of Warsaw, argue that peaceful coexistence has already existed under Lenin. He points out that the elements of cooperation and peaceful coexistence can be found in the Decree on Peace of the 1918, which proclaimed a ‘peaceful coexistence with other governments’. Furthermore, the economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Capitalist states in the 1920s during the New Economic Policy (NEP) was also a pragmatic rather than ideological policy which was very similar to the Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence and in turn détente.
However as Markwick points out, there is a significant difference in the approach to foreign policy under Stalin and Lenin, and Khrushchev and Brezhnev. The former two believed in an inevitability of conflict, while the latter ones abandoned these views, choosing to believe that conflict can be avoided. Although Lenin also sought peaceful coexistence, for him it was a temporary measure to ‘gain respite for the Soviet Union’, rather than a permanent feature of international relations, as it was for Khrushchev. This was the most significant difference between the peaceful coexistence and the previous Soviet policies.
A belief that conflict can be avoided may have derived from the increased destructiveness of war caused by the development of nuclear arms, which made war undesirable as it eliminated any benefits of warfare and put the existence of the human race as a whole in danger. This was pointed out by Gaddis in his later work, where he argues that the Soviet leadership was willing to coexist peacefully with the West and shift confrontation to other areas, such as the space race, in order to avoid the conflict.
However, peaceful coexistence was not a bilateral policy of both the US and the USSR. Instead, it was initiated by the USSR, as can be seen in the willingness of Khrushchev to seek prolonged peace with the West following the downing of the U2 spy plane over the Soviet territory.
The first shifts towards détente from the Soviet perspective may be seen in the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the US and the USSR established a hotline in order to regulate the incident and avoid the conflict. Therefore, the major difference between peaceful coexistence and détente is that the former is the policy conducted primarily by the Soviet Union, whereas détente was ‘the process of reorganising the modern system of international relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence’. Thus, détente was founded on the main principles of peaceful coexistence, with the West responding to the Soviet attempts to ease tensions. An example of this is the creation of the Berlin Wall. Although it may seem like an event that would destabilise international relations, it established concrete spheres of influence of both the US and the USSR, thus reducing the possibility of conflict.
Not only did détente stay in line with ideology, as described above, but it also provided the Soviet Union with the political recognition it desired, as now it was treated as an equal power to the US, ‘without whose participation not a single international problem can be solved’. Furthermore, it aided the USSR economically as it opened the USSR to foreign trade, which benefited the Soviet economy, as well as helped to maintain status quo in Europe through peaceful means through the Helsinki Accords. Therefore, the Soviet Union engaged in détente primarily for geopolitical reasons, similarly to the US, even though it stayed in line with ideology.
For the Soviets, as Markwick argues, détente was a major success, particularly because it ‘established an international legal basis for the relations between the USSR and the US through international agreements, such as the SALT I or Helsinki, and thus ‘embodied the principles of peaceful coexistence at the level of state-to-state relations’. In particular, the First Basket of the Helsinki Accords was of highest importance as it ensured that the balance of power in Europe remains the same by securing the borders. This helped to stabilise the international system and make it more predictable, which was beneficial to both the US, as was argued by Gaddis, and the USSR economically and politically.
However, according to Markwick, the failure of détente lies in the failure of the US to ratify SALT II agreements, which was caused by a fall in popularity of détente in the US following its inability to meet its expectations, as was outlined by Gaddis. The reason why it led to a fall of détente is that political détente, best expressed by the Helsinki Agreements, wasn’t supported by the military détente. Although SALT I agreements made some steps towards it, SALT I was largely a ‘cap’ on the arms race, rather than an actual arms control. Therefore, according to Markwick, although  détente was beneficial to the Soviet Union, it ultimately failed due to the unwillingness of the US to proceed with the policy. This point fundamentally contrasts with the position expressed by Weber, who argued that for the Soviets the arms race was one of the fundamental reasons for détente, as it ensured the willingness of the US to cooperate because of the potential destruction that a war may bring.
analysis of the system of international relations
Unlike the two interpretations given above, Steve Weber doesn’t approach détente as part of the US or Soviet policy. Instead, he looks at the system of international relations as a whole. He uses neorealist theory, developed by Kenneth Waltz, as a basis for his interpretation. Thus, before looking at Weber’s argument, one must first understand the realist theory.
Although Weber makes predictions about the future of the relationship between the superpowers, which didn’t come true due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the argument presented by him is unique and looks at more than just policies of individual states.
According to neorealists the system of international relations is anarchic because there is no supreme authority. Therefore, states have to rely on themselves to ensure their security and well-being as no other state will aid them in a crisis, thus accounting for the principle of self-help. In such a world cooperation between states is limited because they are insecure about actions of others, thus increasing the likelihood of conflict taking place. Therefore, according to neorealists the confrontation between great powers, the US and USSR in this case, was inevitable.
However, Weber modified this argument by claiming that nuclear weapons, and in particular Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), significantly changed the system of international relations by putting both superpowers in ‘joined custodianship of the system’ by eliminating relative gains of warfare through the introduction of the nuclear deterrence. This is because a military confrontation between the two powers will inevitably result in the complete destruction of both, thus eliminating any benefit of wars. He still agrees that the world of international relations is not hierarchic, but because of the destructiveness of a nuclear confrontation for both parties, the relationship between superpowers was ‘now deprived of the basic principle defining an anarchic international relations system: the ever-present possibility of recourse to force’.
Because the use of force was unlikely due to the relatively equal distribution of forces, the US policy-makers, as argued by Weber, sought to cooperate with the Soviet Union, rather than confront it, to further the US interests. The political cooperation for the US was to be supported by the  bilateral restraint in the arms race, as it would help to maintain public support for détente in the US. Whereas military considerations were not as important, as Weber argues, because ‘deterrence could be maintained by unilateral action’.
For the Soviets political aims have shifted as well, as a military confrontation of Socialism with Capitalism was no longer desirable to achieve the dominance of the USSR, as can be seen in the Khrushchev’s speech at the 20th Party Congress. Thus, the USSR was forced to seek a non-violent way to achieve recognition and domination. Although both sides were willing to engage in détente, the difference in their understandings and aims caused a fall of détente.
In particular, the Soviets had different understanding of military détente. As stated above, for the US arms control was a necessity for political cooperation. The Soviets, in contrast, believed that the military might of the Soviet Union was the primary reason for the cooperation and recognition of the USSR. This difference was highlighted by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. For the Soviet Union, who experienced failures in developing effective ABM systems comparing to the US, the ABM treaty was an agreement that would allow the USSR to remain a viable competitor to the US military through the development of offensive capabilities, and thus reinforce the Soviet status of an equal to the US power and reinforce détente. For the US, however, the AMB treaty was a stepping stone to the limitation of offensive capabilities, which would reinforce détente. Thus, the military growth of the USSR was seen by the US as an act going against the relaxation of tensions, rather than enforcing it.
The difference in the Soviet and the US perception of détente resulted in cooperation ‘based on complementary interests, which represented a convergence of short-term goals’, thus resulting in the breakdown of the cooperation between the states in the future, as ‘there is no consensus to support the sequelae of cooperation over the long term’. Furthermore, because both states failed to achieve their aims, as the US wasn’t able to restraint the Soviet Union and the USSR failed to achieve the recognition it desired in that its engagement with the US was falling in the 19070s, both states sought to reverse their policies. The USSR reversed its approach to the arms race, as can be seen in the Brezhnev’s Tula Speech 1977, where he declared the the USSR was not striving for military superiority. While, ironically, the US adopted a more offensive approach, as can be seen in the increased defence spending under Ford and Carter, as well as in the failure to ratify SALT II. Therefore, the different understanding of détente by the two parties resulted in the fall of détente and the breakdown of cooperation.
However, despite the fall of détente of the 1970s, the structural change in the international relations, which resulted in the creation of joint custodianship, forced both the USSR and US to cooperate, as can be seen the greater extent of cooperation in the 1980s, such as the 1985 attempts to reintroduce arms control negotiations or 1989 military agreement. Therefore, contrary to the neorealist argument, nuclear proliferation facilitated cooperation between the two dominant states due to the elimination of relative gains of warfare. However, the difference of interpretations of détente of the 1970 by the Soviet Union and the US resulted in a fall of cooperation, causing a fall of détente. But the fact that agreements signed in the era of détente, such as SALT I, continued to exist after the fall of détente marks its achievement, as it showed that positive cooperation between the superpowers is possible, rather than simple ‘coordination to avoid shared aversions’, as was in the case of Concert of Europe of the 19th century, which merely sought to defuse revolutionary forces threatening the stability of the Concert.
Although the position expressed by Weber is similar to the one of Markwick in that both argue that the USSR engaged in détente due to the increased destructiveness of war, they are fundamentally different in that the former points out that the Soviets saw the arms race and the military power of the USSR as a fundamental reason for détente. The latter, however, argues that for the Soviets to engage in political détente, military relaxation of forces has to be put in place. This distinction is important, as it has major implications on the conduct and outcomes of détente.
Conclusion
The three perspectives given above complement each other and help to create a good understanding of détente. While the perspective presented by Weber gives an overview of the system of international relations as a whole, Gaddis and Markwick concentrate on the US and the USSR respectively. Gaddis and Markwick both argue that détente is an evolution of the foreign policies of both superpowers as a result of changing circumstances, in particular nuclear proliferation, as argued by  Weber, which stimulated the creation of joint custodianship of the system, thus altering the system of international relations. Both Gaddis and Weber seem to agree with the fact that the failure of détente derived from the misunderstanding of its aims. Markwick, on the other hand, argues that it lies with the failure to ratify SALT II agreements by the US, which was caused by the disappointment of the US public in the policy, which was outlined by Gaddis. All three sources acknowledge the achievements of détente in that the extent of cooperation between the great powers, which was not seen before, as demonstrated by the longevity of SALT I agreements which survived the fall of détente. Furthermore, Gaddis and Markwick point out the increased stability of the period due to the attempts of both sides to maintain the current balance of power, as was highlighted by the First Basket of the Helsinki Accords, which was aimed at maintaining the status quo in Europe. Therefore, one of the main achievements of détente was the promotion of stability in the system of international relations through the establishment of instruments helping to resolve issues peacefully, such as the establishment of the hotline. Moreover, as Gaddis and Weber argue, despite the fall of détente in the 1970s, there was a possibility of the second détente in the 1980s and 1990s, as both states were still willing to cooperate in order to avoid the unnecessary risk of recourse to force. This can be highlighted by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of the 1987, which helped to further limit the arms race. Thus, the main achievement of détente was that it set a precedent of cooperation between the two superpowers that may have had more visible long lasting effects if the Soviet Union continued to exist in the 1990s.