Essay: Mohammed Bin Salman influence on Saudi domestic/foreign policy

The influence of the newly elected Crown Prince on Saudi Arabia’s domestic and foreign policy: Mohammed Bin Salman
The MENA region has witnessed massive policy changes since 2013, notably in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). The world’s largest oil exporter is under a monarchial regime and follows the rule of Islam. The current King, His Highness Salman Al Saud who succeeded his brother King Abdullah Al Saud in 2015, has transformed the royal line principle by dismissing his brother Prince Naïf Al Saud and appointing his son as a crown prince instead. Yet, it is claimed that Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) was elected democratically by the Saudi Council of Ministers formed of 21 Ministers and 7 Ministers of state (The Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C, 2018). This unpredictable royal decree allowed MBS to take the reins on 21 July 2017. In a year time, this ambitious young leader has completely shifted the policy dimensions of KSA on a national and international level (Al Rasheed, 2017).
On a domestic level, he started with the establishment of the Saudi 2030 vision in April 2017, to relieve Saudi Arabia from its reliance on oil revenues, and to diversify its economy (Saudi Vision 2030, 2017). The National Transformation Plan was another program under Vision 2030 to contribute and to ensure its realization by 2020 (ibid). The newly elected crown prince has continued shaping the recent future of Saudi Arabia by lifting the ban on women driving in September 2017, and inaugurating cinema halls across the Kingdom as well as limiting the influence of the Saudi religious police  (Chulov, 2017). As a result, KSA has participated in international platforms like the World Economic Forum, the G20, and the International energy forum, to promote the positively framed image of KSA internationally and to attract foreign investors to start establishing businesses in the field of energy, entertainment and leisure (IHS Markit, 2018). On an international and regional level, the elected crown prince has been taking whet decisions putting his country’s reputation at stake and risking the region its stability. MBS has followed an unpredictable policy towards his neighboring countries, internal activists and international allies like Canada (Hughes, 2017).
This essay will elaborate on the previously mentioned cases and will attempt to examine how will these high-stake shifts outweigh the positive changes MBS is striving for. The first part will distinguish the two faces of MBS’s policy nationally and internationally, the second part will demonstrate the influence of social media on the modernized leadership by examining the situation between KSA and Canada. The essay will then conclude with a possible view on where Mohammed bin Salman’s policy leading the future of Saudi Arabia and the Middle Eastern region.
In the 1920s, the Saudi regime attempted to install social changes in KSA by implementing a modernized and westernized policy, but due to the ideological and political structure of the country the process failed (Lackner, 1978). At the time, the authorities were not focusing on investing in their citizen’s capabilities, instead the emphasis was on exporting oil and importing international expertise to build KSA’s infrastructure (Shaw, 1982). John Shaw and Helen Lackner both agreed that social change in KSA was on the table since the 80s, yet the Saudi mindset built on ideological and conservative beliefs mislead the way. However, MBS has proven today that the implementation of the Saudi 2030 vision was translated into a positive culture shock and has demonstrated how Saudis have always been embracing change (Anon, 2018). In an interview on CBS in March 2018, MBS made a clear point regarding Saudi’s shift of interest from oil to three other pillars that will contribute to the economic growth of KSA and the creation of job opportunities. As a result, focusing on internal resources, specifically the younger generation that forms 30% of the Saudi population will only lead to significant changes in terms of KSA’s internal policy (UN, 2015-2050). This strategy proved that this young leader had more courage to pursue change than any previous crown prince. He believed in his fellow citizen instead of naively relying on existing oil and taking the rest of the resources for granted (McKinsey, 2015). One major drawback of this wave of change remains unclear till now. At the beginning of August, the authorities arrested seven human right activists unexpectedly (Amnesty international, 2018). This comes at a time to prove that no matter how positively changes are being implemented, free speech continues to be selective in KSA (Craze and Huband, 2009). Interestingly, these activists were only expressing concerns related to woman’s rights in the Kingdom since 2012 (Benjamin, 2016). As far as MBS was concerned, once he took the crown he improved the status of women in KSA by lifting the ban on women driving, abolishing the male guardianship law, opening up education, as well as allowing mixed working places and introducing women to sports.  The capture of these activists after the previously mentioned changes, left the world wondering the grounds of such a decision towards Saudi human rights activists (Chee, 2018). What was also surprising, was the major coup in July inside the house of Saud when MBS claimed an anti-corruption wave against his cousins and held 18 of them in the Ritz Carlton for months (Chulov, 2018). If we now try to analyze these unexpected decisions towards these two groups, having one of the parties with a familial link to MBS, we may reach the conclusion of an authoritarian and interventionist policy followed by MBS. The reason of this may not be clear but it may have something to do with power and decision-making centralization, in other terms, MBS wants to be the only doer-in-chief and mastermind in Saudi Arabia.
Contrary to expectations, MBS expanded his policy regionally to declare a blockade on one of his neighboring countries: Qatar. It was claimed that the reason behind this abrupt Saudi reaction was the actions of the Qatari government towards Islamic groups in the region (Mirgani, 2017). MBS accused the young leader of Qatar Sheikh Hamad Al Tamim of financing terrorist groups and supporting the expansion of Iran’s ideology in the region (Kelly, 2018). The conflicting historical relationship between Saudi and Qatar goes back to 1981, when the Gulf Cooperation Council was formed including  Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates (Partrick, 2016). Notwithstanding, many KSA-Qatari army incidents took place from 1992 over border agreements and wasn’t resolved until 1999-2009 (ibid). In 2011, Saudi Arabia tried again to conceal over Qatari’s boarders, at a time when the relationship between these two neighbors was still peaceful (ibid). In the last five years, Qatar has shown to be an independent and wealthy country, noting that this emirate will be the first Arab country to be hosting the FIFA 2022 (Booth, 2018). Since Saudi Arabia is considered to be a dominant power in the GCC and a pivotal state for the region, these has shown that the conflicting relationship between Qatar and Saudi Arabia was already existing over territory power. As a consequence of MBS whet policy, the only solution was obviously to isolate Qatar and eliminate all the possibilities allowing this small state from rising. Another view may suggest, that the leaders of Qatar and KSA are both young, so the only possibility for MBS to keep influence over Qatar was to undermine Qatar’s leadership. Social media was a key player in this scenario, since it all started on twitter when an interview for Sheikh Hamad against Saudi Arabia and its regime was leaked. Qatari claims that the content was fabricated by the Saudis and the UAE leading to this blockade (Miller, 2018). Another leading factor to Saudi’s foreign outbreak was also over a tweet by the Canadian Minister of Foreign affairs on August 6, 2018. This tweet drove Saudi Arabia outrageously that was related to the imprisonment of HR activists Samar Al Badawi. Saudi made it clear that no state had the right of intervening and considered what is supposed to be universal an internal affair. The Saudi Canadian relation stands for years and had assets of billions. Saudi Arabia reacted predominately to this act, in the sense of protecting itself from any external interference. As example Syria. Social media has proven to lead over decision making. The Arab spring started over a tweet, public figures have been destroyed. Prime minister of Lebanon has resigned while being held in Saudi Arabia over tweet, and the recalled his resignation also over twitter. Freedom of speech is not a courtesy in KSA, the government is controlling all these platforms, and any opposing opinion faces at least 4 years or more of imprisonment. Yet one must not decline the fact of the created friction internally, regionally and internationally.
It can be concluded that, in the past 5 years Saudi Arabia’s policy has noticed drastic changes on a domestic and foreign level. Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), has shown to be a driven and overly ambitious young leader. He has followed different measures tactically and strategically to shape the foreign policy of his country. As a Crown Prince and future King, MBS was able to also shift the internal policy of KSA by enforcing positive reform and change through a well drafted vision: Saudi 2030 vision. This young ambitious leader has only shown confidence as a leader of an oil-rich state, and a regional power that has a massive influence on the stability of the Middle East. It has been claimed that MBS is orchestrating an interventionist and dominant policy rather than a diplomatic and moderate one. Throughout his term as a Crown Prince he has created internal, regional and international enemies which led to inoperable frictions. Starting with the capture of his cousins and accusing them of corruption, to arresting human rights activists and clerics, then to declaring a blockade on Qatar, as well as to freezing all trade and diplomatic relationship with Canada: MBS’s dominant and centralized policy has somehow outweighed his ambitious policy. Saudi Arabia’s and the regions’ future are now unpredictable. As a result of international and regional challenges facing KSA, MBS has set Saudi Arabia and the region on a fine line between falling or rising.
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