Essay: Success and failure of the Libyan intervention

Introduction
The killing of Libyan despot Muammar Gadhafi was supposed to cease months of bloody fighting but instead marked the prelude to Libya’s disintegration. The capitulation of Libya has been solely accredited to Western powers for seemingly using the cover of ‘humanitarian intervention’ to instil regime change in a volatile but sovereign nation. Gadhafi’s mobilization of his forces against his own citizens prompted Western forces, led by France, the United Kingdom and the United States to lead a coalition responsible for preventing further human rights violations. The UN-mandated mission specified its purpose was the protection of civilians, yet, events that followed suggested that the bias of the coalition influenced events in Libya in a manner which best served the interests of the Western forces. In this essay, I will assess the success and failure of the Libyan intervention by using primary sources and offering a comparison to modern-day Libya. The failure to provide an appropriate method of post-conflict resolution is what I will argue is one of the biggest failures of the Libyan intervention and this will be discussed throughout. Furthermore, the intervention was authorized on the UN mandate of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, this will also provide another basis for my assessment. I am going to argue the fact that the NATO intervention in Libya has played a significant role in damaging the credibility of international aid and ‘R2P’ as a tool to combat humanitarian crises. In this essay, I will also consider the various aspects of the intervention which may be seen by some commentators as evidence of success. This comparison will allow me to formulate an informed assessment of the success and failure of the NATO-backed intervention of Libya in 2011.
Humanitarian intervention or imperialism?
Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s instructions for his supports to openly attack protestors of his regime provided genuine moral clarity for an international response. His labelling of protestors as ‘rats’ and ‘cockroaches’ who did not deserve to live was largely reminiscent of similar rhetoric used to spur the Rwandan genocide in 1994. (2011)
The United Nations Security Council challenged the government of Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its citizens and under the same auspice, the Council authorized military air strikes and the ensuing intervention. Following failed diplomatic efforts, the United Nations Security Council assumed responsibility for all international air operations after referring to Chapter VII on the UN Charter on ‘Action with Respect to Treaties.’ (Engelbrekt, Mohlin, & Wagnsson, 2013). This authorized a coalition of member states to use ‘all means necessary’ to protect the civilians in populated areas. Nevertheless, NATO forces exceeded their original UN mandate by evident action to enforce a regime change. The failure for NATO to promote a ceasefire and political solution to the conflict as well as the provisions of logistical support to rebel insurgents are further indications that the intentions of the true intentions of the coalition were to overthrow the Ghaddafi regime.
States which seemingly fail to comply with the status quo in regard to international law and relations are often targeted by larger states, dependent on several factors. Larger states asses the geopolitical positioning and current political climate in a state and if these two assessments provide justification for any action then larger states take action. In the case of states such as Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan, larger states have attached the label of ‘rogue’ to the state in order to seemingly marginalize them from the international community before expanding economic, political and military actions. The crimes allegedly committed by these “rogues” include state-sponsored terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, internal repression, and the violation of international norms of peaceful coexistence (Van Genugten, 2016)
Radical approaches to international theory, however, propose an alternative view. Some writers, such as Noam Chomsky argue that the events which have occurred in these ‘rogue’ states have exposed the ways in which powerful Western states have become a threat to international peace and security. (Chomsky, 2011) The actions in Libya highlight this as the intervening forces manoeuvred around international laws on sovereignty and ultimately led to a regime change and the creation of an unstable region in Africa. This challenged the notion of Western powers being the sole providers of security and stability, a view which is often portrayed in a multitude of mainstream academic International Relations.
A Catastrophic Failure
Critics often describe the Libyan intervention as a ‘catastrophic failure’ and there is some truth to this due to the nature in which it was executed (Milne, Seumas, 2011). A notable execution was that of Colonel Gadhafi and his captured forces in Sirte. The intervention in NATO was mandated to prevent such atrocities but the reality highlighted the betrayal of the moral relativism that humanitarian interventionists typically ascribe to their opponents. Hence, a failure of the Libyan humanitarian intervention lies the fact that NATO forces defied international humanitarian law as they failed to apply those same moral principles to Colonel Gadhafi and his men. The Guardian’s Seumas Milne described the killing of Gadhafi as a war crime due to the barbaric nature in which it was handled by rebel forces in collusion with NATO. Milne also proposes a significant postulation – there had been no evidence to suggest that Gaddafi’s forces had either the capability or the intention to carry out such an atrocity against an armed city of 700,00. (Milne, Seumas, 2011)
From a historical perspective, states such as the US, France and UK appear to only intervene when their own self-interests are first. This is a key feature of Realism, the political lens which I believe is best suited to analyze events surrounding the Libya intervention. Realism places great importance on the state but the intervention of Libya in 2011 symbolized the surpassing of collective security measures over the state-centric ideals of sovereignty. The intervention can be seen as an example of power politics within international relations and commentators still acknowledge the possibility of ulterior motives. There is evidence to suggest this claim, particularly regarding the United States’ role in Iraq, a country laden with vast resources, highlighting key similarities between Iraq and Libya. One commentator suggested that had Libya’s most significant resource been carrots, there would have been no United States-led intervention. (Garner, Ferdinand, & Lawson, 2016) The protective shell of sovereignty was seemingly abused by Gadhafi’s forces as sovereignty allows state rulers to act in their states best interests, regardless of international opposition. Sovereignty was legitimized in order to guarantee non-intervention in the internal governance or domestic affairs within a state.
The evidence of the failure in Libya is represented by the new role Libya plays as a terrorist and Jihadist hub. The Obama administration’s involvement in the intervention was conceded as a botched enterprise with insufficient attention being paid to post-conflict planning. The effects of the distribution of weapons and logistics by NATO to rebels still reverberate around the region today. Furthermore, a Human Rights Watch investigation concluded that at least 72 civilians were killed as a result of the NATO air campaign. This is evidence contradicting the claims that the majority of casualties originated from the Qaddafi regime (Abrahams, 2015). The consequences of the intervention are evident today as criminal organizations and Jihadist groups seized military equipment from the regime and further terrorize citizens. Critics also comment that “the tribal and fragmented nature of Libyan society and the lack of democratic experience suggest that any transition to democracy would have been long and difficult.” (Mimoun, 2014)
Another measure of success if the lack of military casualties for NATO forces. Intervention in a hostile state has the potential of resulting in a number of casualties. The decision to avoid ‘boots on the ground’ can also be seen as a success a this mitigated the possibility of casualties and further domestic. Under Colonel Ghaddafi, Libya was what we could potentially describe as a failed state, and it was likely to maintain the abuse of its domestic infrastructure, as well as its citizens. The intervention and revolutions where a Libyan struggle and the rebels truly wanted a change of power from their repressive autocrat. The Libyan rebels had the will and numbers, nevertheless, they lacked the resources, structure and training which the Libyan army possessed. As the situation in Libya began to intensify, it became even more difficult to ignore the danger and clear evidence of deaths and mass human rights violations. The logistical support provided by the NATO-backed intervention made victory against Gadhafi’s forces a realistic ambition.
An International Responsibility to Protect
Nevertheless, I would argue that the law of unintended consequences cannot undermine the legitimacy of intent. Historical evidence shows us that military interventions are rarely ever free of moral ambiguity, but the action taken arguably may have prevented further atrocities. Also, even with the benefit of hindsight, most criticisms of any humanitarian interventions fail to justify non-intervention. one example is in the case of Rwanda and we see clearly the consequences of Western powers failing to impose the necessary diplomatic, political and military force. A counter-argument to the notion that the intervention was a failure derives from the fact that the crimes committed in Sirte pale in comparison to those that we would have expected had Ghaddafi overrun Benghazi. Although this is an assumptive statement which by definition is impossible to prove, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper issued a statement in 2011 regarding the Libyan conflicts:
“one either believes in freedom, or one just says one believes in freedom. The Libyan people have shown by their sacrifice that they believe in it. Assisting them is a moral obligation upon those who profess this great ideal” (Mueller, 2015, p. 32)
In this respect, Harper’s views were upheld, and the intervention did provide the Libyan people with the appropriate support system to tackle a genuine threat to their individual liberties and human rights. It can also be argued that Western states have greater legitimacy for state building enterprises than developing states as Western democracy have an established human rights ethos and stable liberal societies.
Whilst it is true that the intervention failed in creating a peaceful and democratic Libya, that was not the original target for NATO forces. The goal was to provide protection for civilians and prevent atrocities similar to those evident in Rwanda. I would argue that this would be a more realistic lens in assessing the failure of the Libyan humanitarian intervention. This can be done through a comparison between what Libya looks like today, as opposed to how it would look had Gadhafi’s forces had been allowed to reign terror across Libya. As the United Nations Security Council approved intervention in Libya, they stated that the goal of the intervention was “to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack” (NATO, 2011) and arguably, this was achieved. President Obama acknowledged in an interview with Thomas Friedman that “had we not intervened, it’s likely that Libya would be Syria. … And so there would be more death, more disruption, more destruction.” (Friedman, 2014)
Conclusion
Milne (2011) concluded that in the case of the Libyan intervention, NATO failed to protect the civilian population in Libya. He also notes that NATO, in fact, multiplied the number of civilian deaths through air strikes, whilst losing not a single soldier of its own. I would argue that the Libyan intervention allowed the Western powers to assert themselves in the heart of a strategically sensitive region in the world. However, the long-term implications of intervention were not addressed, and no post-conflict resolution of any form was proposed. This is where I would conclude and state the intervention was primarily a failure, rather than a success. A more holistic approach to the crisis should have been proposed and enacted and all possibilities, including that of regime change, should have been addressed. For the indigenous population, they were victims of brutal attacks from rebels within their country and NATO forces from above. The actions of NATO may be compared in the future to that of the Nazi-led Condor Legion, whose methods of strategic bombings led to the mass deaths of civilians.
As well as this, it is clear that the intervention did not remain in the strict parameter of protecting Benghazi and NATO was in violation of UN Resolution 1973 by engaging Gaddafi’s forces in Tripoli. What the Libya intervention highlighted clearly was that foreign intervention not only corrupts the essence of sovereignty, it fails to protect lives or provide the necessary infrastructure for re-development and stability. Ignoring the obvious moral ambiguity surrounding the intervention, another element of failure is the fact that the events in 2011 further consolidated the mistrust for Western intervention and aid. This will make any future humanitarian crises much more difficult to combat via international bodies and civilians will have to rely on the constitutional frameworks of their countries. Another manner of assessing the failure or success of the intervention lies in the assessment of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and how well it was fulfilled. The assessment on the question of the legitimacy of the intervention has shown that it was indeed a justifiable resolution as Gaddafi, on several occasions, stated clear disregard for Libyan civilians. (Garner, Ferdinand, & Lawson, 2016). Furthermore, R2P works on the basis that the intervention should have a ‘reasonable chance of successfully meeting the threat in question’ (United Nations, 2005) and this was indeed the case for Libya. However, the proportionality of means to archive the goal was exceeded by NATO forces and this can create questions upon the legitimacy of the intervention. As well as this, although the Responsibility to Protect doctrine does not include rebuilding and resolution as its key components, the goal for a legitimate humanitarian intervention would be to instil a stable security apparatus in order to consolidate the protection of civilians. But, in the case of Libya, the state was left in chaos and the initial threat to civilian life was only replaced with a different one.