The rise of epistemological contextualism is caused by the view that we have no knowledge of the world around us. Based on the claims made by skepticism, there are apparent conflicts with the following statements, which are formulated by Keith DeRose.
1. I don’t know that not-H
2. If I don’t know that not-H, then I don’t know that O
3. I don’t know O.
The propositions and the followed conclusion seem logically flawless, and if we apply the logic and the infallibility of knowledge, we will notice that either everything we thought we know becomes fallible or we actually don’t know what we know. “We are caught between the rock of fallibilism and the whirlpool of scepticism,” the situation described by the Lewis in the “Elusive Knowledge”.
Let’s look at a similar but more specific example, Brain-in-a-Vat, which has the same form as above.
1. I don’t know that I’m not a brain in a vat.
2. I don’t know that I have hands If I don’t know that if I am not a brain in a vat
3. Therefore, I don’t know that I have hands
The first claim is plausible because, to know not-H, I have to rule out the possibility of H. Nonetheless, in this case, I can’t because I and a brain-in-a-vat share the same perceptual experience. The brain can see and feel what I can see and feel even though the experience can be imaginary. My perception cannot be the evidence to support the claim that I am not a brain in a vat and I am not able to find other information that can be used as evidence. The second claim is plausible and logically right and according to Keith DeRose, “Premise 2 of the skeptical argument is true at whatever epistemic standard it is evaluated at”.
Yet, we notice that even though the two premises are plausible yet the conclusion, without any explanation, seem absurd. No one will raise any doubt to this statement if it just randomly comes up, for example, at the dinner table. At that moment, we can consider everyone has the knowledge of the fact that “I know I have hands”. Yet, now, we don’t know anymore. So, do we know or do we not know? Can we change the conclusion from “I don’t know that I have hands” to “I know that I have hands” without creating any conflict?
By contextualism, the answer is yes. “Knowledge is context-dependent in simple or subtle ways; Different contexts vote different standards of evaluation.” (Lewis, ) and “the truth-conditions of knowledge ascribing and knowledge denying sentences (sentences of the form ‘S knows that P’ and ‘S doesn’t know that P’ and related variants of such sentences) vary in certain ways according to the contexts in which they are uttered. What so varies is the epistemic standards that S must meet (or, in the case of a denial of knowledge, fail to meet) in order for such a statement to be true.” (DeRose 1999a, p. 187). In other word, when the skeptical possibility that “I may be a brain in a vat” has not been raised, we are talking about knowledge in a context with lower standard. With proper evidence such as we can see our hands and feel them, we can say that “I know that I have hands.” Yet, after the hypothesis that “I am a brain in a vat” comes up, the standard for knowledge gets higher in the current context with skeptical possibility and the existing evidence no longer satisfies the standard for knowledge anymore. Therefore, we can’t say that “I know I have hands” anymore. The epistemological contextualism separates our knowledge and cognitive system into two parts here: one with a person asking for the possibility that “I am a brain in a vat” and another without such a person. The concept of knowledge changes with contextualism.
To understand the word “standard”, we can use an example as a demonstration. My height is 5.2 feet and there are two statements which are the same – “I am tall”. In the first statement, I’m standing right next to a basketball player, and in the second statement, if I’m standing beside a one-year-old child. Apparently, the first statement is false and the second true. In the scenario one, the standard of “tall” is high, and therefore it is false. Yet, in the second scenario, we lower our standard and the statement becomes true. In the most of context with normal standard, it is safe for us to know a lot.
Now, let’s apply the analysis of brain-in-a-vat above to the case of Ms. Wu. In the “Things I Mean to Know”, Diane Wu started doubting whether we have knowledge about things we called “common sense” if we don’t know the actual evidence behind them. Is it true that “when you think hard about what you know that is real and true, it just gets smaller and smaller”? We need to break the situation into two parts – one that Diane has not doubt her common sense knowledge and another that Kroto asked for evidence.
In order to determine whether Diane has knowledge at the beginning, based on epistemological contextualism, we need a context, a standard. We can apply JTB account of knowledge. According to JTB(Justified True Belief), S knows that p if and only if (i) S believes that p, and (ii) p is true, and (iii)S is justified in believing that p. Diane believes what she has already known such as earth revolves around the sun before Harold Kroto gave his talk. Therefore, the first requirement of JTB is satisfied. Also, Diane can be justified in believing the knowledge by claiming she learned it from the universe model created by authorities or she saw the satellite image. As a result, the third requirement is satisfied. Finally, we need to know that whether p is true. Is it the fact that earth revolves around the sun or is it just a lie created by government so that we will never know another ugly truth? This type of question is exactly like brain-in-a-vat question. Under the context of skepticism, Diane or anyone will never know and by Rule of Sensitivity she will never be sure. However, if we apply a normal context, we can be sure that earth revolves around the sun is true. In conclusion, all three standards of Justified True Belief have been met and Diane can say that she actually have the knowledge.
Yet, Diane was asked for evidence to make sure she knows what she knows about the movement of sun and earth. Then she has doubts. She realized at that point she does not know the evidence and she is not sure whether she has the knowledge anymore. The low standard has changed to a higher one. Is the kind of change invertible? Can she forget about Kroto asked the question at all? The answer is a no. Under the context with a high standard, Diane did know less. From this point of view, Wu’s claim that she actually knows less than she used to think that she did makes sense.
After a long debate about knowledge in various context, we need to pay attention to the social role of knowledge by asking “what knowledge does for us, what its role in our life might be, and then ask what a concept having that role would be like.”(Craig, 1990) We are feeding with information every day, from the news and radio, and from our daily interaction with other people. Some is trivial and it does nothing with our life, while some is not. For example, we have seen that while promoting certain policies, the politicians list a series of data and scientific research result to convince the audience that something is happening and the country need to make actions. In this case, how should we apply epistemic contextualism? Do the politicians or the source of information know what they are promoting to the masses? Do we have the knowledge instead of beliefs after getting the information from the source?
In the “Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism”, Sarah Wright stated that “Rather than being grounded in just any interests that an agent might happen to have, these contexts are grounded in the social roles of that agent. The moral virtue theory of the Stoics insists that our lives and their embedded social roles are the materials with which we practice the moral virtues.” She pointed out the relationship between our social roles and the context we choose. She made examples about how a mother will choose to carry more social burden and a patient who suffers from color-blindness will pay more attention to the related news because of the social roles they play. Here, what we need to recognize first is the role of the informants. How different is their roles from ours?
For example, if it comes to climate change and the influence on our future generations, the standard of a parent or an environmental scientist may be higher than someone without any children or without any previous exposure to such topic. He/she is more likely to ask questions about the construction process of related scientific research. The amount of collected data or the scientific authority will be taken into consideration. The threshold of people who play different roles are also different. As a source of information, people who play the same roles as ourselves seem to be more reliable. Now, we can see that why during the campaign while making policies, the candidates will emphasize their roles as a part of families, a parent, a part of minority group, or someone who experience poverty. The epistemic contextualism says different contexts create different standard of knowledge.