The concept of Cow protection is not new to India. Since the last century, cows have been sacred in Hinduism, and hurting cows in any way or form can result in frightening consequences. However, the political rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party and by extension, that of its parent organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh , gives new force to cow protectionism. While cow protectionism seems quite a trivial concept to worry about, the idea represents and amplifies the injustice against freedom and material welfare of India’s religious minorities. The endorsement of cow protectionism by the government has opened up a new source for them to obtain valuable votes from the Hindus. The pro-Hindu political parties have time and again associated beef eating as the identifying mark of the Muslim community , devising a way to fuel the feud between Hindu and Muslim community. In recent years, the pro-Hindu government and intelligentsia has successfully been able to legitimize vigilante activity in the name of ‘cow protectionism’. For instance, when a Muslim youth was lynched by a mob protesting against alleged cow slaughter in UP, the state chief focused solely on the illegality of cow slaughter than the lynching .
India’s most revered freedom fighter Mahatma Gandhi has also been famously linked with the cow protection movement. He once said that the "central fact of Hinduism is cow protection” and spoke about the "idea of penance and self-sacrifice for the martyred innocence" it embodied. While his insistence on cow protection was a major factor in failing to attract majority of the Muslim population during Independence, Gandhi never insisted on banning beef altogether: “How can I force anyone not to slaughter cows unless he is himself so disposed? It is not as if there were only Hindus in the Indian Union. There are Muslims, Parsis, Christians and other religious groups here”. Nevertheless, the Hindu radicals seem to have hijacked the cow, and all it stands for. The sacred stature of the cow is itself fraught and questionable. Contrary to popular historical belief of the cow being the most revered animal among Hindus, never to be slaughtered or consumed, D.N. Jha (2002) argues that cow slaughter and beef eating were part of ancient Hindu traditions. Much of the present belief of the sacred nature of cow is thus a constructed concept which has emerged only eventually and serves as a political tool in the hands of communal forces. The veneration of this animal has become a characteristic modern trait of ‘Hinduism’, corrupting the uneducated as well as the intellectuals. In this paper, I explore the historical importance of cows in Hindu theology in order to understand why cows were considered sacred, in what manner were they venerated, and how cow sacredness came to play in Hinduism. I chronologically present the development of the cow doctrine as a means of political tool. In addition, I use such historical, religious, and political information to understand the political agenda of promoting cow sacredness and protection, and thus highlight how the defense of the sacred cow serves as a justification of violence against religion minorities in India.
Historic exploration: The complexity of cow sacredness in the textual history
Veneration of the sacred cow is widespread and has a significant influence on different societies in India. Worship of domesticated animals in general is not a unique concept but something that is prevalent in many cultures. Cows were considered sacred in Egyptian culture, and thus slaughtering the animal was punishable by death. Moreover, cow veneration is common in modern savage and semi-savage tribes in Africa . However, while respect for domesticated animals is quite common amongst pastoral stages of culture, it is quite rare to find the passion towards a sacred animal with which the Hindus adorn their sacred cow. Helmuth Van Glasenapp asserted that cow worship is the second most recognized faith amongst Hindus, the first being the appreciation of Vedic theology that includes the caste system, incarnation doctrine and Karma law . An excerpt from Shantiparv, Mahabharata says "The very name for a cow in Sanskrit is 'Aghnya' which is translated as "not to be killed", an indication that they should never be slaughtered. Who, then could slay them? Surely one who kills a cow a bull commits a heinous crime".
The respect for the cow comes down from that ancient period when the Indo-Aryans or Vedic-Aryans settled in Northwest India during the second millennium B.C. . In other words, it probably dates from the pastoral stage, when the kinship of the herdsman with his domesticated herds was fully recognized. Among the Indo-Aryans, as appears from the Rig-veda, the cow had acquired a considerable degree of sanctity. She was sometimes regarded as a goddess and as inviolable; the mother, or one of the mothers, of the god Indra was a cow. The considerable degree of sanctity for the animal is primarily derived from the major role it played in the economy of India. The economic importance of the cow is heavily stressed in the Vedas as well. The animals were a source of food, providing milk to the people. Cattle were also considered a source of currency and were viewed as a source of wealth. However, while cows were venerated in the Rig-Veda, it did not prohibit cow sacrifice and beef eating. Along with pastoralism, the Aryans brought with them the practice of animal or cattle sacrifice. Moreover, the Rig-Veda frequently refers to cooking the meat of the ox, primarily as an offering to the Goddess Indra, the greatest of the Vedic Gods and a destroyer of evil.
How can this feeling of respect be reconciled with the habitual sacrifice and the use of beef as food in the Vedic age? The concept of cow sacredness in terms of historical significance is quite complex and contradictory. W. Crooke said that the Aryans and Vedas sacrificed and ate cow meat primarily during the consecration of a King and in the worship of God. Crooke also pointed out that the heroes of Mahabharata frequently ate beef, and Vedic texts even justified the practice, primarily because partakers of the Mahabharata were on a religious mission. On the other hand, D.N. Jha argues that cows were neither sacred nor unslayable during the Vedic period, since nowhere in the Vedic texts is there a direct assertion for cow protectionism. Instead, Jha corroborates the Aryan ideology that cows were primarily revered for their economic value. Cow meet provided nutritious food for the people, and the Sarapatha Brahmana explicitly states that “meet is the best kind of food”. Cow hide provides clothing and shelter, milk provided a healthy diet, Ox helped plough the fields, and finally cattle could also be used to complete the sacrificial obligation stated in the Veda (havis) .
In the historic exploration of cow sacredness, while there are many contradictions as to why and for what reason the cow was considered sacred, the idea of politicization of the cow is missing. The contradictory concept of beef consumption clearly highlights that the cow was not considered as unslayable, but rather as a symbol of economic value. Moreover, there was no sign of communal rifts due to cow veneration, since Frank Korom suggests that even when Vedic texts prohibited cow meat for the Brahmins, it did not prohibit other castes or creed to do the same.
Moving towards non-violence and cow protection
The Vedic literature is relatively silent concerning nonviolence directed toward the cow. Not until the very end of this period do we find even the slightest allusions concerning the matter. We start seeing hints of ritual substitutions from animal sacrifice to cooked food or animal effigies as divine offering. Jha believes that this was due to the gradual weakening of the Rgvedic pastoralism. As people started to live in agrarian settlements, animals were being used primarily for agricultural operations than for meat production. In addition, the growth of Upanisadic texts also strengthened the concept of ritual substitution, since Upanisads brought about ideologies of karma and transmigration, according to which the actions of a person in his present life will determine the man’s place in the next. In the Chandogya Upanisad (3.17.4), we read, 'Austerity, almsgiving, uprightness, harmlessness, truthfulness; these are one's gifts for the priests’ . Here "harmlessness" or nonviolence is used as a virtue, along with a number of other traits that suitably qualify as "gifts" to give to priests in payment for sacrificial duties rendered. In short, at the close of the Vedic period, we can surmise that while the cow was still being eaten, but nevertheless served as a powerful symbol.
With the advent of Buddhism and Jainism at the beginning of the fifth century BCE, the notion of ahimsa slowly rose in prominence within Brahmanical circles. The sacred texts and law books from this period make ample mention of it. The Bhagavadgita, for example, mentions the term four times (10.5, 13.7, 16.2, 17.4), but it is not used in a doctrinal sense, for it is defined as one quality among others. The Manusmrti explicitly prohibits eating meat for Brahmans but does not prohibit its consumption by other castes. Nevertheless, as with Vedic texts, the post-Vedic texts are also filled with contradictory concepts of cow sacredness. For instance, the Manusmrti states that a person who eats the meat of an animal in this lifetime will be devoured by the very same one in the next world (5.55). But in the verse (5.56) immediately following this passage it clearly states that "There is no sin in eating meat". Elsewhere in the book, harming a cow is discouraged (4.162) and slaughtering her (govadha) is considered a crime (11.60). The law book is, however, ambiguous on this point. As Brown suggests, it supports ahimsa (more of which is discussed in the next section) in some passages and denies it in others (1964, 247). Other law books are also ambivalent on the question of the murder of cows. The Arthasastra, for example, says that selling meat is legal, but cattle are not to be slaughtered (2.26). In the Sanskrit epic literature as well, we find passages that protect cows, but condone other sorts of meat for consumption. The Mahabharata states that he who kills a cow lives as many years in hell as there are hairs on the cow's body. Irrespective of the contradictory arguments (which are prevalent in most Hindu scriptures in multiple facets), there seems to be a strong correlation between Buddhist and Jain rise in India with Hindu scriptures preaching ideologies of Ahimsa towards all living beings. It is thus possible that Hinduism imbibed the idea of meat ban and cow sacredness from Buddhist and Jain scriptures, which is what I aim to explore in the next section of my paper.
Buddhist and Jain ideology on meat consumption and animal sacrifice
Early Buddhists, although perceived animals as inferior, nevertheless preached the idea of non-injury towards them. Despite their ideology of ahimsa and opposition of animal sacrifice or meat production, early Pali texts provide numerous examples that indicate that cow slaughter was still prevalent. The Sutta Nipata speaks of the King Iksvaku who slaughtered thousands of cows on the advice of brahmanas. Moreover, Buddhists texts also suggest that beef production and consumption was prevalent during the age of Buddha himself; it was so prominent in his time, that some suggest that even Buddha and his members did not seem to abstain from eating meat. In addition, flesh of deer was considered to be the staple food of a warriors in those times and in one Jataka story a king is said to have hunted a deer for its meat. However, in another story, the king is said to have been advised not to hunt the deer. While there will always be contradictions when exploring early texts, there seems to be strong evidence for the fact that Buddhists did in fact consume beef and other meats.
Jains, like Buddhists, also strongly advocated ahimsa and non-injury of animals. Dr. Jha advocates that some strong followers of Jainism took extreme measures in order to prevent harm of any living being whatsoever. For instance, Jains would not eat onions and would also cover their mouth with some kind of cloth in order to prevent mosquitos from being killed by their foul breath. Jains were a step ahead of Buddhists, in the sense that they encouraged respect for both animal AND plant life. Jains even practiced non-killing in a more extreme manner; they not only prohibited meat consumption, but also consumption of any food that might contain live germs in them . Therefore, monks would not consume honey, ghee or curd, which contain bacteria that thrive in the lack of oxygen by anaerobic respiration. There are some depictions mentioned, though, that do show some instances of animal slaughter. Udyotanasuri mentions a King who followed the Jain preaching of ascetism and avoided beef, but also refers to animal sacrifice and animal flesh as food. In addition, a Jain King Yasodhara strongly argues against eating beef, saying that while a cow can be used for other purposes, it may not be used for its flesh.
Looking at the Upanisadic, Buddhist, and Jain ideologies and examples from the post-Vedic period, we can see that all three found animal food unacceptable in normal circumstances, Jains even more so. However, while Buddhists showed no sign of relative significance of cows in their theology, Jain tradition does provide examples of profound respect for cows and strong disagreement of beef consumption. Nevertheless, despite the role of all three ideologies toward the development of ahimsa, Jha insists that the flesh of cow did not stop the Brahmanas from pleasing their palates. Crooke corroborates the idea by adding that even after the spread of Buddhism in India, one could constantly hear of butchers and slaughter-houses. Even during the reign of the great king Ashoka, who was a strong advocate of ahimsa, Jha argues that it did not stop the general population from cow slaughter. While Korom disagreed with Jha, he agreed that animal sacrificed nonetheless re-emerged after the reign of Ashoka. Thus, despite the fact that Buddhists, Jains, and Upanisads preached ahimsa, and Jains particularly highlighted prevention of beef, there is little to no evidence to support that the Brahmanas imbibed the ideology of cow protection after the spread of the Jainism and Buddhism in India.
Beginning of the political concept of cow sacredness
Although the sacred cow doctrine had been well established in the Hindu society, the concept of cow protection arose in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Hitendra Patel argues that the importance of the cow sacredness, while usually a doctrine of the passionately religious, was then becoming crucial for the intelligentsia, thus slowly becoming a political tool. The Bihari intelligentsia, for instance, held strong opinions about cow protection, and the cow protection movement can be traced back to the early 1880’s in that state. This is evident by the book Goraksha, that contains persuasive religious/economic explanations for cow protection, and also seeks support for the cause by the government. Many important people, such as the British Queen, were called upon to take a stand in support of the cow protection movement.
With the support of the government, the Hindu newspapers published articles and reports in support of the movement: "Here a cow was saved from a cow-killer, a crooked Yavana (Muslim)……. We thank Babu Sahab and appeal to all Aryans to do something for the protection of cow”. Patel points out that educated Hindus now started to propagate contemporary Hindu stories that highlighted cow sacredness in order to boost the cow protection movement. Madhav Mishra, in one of his writings, illustrates a conversation between the great Mughal emperor Akbar and the Maharaja of Jodhpur. Akbar asked the Maharaja “Who is a Hindu”, to which the Maharaja replied “said that if one foolish, rustic old Brahmin who could die any moment, an ill, old cow and a man's only son were trapped in a burning house, the man who saves the old Brahmin or the old cow before his only son is a real shresthsa (superior) Hindu. The story ends with Akbar forbidding cow slaughter in his empire. While it is impossible to know whether this actually happened, this anecdote corroborates the idea that the intelligentsia were—advertently or inadvertently—propagating the cow protection movement by striking the sentimental chords of the Hindu community, and also questioning the identity of the people who did not support the cause. Thus, such stories started to an ideology in the Hindu community that a Hindu is expected to not accept cow slaughter at any cost, and one who saves a cow is considered a true Hindu.
The cow protection doctrine further intensified in the late 70s and 80s, as the Hindu community increased their follower base for their propaganda by convincing the intelligentsia of the importance of the movement. The Go Raksha book contained historic and economic justifications, quoting extensively from Hindu, Islamic, and Christian texts, English newspapers and ‘medical experts from America, Bulgaria and Turkey’. It argued cow slaughter was the worst kind of sin and can lead to famine and all kinds of diseases and loss of life if now stopped. Such propaganda increased scrutiny against the Muslim community. Dharma Diwakar, a regional newspaper, once reported that a Muslim was given a penalty of Rs. 25 for breaking a foot of a cow, and the Judge was sorry that there was no provision in the law, otherwise he would have given him a punishment of being flogged 25 times for the crime he had committed. The adjective ‘cruel’ was used multiple times in the report. Patel points out that in no report ever was a Hindu considered guilty for anything related to cow violence. Such reports were invariably trying to convey that Muslims were conspiring to kill cows.
Nevertheless, some reports also suggested that Hindus were merely the victim of the cow slaughter quarrel, and that Muslims were equally responsible. One report said: "Sir Anthony McDonnell has not accepted the opinion of Mr. Forbes, Commissioner of Patna Division, that the Hindus are entirely responsible for the cow slaughter quarrels. (He considered the Muslims equally responsible.) Sir Anthony has also assured the Hindus that steps will be taken to prevent the Muslims from killing cows in an offensive manner. And the Hindus want nothing more than that". While it seems that the papers and Sir Anthony McDonell were only trying to take a neutral, reasonable position, Patel argues that the overall tone propagates the idea that Hindus were merely passive receivers of unjust actions by the Muslims. Lt. Governor Charles Crosthwaite would have agreed with Patel.
The complex stance of Mahatma Gandhi on cow preservation
The success of the Cow Protection Movement in the years between 1887 and 1917 lies in this fact that more and more people started considering the issue of protection of cows as a Hindu sentiments' issue. While the movement was initially claimed that it was not against the rights of Muslims and only demanded for more respect for the cow, the concept for many people slowly became central to the Hindu identity. Hitendra Patel argues that Mahatma Gandhi’s unclear stance on the issue was a major contributing factor. Gandhi wrote to a local newspaper in which he asserted her: "There is not a single Hindu throughout the length and breadth of India who does not expect one day to free his land from cow slaughter”. However, at the same time, Gandhi felt that is was unfair to other religions if one was held accountable for not following the “Hindu law”. Gandhi famously said "How can I force anyone not to slaughter cows unless he is himself so disposed? It is not as if there were only Hindus in the Indian Union. There are Muslims, Parsis, Christians and other religious groups here."
B.G Bhosle argues that while Gandhi was a strong believer of cow preservation, he argued against violence to achieve that goal. Gandhi, in one of his writings wrote “to attempt cow-protection by violence is to reduce Hinduism to Satanism and to prostitute to a base end the grand significance of cow-protection.” Gandhi’s arguments, thus, on cow protection catered to both Hindu and Muslim communities in their own respective ways. Bhosle further argues that while his methods and manner of speech provide an ambiguous stance on the communal ‘cow matter’ in India, " Gandhi's position of religion and Nationalism can be expressed by his choice between a unified nation and cow protection; Gandhi was prepared to opt for the unified nation . Nevertheless, the Hindus intelligentsia and influencers primarily propagated the intense pro-cow side of Gandhi in order to maintain using the cow sacredness concept as a political tool.
Introduction of religion in politics
With both the Hindu and the Muslim community thinking that they were being the victims of unjust actions, both communities needed a voice to propagate their grievances, and leaders who could make sure that they receive justice. Thus, political parties slowly turned into representations of religious beliefs. A major fuel in the movement of cow protection began with the creation of the ‘All Party Campaign for the Protection of the Cow’ (SGMS), formed by the country's major Hindu political outfit, the BJS. The campaign received an overwhelming response, with over a crowd of 100,000 rallied in the Parliamentary complex in support of the cause. While the proceeding started with a relaxed, festive mood, it turned into a riot with the supporters, led by saffron robed sadhus, furiously questioning the lack of actions taken by the government in support of the movement. It was then clear that the majority of the voting population felt intensely about cow protection, and that religious sentiment was indefinitely going to play a vital role in government campaigning. Thus, political parties who wanted to a reasonable resolve had to tread cautiously in order to not hurt sentiments of the any religious group, primarily the Hindus.
Ian Copland in his paper discusses the challenge posed to the Congress-led Government of India by the agitation for central cow-protection legislation, which arrived at a crucial moment in Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's first term. In response to the attacks by the sadhus on the parliament, promptly detained two men to demonstrate that steps were being taken against vigilante attacks by Hindi radicals. She, like her predecessors, knew that to win elections at the national level, she would have to support both major religions (Hindu and Muslim), and supporting against one of the now biggest ideologies of Hindu would cause a great voter backlash in the general elections. Thus, she also knew that launching a frontal attack on the cow-protection movement was not a viable option. Copland says that Indira, while maintaining a balanced view on cow protection movement in front the of liberal media, was aiming to pass a national law, along with the RSS, to ban cow slaughter. On January 5, 1967, she addressed concerns in the Lok Sobha about the problem of cow killing, and to look into the feasibility of 'total ban on the slaughter of the cow and its progeny’. In short, she aimed to take action to ban cow slaughter in all union territories, including Delhi. The determination of the Prime Minister to support the cow protection movement more than satisfied the SGMS, and thus Indira gained full support from them for the upcoming elections. However, their celebration was short-lived because after she won the 1967 elections, she had primarily reserved seats for SGMS members who, although were known to be cow sympathizers, were trusted allies and skeptics: trustworthy Congress politicians; secularists; and federal and state Agriculture and Industry bureaucrats, known to be concerned about the future of the country's lucrative hide and beef trades. Thus, the bill to ban cow slaughter, while still remained a debate in the parliament and was alive in the speeches of the political leaders, including Indira, was not passed.
Copland argues that while Indira Gandhi was a Hindu by lineage, she did not share the intense sentiments of her Hindu followers regarding cow sacredness. Although she was never an enemy of the cow or the concept of cow protection, she was staunchly against radical ‘cow savers’. The move to cooperate with RSS and the SGMS regarding cow protection laws was essentially political. Mrs. Gandhi felt confident enough of her position as leader to allow the 'religious' side of be exhibited, and in this vein sought to expunge any lingering public suspicions that she was anti-cow. On the other hand, she played safe with the other religious minorities by maintaining an unprejudiced view on the cow protection in front of the liberal media. Copland’s article reiterates the idea of Hindu historians and intelligentsia wanting to construct a new narrative of the country’s post-Independence experience. With the religious/political feud that first began with the separation of India and Pakistan, leaders were certain that appealing to religious sentiments was crucial to gain political power. Thus, the rekindling of concept of cow sacredness in a new narrative proved to be a strong enabler of religious sentiments; for Hindus, to be in support, and for the Muslims to be against, the cow protection movement. The post-Independence political use of the cow sacredness concept was the beginning of religious representation of political parties.
Religion being represented by political parties
The last two decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a growing reaction against religious reform movements among Hindu and Muslim groups. The demise of Indira Gandhi in 1984 cost a major setback to the Congress party, primarily because they were too dependent on their leader to maintain political power against the vocally pro-Hindu parties. In spite of the humiliating setback in 1968, the SGMS agitation had made a lasting impact on the politics of India. The Bhartiya Janata Party, founded in 1980, followed in the footsteps of SGMS and BJS, further embedding the image of the “sacred cow” in popular consciousness, which became one of the major factors responsible for the sharp rise in Hindu-Muslim communal violence that occurred over the latter part of the decade. While the Congress too aimed to exhibit their support for the sacred cow, the balanced stance of Congress during Indira Gandhi’s reign had created a favorable following of Muslims for Congress, which deterred strong Hindu followers from supporting them. To this day, many Muslim families, including my own, vote for the Congress party primarily because Congress displays a balanced stance on communal and religious disparity.
The Bihar municipal elections in 1990 saw the Muslim candidates carrying out a bitter campaign against the Hindu in general, and vice versa. The main topic of rivalry and debate: the issue of cow slaughter. The political rivalries became so intense that a riot took place in 1991 in the district of Darbhanga in which the Hindus allegedly burnt down Muslim houses. Powerful political figures were funding cow protection movements in order to win Hindi votes, since they were—and still are—the majority in India. The concept of democracy and government, which should have been in place to move away from the divide which was created by the British rule, was instead fueling religious conflicts in order to remain in power. With the rise of political parties voicing religious grievances, John Mclane asserted that Hindus, who had previously been unorganized, now openly defended idol worship, caste, the sanctity of the sacred cow doctrine, and the legitimacy of customary marriage practices. The Muslim community, on the other hand, were either against such practices or were resistant toward ideologies such as cow sacredness. While this difference in opinion was present in the past, the sheer number of people now involved along with the intensity of passion with which the communities defended themselves took the inter-religious rivalries to the next level. Certain Hindus and Muslims who were seeking asserted the superiority of their own religious traditions while at the same time desecrating the traditions of the other.
As Indians developed a sense of Indianness after the Independence in 1947, they often did so through a heightened appreciation of their own religious tradition, mistaking their religious identity with the Indian identity. Thus, in addition to cow protection as a reflection of Hindu identity, the concept was now being used to reflect one’s Indian identity; a Hindu is expected to not accept cow slaughter at any cost, and one who saves a cow is considered a true Indian. The idea of nationalism being incorporated into the concept of cow sacredness thus provided Hindus a means of justification to use force to defend their ‘holy cow’.
The emergence and effects of cow vigilantism
With the gain of political power in the early 2000s, the BJP was successful in passing a law that prohibited the North-East states to prohibit slaughter of cows, calves, and other draught cattle. This was an important moment for the pro-Hindu community, as the bans implied government support, thus legitimizing vigilante activity. For example, the Gau Rakshak Dal (cow protection group) was formed in Haryana in 2012 and now perceives itself to be acting upon the mandate of the government. Gau rakshaks (cow protectors) in various states take it upon themselves to punish those they believe to be harming the cow. It should be noted that it is the impression of violation of the cow, not necessarily the violation of the law, that drives these acts of retribution. In many cases, the violence occurs where the law may be silent, such as in the handling of dead cows. What is unquestionable is that the acts of violence themselves are illegal, but gau rakshaks are bolstered by the belief that their actions represent the political will of the state and the Hindus of India. As previously seen in the paper, cow vigilantism itself is not new in India, and violence over the protection of cows has occurred in the past. However, the frequency, impunity, and flagrance of the current instances of cow-related violence are unprecedented.
In September 2015, a 50-year-old Muslim resident of the village Dadri in Uttar Pradesh was killed by a mob that had sought him out because he and his family were rumored to have been eating beef. In March 2016, a young man and a child, both Muslim, were beaten to death and left hanging from a tree in the Latehar district of Jharkhand , a crime attributed to local cow vigilantes whom the local BJP representatives did little to decry . Aside from other instances of gau rakshaks beating Muslims, perceived crimes against cows (such as transporting beef) have also led to Muslims being forced to eat cow dung and drink cow urine as punishment .
These incidents of lynching, beating, and humiliation may be represented as relatively spontaneous outbursts of rage against a perceived crime in the interest of protecting sacred animals, a flowering of authentic Hindu pride and righteousness. However, this type of violence and vigilantism is far from a spur-of-the-moment event. Rather, it is the product of a rising tide of Hindu chauvinism that is, to a large extent, supported by the government. For instance, Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not immediately condemn the Dadri killing. While defending Mr. Modi’s silence, the BJP member of parliament Sanjeev Balyan made a highly revealing statement ‘hum gaye ko mata kehte hein’ (we call the cow our mother) . This was intended to explain the violence in Dadri as a reaction to the offensive act of slaughtering and consuming a cow. Actions and statements such as this, and the silence—or approval—of the political leadership, have encouraged further cow vigilantism and related violence. Non-BJP politicians such as Shashi Tharoor have quipped that in India, it is safer to be a cow than a Muslim .
Conclusion
The image of the Indian cow projected through historical Hindu texts and traditions is polymorphic. The concept of cow sacredness in textual history is filled with inconsistencies, with multiple contradictions noted in the Rgveda and Brahmanical texts regarding the issue. Even though one can make a strong argument that cows were considered sacred in Hindi ideology, one cannot link that idea with cow protectionism, since the history of Hindus themselves reveals that the absolute proscriptions of beef consumption and cow slaughter are of recent vintage, narrow in scope and totalitarian in effect. Basing the concept of cow protectionism on the foundation of the ‘holy cow’ doctrine was a disinformation propagated by the Hindu intelligentsia beginning in the late 18th century to use the concept as a political tool. Such propagation gradually made cow protectionism an important part of the Hindu identity, and as we moved toward an independent India, religious identity slowly transformed into national identity for, making cow protectionism seem as a national duty to the Hindu community. The political parties realized the importance of this religious sentiment in election outcomes, and thus further intensified the use the cow protectionism concept as a political tool to such an extent that it has now jeopardized religious freedom—such as beef-eating— as well as legitimized vigilante activity against religious minorities.
Beefs bans and lynching, in the current social scenario, represent new challenges to Indian democracy. According to Radha Sarkar, an analysis of the bans and killings through the essentials of religion approach, a test developed by the Indian judiciary for the unique Indian context, indicates a failure by the state to uphold its own interpretive standards. Sanctions —such as beef bans—to supposedly protect Hindu sensibilities, as well as maintaining silence on grave issues such as lynching only elevate the disparity between the already dominant Hindu community and other religious minorities. The defense of the sacred cow to achieve a sense of superiority and entitlement has truly created an unsafe environment for religious minorities in India.