In the Great Leap Forward (GLF) Mao aimed to ‘leap’ over the stages of the development of capitalism, that Marx set out, and become an industrialised economy. The Cultural Revolution as a preventative measure against the increasing capitalist turn that China was taking. Western historians agree that the GLF and the Cultural Revolution were generally failures, however there were successes. Firstly I will discuss the GLF and its factors; agriculture, collectivisation and the famine, that made it a success or failure. I will then discuss the Cultural Revolution and its related political success and economic failures due to the mobilisation of the young masses in the form of the Red Guards.
In the early stages of the GLF, in the 1950s, there appeared to be considerable success as agricultural output showed an amazing increase as it doubled. Agricultural output had doubled by 1958-59, yet as the weather in China became a hinderance to the growth of crops in between 1959-60, the statistics continued to show an increase in output. In reality the rural population had, at first, met the moderate targets set by the state. From this point on the euphoria, as Gray (2002) calls it, of success led to the state increasing targets that were realistically unattainable by the rural population, because they were often asked to grow crops that would not grow in Chinese soil. This was partly due to Soviet advisors that, although giving good advice, failed to consider the differences in soil and climate and other such aspects. The local cadres felt pressured by state officials, and later by other communes success stories, to meet targets and resorted to manipulating the statistics that then forced them into a cycle. In this sense the GLF was an economic failure as no agricultural targets were actually achieved.
Not only were targets unachievable but arable land was also in short supply as “one third of China’s arable land was stricken with drought and another sixth was flooded” (Gray, 2002, pp.313) which made many resort to deforestation. Breslin (1998) highlights that not only was deforestation done in the search for arable land but it was meant to supply fuel for the ‘backyard furnaces’. ‘Backyard furnaces’ were an attempt to increase China’s steel production outside of factories in the rural setting. It could be said that the ‘backyard furnaces’ were not a total failure, because there was an initial increase in steel production, however due to the poor quality steel that was produced it could not then be used and proved to be a waste of useful metal objects time.According to Breslin (1998) many crops were left to rot due to a focus on steel. As a result after the government had collected their portion of the harvests the rural communes were often left with “only half or one-fifth of their usual subsistence grain supply.”(Fairbank, 1987, pp.304) All these failures and problems that occurred in agriculture greatly contributed to the later famine.
The rural population was organised into large communes with previous privately owned land being collectivised. The ‘iron rice bowl’ strategy that was adopted for these communes meant that every worker's wage, housing, healthcare and pension was all guaranteed. Navarro (2008) points out that the flaw in this strategy is that there is no incentive to work hard when there is no personal gain as everything is predetermined in the ‘iron rice bowl’, even profits go to the state. The aim of these communes was to have them work as autonomous entities from the state, however local cadres put in charge of coordinating the communes were actually responsible to the state and not to the people of the commune because they were paid by the state. The problem here was that local cadres were acting on instruction that was actually too general to apply to the conditions of their specific commune. Through the local cadres the state controlled farming methods, distribution of produce and prices. Starr (2010) explains that this allowed the state to determine their own price for the produce, the state decided to make a profit from this and so the price payed was quite low.This exploitation of the rural population appears to be very contradictory to Mao’s whole “the theory of development (through community initiative) that the GLF was based upon”(Gray, 2002, pp.309). The government used the profit from agriculture to invest in the urban industrialisation as well as pay the debts it still had to the Soviet Union.
The Famine from 1958-62 was a consequence of the GLF and served to end it. The famine caused a large number of deaths and is thought to be one of the biggest disasters in Chinese history. Bad weather such as the droughts and floods contributed as one of the causes for the famine, how much of the famine was caused by natural disaster and by the GLF is unknown, however most historians agree that the policies of the GLF made a large contribution to the famine being so catastrophic. “The Great Leap was in many ways a catalogue of errors” (Breslin, 1998, pp.93) that led towards the famine. One of the first errors was that the manipulation agricultural output statistics led the government to believe there was enough food to feed the masses. This in itself could be a result of Mao’s own enthusiasm about the GLF, Teiwes and Sun (1999) explain that it was Mao’s attachment to it and pride in his policies that brought it down the wrong path. Those around Mao were too afraid to tell him the truth of the problem, that the statistics were incorrect and that people in the rural areas were suffering. Those that did confront Mao with the truth were removed from their positions named as traitors to the Communist Party. Another error, on Mao’s part, was that he ignored his concern over the ratio of people to arable land, says Starr (2010), and instead chose to focus on the advantage of having a larger population. The final error was “Mao’s overestimation of the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses.” (Breslin, 1998, pp.93) Many of the rural population were actually forced into communes by officials and, as a result, were not willing to pool all of their resources. So when looking at the famine as a the product of the GLF, it was a failure.
From a more long term perspective we can see that the GLF actually had some successes. “A massive application of muscle power” (Fairbank, 1987, pp.300) did get results. This labour constructed irrigation works and flood control such as damming and water power. Gray (2002) explains that although these failed to prevent or alleviate the famine at the time, it was successful in the future and helped to prevent other future famines. Another success, according to Brock and Wei (2012), was the introduction of science and technology to the rural areas, in both the GLF and the Cultural Revolution, that helped future industrialisation attempts. Rather than the Machine Tractor Station approach of the Soviets, Mao stressed the need for all the rural areas to posses their own tractors (Brock and Wei, 2012). It could be argued that the economic recovery in 1962 was due to the GLF as well, however I believe that it was due to the new policies put in place by Deng Xiaoping after the failure of the Great Leaps’ policies.
In the wake of the GLF and the problems that it caused, Lui Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping came into power to try and resolve the problems that had been created. Mao feared that they would reverse his Communist ideology and instead reintroduce capitalist elements. With the Cultural Revolution he aimed for a permanent revolution that would engrain his Communist ideology deep in Chinese society. To do this Mao mobilised the youth of China who reeked havoc across China. The Red Guards were very violent and tended to accuse “veterans who had battled against capitalism for decades” (Terrill, 1999, pp.350) of being capitalist, showing that they knew little, or chose to ignore, the difference between the communist and the capitalist.
Gregory and Stuart (2014) explain that the Red Guards damaged education in China as they refused Western teachings and exiled intellectual as well as political elites to the countryside. Science also suffered with scientists being targeted due to their educational links with America (Brock, 2012). The Cultural Revolution negatively affected economic performance so much so that “meaningful estimates of GDP during the Cultural Revolution are not available” (Gregory and Stuart, 2014, pp.433). Mao employed a force that he later found he could not effectively control, with the Red Guards, and so had to look to the People’s Liberation Army to stop the chaos that the Red Guards were causing. During the time of the Cultural Revolution Mao did manage to remove his enemies in the Politburo, this was in no way long lasting as these same people, like Deng, came back in the 1970s as “the victims of the Cultural Revolution” (Terrill, 1999, pp.439). Terrill (1999) states that the return to rightwing policies in 1972 after the Cultural Revolution reflects that of a similar return to rightwing policies in 1962 after the GLF.
Both the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution weakened or destroyed the state structure (Gregory and Stuart, 2014), this is a success because this is something that lasts to this day and is a permanent achievement of both revolutions. The new regionally decentralised authoritarian regime (RAD) that was created actually proved to have positive results in the future. The RAD allowed for the communist party to stay power while dividing governing at a subnational level. Tournament theory, where relative performance is rewarded, has become employed to a certain extent, Gregory and Stuart (2014) looked at studies that found that regional leaders gained either more or less representation on the Central Committee depending on their economic growth relative to other regions. This gives the central government considerable control over the large population. During the Cultural Revolution there was also local industrial development that's “main purpose was to service the modernization of agriculture but…in the event of invasion be switched to defence” (Gray, 2002, pp.362). Sigurdson states that the petroleum industry was successful during the Cultural Revolution, yet this success led to ambitious future targets that were not achievable (Brock, 2012).
The main successes of both the GLF and the Cultural Revolution in modernising China was; the application of manpower which Fairbank (1987) and Gray (2002) explain that the building of irrigation and flood control prevented future famines; Brock and Wei (2012) highlighted the importance of the introduction of science and technology as well as the mechanisation of rural areas in the future industrialisation of China; Gregory and Stuart (2014) emphasise the permanent structure of RAD still being in effect today and that it helped the Central government control the large population of China. On the other hand, the failures were; euphoria from achieving the moderate targets led to unachievable targets that left the local cadre having to manipulate figures that caused a cycle (Gray, 2002); the Soviet advisors not considering differences between Chinese and Soviet soil and climate that caused poor crops; deforestation and ‘backyard furnaces’ were a waste of metal and time (Breslin, 1998); Navarro (2008) explains how the ‘iron rice bowl’ strategy left the rural population with little incentive to work hard; Teiwes and Sun (1999) highlight that Mao’s over enthusiasm led to him being blinded to the problems that unfolded and left him unable to deal with them; Terrill (1999) points out that the Red Guards were too young and naive to carry out the revolution as Mao had planned; Gregory and Stuart (2014) point out the damage the revolution did to the education system and economic performance while Brock (2012) highlights the damage to science.
In conclusion the failures of both the GLF and the Cultural Revolution to modernise far outweigh the successes. The main failure was on Mao, which both Teiwes and Sun (1999) and Starr (2010) explain, who was completely blinded by his own vision and his determination to implement his ideas. In this sense the GLF was, for the masses, less of a revolution that involved voluntary enthusiastic participation, as Mao thought, and consisted more of compulsory state enforced participation. And in the Cultural Revolution he employed the youth who did not fully understand his ideas and so could not carry them out very well. The one thing Mao did achieve was the Communist ideology being part of China as the government is still communist today, however with capitalist elements that Mao never wished to be put in place. Essentially his actual attempts at change with his own ideas failed to modernise China in the GLF and Cultural Revolution.