Whether there is a place for Human rights in the arena of international relation has sparked an interesting debate. Whereas some contend that the arena of international relations and foreign policy is evidently interest-led, some have sort to see an increase in a global agenda that places value on human rights and ethical considerations. Nigel Dower, bringing a philosophical background into his perspective on international relations, soundly falls within the debate that pushes for a place for human rights in international relations. Similar to his research area in world ethics, Dower’s article aims to present his support for an ethically global community. In this paper I will outline some of the key focal points of Dower’s article and how he develops to present his argument. I will conclude by evaluating that Dower’s article inserts some theoretical insight into the wider debate that encourages the necessity of a universalist/cosmopolitan view. Nonetheless, it fails to provide adequate applicable examples which as a result subdue a full understanding of why this has not been achieved, though desirable.
Dower states from the onset the purpose of his article and firmly grounds it in the exploration of the ethical basis of international relations. His article attempts to explore the implications of international relations accepting the thesis that there are human rights. Though Dower highlights various ways some may choose to explore the relationship between human rights and international relations, he clearly pinpoints his article in investigating the relationship between the acceptances of human rights theories and its implications on the understanding of ‘normative’ international relations (p.86). Dower highlights that within the field of international relations many thinkers are reluctant to engage in the talk of ethics as they may consider it inappropriate for different reasons, however his article attempts to contribute to this debate by giving ethics a place within international relations discourse. Dower breaks down his article into three main parts. Part 1 attempting to provide his reader with some context explores the common question “What is a Human Right?” and how talk of human rights presupposes a universalist/cosmopolitan theory. Part 2 presenting the reader with different approaches towards the moral relations between states, heavily focused on theories that imply a universality of human rights. Part 3 examining the different implications of universal ethical theory on international relations in theory and in practice (p. 87).
Dower argues that the talk of human rights infers there is universality and he thinks that a universality/cosmopolitan theory is the only acceptable one. He identifies rights can exist in many different ways and concludes “A human right[…] is at bottom a right constituted by a moral theory or, to put it less grandly, a right established by moral reasoning”. He also clarifies, though there may be differences in the degree some apply the term ‘universalist’ and ‘cosmopolitan’, by a universalist moral theory he means “one which asserts that all human beings belong to the same moral realm, sphere, domain or, […] universe.” This clarification is beneficial to the understanding of Dower’s argument by permitting the reader to follow his direct train of thought. By clearly outlining his own definitions and understandings of terminology this cements the article sturdily in Dower’s understanding. Even though some may disagree with his definitions and argument, Dower does not give much room to misinterpret his argument.
Additionally, Dower argues that in theory the implication of “any theory of universal morality, especially one that makes reference to human rights” is that it provides a benchmark for internal and external criticisms. He asserts if external criticism “implies a rejection of sovereignty, so much the worse for sovereignty. As an absolute concept sovereignty has become a sacred cow, but not one worth worshipping.” (p.105). Although he recognises some may retort such external interference could stifle an internal “democratic right to criticise and influence policy”, he insists “there is a false contrast being drawn between what a fundamental morality demands and what a genuinely democratic procedure would select as basic rights to be protected.” He believes if all people in a society were genuinely and fairly consulted there would not be “real disagreement about what basic rights needed protecting or realising.” (p.106) Nevertheless, this section largely ignores previous contributions to the debate that recognises that in practice international relations interactions are often interest-based. Hugo Slim (1998), using stakeholder analysis, identifies that various actors have an interest in wars even though war should often be of a humanitarian concern.
Moreover, similar to Slim, Dower does observe the challenges posed by rights in theory and in practice. He recognises in practice there are various obstacles to the realisation of such cosmopolitan goals. He identifies that the state-system itself is in opposition to the notion of a “genuine world community in which such universalist goals can find expression”. Also, he notes that any action from outside actors is often perceived as a form of unfounded interference or intervention. Finally, he highlights that even to the extent that states representatives and leaders do adopt a universalist moral position, these positions often clash with one another. (p.107) Nevertheless, he argues these hurdles are revealed because we are striving towards cosmopolitan goals and the pursuit for universalist goals illustrates a commitment towards universalist/cosmopolitan morality. To an extent this has been reinforced by some scholars, for instance Daniele Archibugi recognized “the feeling of belonging to a planetary community and taking public action for the global commonwealth is nevertheless growing”( Archibugi,D, 2004.) However, Dower fails to deliver examples of obstacles that show a strive towards universalist goals. Unlike Dower, Archibugi highlighting the problems presented to states when called upon to grant rights to individuals that are not citizens of the state, such as refugees and immigrants, enables the reader to grasp some understanding of the obstacles posed by the cosmopolitan view of democracy.
Dower lack of examples stems for his initial proclamation that he would not be using case studies to support his argument, which leaves most of the article based on his theoretical perspective. Though this at times contributes to his argument by conveying the theoretical implications, on the other hand this makes it difficult to compare to adequate examples. As a result the article at several points falls short of placing some of Dower’s argument into perspective; instead it acts as an article trying to convince the reader that a cosmopolitan view should be the accepted view regardless of the drawbacks. Furthermore, if one was to take it upon oneself to compare Dower’s points it to an example they saw fit, this may lead to a misinterpretation his argument. This fundamental goes against what Dower attempts to do by clearly imposing his definitions and understanding on the reader.
Nevertheless, in order to get across his argument effectively, Dower attempts to ground the reader in some basic theoretical approaches to human rights. He chooses to modify and explain four approaches to the reader: Natural rights, Kantianism, Utilitarianism and Ideal Contract Theory. Similar to Dower imposing his own definitions, his modification of the approaches to fit the discussion of international relation and human rights helps the reader read the article from a specific lens and therefore clearer delivers his argument to his audience. Nonetheless, Dower’s selected approaches all hold similar views towards human rights as being universal which creates a huge gap left unexplored by Dower; the opposing arguments. Despite the fact Dower briefly identifies some critics’ towards each approach; he quickly counteracts them with his argument. For instance, though Dower identifies Bentham as a critic with his “disparaging remarks about talk of rights being ‘nonsense on stilts’, he is swift to reinterpret Bentham’s pronouncement “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one” as having “an air of ‘rights’ entitlement to it.” Dower’s lack of desire to expand on what Bentham may have meant but proceed to infer it echoed talk of rights stifles the article with his own bias. Although this supports Dower’s repeated announcement that his concerns do not lie in addressing criticisms but in exploring the implications, the article spends an extensive amount of time defending Dower’s position. Contrary to Dower’s assertion that the implications would be the focal point, the third part makes up a relatively small portion of article. Therefore, combined with the lack of examples, the reader does not gain a wide view of the implications.
On balance, Dower contribution towards the wider debate of the place of ethics in international relations is relevant as it identifies why we need to continue striving to universalist values, however this largely ignores cultural debates. Nevertheless, he fails to touch on the disadvantages and to some extent ignores these. As a result this presents an article based more on his ideals than practicality. In dividing the implication of rights in theory and in practice Dower supports the wider debate that the two pose a challenge to one another. Nevertheless he does not provide an answer on how we can reconcile the two. This calls for the continued debate in this area.