Theft opportunities which are highly specific and concentrated in time and place within the supply chain are causing the risk of cargo crime and the risk can be reduced by implementing crime preventive control measures. The control measures are put into practice as to induce a change in the characteristics of cargo crime opportunities and eventually changed the outcome of a criminal decision process. If the potential criminal can change their decision on the target, method, place and time then they will do so within their own capability and the crime will be displaced. A model on crime displacement impact cargo crime needs to begin with the supply chain concept. This is the system context for the model, which means that the supply chain is elucidated with the needs for logistics fulfilment. The elements of crime theory can be used as a foundation for all crimes against supply chain activities worldwide. However, the elements of crime are limited to time, place and motivation in reality. The smaller parts of the global flow of cargo examined and it is less likely for the crime displacement theory to be valid. This is due to the limitations addressed with the assumptions of crime displacement as a reliable explanation about changes in cargo crime characteristics. The practical restraint involves daily business cannot be underestimated.
The management approach in reducing the impact of cargo crime is known as transportation security. Transportation security means the interaction between physical security control measures such as door locks, security seal, vehicle alarm, Global Positioning System (GPS) and the intervention of humans with the aim of reducing theft, sabotage and other types of illegal activity (EC, 2003; Ekblom, 2007). There are many preventive measures which can be used to reduce the risk of cargo crime but it is important to use it effectively (Mayhew, 2001). These control measures include premises fences, locks, seal, security guards and other types of security systems (Clarke & Homel, 1997). Ekwall (2013) in his research found that 97 per cent of all attacks at stop area occurred at non-secured parking locations. Cargo crime at non-secured parking locations is more of a volume crime than a high impact cargo crime. The objectives for these types of control measures are to ensure the theft or crime is more difficult to happen. The next important control measures are looking at the control and targeting the internal theft problem. Trust of employees in the company can be subdivided in two areas that is the present employees’ supervision (Mayhew, 2001) and new employee reference checks (Muir, 1996). These methods are not sufficient without security plans (EC, 2003), risk assessment and employee education (Mayhew, 2001) to reduce the risk of cargo crime. The complexity of supply chain requires the need for security counter measures to be implemented in different type and method. This approach is to reduce factors specific to different types of crimes, locations and situations (Ekblom, 2007). The key issue is to recognize that crime often reflects the risk, effort and payoff to the criminals (Clarke, 1995).
Cargo crime research conducted in Sweden revealed that many transportation companies do not invest in security to secure their trucks (Urciuoli, 2010). In Sweden, criminals often have time to attack cargo when the driver leaves the trucks for lunch, or when driver is sleeping in the cab or delivering the goods to the customer (Urciuoli, 2010). Urciuoli (2010) adds on that cargo crime is a growing problem in Europe. His explanation on why Swedish transportation companies are doing too little to enhance security is that they often do not find it worthwhile to tackle such a problem. Consequently, relevant stakeholders such as Police, Customs, Courts of Justice, Insurance companies, Certification Bodies, Security companies, Transportation companies, Shippers and Cargo owners put less effort into fighting cargo crime than they should but Urciuoli’s (2010) survey revealed that it pays to address this issue. Only a few Swedish transportation companies who invested in security, establishing closer collaboration with the authority face less security incidents.
The majority of freight transport in the European Union (EU) happened on the road and it is very significant to the economy of European Union (Europol, 2009). A report on cargo crime was published in 2008 by the International Road Union (IRU) and International Transport Forum (ITF) analyzing crime from year 2000 to 2005. Issues highlighted such as drivers being attacked, assaulted at the parking area, load being taken from trucks and cases of crime are not reported to Police. Transportation cargo crime is an on-going threat caused by syndicated criminal targeting road freight where cargoes obtained can be easily sold in the black market. The majority of cargo crime in European Union happened on the road during transportation of the cargo and it is estimated worth Euro8.2 billion annually, an average value of Euro 6.72 per trip (Europol, 2007). Those figures are only estimated figures and gathering accurate numbers of cargo crime losses is very difficult or almost impossible in many instances. This is due to limited reporting by the transportation operators or industry and also lack of law enforcement department requiring such reporting. However, where specialist units have evolved, such as in Belgium, France and the United Kingdom, there has been a noticeable shift in attitude, enabling the Police to direct more (even though still small), numbers of resources to the problem. Despite that, criminals are showing an increase in the usage of firearms and violence in pursuit of their goals and in many cases have demonstrated little regard for human lives. Hijacking, particularly armed, has shown a significant increase in several countries, especially in the United Kingdom.
The National Cargo Security Council; a coalition of public and private transportation organizations has retained FIA International Research Ltd (FIA) to examine how the transportation and supply chain function is impacted by cargo crime specifically on contraband. Whenever there is enough demand for contraband product and if it is sufficiently lucrative to supply it, then organized crime groups will enter that market. Eventually they dominate it because of their capability, well-resourced in infrastructure and expertise to supply contraband products on a commercial scale. The massive size, complex transportation and supply chain function provides organized crime groups with an almost infinite number of ways to conceal smuggling of counterfeit or pirated goods (FIA, 2001). Research indicated that cargo crime in USA is a nationwide problem and mostly concentrated in southern California; south Florida and New York City or New Jersey metropolitan areas. However, there are no precise figures quantifying the extent of cargo crime in the United States because the cargo crime data is not specifically collected under the Uniform Crime Reporting Program administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Journal of Commerce, 2001). The industry estimated and indicated the severity of the problem that worldwide cargo crime account for direct merchandise losses to be as much as $50 billion a year (Journal of Commerce, 2000). If all associated losses such as the cost of product re-ordering are included, the estimated cost may hit $60 billion (Best Review, 2000). Rand Corporation research reported in Inter-agency Commission on Crime and Security (2000) that an estimated theft from U.S. manufacturers and their customer could exceed $5 billion a year due to the advancement of technology and components.
In Australia, there are about 80 to 99% of cargo crime happened in large-scale theft at freight forwarding yards due to collusion between truck drivers and warehouse employees (Hume, 1996; Ackerman, 1997; Atkinson, 2001). While one employee has been historically responsible for most cargo crime, crime syndicates pose an increasing threat (Atkinson, 2001). Cargo is at its highest risk during loading and unloading and it can be carried off when a driver’s attention is being diverted. Cars and trucks transported are common targets and may be shipped overseas, broken down for parts, or have a counterfeit identity created for them (DeGeneste & Sullivan, 1994). Therefore, access to loading areas in freight yards must be restricted and controlled. If many organizations share the same freight-forwarding facility then security must be carefully coordinated (Hume, 1996). It is also very important for security guards who manage the gates to ensure that trucks are not let out of freight-forwarding yards without verification of full documentation and photographic identification of the drivers (Boyer & Cole, 1995). Cargo is vulnerable when procedures break down, rules are not followed and errors are created (Tyska & Fennelly, 1983). Faxed invoices may contribute to cargo crime as they may be leaked, copied or sold to criminals (Huska, 1998). In Australia there are 218,816 truck fleets used in the movement of most cargo (MAA, 2000). Trucks carrying cargo are vulnerable because they are highly visible, easily identified, may be parked unattended for relatively long periods of time, and they are exceedingly mobile (Gooley, 1999). Comprehensive prevention requires target-hardening, procedural and inventory controls to prevent cargo crime.
Tang (2009) conducted a research on the linkages among inflation, unemployment and crimes rates in Malaysia. The objective of his research is to examine the linkages among inflation, unemployment and crime rates in Malaysia. The research extends the unemployment-crime model specification by introducing the variable of inflation that has not been considered by previous studies. The introduction of inflation into the determinants of unemployment and crime specification may avoid the misspecification problem. This may also draw some attention on the implication of using inflation and unemployment rate as a policy instrument to reduce crime rate in Malaysia. Furthermore, the modified Wald test (Toda &Yamamoto, 1995; Dolado & Lutkepohl, 1996) is used to ascertain the causal links between crime rate and its determinants. This research used annual data of crime rate, consumer price index and unemployment rate from 1970 to 2006 in Malaysia. The data were extracted from International Financial Statistics (IFS), Malaysian Economic Report, United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network (UNCJIN), Euro-monitor International, and the Royal Malaysian Police reports. Tang (2009) investigated the linkages among inflation, unemployment and crime rates in Malaysia through co-integration and causality analyses. In this research, the normalized coefficients for inflation and unemployment rate are positively related to crime rate in Malaysia for period of 1970 to 2006. This implied that inflation and unemployment are two importance criminal motivation factors in Malaysia. In another research on crime by Baharom and Habibullah (2008) tried to correlate crime with inequality in Malaysia.