Understanding the nature of rational actors has been the subject of discussion within political science in recent years. Political scientists have made claims aimed to identify the nature of rational actors and maximisation of their goals and preferences. This review will attempt to ascertain the nature of actors be it rational or not, what preferences they have, preference maximising and generally what the actors actually do, as evidenced by works of several scholars in a geographical context.
The first category of research is rational actors and will be accompanied by researches by Weil (1975), Rubin (1997), Tsebelis (1990) and Monroe (1991). These authors discuss rational actors effectively, accompanied by strong evidence. However, their researches are delicate in some areas. A second category of research focuses on preference maximisation. Renwick (2005) and Rhodes et al (2008) provide arguments illustrating preferences and maximisation of those preference. Their arguments are also strong however to uncover gaps they will be examined in depth.
According to Tsebelis (1990) a positive approach (rational choice approach) can strengthen an understanding of why rational actors should remain rational. Using the rational choice approach, political actors can be studied and a solution is reached, revealing that they should be rational. Rational actors are distinguished by rationality, weak rationality (internal preferences and beliefs) and strong rationality (external requirements of beliefs with the real world). Rational actors are constrained by a probability calculus, a weak requirement for rationality. Intransitive preferences are impossible for this rationality therefore failure to follow the rules of probability calculus will result in a loss (Tsebelis, 1990: 26).
Should political entities have the power to veto decisions of centralised regimes? Can they be referred to as rational actors? Edward Rubin who analysed rational actors using public choice theory – maximising self-interest is a characteristic of a rational political actor as a response. Rubin discussed the pooling of resources by rational actors later exercising their autonomy when threatened by their own centralised government in order to evade interest groups (Rubin, 1997:1434). Similarly, Herman Weil analysed bureaucracies and decision-making. Weil found that the decision-making process in North Vietnam in 1971 and in the United States were during the Vietnamese War. However, Weil’s research lacks consistency as it may have been difficult to examine decision-making processes during the late twentieth century as a result of conflict within the international system, therefore obtaining information on international actors would have been difficult. Ultimately, states discouraged the passing of information particularly to the US.
Weil provided further evidence on North Vietnam’s foreign policy during the 70s. He found decisions on foreign policy were heavily influenced by nongovernmental actors, more significantly was the Vietnamese People’s Army (VPA). He carried out further research and found that the groups played a significant role in the running of the government’s policy decisions, with Lao Dong Party being the more influential in military and foreign affairs (Weil, 1975: 438). This evidence indicates that the government was not governed by self-interest but altruism was possible amongst decision-makers. According to Rubin and Weil, government’s decision are governed by self-interest, however other political actors have the power to veto or question their decisions. The authors remain adamant that rational actors tend to exercise their autonomy after considering the interests of domestic actors.
Research studied in 1991 provides an evaluation of altruism in relation to rational actors using several fields using in in-depth interviews. Kristen Monroe discovered that economists believed that altruism is merely a reflection of self-interest. Rational actors held expectations that material goods will be returned once they achieved their goal, owing that others were influenced by their ideas (Monroe, 1991: 398). Methodological individualism – a principle that describes the actions of individuals as being constructed by situations and dispositions in society (Watkins, 1955:58) suggests that actors are bound by the rules of an institution who have to maximise their preferences. Based on this principle, it becomes difficult to ascertain the true motives of actors.
To understand the significance of methodological individualism, Kaushik Basu uses an economist standpoint to argue that the institution precedes the individual as the unit of analysis. For instance and in the context of rights, individual rights should be entrenched by the state. To ensure they are not ignored, internal units such as the police are responsible for upholding the rights (Basu, 1996: 270). Thus, we can predict that it is within an institution’s economic interest to safeguard the rights using various units.
When analysing institutions, using a micro-foundation analysis allows us to ascertain the preferences of internal units and how they maximise them, hence we will consider the behaviour of electoral candidates. In 2005 Alan Renwick analysed Hungary’s 1989 electoral system. Renwick discovered that electoral candidates sought a seat in office by maximising their chances of election t calculating which electoral systems would give them a better chance at achieving their goal. In Hungary, favouring a majoritarian or proportional electoral system determined the success of parties and candidates alike (Renwick, 2005: 1004).This research lacks in some areas as the author focuses on a single electoral system which cannot be used to generalise although it does give some understanding of the electoral system in Hungary. The author suggests actors seeking roles within institutions should be considered as it allows for an analysis of various institutions in democracies.
Exogenous constraints such as game theory, do not form part of rational choice framework but does offer further understanding of institutions and rational actors. Game theory, introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) implies that actors are constrained by the processes within the institution, which manufactures the information they need, thus determining an actor’s preference. Theoretically, an electoral candidate will choose a policy based on voters’ preferences. Each voter reveals their preferred policy. This in turn reveals the candidates preferences, subsequently creating a game. If his or her preference is not close to the median voter’s preferred policy, they lose. Nash Equilibrium plays a role in this (Rhodes et al, 2006: 25).
In this game, Nash Equilibrium – which means that each player maintains their strategy rather than deviate from it allowing for stability (Holt et al, 2004: 3999) – is for both candidates to remain at the median level, allowing for a winner to be selected at random (Rhodes et al, 2008: 26). Tsebelis (1990) also contributes to the discussion on game theory. According to strong requirements of rationality, equilibrium exists on more than one occasion in the game, as a result it becomes difficult for players to coordinate, which creates an opportunity for each player to develop a strategy, Nash equilibrium is created (Tsebelis, 1990: 28). Conversely, game theory is merely a method rather than a form of rational institutionalism. However, it offers an insight in to how units of an institution shape and maximise their preferences. Rhodes et al suggest that game theory is not wholly exogenous but the players influence rules whilst Tsebelis’ discussion reveals that Nash Equilibrium is necessary for outcomes to be stable.
According to Bryan Jones, Bounded rationality implies that decision makers make rational decisions because they are inertly rational although they cannot always make rational decisions. Actors have to be rational if they are to maximise their preferences, but obtaining information is a challenge. Cost of obtaining information should be considered for situations where large information is required. Hence, bounded rationality might be a solution. Where often a political decision is desirable, rationality fails. Consequently, there is no compromise between the preferences of the decision-maker and the decision-making environment. Therefore, bounded rationality prevails (Jones, 1999: 298).
In 1963 Mancur Olson introduced the logic of collective action theory. He noted that mass organisations reflect the common interests of individuals therefore to achieve collective action would be problematic. Free-riding (obtaining without little effort) on the works of others becomes a temptation. Although collective achievement is desirable, an individual is not more significant than the other therefore free-riding will appeal to each individual, leading to no contribution (Shepsle, 2010: 280). Similarly, collective action tends to be a dilemma for individuals, particularly in a situation where an opportunity to maximise their own preferences is given. The absence of systematic arrangements prevents a collective behaviour, which subsequently prevents complimentary collective action. Ultimately, a struggle for power exists (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 12). Collective action merely mirrors free-riding according to Shepsle, Hall and Taylor, who reveal rational actors as being self-interested and concerned with maximising their goals whilst benefitting from the efforts of others. Hall and Taylor use the American legislature to support their argument. They found legislative committees in the United States Congress to be more concerned with allowing members access to information about proposed legislation.
Drawing from the findings, we can conclude that institutions are naturally rational actors. However, underlying processes suggest their goals and preferences reflect the interests of individuals rather than collective interest. We identified the methods used exemplified by game theory and election processes in Hungary. Evidence uncovered from the United States, Vietnam and Hungary prove that our findings have revealed the nature of rational actors in a geographical context. Does public choice theory maintain the argument that institutional processes are a ‘game’ between actors? The most recent finding by Kenneth Shepsle implies that institutions remain heavily influenced by the individual. Surely methodological individualism implies otherwise?