The term ‘Mafia’ originates from Sicily, an island where beauty and brutality live side-by-side, and is loosely translated to “the private use of violence in public domains” (Blok, 2008:7). According to Paoli (2004) the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta and the Sicilian Cosa Nostra are the most powerful Italian Mafia groups, followed by the Neapolitan Camorra. Blok (2008) states that notions on how these Mafia groups came to existence are controversial. According to Blok (2008) the Mafia developed in the slipstream of the Unification of Italy around 1861, when a modern state-structure was imposed on a mostly agrarian society, with mostly feudal features. To understand the origin and position of the Italian mafia groups within the Italian society, one thus needs to be aware of the societal and cultural conditions under which the Italians used to organise their daily lives. More specifically, within the Mezzogiorno, the Southern half of Italy, where the Italian mafia groups originally have also held the most power. Abse (1984) states that any idea of a single homogeneous type of a traditional society existing within the Mezzogiorno must have been derived from ill-informed dogmatism. His opinion is based on the work of Pino Arlacchi (1983) whom has described a number of differing societies within the South-Italian region of Calabria during the period of the Unification of Italy. The way in which families organised their lives created a power vacuum within those societies (Anderson, 1997) as will be exemplified through three examples of rural societies from the Mezzogiorno.
2.1 The Rural Heterogeneous Societies within the Mezzogiorno-region
The Cosentino, in the heart of Calabria (see image 1), were characterized by traditional agriculture and aimed at self-sufficiency, as opposed to providing products to trade on the market (Abse, 1984). This made each peasant-family a unit of production and a household at the same time. This society relied on cohesion and reciprocity between families, with often little to no economic justification for the exchange of gifts and services. Furthermore, another Calabrian peasant society on the plain of Gioia Tauro shared the rural characteristics and conditions of the Cosentino-society, but was also quite different (Abse, 1984). This society did produce crops for the market, albeit under very fluctuating circumstances. These tough circumstances made emotional and natural reciprocity difficult, but instead led to artificial and instrumental reciprocity amongst the often rivalling families. The mafia played a role in creating an equilibrium within the chaos, as the economic elite was subject to the fluctuating circumstances on the plain and failed to provide protection for the lower classes (Abse, 1984).
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IMAGE 3, CALABRIA IN THE 19TH CENTURY, SHOWING THE TOES OF THE "BOOT". SOURCE: PINO ARLACCHI (1983).
The examples indicate that the Italian societies were similar and different at the same time. On the one hand they operated without a state, as the self-sufficient role of family and rules of personal honour played an important part in the lives of these peasants. Although the latter made reciprocity difficult at times. On the other hand, some amount of reciprocity between families was needed in order to guarantee basic economic safety and an acceptable livelihood (Abse, 1984). The following paragraph will describe how there is nexus between the imposing of a modern state-structure on these heterogeneous agrarian societies and the protection offered by the Italian mafia groups, by the use of ‘protection theory’.
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2.2 ‘Protection theory’ and the Italian mafia groups
Protection rackets are amongst the best-known practices of the Italian mafia (Bandiera, 2003). According to Tilly (1985) the implementation of such “protection” rackets is rightly immediately associated with organised crime. The Italian mafia groups were not shy of using extortion in order to make landowners pay for their protection and thus synonymously protected the landowner from the threat that the mafia groups themselves posed on the landowner (Bandiera, 2003). This latter assessment of the mafia’s working methods is precisely why this offer for protection classifies as a racket; anyone who offers protection from the threat that they themselves pose, at a price, can justifiable be called a ‘racketeer’ (Tilly, 1985; Green & Ward, 2004). Tilly (1985) argues, however, that governments themselves often operate as racketeers during state-formation. States often are organised to monopolize violence within the region that they claim as theirs. States are solely excluded from the label of organised crime, due to the legitimacy of their claim to the monopoly of violence. However, Tilly (1985) argues further that legitimacy is nothing else but the probability that other authorities will sway for, and act according to, the decisions of a given authority. In addition, other authorities are more likely to conform to the decisions of an authority that claims a substantial amount of force, for instance out of fear for retaliation. According to Tilly (1985) it is for these reasons why the monopoly on violence is so important to any authority, and more specifically the state. The monopolisation of the use of violence makes the state its claim that it can provide protection more credible to its citizens, and their claim for the monopoly on violence thus seem legitimate. War-making with competing authorities over the monopoly on violence has therefore been an important strategy for any European state in the making (Tilly, 1985). Tilly’s (1985) arguments shed different light on the process of state formation in Italy. In contrast to popular convention on the legitimacy of the claim by states on the monopoly of violence, his arguments show that this legitimacy of power is only relative to its perception by other competing authorities. Even though the Italian state formally claimed the right to the monopoly on violence, with its Unification in 1861, it failed to legitimate this claim to her competing authorities: the Italian mafia groups (Anderson, 1997). Instead of looking at the Italian mafia groups from the perspective of rebels that resist against the power of the state, it would therefore be more suitable to view them as a competing authority with the Italian state for the legitimization of their use of violence. Paoli (2008) even claims that for a long time, the mafia groups were more effective and legitimate in exercising their power than the Italian state was. Their deep involvement with extortion practices, or protection rackets, made them claim a certain sovereignty. Just like a state would do, they taxed the main production within the regions under their control and additionally mediated in
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conflicts or guaranteed property rights (Paoli, 2008). This is why the Italian state found a fierce competitor in the Italian mafia groups, for the claim to a monopoly on violence and sovereignty after the Unification of Italy in 1861 (Anderson, 1997). The Italian mafia thus replaced the protective role of the state with its practices that were similar to a state collecting taxes, in the form of protection rackets, and similarly punish disobedience in the communities under their power (Shelley, 1994; Bandiera, 2003: Tilly, 1985: Paoli, 2008).
2.2.1 Different perspectives on the applicability of ‘protection theory’ on the Italian mafia
In the existing literature, different perspectives have been raised over the application of ‘protection theory’ on the Italian mafia groups (Paoli, 2014). Paoli (2004) and Gambetta (1993) both have different interpretations on the applicability of this theoretical perspective on the Italian mafia groups. Gambetta (1993) proposes that mafia groups are only providing a service which is not provided by the state. Where the state fails to protect property rights and ensure economic transactions, mafia groups are merely stepping in to sell this security with their services. Skaperdas (2001) expands on this notion, by claiming that mafia groups in general have a tendency to arise out of power vacuums, which are created by the absence of state enforcement. The Italian mafia groups thus only respond to a demand for private protection (Gambetta, 1993). From this view, the mafia is to be seen as an economic enterprise which produces, promotes and sells legal and illegal private protection and the mafia supposedly doesn’t intend to seize upon opportunities for extortion and abuse of power. This interpretation has stronger and weaker parts (Paoli, 2014). It holds some explanatory power as to how the dominance of the Italian mafia groups could have endured for so long. It is implausible that this could have gone on for so long without the implicit or explicit support from large parts of the population, the government and economic actors. The weaker part of this interpretation is that the analogy between states and Mafia groups doesn’t hold, as states usually are not involved with illegal transactions. Furthermore, the tangible, observable and numeric empirical evidence of protection money, extortion, violence and killings suggests that the Italian mafia groups have abused their power and opportunities by a large scale in the past (Paoli, 2014). Paoli (2003) thus criticises Gambetta’s (1993) perspective, stating that Mafia groups are better to be seen as multifunctional organizations, with fundaments of premodern status and fraternization contracts. Historically, the Italian Mafia groups have been used by their members to achieve a plural amount of goals and have been organised to provide different functions to the communities within their territory. Paoli (2004) her arguments are partly in congruence with Gambetta (1993), though. Both view the Italian mafia groups as organisations whom provide protection and exercise political functions to communities. Paoli (2004) for instance views the Italian mafia groups as political communities whom are not formally institutionalized. Resulting from this, she states that they strive
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for dominance with the use of violence, even if the surrounding society has no demand for their services. Paoli (2004) thus concludes that the Italian mafia groups are not as ‘benign’ as Gambetta (1993) claims and have been guilty of the abuse of power in the past.
2.3 The Italian mafia: a natural outgrowth of Italy’s culture and politics
According to Blok (2008) landowners in Sicily were mostly absent and entrusted the management of the region to local overseers, whom were known for their use of violence and therefore commanded ‘respect’. These local overseers were the backbone of the mafia, whom were organised through loose coalitions, better known as a cosche or families. It is thus justified to claim that before and after the Unification of Italy, especially within the Mezzogiorno, the Italian people had a tendency to use new systems of private protection outside the state, in order to secure their land and property (Anderson, 1997). The mafia formed the link between state and community, while legitimizing their existence with the use of violence. Anderson (1997) states that the weak authority of the Italian state forced it to implicitly grant the Italian mafia the right to enforce public order and control peasant unrest. The state had to come to terms with the mafia groups who did have authority on a local level; even though it formally prohibited the use of ‘private’ violence, it granted the power to govern on its behalf to the same local ruling class who made use of it. As a result, the mafia were hired to protect estates in their owners’ absence. Moreover, the mafia gained control over the products, i.e. the manufactured crops, which were intended for the peasants themselves or to be sold on the market, thus even strengthening the power of their grip on the Italian societies (Anderson, 1997). The Unification of Italy can be classified as a political driver for organised crime to develop (Galeotti, 2004) as it created some beneficial circumstances for the growing Italian mafia groups and provided new opportunities for the Italian mafia to extend their power. Not only did they get a share of the formal state its money, but the state was also dependent upon the mafia groups. The mafia groups were thus able to flourish, especially in the Mezzogiorno, as those citizens were originally even more sceptical of the legal authority of the Italian state (Shelley, 1994). The mafia came to control all local resources, from property; markets and services; to votes, until at least the 1960s (Blok, 2008). Anderson (1997) thus suggests that between the years of 1860 and at least 1957, the Sicilian mafia was nothing more than a natural outgrowth of culture, politics and law enforcement, by functioning as a form of government. From the 60s until the 80s, social scientists would even approach Mafiosi as a subcultural form of behaviour instead of a criminal behavioural pattern (Paoli, 2004). It was because of this social embeddedness (Van de Bunt, Siegel & Zaitch, 2014; Paoli, 2014; Buskens & Raub, 2013; Granovetter, 1985) within Italian society that, until up to the mid 1980s, any connection between the mafia and organised crime was structurally denied by Italians (Paoli, 2004).
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2.4 Theoretical perspectives on the social embeddedness of organised crime
The previous paragraph made it clear that the phenomenon of Italian mafia groups can not be dissected without this notion regarding the social embeddedness of organised crime (Paoli, 2014; Van de Bunt, Siegel & Zaitch, 2014: Granovetter, 1985). Theorists whom approach organised crime from this perspective argue that organised crime does not operate within a social vacuum, but interacts with its social environment; a position which stresses the need for a deeper understanding of the social ties and social interactions in order for organised crime phenomena to be explained (Paoli, 2014). Societies with ineffective political structures have organised crime embedded within its society differently than in societies where the power is deemed as legitimate (Van de Bunt et al., 2014). In the case of organised crime, social ties are of importance, because offenders operate within illegality and uncertainty, making the ability to trust your ‘business’-partner of great importance to gauge the likelihood of their cooperation. Buskens & Raub (2013) point towards the sociological notion of ‘game theory’ within business-deals, referring to Coleman’s (1990) proposition of the ‘trust problem’ between sellers and buyers. Buskens & Raub (2013) argue that the knowledge that two business partners meet again, means that reciprocity becomes the more attractive option and therefore be the most likely option for both the trustor and the trustee, resulting in a decrease of the ‘shadow of the future’; the uncertainty over a reciprocal future business relationship. These same ideas could be applied to the structure of social relations between Mafiosi, which means that factors like social and geographical distance also become important in analysing the business relationships between Mafiosi (Paoli, 2014). Some theorists depart from this rational individual sociological perspective on embeddedness and argue that social structure and culture are a more valid way of explaining phenomena of organised crime (Paoli, 2014). According to Van de Bunt et al. (2014) structural social embeddedness can be analysed on micro-level (i.e. a local pizzeria owned by Mafiosi) and on meso/macro-level (i.e. the community or city in which the pizzeria is located). To put it in layman’s terms, structural embeddedness refers to the structural opportunities and context in which social interactions can develop, for instance by meeting new people. Relational embeddedness refers to the notion that criminal activities are related to the social interactions and the institutional environments of those interactions. Both can be influenced by culture. This particular theoretical approach has improved traditional questions stemming from the bureaucracy model of organised crime, by changing the question from “Who is in charge?” to “Who is dependent on whom?” (Paoli, 2014) and thus increasing the external validity of analyses on social networks of organised crime groups like the Italian mafia; Mafiosi co-operate usually through loose coalitions and not a strict hierarchy (Blok, 2008). An example of this deviation from traditional sociological theories on social embeddedness and a focus on culture is Paoli’s (2003; 2004; 2008; 2014) perspective on the Italian
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mafia groups. Her notions on the culture and social structure of Mafia networks make it possible to apply this perspective on the culture of Italian mafia groups, whose ways of operating are very much explainable through their subcultural traditions and the way in which the mafia groups are embedded within the Italian society (Paoli, 2004).
2.4.1 The mafia as a subculture and its embeddedness in Italian society
In her work of the subcultural traits of the Italian mafia groups, Paoli (2004) focuses mainly on the Cosa Nostra and the ‘Ndrangheta. In accordance with my earlier arguments on the history of the Italian mafia groups, Paoli (2004) claims that antecedents of contemporary mafia groups have existed since the 1880s and possibly even before. She states that both groups possess distinguishing trait of organisations: independent government bodies which regulate the internal life of each associated family and are clearly different from the authority structure of their members’ biological families. From the 1950s and onwards, both have set up subordinate bodies of co-ordination, known as ‘commissions’. These commissions harbour the organisations’ most important bosses. Their power is more limited than one would expect (Paoli, 2004), going by how popular consensus usually portrays mafia groups as operating under a strict hierarchy. Their unity is more guaranteed by “the sharing of common cultural codes and a single organisational formula” than their social hierarchy (Paoli, 2004:20). Like many other organisations in pre-modern societies, the mafia groups depend on mechanical solidarity, deriving from the replication of corporate and cultural forms (Paoli, 2004). Because of the criminalisation of their groups and their usage of violent methods, they need to swear an oath of silence before affiliation. New members ought to come from either Sicily or Calabria and will become ‘man of honour’. They need to assume this identity for the rest of their lives and, if needed, they must be willing to end it if the organisation demands it from them. The affiliation ceremony is an act of fraternisation; recruits become brothers of all other members. From then, they become part of a ‘regime of reciprocity’; the expectance of altruistic behaviour without short-term reward. This creates trust and solidarity amongst its members, in order to make it possible to achieve specific goals and thus to satisfy the instrumental needs of the individual Mafiosi (Paoli, 2004). Much debate has been ongoing over what the organisations’ goals are: either earning money or acquiring power (Gambetta, 1993; Paoli, 2004; Paoli, 2008). I argue this is a false dilemma, as the reality is much more complex than that. It is not possible encompass these organisations under a single function or goal as they have a very multifunctional nature. One of these functions, which has been frequently overlooked is the exercise of a political dominion over the territories they claim (Paoli, 2004). The Camorra is very similar to the other Italian mafia groups, although it is less monolithic and more fragmented. Although much can be said about their cultural history, norms and rites of passage, the key value with which they justify their existence is ‘honour’, which comes before either
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money or power (Paoli, 2003). Acquiring money or power are thus just the means with which to reach this goal. According to Paoli (2003) the Mafiosi and their goals reflected a cultural value system that was widespread throughout the whole traditional Mezzogiorno-region. The desire for money came only second to the acquisition of respect in these societies. For instance, until the 1950s, wealth was only part of a multiplicity of ways by which men could earn respect and not even the most important one. A man’s physical strength and the ability to use violence were deemed of more importance. If a Mafioso had acquired land it was a sign of a good position in the hierarchy of honour, however most Mafioso were from lower or middle social classes and were only able to use violence in order to gain respect. These cultural principals of acquiring respect are still even today of great importance to the ‘men of honour’ (Paoli, 2003). The structural embeddedness of the Italian mafia groups refers to their internal focus on locality. The mafia groups and their members are clustered within the same communities and cities and can therefore regularly meet. The relational embeddedness refers their cultural norms and how this makes them interact with these communities.
2.5 The second half of the 20th century: Repression of Mafias and their response
Paoli (2008) states that in the second half the 20th century, the specific goal to obtain political power was exemplified by the mafias’ participation in at least three right-wing terrorist attacks. This is in addition to the accounts of some scholars suggesting that for the lion share of the 50 years post World War II, there was a full-scale infiltration of organised crime into the Italian state (Shelley, 1994). Furthermore, from the late 1970s, Cosa Nostra was held responsible for many assassinations on policemen and politicians (Paoli, 2004). These assassinations went on until the early 1990s, when Cosa Nostra murdered two prominent Palermitan judges with the use of bombs, deviating from the notion that they intended to stay underground (Siegel, Van de Bunt & Zaitch, 2003). On top of these killings in public, a series of bombings occurred outside of traditional mafia territory, namely in Rome, Florence and Milan (Paoli, 2004). These assessments provide empirics to the perception that the mafia groups were capable of skilfully switching between acting from within the institutions in order to combat these same institutions, in order to seek out a growth of their own power (Siegel et al., 2003). As most states do in order to restore their own legitimacy (Green & Ward, 2004) the Italian state responded by instilling hegemony over the Italian citizens. By stating that the violent strategy of the mafia groups were no longer in cohabitation with the legal power, but with its progressive evisceration (Siegel et al., 2003: 167). The Italian state justified its countering use of force against the mafia, making a claim on the use of common-sense by its citizens in order to be able to uphold law-and-order; typical of a hegemonic process (Green & Ward, 2004: 3). The state thus fiercely upheld an increase of law enforcement on the Italian mafia groups since early 1990s (Paoli, 2008).
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When the state of Italy passed legislations which made it easier to prosecute Mafiosi, a significant amount of Mafiosi were arrested. In perspective of their failings on the illegal markets, the mafia groups were thus already on the back foot when state repression increased. This meant that from the early 90s the mafia groups needed to undergo certain organizational transitions to minimize the impact of law enforcement (Paoli, 2008). Contemporary scholars are trying to discover how the Italian mafia groups operate nowadays and with which goals. Some mafia groups have partially moved out of their originally claimed territories, particularly ‘Ndrangheta and to a lesser extent the Cosa Nostra (see image 3). According to Savona (2015) this is mainly due to a law which made it possible to separate convicted Mafiosi from their peers, by forcibly relocating them in the northern regions. This has thus not stopped the Mafiosi, but made them only more fragmented and able to embed themselves within new communities. More research is needed on their recent developments.
IMAGE 4, MAPS OF THE PRESENCE OF COSA NOSTRA, CAMORRA, 'NDRANGHETA, APULIAN ORGANIZED CRIME AND OTHER MAFIA ORGANISATIONS IN ITALY (2000-2011). SOURCE: ERNESTO SAVONA (2015).
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3. Methodological reflection
3.1 Description of the respondent
The empirical data for this study consists of one semi-structured interview with Professor Ernesto Ugo Savano. Professor Ernesto Savona has a degree in Law, acquired in 1965 at the University of Palermo. Furthermore he acquired a degree at the Postgraduate School in Sociology and Social Research at the University of Rome in 1966-1970. Nowadays he is Director of Transcrime, Joint Research Centre of the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore and the Università degli Studi di Trento. Since 2003, he is a professor of Criminology at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan. From 1986 to 2002 he was professor of Criminology at the Faculty of Law at the Università degli Studi di Trento. From 1971 to 1986 he was associate professor at the Faculty of Statistical Sciences at the University of Rome. His research activity has centred on the following topics: analysis of crime statistics; law and social change; effectiveness of legislation; organised/economic crime and criminal justice systems; crime and economics and corruption. He has recently concentrated his research on developing a methodology to measure the impact of legislation (Transcrime, n.d.). Professor Ernesto Savona has published numerous scientific articles regarding the activities of organised crime in Italy.
3.2 Data collection
On the 30th of November 2015, I contacted Professor Savona through e-mail, in which I inquired the possibility of doing an online-interview through Skype. He agreed upon my inquiry, after which his secretary contacted me to plan the interview. We agreed upon the 5th of December 2015 as the time and date of the interview, and as such, the Skype-conversation took place on this time and date. I was equipped with a topic list and was able to record the audio from the conversation. The length of the interview was approximately 45 minutes. For the purpose of properly analysing the interview, I’ve transcribed the whole conversation in Microsoft Word. The raw data is not included, but I can deliver it on request (see e-mail address on the front page).
3.3 Practical problems
The practical problems that I’ve encountered during my research, can be universally applied to any research on the Italian mafias. For obvious reasons, it was not possible to speak to any Mafioso. Furthermore, I don’t speak Italian, which prevented me from reading newspapers, websites or academic literature from Italy. Professor Savona, for instance, has published many articles in Italian, which I was not able to read. Lastly, the Professor dropped his computer halfway through the conversation. This problems was fixed within a minute and the conversation could continue