The controversy surrounding the efficiency and effectiveness of the United Nations has persisted ever since the institution’s founding in 1945, with a resurgence of fierce debate around the topic in the post-Cold War era. The primary goals of the United Nations were to put right the failures of its predecessor – the League of Nations – in promoting peace and resolving inter-state and domestic conflict: both of which, in an increasingly globalised world, can a profound impact on security worldwide. The following paragraphs will firstly focus on the founding principles and organisation of the UN, then will move on specific successes but, more predominantly, the failures of intervention, non-intervention and finally the systematic problems in the modern-day United Nations, most notably regarding the decision making in the Security Council. Through looking at infamous examples of UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement, or lack thereof, in past and present conflicts such as Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Iraq, along with the constant dilemma the UNSC faces, the findings will conclude that the United Nations, although pursuing noble and humanitarian causes that liberal internationalism has long sought after, is not efficient in maintaining international security and is in need of urgent reform.
Firstly, to comprehend the dilemma the UN faces, one must look at its founding structure in 1945 and its aim to put right what the League of Nations failed to do – prevent another devastating world war. The UN first of all sought to be a credible international organisation – something the League of Nations wasn’t. In order to ensure this and appease the major powers, the 5 countries deemed so at the time were given disproportionately more power than the rest of the world, and most importantly, a veto (Hanhimäki, 2008). It was the critical addition of the veto that would ultimately be the demise of the UN’s authority throughout the years leading to the end of the Cold War. The Security Council’s decisions are legally binding, and must be unanimously passed by all 5 permanent members. Therefore, with both the USA and the USSR as members of the P5, and the enduring East-West antagonism, 193 vetoes were used from 1945-1990, meaning the UN could not act in the way it was intended to (Baylis, Smith & Owen, 2014). The UN’s only major theatre of action during this period was the Korean War, with a smaller contribution in the Suez Crisis (1956). When the USSR dissolved, the makeup and the aims of the UN transformed dramatically in the absence of Cold War tensions, and it could finally function in the way it was intended. Despite this optimism, the modern-day UN still finds itself restrained in promoting international security and, although a major Third World War has been prevent, Hanhimäki (2008) points out that not a day has gone by since 1945 that there hasn’t been a deathly conflict somewhere in the world.
From 1990 onwards, the UN found itself implicated in numerous peacekeeping operations as it could finally, without the Cold War struggle, perform its intended purposes, but, from now onwards, it would involved in primarily intra-state conflicts as opposed to inter-state conflicts, which Goulding (1993) argues are messy affairs and which required a controversial switch from peacekeeping to peace enforcement without potentially violating a state’s sovereignty. The UN intervention in Bosnia less than 3 years after the Cold War finished was one such example that highlights the inefficiency of the organisation and proves Goulding was correct. UNPROFOR was established to mitigate humanitarian impacts in a very sensitive ethnic conflict In Yugoslavia, but found itself, despite its major resources, lacking a large enough mandate from the security council to intervene militarily due to national interests of the international community, most notably from NATO members and the UN’s main financier: the US (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). With no mandate, UNPROFOR needed cooperation between the Croatian, Muslim and Serbian ethnic groups, but due to many suspicions on both sides of the conflict – albeit mostly from the Croatians – about the supposed impartiality and willingness of the peacekeepers to defend innocent civilians, Doyle & Sambanis argue that disarming either side or finding any form of agreement became almost impossible. Indeed this was reflected by the Croatians as some cynically renamed the force UNPROSERB’ as the Serbians were ‘given’ victories in 1992 and 1993, despite evident human rights violations (Berdal & Economides, 2007). It is in this paralysis of authority that led to the depressive outcomes of the war in Bosnia. Berdal & Economides (2007) believe it was the absence of a US influence in the war that would cause the shortcomings of the UN, as they had done their part in the Gulf War, it was up to Europe (namely France & Germany) to prove they could contribute to international security – but still the P5 lacked any willingness to enforce peace rather than keep it. However, one cannot heavily place the blame on the UN just because of their lack of mandate, as the Yugoslav conflict was not like the Iraq-Kuwait conflict: it involved ethnic tensions, no real definition of borders and the dilemma over whether humanitarian intervention meant actual enforcement. Still, despite this fact, UN forces oversaw cases of ethnic cleansing on European soil such as the slaughtering of 6000-7000 Bosnian Croats in Srebrenica by the Serbians (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006) and the eventual subcontracting of NATO forces in 1995 to push back the Serb forces – effectively making the operation a western-dominated one; a common theme that arguably continues today. Although intervention did mitigate humanitarian impacts and the war was brought to an end, the UN’s first real test in international peacekeeping exposed its inefficiencies and ineffectiveness, with Bosnia & Herzegovina today very much a divided state. Other UN operations during the post-Cold War period exposed similar flaws, such as in Somalia, but at the same time we can see where non-intervention, particularly in relation to the Security Council, has led to as much, or even more disastrous consequences.
The Rwandan Civil War in 1994 highlighted the dangers of a lack of an early warning mechanism in the United Nations, whereby UNAMIR II – the task force – was deployed only after the lives of 750,000 Rwanda Tutsis and Hutus were taken in a blatant act of genocide (Berdal & Economides, 2007). The depressive state of affairs in UN operations in Somalia and Yugoslavia had tarnished UN morale and there was never any desire to get involved in a conflict – deemed a ‘civil war’ rather than genocide similar to that of the holocaust – despite statements put to the Security Council about the situation (Vaughan & Lowe, 2010). The genocide therefore exposed that the UN behaved differently towards different states, arguably that this was a conflict far from Europe, of which provided little interest for the P5, thus asking the question of the role of geography and in the UNSC’s decisions (Duque, Jetter & Sosa, 2006). As it was far from any of the P5’s sphere of influence, the failure outlined the need for a rapid deployment force and early warning systems, no matter where in the world,. Furthermore it exposed a danger to peacekeeping’s effectiveness – UNAMIR was given a very narrow mandate through which to act – and like Yugoslavia, the impartiality led to resentment towards Blue Helmets which led to their withdrawal, giving the CDR (the elite group of Hutus) in Rwanda a free hand to slaughter Tutsis and so-called moderate Hutus. Had Rwanda been in Europe, Duque, Jetter and Sosa argue, perhaps a withdrawal would not have taken place. Lessons were arguably learned and the actions of the Secretariat – who failed to provide evidence to the Security Council – and the UNSC were never repeated after Rwanda, as shown in Sierra Leone where troops were not withdrawn (Berdal & Economides). However, Berdal & Economides state that these lessons have failed to be learnt in conflicts such as Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, thus supporting Duque, Jetter and Sosa’s argument that geographic location also plays a role.
Following on from the failures of the 1990s in terms of peacekeeping operations, one clear example about the scepticism of the UN’s supranational power was the conflict with Iraq in 2003.