Hegelianism undoubtedly had a great impact on Russian philosophy. However, it may be contested to what extent Hegel’s philosophy was in fact a way for Russian philosophers to overcome their own alienation, and reintegration into existing society. In order to assess this theory in light of Alexander Herzen’s thought, it is essential to first of all evaluate the impact that “Reconciliation with Reality” had on his philosophy, and then to focus on his wider theories on the role of the individual: namely on his theory of the three stages of evolution of the mind; the types of intellectual identities that he identifies, the dilettante and the formalist; and finally his rejection of the historical determinism and the use of abstract concepts as a justification for subjugation of individual liberty in favour of a utopian future. Throughout the analysis, it is not only Herzen’s rejection of the “Reconciliation with Reality” that becomes evident, but also that this notion is, in essence, incompatible with Herzen’s philosophy.
Hegelianism had a profound effect on Russian philosophical development in general, and the Westernizers in particular. Most notable is Hegel’s notion that “all that is rational is real, and all that is real is rational”, developing into a period known as the “Reconciliation with Reality”, and it is to this that primary attention should be turned to. Arguably, Belinskii and Bakunin misinterpreted Hegel’s philosophy to signify that everything that exists is reasonable, necessary and rational, and that men should accept this despite their “subjective” perceptions. In fact, Hegel’s ideas connote that the world is the development of the rational and necessary course of the Absolute, meaning that the development of all things in the world follows a logical order and pattern, and consequently, the rational order is inherent in all things. However, he makes the point that not all existing things are equally rational, as reason also possesses a dialectical progression that is constantly changing. In this way, Hegel placed emphasis on progress, in the sense that antiquated modes consequently become irrational. These notions are critical in analysing the ideas of the Westernizers, as Hegel’s philosophy urged ‘towards submission to the “objective” facts of existence and acceptance of the status quo, absolute monarchy in particular, as the highest form of the “rational” in history’ . It is this final notion that particularly struck a nerve with Belinskii and Bakunin, and other progressive Russian intelligentsia at the time, in response to the failed Decembrist uprisings which resulted in the disillusionment with the potency of political action and led to their adoption of “Reconciliation with Reality” . Hegel’s influence indeed led Belinskii and others to accept the status quo and to extol those aspects of Russian society which they so heavily criticized previously, namely the aristocracy, serfdom and anti-Western nationalism, to such an extent that Malia goes as far as to say that their ‘articles were shameless apologias for autocracy and Russian nationalism’ .
However, when looking at the philosophy of Herzen, a completely different image begins to emerge. Herzen’s encounter with the concept of “Reconciliation with Reality” took place when he returned from exile in 1840, and he immediately denounced it as a form of ‘moral suicide’ . Despite this, Hegel had a profound effect on Herzen’s philosophy, which builds on and ultimately transcends Hegelianism. Seemingly building on Hegel’s notions of the “geist”, ‘Herzen divided history into three great epochs, corresponding to the three dialectical moments in the evolution of the mind: the age of natural immediacy, the age of thought, and the age of action’ . The age of immediacy corresponds to a period of particular individual interests which fail to attain absoluteness due to their absence of awareness and submission to blind forces. Natural immediacy is transcended and negated through the onset of science (taken to signify knowledge) which leads to the rejection of individuality in favour of impersonal truth and is thus elevated to the realm of the universal. The third and final dialectical moment comes with the negation of these impersonal abstractions of science in favour of conscious action, whereby individuality reasserts itself, ‘bringing rationality and freedom to the historical process’ . For Herzen, this is the ultimate goal: ‘he desires to act, for action alone can satisfy man to the full. Action is the personality itself.’
To be clear, for Herzen there existed two types of intellectual personalities, explored deeply in his Dilettantism in Science. One was the type of the “dilettante” who is too afraid of losing his individuality to delve deeply into the world of knowledge and become engaged with actual, detailed facts. This amateur explores science only on the surface without the ability to develop ‘sober knowledge’ , and thus simply makes vague, useless generalisations. The other type of intellectual personality is the formalist – a person who dives deeply into his field of study and becomes preoccupied only with isolated facts, which become his sole interest and which he explores with greater depth. In this way, this type of scientist loses his individuality through absorption into his subject. Building on the type of the formalist science, another type of personality may emerge: the Buddhist. He is able to reach the stage of the negation of natural immediacy through his encounter with science, however is unable to transcend into the third great epoch of the mind due to his rejection of participation in history and consequently the negation of self-realisation . For him, it is enough to be elevated to the realm of the impersonal supra individual, and thus he holds no desire towards a renaissance of the self through conscious action. Herzen says of the Buddhists:
They imagined that to know reconciliation was sufficient and that to put it into effect was superfluous. […] It never occurred to them that science is but a stage of life, that life surges towards it naturally and spontaneously and flows from it again consciously free.
And so Herzen believed that objective and detached study of science was necessary to reconcile these two dialectic intellectual types, in order for humans to have the ability to understand life in a more enlightened way, as neither type could be discarded altogether.
It is in this notion of the need for action rather than mere abstractions that Herzen’s criticism of Hegel comes in. For Herzen, ‘Hegelianism was the highest achievement of abstract thought’ however it went no further than the second stage of his theory on the evolution of the mind. As previously alluded to, Hegel’s reasoning was that freedom is not about choice but rather the understanding of the ways that reason orders everything in the world. Correspondingly, everything that happens in the world corresponds to a greater, rational order and thus everything that happens is reasonable and rational. Understanding of this allows man to determine his position in that order, and thus acquire freedom. In this way, Hegelianism stopped at the age of thought and failed to reach the age of action promoted by Herzen, as it failed to challenge the existing order and instead sought to accept it as the development of higher forces in which humankind has no influence.
Consequently, Herzen not only challenges Hegel’s complacency towards action but also his pan-logism; the idea that only what is rational is real and thus that the laws of history follow the laws of logic. Herzen argued that man not only possesses logic but also will, and it is the will of man that incites him towards conscious action. He states that:
Man’s vocation, however, is not logic alone, but also the socio-historical world of moral freedom and positive action; man has not only the ability of abstracting comprehension but also the will which may be called positive, creative reason.
Henceforth, Herzen asserted the moral necessity for free action. Herzen fervently rejected the idea that nature obeys a certain plan, or that there is a purpose to human life. This is one of Herzen’s key ideas that ‘men are predestined to nothing’ . In From the Other Shore, he asserts that ‘Life – is both the means and the end, the cause and the effect’ . This is a crucial notion to his ideas on individual liberty as it rejects the inevitability of an ideal life at a point in some distant future. He argues that there is no formula or general solution which can free society from its problems. Consequently, a man’s free will should not be suppressed for the attainment of abstract principles, such as history, humanity, or progress: this he saw to be ‘a form of delusion which leads to the destruction of all that alone is valuable in men and societies’ . To demand sacrifice in the name of abstract concepts is indeed delusional and this delusion derives from the fact that the future is uncertain, and it fails to bring liberty to individuals in the present moment. For the uncertainty of the future Herzen turns to evidence from natural forces: ‘Nature is perfectly indifferent to what happens…’. Therefore, it is foolish to sacrifice liberty today for an idolised vision of the future because it is unattainable.
Ultimately, it becomes apparent that Herzen’s philosophy is incompatible with the notion of the “Reconciliation of Reality”, and thus for him, Hegelianism was neither a way of overcoming his own alienation nor a way of reconciliation with the existing reality. Herzen undoubtedly embraced many aspects of Hegel’s philosophy, namely historical dialectic materialism, however he fervently rejects the idea that history has a purpose that humans should be striving towards. Instead, he argued that human life is purposeless, placing much emphasis on conscious action in favour of individual liberty in the present moment, not the submission of liberty to action towards an uncertain future in hopes of some distant Utopia. In this way, Herzen continues where Hegelianism stops: Hegelianism strives for the negation of natural immediacy in favour of impersonal truth, whereas Herzen promotes the subsequent negation of impersonal truth for a reconciliation of the ego in order to reach level of mental development where conscious action can occur. In a way, Herzen’s philosophy is thus the opposite of “Reconciliation of Reality” as he promotes a reconciliation with the self in order to challenge existing reality in favour of individual liberty. Finally, it becomes apparent that although Hegel had a profound influence on Herzen, he sought to transcend and to some extent reject Hegelianism. However, one must note that this is neither an exhaustive study of Herzen’s philosophy, neither does it cover the ideas of other Russian philosophers of the age, and thus it is impossible to reach a solid conclusion as to what Hegelianism signified for other Russian philosophers of the 19th century and beyond.