‘The Cotton Ceiling’ is a “theory proposed by trans porn star and activist Drew DeVeaux to explain the experiences queer trans women have with simultaneous social inclusion and sexual exclusion within the broader queer women’s communities.” In other words, The Cotton Ceiling describes the tendency of cis queer women to be friends or allies to transwomen but not sexual partners. This paper will analyze this phenomenon through Robin Dembroff’s theory of sexual orientation, consider an objection to Dembroff’s view posed by Talia Bettcher, and ultimately present an argument which, in endorsing Dembroff’s view, justifies cis lesbian women’s lack of de facto obligation to view queer transwomen with penises as viable sexual partners.
Robin Dembroff’s Theory of Sexual Orientation
In their paper, What is Sexual Orientation?, Robin Dembroff attempts to develop a non-heteronormative theory of sexual orientation by proposing a theory dubbed “Bidimensional Dispositionalism.” Bidimensional Dispositionalism “is based upon a person’s sexual behavioral dispositions under the ordinary manifesting conditions for these dispositions (i.e conditions corresponding to the applications of the term ‘sexual orientation’ and related terms), and having a particular sexual orientations is based upon what sex[es] and gender[s] of persons one is (or is not) disposed to sexually engage with under these conditions” (Dembroff, pg.3). In other words, Dembroff’s theory endorses a view of sexual orientation on the basis of dispositions toward particular attractions or behaviors, rather than on the basis of assumed binary categories, normative notions of gender-attraction and sex-attraction, or rigid ideal or behavioral conditions. In this way, Dembroff avoids falling into potentially toxic or presumptuous normative standards in their presentation of sexual orientation.
In order to fully understand Dembroff’s theory, one must understand their proposed distinction between sex and gender. In Dembroff’s view, sex and gender are independent categories of personhood with sex corresponding to anatomy and gender corresponding to social station. Dembroff states that current “characterizations of sexual orientation typically… analyze sexual orientation in terms of either sex-attraction to the exclusion of gender-attraction or vice versa, [which] lead[s] to understandings of sexual orientation according to which sexual orientation is unidimensional – tracking either sex- or gender- attraction, but never both independently of each other…” (Dembroff, 9). This is to say that current understandings of sexual orientation automatically link sex and gender according to normative understandings of each. In this way, such understandings of sexual orientation do not accommodate attractions to sex/gender combinations which deviate from those norms. Dembroff posits that accounting for the distinction between sex and gender as mutually exclusive categories allows for a more comprehensive understanding of sexual orientation – one which accommodates multidimensional attractions and dispositions to unlinked sexes and genders.
Moreover, Dembroff does not conflate sexual attraction with gender attraction. Their reasoning for this considers “the frequency with which people experience sexual attraction not only to individuals with particular gendered features, but also to individuals with particular primary and secondary sex characteristics… and the need to recognize the community of persons who are exclusively attracted to transgender individuals, or who are themselves transgender and seeking persons with these attractions” (Dembroff, 10). In distinguishing between sexual attraction and gender attraction, Dembroff allows for the existence of orientations whose gender and sex attractions would ordinarily be seen as incompatible given current understandings of the linked nature of sex and gender.
Importantly, Dembroff’s theory also considers the distinction between ideal dispositionalism and behaviorism; two approaches to defining sexual orientation which Dembroff ultimately dismisses, endorsing ‘bidimensional dispositionalism’ in their place. Dembroff states that, “under a behaviorist account, an individual’s sexual orientation is decided simply by looking at their sexual behaviors, and seeing what sex[es] and gender[s] of persons they sexually [sic] engage with” (Dembroff, 12). This behaviorist determination of sexual orientation creates inflexible boundaries of orientation which make it difficult “[to determine] what behaviors and span of time are relevant to someone’s sexual orientation” (Dembroff, 12). This view fails to accommodate both variation in attraction across sex and gender lines, and does not acknowledge nuanced disconnect between orientation and behavior motivated by social circumstance or practice.
Dembroff suggests that the behaviorist view on sexual orientation should be modified to consider behavior but primarily be determined by dispositions toward particular sexual behaviors, rather than the behavior alone. However an analysis of ideal dispositionalism specifically, which Dembroff presents as the view that “a person’s sexual orientation is determined solely by what sex[es] and gender[s] of persons S is disposed to sexually engage under certain ideal conditions,” (Dembroff, 13) reveals its own set of analogous problems. This view presupposes that one’s sexual desires are “‘held fixed’ independently of someone’s actual social context, and that these desires… remain constant when projected into ideal circumstances” (Dembroff, 15). In other words, ideal dispositionalism entails its own type of rigidity, one which does not accommodate situation-dependent variation in disposition toward particular sexual behaviors. This essentially reassigns the failings of behaviorism to ideal dispositionalism. The same problem of inflexibility and rigid categorization arises once ideal dispositionalism mandates the invariability of supposedly determinate behaviors. Furthermore, ideal dispositionalism fails to consider the range of cultural environments in which those ‘ideal conditions’ could manifest. As Dembroff states, “this view legitimizes a worrisome cross-cultural projection of our concept of sexual orientation… In other words, the view implies that we can ascribe sexual orientation (as we understand it) to all human beings across cultures by holding fixed their sexual desires and projecting them onto corresponding ‘ideal conditions,’ regardless of how foreign these conditions are…” (Dembroff, 14).
In order to avoid the problems posed by behaviorism and ideal dispositionalism, Dembroff endorses bidimensional dispositionalism which says that “a person S’s sexual orientation is grounded in S’s dispositions to engage in sexual behaviors under the ordinary conditions for these dispositions, and which sexual orientation S has is grounded in what sex[es] and gender[s] of persons S is disposed to sexually engage under these conditions” (Dembroff, 18). In this way, bidimensional dispositionalism removes the rigidity in categorization and determinate behavior imposed by behaviorism and ideal dispositionalism. Thus, bidimensional dispositionalism accommodates a broader range of situation-dependent, culturally sensitive factors in determining sexual orientation.
Talia Bettcher’s Analysis of Deception-Motivated Transphobic Violence
In her paper Evil Deceivers and Make-Believers: On Transphobic Violence and the Politics of Illusion, Talia Bettcher deconstructs accusations of deception integral to many acts of transphobic violence. Bettcher posits that transphobia often encompasses an “appearance-reality contrast between gender presentation and sexed body… [with gender presentation] constitute[ing] a gendered appearance, whereas a sexed body constitutes the hidden, sexual reality” (Bettcher, 48). This dichotomy in presentation and biology also yields a false, transphobic dichotomy between falsity and truth, where the ‘sexed body’ is the individual’s ‘true’ gender and any presentation which diverges from this supposed truth is deceptive.
This perceived deception informs and motivates a continuum of transphobic violence. One avenue through which this violence festers is presented by the ‘double bind,’ where the only options as a trans person are “to disclose ‘who one is’ and come out as a pretender or masquerader, or refuse to disclose (be a deceiver) and run the risk of forced disclosure, the effect of which is exposure as a liar” (Bettcher, 50). Each of these options are inextricably linked to the presupposed dichotomy between gender presentation and the sexed body. Whether the trans person reveals themselves as a deceiver whose presentation diverges from their ‘true sex,’ or they refuse to reveal their trans-identity, they are forced to acknowledge their divergence from the normative link between sex and gender. In this way, whether or not the trans person chooses to disclose their status as trans, they are simultaneously forced to abide by the externally prescribed distinction between sex and gender and accused of deception or pretending in their subversion of the same schema. Each of these options entails an element of perceived deception committed by the trans person. Thus, each of these options carry the threat of transphobic violence.
An important component of Bettcher’s analysis of transphobic violence is “gender presentation as genital representation” (Bettcher, 52). Bettcher says that “gender presentation is generally taken as a sign of a sexed body, taken to mean sexed body, taken to communicate sexed body. And it is precisely for this reason that trans people who ‘misalign’ gender presentation and sexed body are construed as either deceivers or pretenders” (Bettcher, 52). In other words, gender presentation is assumed to communicate one’s ‘true’ biological sex characteristics, namely one’s genitalia. To present as a gender which does not track the ‘correct’ normatively linked genitalia constitutes a sort of deception.
There are two common responses to accusations of genital deception, both of which Bettcher rejects. The first “involves simply denying there is any deception at all. On the contrary, according to this view [trans]… people are merely ‘being themselves.’ [The] second… response involves posing the question why [a trans person] should [be] expected to announce that [they] are ‘transgender’ (or declare [their] genital status) in the first place” (Bettcher, 53). As Bettcher suggests, both responses do not go deep enough. They ignore the subtlety and number of factors influencing the trans person’s decision to disclose their status as trans. The latter response still reinforces the presumption that trans people are deceivers. This response operates under the assumption that a trans person might be able to disclose their status as trans without imparting the supposition that they are somehow deceiving the newly informed party. While the question posed by the latter response suggests that trans people do not have an obligation to disclose their status as trans, it also implies that there is not only ‘a way’ to come out as trans but a way to do this which does not also entail the accompanying accusation of deception.
Importantly, Bettcher proposes that the perceived deception formed by supposed disconnect between genital representation and gender presentation is integral to transphobic acts of violence. The invalidation of trans people’s self-identification, by way of refusing to accept any divergence from normatively linked presentation and representation, is “so deeply bound up with the transphobic hostility and violence” (Bettcher, 54). The automatic dismissal of trans people’s proclamations of identity is motivated by strict adherence to inflexible understandings of gender presentation and genital representation, and is foundational to transphobic acts of violence.
While Bettcher does not construct a way to address this violence, she does describe the presentation politics and communication methods utilized within trans specific or trans-friendly spaces. Bettcher observes that in these spaces “gender presentation does not represent genital status at all, instead constituting a visible indication of how a transsubject wishes to be interacted with… The authority of transsubjects in determining self-identity is generally taken as a starting point, and the significance of the gender presentation as well as gender identification category is generally provided by the subjects own personal ‘intelligibility conferring’ narrative” (Bettcher, 59). It seems that in these spaces, where one is less tied to the normative, dichotomous understandings of gender presentation and the sexed body, trans person is the authority and arbiter of their own social existence. In these spaces, the trans person presents themselves as they wish to be seen rather than being accused of deceiving those who misread the trans person’s presentation.
Bettcher states that these spaces provide “contexts in which escape from the system of gender as genital representation may be possible” (Bettcher, 60). Here, Bettcher seems to be implicitly suggesting that removing the power of the normative dichotomy between gender presentation and the sexed body would begin to chip away at the overwhelming presence of transphobia and transviolence. This sentiment is further solidified as Bettcher posits that the far-reaching influence of the dichotomy between the sexed body and gender presentation in acts of transphobic violence and beyond warrants “direct oppos[ition to] the representational relations between gender presentation and sexed body that grounds the construction of trans people as deceivers” (Bettcher, 58).
Contrasting Proposals
There seems to be a direct contrast between Robin Dembroff and Talia Bettcher’s views regarding the distinction between gender as a social construct and sex as a biological feature. Dembroff’s theory of sexual orientation not only includes but mandates the distinction of gender and sex as a means to encompass the full spectrum of orientations. However, Bettcher seems to be suggesting that that the same distinction should be called into question as it underlies and perpetuates violence against trans people whose identities diverge from it.
Bettcher suggests that the distinction between gender presentation, genital representation, biological sex, and culturally defined notions of gender all induce the accusation that trans people are deceivers or pretenders. She posits that this accusation of deception is fundamental to transphobic acts of violence, and implicitly suggests that to begin to combat transphobic violence, one must break down each of these distinctions. However if one is to adopt Dembroff’s view, such a deconstruction is impossible because Dembroff’s view of sexual orientation is dependent on at least the distinction between sex and gender. Ironically, part of Dembroff’s motivation for their adherence to this distinction stems from a desire to create a definition of sexual orientation which comfortably accommodates attraction to trans people.
It seems then that Dembroff and Bettcher are presenting conflicting proposals regarding the distinction between sex and gender. Dembroff’s view mandates not only embracing the distinction between sex and gender but emboldening this distinction as a means to a more comprehensive definition of sexual orientation. On the other hand, Bettcher’s view implies not only the blurring of this distinction but the potential eradication of this distinction with an establishment of self-identification and presentation as the most salient means of understanding gender.
The Cotton Ceiling
The Cotton Ceiling laments the tendency of cis lesbian women to reject transwomen as viable sex partners. Consider a lesbian woman whose sexuality is defined as ‘homosexual.’ This describes an individual with female sex organs, who presents as gendered female, and who is attracted to women. Should this lesbian cis woman reject a transwoman as a sexual partner then she rejects of transwomen’s identity as a woman. This is because the cis queer woman’s sexuality seems to encompass all individuals categorized as ‘woman’. The transwoman is an individual categorized as ‘woman’ and yet, is still sexually rejected by the cis queer woman. This act implies that the transwoman does not fall under the cis queer woman’s category of attraction (to women) and thus, in at least the sexual realm, the transwoman is not considered a ‘real’ woman.
This rejection of the transwoman’s identity as a woman is oftentimes deeply offensive, invalidating, infuriating and disheartening. In an article written in Big Closet World Amanda, a transwoman, says that to cis lesbian women, transwomen “are not real women… [Cis lesbian women] resist the penis. The penis to them is the Devil. Anything having to do with penises, they unequivocally oppose, regardless of whether it is exclusionary or irrational… Some may say they support trans rights… However, when it comes time to open themselves up to dating [transwomen]… the answer is NO WAY. We are icky, icky transwomen with…gasp…penises.” This lamentation gets at the heart of the Cotton Ceiling. Amanda’s experiences as a transwoman seeking a cis lesbian partner entail frequent rejection and invalidation of Amanda’s identity as a woman.
Problems with The Cotton Ceiling
It is important to establish why there may be pushback against the obligation of cis lesbian women to view transwomen as viable sex partners entailed in the Cotton Ceiling. People frustrated by the Cotton Ceiling suggest that cis lesbian women who do not want to have sex with penises are “confused about what it means to be a lesbian, or a woman…. [and that they] confuse [physical preferences and gender identity].” Furthermore, these critics suggest that cis lesbian women “don’t bother to interrogate the origins of [their] phallus-based distaste for transwomen, [or] think about whether it’s actually a dislike of the organ… or whether transphobia and a refusal to view trans women as women is involved” (Faucette).
While I can understand this frustration, I think it is misled. It is important to consider the validity of one’s right to refuse sex with particular bodies, or frankly for any reason. To propose that any individual is obligated to have sex with anyone is at the very least inappropriate. To suggest that the reason someone should have sex with someone else is entirely in the name of social justice is wholly objectionable. Moreover, to oblige someone to engage in an act as inherently intimate and personal as sex as a means to combat transphobia is not only objectionable but also inappropriately suggests that one should be ashamed for not doing so.
Additionally, the issue is complicated by the prospect of traumatization. It is quite possible that the reasoning behind an individual’s refusal to sleep with a transwoman with a penis is transphobic. Even still, the only thing this reasoning can appropriately warrant is a great deal of introspective evaluation in an attempt to combat that individual’s internalized transphobia. However to suggest that this individual should ‘get over’ their disgust for the penis and sleep with transwomen with penises is not only inappropriate but potentially traumatizing; especially if the individual chooses to do so out of a sense of guilt and not out of enthusiastic voluntariness. Moreover, this issue is made even more complicated by the existence of cis lesbian women who are also survivors of sexual assault. To proposition these women with the same suggestion entails the same potential for traumatization or re-traumatization.
The Implications of Bettcher’s View on The Cotton Ceiling
If one were to apply Bettcher’s attempts to reduce instances of transphobic violence via the reduction of power in the current dichotomous understandings of sex and gender, Amanda’s experiences would likely continue to go unresolved. Moreover, Amanda’s invalidation as a woman might become more salient. Bettcher’s view suggests that gender presentation and self-identity should be the determining factors in our perceptions of trans people, and that subscribing to this sentiment will reduce instances of perceived deception.
However, this view does not acknowledge the reality of different genitalia. As Amanda’s account suggests, it is often not a question of whether or not a transwoman is a woman but rather whether the transwoman is a woman with a penis. It is not necessarily the rejection of transwomen as viable sexual partners but rather the rejection of penises as viable objects in cis lesbian women’s sexual experiences. By ignoring the nuances of this rejection, Bettcher’s implicitly suggested solution to transphobic violence does not eradicate motivating factors of accusations of deception.
If, for example, a cis lesbian woman were to subscribe to Bettcher’s view entailing the purely presentative nature of gender identity, she would quite possibly still feel deceived. For while the cis lesbian woman may readily believe that the transwoman’s presentation of her identity as a woman does indeed dictate her status as a woman, she will still be confronted with phallic genitalia. In this scenario, the cis lesbian woman does subscribe to Bettcher’s proposition of the performative over the presumptuous and thus more readily believes and validates the transwoman’s status as a woman. However, Bettcher’s view still adheres to a linked understanding of sex and gender. So when the cis lesbian woman perceives the transwoman’s presentation as ‘woman’ to be valid, she still anticipates genital representation which matches normatively linked understandings of sex and gender – a vagina. It seems then that while Bettcher’s view could begin to chip away at transphobic acts of violence, when applied to matters of sexual relationships where genital representation is more obviously relevant, Bettcher’s view is not entirely comprehensive or farsighted.
The Implications of Dembroff’s View on The Cotton Ceiling
It seems that one of the failings Bettcher’s view is that while it makes self-identification and presentation more determinate than preconceived notions or assumptions of gender, it still preserves current normatively linked definitions of sex and gender when presentation no longer becomes the only visible factor, as is the case with sexual encounters. It is this piece of Bettcher’s view that Dembroff’s recognizes and succeeds in addressing.
It seems that part of the reason behind transwomen’s infuriation with the Cotton Ceiling is with the implication that their lack of viability as sexual partners indexes their invalidation as women. This implication is motivated by the supposedly linked nature of sex and gender. Because, under current notions of sex and gender, gender presentation is perceived to track genital representation the rejection of transwomen’s genitals is simultaneously a rejection of transwomen’s gender as valid or real. In Dembroff’s redefining of sexual orientation, the regression toward problematic conflations of sex and gender is neither present nor possible, especially in instances of sexual encounters. Dembroff’s view emboldens the distinction between sex and gender and thus, this indirect rejection of gender is no longer entailed by the rejection of a transwoman’s penis.
In making sex and gender independent from one another, Dembroff’s view accommodates a variety of dispositions toward combinations of different gender and sex attractions. One such combination is extremely relevant when considering the Cotton Ceiling. Under Dembroff’s system of understanding sexual orientation, individuals can make mutually exclusive claims over their sex attraction and gender attraction; where one attraction may have no bearing on the other.