What is your view about the causes of the Cold War in Europe in the year 1944-1949?
The Cold War dominated the thinking of much of the latter half of the 20th century. The unrivalled economic and military development of the USA in this period leads some historians, such as Walter LaFeber, to argue that the Cold War was begun –and subsequently continued by- the actions of the US. Protection of the economy from “internal collapse” and the spread of ‘liberal democracy’ as its vanguard were the guiding forces behind US foreign policy decisions of the period. However all of this was fundamentally motivated by the expansionist and protectionist capitalist ideology that is so commonly associated with the USA. Running in opposition to this position is the suggestion that the USSR was actually a threat to the US and to peace in Europe following the end of World War 2 and the political and economic destabilisation that followed. The particular line argued by Pleshakov is that Stalin himself was to blame for the animosity felt by the US and contributed to the escalation of tensions through his paranoid personality and constant self-doubt. As expected, there are also historians who do not subscribe to this polarised view of the Cold War. John Lamberton Harper takes a more nuanced view, arguing that the Cold War, whilst inevitable, was escalated beyond necessary proportions by the miscalculations and, more importantly, the historically rooted world views of the two nations. Despite these other views, LaFeber’s argument that the US was acting on economically protectionist lines holds the most weight encompasses or discredits the opposing arguments.
LaFeber provides the most convincing view arguing that the Cold War was caused primarily by the aggressive foreign policy of the US towards the USSR and Western Europe, motivated by a need to protect the American economy through bolstering economies in Europe and containing communism as it offered the alternative to capitalism. The Second World War had left a power vacuum in Western Europe that would inevitably be filled by one of the two remaining ‘viable’ economic powers, as it was one of George Kennan’s “Four key aggregations”. The US commitment to filling this vacuum was made clear in Truman’s pledge to contain communism in its post war borders and in the offering of Marshall Aid to economically weak European nations. LaFeber argues that these two actions, the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid, signalled that start of the Cold War, thereby placing the blame on the US. His argument follows that Marshall Aid, while appearing altruistic on the surface, was a subversive attempt to protect the US economy and link Western Europe to the US rather than the USSR. Countries that entered into Marshall Aid were economically tied to free trade deals with the US, deals the often favoured the US and excluded them from deals with the USSR. What makes this policy such a clear statement of antagonism towards the USSR is how much it differs from the American foreign policy norm. For the longest time, the US was an isolationist nation with little foreign investment in capital or politics, adhering to Thomas Jefferson’s commitment to “entangling alliances with none”. However, following the great depression of the 1930s, it became clear that this was an unsustainable economic model and the USSR and post war Europe provided the perfect excuse for economic and political expansion. A two pronged approach was taken to soften the blow of the huge shift in ideology. Firstly, a largely fictional image of communism was painted in an attempt to convince the American political establishment and public to agree to this major shift in economic focus. It showed communism to be a war mongering, expansionist threat to the American way of life. Indeed it was an effective painting. Secondly, Point Four of Truman’s foreign policy plan – as outlined in his Inaugural Address of 1949 – put forward the spread of scientific and industrial knowledge to the Third World. LaFeber calls this a “kind of private-enterprise Marshall Plan”, suggesting that it would have a similar polarising effect to the later policy of Marshall himself. Furthermore, LaFeber comments on how the Third World was becoming “increasingly important” in the game of international politics and could prove an invaluable asset to the side that held more influence. Notice that scientific and industrial knowledge are two cornerstones of economic improvement; the end goal of Truman’s policy and the precursor to a safe haven outside America for US economic expansion. The public and the establishment, convinced by Truman’s speeches, gave him the go ahead to carry out his policies. Peter Kenez agrees with LaFeber in this regard and both are careful to point out Truman’s rhetorical technique in the Truman Doctrine. He refrained from criticising Stalin’s personality and “never publicly condemned Soviet policy”; rather he demonised communism as an idea. It would have been impossible to tell the US public that while, “on the one hand Stalinist Russia was a murderous dictatorship” yet also “not a threat to vital American interests” (namely oil in the Middle East and political capital in emerging European economies). By attacking the ideas behind the state, Truman could get away with what could be described as warmongering and expansionist policies without any suggestions of preparing for war with the USSR. LaFeber makes use of Lincoln McVeigh, US ambassador to Greece, in a critical jab at the US. He points out the irony in McVeigh’s thinking that “any empire that bases itself on revolution always has expansionist tendencies”, reminding the reader of the American Revolution of 1776, rather than the implied Russian Revolution of 1917. A defendant of the US could argue that McVeigh’s statement still held water with the USSR, arguing that it did have a desire for world domination (regardless of its actual ability to do so). However, in maintaining this position they would be conceding that the US also had these expansionist desires. Equally, in accepting the US had expansionist motives, LaFeber is accepting the USSR’s latent desires. However, Pleshakov and Zubok provide the shovel to dig LaFeber out of his ‘hole of circular argument’; a defence of the USSR following an assessment of Stalin’s character. They write that he was not interested in dominating the world at this point in time, rather that he had a “fear of domestic enemies [which] led to extensive purging”. Forcing another world conflict having just purged large portions of the army and bureaucracy would leave Stalin at a huge disadvantage and he and the US knew that. LaFeber writes that “the two top State Department experts… believed Stalin had no grand designs for world conquest”. This view was shared by individuals in all facets of government. Robert Taft, leader of the Republican Senate, condemned Truman as being divisive and splitting the world into communist and anti-communist, flat out stating “I do not want war with Russia”. This “with us or against us attitude” that was growing in US government only served to foster opposition to Truman and his “simple and militaristic” foreign policy. Trying to force economic development in Soviet border-states would inevitably lead to a conflict of interests that could escalate into a hot war. Having suffered little losses in World War 2 (a poultry 400,000 deaths, 0.5% of Soviet losses) the US could inevitably weather any limited conflict caused by expansion as the Soviets would not be able to maintain a prolonged war. A lot of LaFeber’s sourcing comes from a rather one sided perspective. He extensively uses sources like George Kennan, Truman, and backdoor conversations between members of the Washington DC elite, whilst employing little in the way of Soviet sources. The text, which has been continuously updated since its release in 1972, can be forgiven for its limited use in its earlier editions. However, following the collapse of the USSR, previously impossible to access records became publicly available and many historians soon incorporated them into their works. LaFeber seems not to have done despite the text being on its 10th edition. Given the nature of the sources used (private conversations and official documents) we can safely assume a degree of truth within them. Private conversations are, by virtue of their existence, often honest and “unheard” truths, and official documents that incriminate the author can be treated in a similar way.
An alternative viewpoint posited by Russian authors Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, is that Stalin was emotionally unstable, unavailable and volatile, and this informed his decision making particularly in matters of border security. The development of the Cold War, on this view, cannot be attributed to the “new breed of rigid and xenophobic diplomats” created following the rise of Stalin but to Stalin himself as he tried to build “Europe’s biggest war machine”. By the time war had ended, Stalin had a total monopoly of all state powers and “his personality [had become] the single most significant factor in the decision making process in the USSR” however paranoia plagued his mind and thus informed much of his foreign and internal policy. Territorial protectionism became a key aspect of Soviet policy and the establishment of the US hated satellite states exemplifies this. Poland was the main object of Stalin’s paranoia as it had served as the route of invasion for the Nazi’s in 1941 and the Central powers in 1915. Its division and political leaning became a major sticking point at the conferences of the 1940’s and the antagonism created by the opposing views contributed to the escalation of tensions between the Big Three, in particular the US and USSR. Stalin’s obsession with having an “advantage in the game of international politics” was shown by his surveillance and spying at the Tehran and Yalta conferences, in particular, with wire taps placed on Roosevelt and Churchill. Stalin felt it necessary to always know what his ‘allies’ were planning in order to create an aura of omniscience and intrigue around his character. It’s arguable that if Stalin had spies, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the US was using spies as to a similar degree and for similar purposes and it wouldn’t be an unfounded to assume. Miles Copeland Jr., a CIA agent in the Middle East who facilitated a coup against the democratically elected leader of Syria and former SS captain Otto Von Bolschwing, an ex-Nazi who assisted the US in the Greek Civil War, are two examples of early Cold War US spies that played a role in securing the US’s position in key geographical areas. Whilst spies were used by both sides, their usage and primary goal clearly shows the motives of each nation. The proactive use of Soviet spies to spy on the US highlights the USSR’s insecurities in its international sphere, stemming from Stalin’s rampant paranoia regarding the foreign image of the USSR. Conversely, the American usage of spies to facilitate an infiltration and monopolisation of new markets, lays bare domestic insecurities regarding the now irrelevant “war economy”, as Roosevelt called it. Pleshakov argues that this desire to appear strong and omniscient betrays Stalin’s “feelings of inferiority towards the west and western leaders”. However it could also suggest that Stalin was creating a plan for expansion and world domination, and was only waiting for sufficient intelligence on US weaknesses to become available to him. Whilst it may have been true that the USSR was not yet economically and militarily ready for total war; following extensive purges and industrialisation under the 5 Year Plans, it was feasible and advisable to support communist military and political coups in bordering nations. Intervention in Greece, Czechoslovakia and Romania show the interests of the USSR currently lay in building up a buffer of communist states in order to help facilitate the regrowth of Russian industrial power. Peter Kenez refutes the idea that Stalin was in the business of world domination, saying that we should “disregard” it entirely, and that while support for communist uprisings was given; it was only to nations contiguous to the USSR’s borders, areas where there was no “undue risk” to Soviet international relations. Communist parties in France and Italy received none of support offered to the USSR’s neighbours, despite being as open to influence as any other weakened European state, and British and American parties were completely off the table. Whilst this line of argument is valid and backed up by suitable amounts of evidence, it isn’t enough on its own to stand up to LaFeber’s argument. All of the USSR’s actions can be factored into his equation and seen from the perspective of a US policy maker. Stalin’s direct interest in the nations near him played perfectly into the narrative spun by the US; that he was looking to slowly expand but not enough to directly threaten the US itself – only its economic allies and assets. Kenez isn’t arguing that USSR and US communications totally broke down and that the USSR wouldn’t touch Western Europe at all. Negotiations and friendly appearances were maintained in the hope of maintaining world peace (at least until Russia was strategically ready otherwise). A divide did eventually appear because, much like as LaFeber argues that Truman was creating the “with us or against us” camps in the US, Pleshakov writes that Stalin saw the world in much the same way – as two camps: “the empire born in flames and the light; and the dark old world – dying, desperate and aggressive”. This bilateral view of the world would inevitably create friction and this came to a head in 1948 following the Soviet decision to blockade Berlin. LaFeber would potentially see Stalin’s reaction as justifiable as the US was abusing its economic power and expanding beyond its ‘fair’ borders. West Berlin was thriving following the economic intervention of the US and provided an alternative view of the “dying” and “desperate” state of capitalist world which caused Stalin to panic (just like any threatened leader would). The cessation of transport in and out of West Berlin was the first moment of actual US-USSR conflict; a moment which Pleshakov believes is the key moment where the Cold War began. Up to this point relations had been sub-optimal yet there hadn’t been any point where East and West had butted heads and sparked a real conflict. Stalin was known for being calm and methodical with much of his thinking but occasionally he would snap and have moments of “menace and fury” however they were not unprovoked and the Berlin Blockade in particular was a long time coming. The US had been aggressively manoeuvring to out play the Soviet Union in multiple key areas of economic interest. The Iranian crisis in 1946 was the first key moment of potential conflict between the US and USSR, however it eventually ended peacefully. The motivations of each nation are where it is possible to see an instigator and a defendant. Stalin was refusing to leave Iran following the end of an occupation deal between the allies which the US had not actually been a part of. Iran was a valuable economic asset for the US as it contained vast oil fields and was a potential foot in the door for Middle Eastern trade. It was only after extreme pressure from the US that the USSR retreated from Iran, having no other options available to them due to their weakened military strength. One could argue that this crisis was not a product of Stalin’s indignant and stubborn personality, going against Pleshakov’s argument, and side with LaFeber in saying the crisis emerged due to US economic interest and expansionism into new growing markets. Iran and the Middle East held a relatively untapped source of oil that, if monopolised, would provide a secure economic asset in a rapidly developing market. For the US, Stalin’s personality and the threat of communism were the perfect scapegoats. It’s clear that Pleshakov’s argument falls neatly into the bracket provided by LaFeber. The sources used add weight to Pleshakov’s argument therefore, by proxy, strengthening LaFeber further. Stalin’s own letters to his mother are used to provide a clear and open view of his inner personality. However even in these letters, he is cold and offers little in terms of compassion or emotion. He writes that “a brave man should always be brave” in relation to the mysterious passing of his wife Nadia. In addition to letters, his own speeches with colleagues and at conferences shed light on his governmental policy. Pleshakov writes that Stalin was taking Russia on a course to “be a world power, second to none”, quoting from a text comprised of conversations between Molotov and poet Felix Chuev. The frequent use of this type of sources (interviews with senior Soviet politicians of the time and direct quotes from Stalin’s speeches) provides credibility to the Pleshakov’s argument that it was Stalin’s personality at fault for the beginning of the Cold War. Inevitably the best source for judging Stalin’s personality would be his own words, and the meaning we can infer from them, and the experiences of his closest ‘peers’ (in the loosest sense of the word).