Whether human beings possess free will is a complex issue as it raises so many questions about the nature of our actions either way, but more importantly it is fundamental to the notion of ethics. The idea of free will depends on the stance we take on our view of human nature; are we some-what constrained by the determinate physical laws of the universe? Or are we outside of the physical laws that govern the world and so able to choose freely? Do animals have free will in the same way as humans? Factors like these are dependent on our views of determinism, libertarianism and compatibilism. This essay aims to demonstrate how compatibilism is the most plausible explanation for the existence of free will; as by diminishing free will completely, we are removing components of our nature that make us distinct, but at the same time, if we were to accept libertarianism, we would be forgetting about the importance of the contribution that science has provided in understanding the principles of cause and effect.
Free will is central to our understanding of moral responsibility. It establishes grounds for determining what is right and what is wrong. It is intrinsic to praising and blaming individuals. If free will doesn’t exist, how can we punish? How can human beings be accountable for their actions if free will doesn’t exist? “For us to be really morally responsible, it seems that we need a similarly nonconventional, real capacity- the capacity of free will.” (Double, 1991) This needs to be established because society and institutions such as the criminal justice system create laws and punishments on the basis that individuals are responsible for what they do. In order to establish whether we have free will, we need to be careful that we do not diminish science and the way that the universe is governed by fixed laws. We would assume that events don’t occur unless they come about through adequate causes and this is because events in the universe work by a process of cause and effect. We would see ourselves as physical objects in the universe and argue that our brains are subject to the laws as everything else is, and this would imply that we wouldn’t be accountable for our actions because they are pre-determined; in the same way that the physical laws are. This idea falls close to the theory of determinism which holds that all of our actions are not a result of a natural compulsion, instead it is based on prior causes. There is a causal chain of affairs that lead to someone performing the action they do and this can be established. To argue for this implies that we are simply “a by-product of the brain’s activities but with no causal powers of its own.” (Libet, Freeman and Sutherland, 1999 p.55)
I argue that the strict approach of determinism is incorrect as although there may be something that causes an individual to choose one action over another, it is ridiculous to suggest that everything we do, relates back to previous causes. It implies that we are simply automatons and have no choice of everything that happens in our lives.
In addition to the inadequate groundwork that determinism proposes, the idea of emotion can also provide further flaws in the argument. Determinism diminishes the components of humans that make us separate from other species. Not only do human beings possess rationality and reason, they are also expressive creatures. The question that comes to mind is; if all of our actions are pre-determined, how would we be able to feel emotions such as empathy and sadness, etc. This brings to mind the difference between humans and other animals, for if a dog was to randomly attack its owner or (anyone else), he would be accountable but it would due to a natural compulsion, and would most likely be put down; not as a form of punishment but for the safety of others. Whereas if a human were to randomly attack someone, they would remain accountable for their actions and thus be punished accordingly. Although both circumstances are similar, the only difference is that the dog’s behaviour is deemed as ‘instinctive’ because he isn’t identified as a rational being. Thus, the idea of free will is necessary to determining the nature of human beings, and so we do have free will because it is a part of what makes us human.
To solve this harsh distinction between free will and determinism, the compatibilist David Hume in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding aims to demonstrate how free will is compatible with the physical laws of the world. His “doctrine of necessity” (Hume, 1748) argues for the existence of determinism, whereby all of our actions relate back to determinism because “the degree and direction of every motion is, by the laws of nature” (Hume, 1748) thus he suggests that our conception of free will is wrong. Compatibilism ensures that our desires in ordinary life fit in with modern scientists view on how the world work. This seems like a plausible basis in arguing for the existence of free will as compatibilism acknowledges the laws that govern the world but ensures that our free will still exists, however, the theory is open to scrutiny. Whilst Hume gives an explanation for the compatibility between free will and determinism, does this still mean we are free? People tend to see free will as choosing an action over another or their own sake, without any influences; including the governing of the world. The implication here is that our usual conception of free will should be diminished in order to accept Hume’s understanding of free will. According to Eddington
“the mind has by its selective power fitted the processes of Nature into a frame of law of a pattern largely of its own choosing; and in the discovery of this system of law the mind maybe regarded as regaining from Nature that which the mind has put into Nature.
This idea suggests that the mind is aware of the natural laws of the world, by choice. So by making choices, the mind is able to facilitate free will whilst possessing the principle of cause of effect. The implication from this is that the brain can give us the options of what action to take, in unification with the laws of the world. This ensures that people are still morally accountable for their actions, and the concept also gives room to those who have mental disorders. This seems like a justifiable argument for the existence of free will because although the cause and effect principle is still theoretical, it is still a strong basis for understanding (or predicting) the natural processes that occur in the world today, whilst still enabling individuals to have free will.
Additionally, the idea that we possess free will without any agent at all is libertarianism, which states that “its best to understand freedom as the absence of physical force or the threat of physical force.” (Boaz and Boaz, p.3). This means simply that we are the source and agent of our own actions and so every decision we make is down to no external factors. This outdated view should be abolished as, by claiming that we take full responsibility of our choices, it fails to recognise the importance of experience and how current choices are shaped by the consequences of previous actions we chose. If this is what free will is comprised of, then no one has free will because free will is based on norms and values of society as well as people’s reactions to the choices we make. Therefore, the physical force may not necessarily be related to science, but it’s still grounded in societal values.
To conclude, the concept of free will is doing what you want to do, without any interference of other agents. From all of the above, it appears that free will only exists if we consider the way the universe is governed, and how we will always be some-what constrained. We could look at this without the inference of the cause and effect principle. If a decision is yours, without any interference of another agent, then this is free will, however, this is still deterministic. This is a choice that individuals make which is still dependent on factors such as upbringing and societal role. So in order to accept that we have free will, we need to take account of factors that are subconsciously external to our decision making but in some way, effect the decisions we make.