There are several cases which have focused the court’s attention towards the nature of Statutes of limitation, so whether they substantive or procedural is the main question which arises here. This distinction holds some importance here for the purpose of conflict of statutes as it is agreed universally that in the conflict of statutes cases the substance of cause of action is governed by the law of the land from where it originally accrued and such procedural aspects are governed by the Law of Forum. As of now the usual statutes of limitation are held to be procedural in some countries such as United States, but certain limitation statutes which purport to control statutorily created rights are considered as substantive, so we can say that the law is not completely settled under this type of statute.
In General
The English courts in the early eighteenth century had ruled that the statutes of limitation were procedural in nature; American courts also accepted this rule subsequently. The idea has been followed in hundreds of conflicts cases, Till now hundreds of conflict cases have been governed by this idea/ruling of the 18th century English courts which resulted in the application of statute of limitation of the forum irrespective of the place as to where the cause of action arose. This rule also applies to the judgments of the other sister states (United States), so that a suit cannot be maintained on the judgment if such action is barred by the statute of limitations of the forum. However certain preliminary matters are of concern over here as to whether for the purposes of the statute an instrument to be treated as a specialty or not, and also as to whether a person is a major. There are strong arguments in favor of this doctrine, primarily that it is simple and convenient to apply and that its application effectuates the stated policy of the forum.
However a theoretical inconsistency of this rule which was applicable to the limitation statute of the forum in all such cases was pointed out by the Justice Story in 1820. In certain cases this enables the forum to enforce a right which is no longer enforceable under the law which created it. The suggestion made was that though certain limitation statutes may extinguish the right while others that merely extinguish the remedy and where the right which was created by the law has taken it away, no action should be maintained despite the fact that the action would not be barred by the statute of the forum. In several cases, courts have recognized this idea, but later found it inapplicable. Story’s idea has been applied only in few cases in determining the law; while the Judge Learned Hand expressly rejected the idea in one case. Story, while defending his theory has qualified by insisting that the right might be extinguished as the parties reside within the jurisdiction where such cause arose for the statutory period. While several writers pointed out this qualification to be illogical saying that since the statute actually extinguished the right, it would make no difference as where the parties resided for that statutory period.
Statutes of Limitation Affecting the Right
Regardless of strong imperviousness to any endeavor to change the central idea as to the way of statutes of limitation, as evidenced by the reluctance to accept Story's thought, it has been by and large perceived by the courts that there are certain types of statutory rights in which the time limit set by the statute applies to the right itself, not the remedy. This might be genuine in spite of the fact that the time limit is found in an alternate statute, if the time limit is adequately coordinated to the newly created liability in order to qualify the right. Among such statutes, which give rights unknown at the common law, are wrongful death statutes, workmen's compensation acts, employers' liability acts, and those statutes which create certain liabilities for shareholders.
A. Shorter at the Locus.
If the cause of action arising under similar statutes that a reason for activity emerging under these or comparative statutes is barred by the law of the forum where the privilege was made, it is likewise banished at the discussion: the running of the statute at the locus bars the remedy, as well as obliterates the privilege/right. This rule was first laid down by the Supreme Court in The Harrisburg, in which Justice Waite said: “Time has been made of the essence of the right, and the right is lost if the time is disregarded. The liability and the remedy are created by the same statutes, and the limitations of the remedy are, therefore, to be treated as limitations of the right.” All courts in which the question has been raised have unanimously accepted this principle.
B. Shorter at the Forum.
The principle issue under this kind of statute is whether a suit might be maintained where the cause of action is barred by the law of the forum under a comparative sort of statute, yet not by the law of the land where the right of action arose. So far, the question is not conclusively settled. In McMillen v. Douglas Aircraft Co., suit was filed in a California court to recoup for a wrongful death which happened in Utah; the action was brought within the two year time limit of the Utah statute yet after the one year period recommended by the California statute for such activities. It was held that the California statute constituted a procedural bar to this action. A similar decision was reached in Hartwell v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, where a suit was filed in a Pennsylvania court to recuperate for a wrongful death occured in Florida. The suit was brought within a two year time limit of the Florida statute which created the privilege, however after the one year period altered by the Pennsylvania law. The court there held that if the law of the forum gives a shorter period for bringing the action than does the foreign law, the shorter time period of the forum controls. Again, in Zellmer v. Acme Brewing Co., an action which emerged in a California court to recoup for a wrongful death in Nevada, it was held that the California one year limitation statute was appropriate as opposed to the Nevada two year restriction statute. The court for this situation perceived that if the foreign time limit had been shorter than that of the forum, it would have been applied as a component of the substantive right, yet it contemplated that while the right may in any case exist under the law making it, there was no remedy available in a California court. Nonetheless, for a case the earlier year, Lewis v. Reconstruction Finance Co., the inverse decision was reached. This was a suit in the District of Columbia to recover for a wrongful death in Nebraska, and the action was brought after the District of Columbia statute of constraints had run, yet before the two year limit provided by the Nebraska statute. The suit was permitted, the court inferring that the privilege stayed in spite of the lapse of the shorter limitation period on similar rights in the forum.
While there is a compelete understanding that suit on a statutory cause of action, in which the limitation "goes to the right" can't be brought after lapse of the limitation period at the locus, in spite of the fact that it is shorter than that of the forum, there has all the earmarks of being perplexity in the circumstance in which the time limit of the forum is shorter than that of the locus. An examination of those cases within the past ten years which have included the last issue uncovers an equal division among the courts; some hold that in such a case the shorter period of the forum will control, while others hold that the foreign statute should govern despite the statute of the forum. This announcement, notwithstanding, should be qualified by the observation that there are not many cases to be weighed.
Logical arguments and policy considerations are advanced to support every perspective. On one side, it is contended that if a foreign statute of limitation is to be viewed as substantive for the situation where a privilege of activity is barred by the law making it, while not all that barred by the law of the forum, it ought to still be viewed as substantive, and connected by the forum, in the opposite circumstance, where the right is banished by the statute of the forum and not by the foreign law. There is likewise the additional argument that since the statute of the forum is itself substantive, it should not be applicable at all to foreign causes of action. Then again, local statutes are encouraged to have a dual capacity: as substance, limiting locally created rights; and as procedure, excepting all activities of a comparative nature paying little mind to where they emerge. Notwithstanding yielding that the remote statute of impediments is a piece of the substantive right, and that the right still exists, the inquiry remains whether a cure is accessible in the discussion; use of the point of confinement of the gathering won't influence the substantive right made by the foreign law. Be that as it may, the primary inquiry is whether the approach of the gathering is adequately sufficient to keep the use of the foreign statute of limitation where it is longer than that of the forum. In the typical case no doubt approach is not sufficiently solid to have this impact, and the opposite conclusion came to by a few courts indicates a provincial attitude.