In this paper I will argue that forms are important for the immortality arguments.
In this case I will show that there is a forms and it plays a vital role in Phaedo's final arguments for immortality therefore forms are important.
PART I: Explanation of forms in Phaedo's final arguments for immortality
Phaedo is one of Plato’s classical dialogues which takes place between Socrates and his friends in the prison on his last day of life in 399 B.C. Phaedo is a conversation which mainly focuses on afterlife and soul or rather immortality of the soul. Plato's Phaedo refers to this term commonly as “the final argument”. Final argument is split into 3 arguments which consists of “Cyclical argument”, “Theory of Recollection argument” and “Affinity Argument”.
Plato assumes that there exists two kinds of things in nature more commonly referred to as “the cyclical argument”: forms and opposites (Phaedo 102 a – 103 b). Plato’s forms are related universally, they do not change where ever you go for example: there are a lot of things that are tall, short, sharp and so on in the world. What does every tall, short or sharp thing has in common with other tall, short and sharp things, in simple terms they share forms of tallness, shortness and sharpness, respectively and so on. One difference between Plato’s theory of forms and the common theories of universals by Aristotle is that Plato does not propose a forms for every kind of thing. It is not necessary to think that there is a forms for every state. In the Phaedo, Plato introduces forms that are shared in by particulars in several specific ways. There are things that are hot, cold, beautiful for example fire, ice, and a flower. These examples share forms respective to themselves and are unique. we might have a fire, sharing the forms of Hotness; an ice, sharing in the forms of Coldness, and a flower, sharing in the forms of Beauty.
In order to explain the relation between forms and things more precisely, we can see that things display the content of the forms which they share. In other words, a fire displays the forms of Hotness. The relationship between the fire and the forms in which it shares makes this possible. So, a thing displays the content of a forms if and only if it shares in that forms. Plato points to this when he says, “There is something you call hot and something you call cold… the Hot is something other than fire, and the Cold is something other than snow” (Phaedo. 103C-D). So, when a particular, such as snow or fire shares in a forms, respectively, it follows that the particular displays the content of the forms, namely Hotness or Coldness respectively.
When something shares a forms which is similar to that thing, there are typically two ways in which it does so: relationally or by rightfully sharing the same traits. For example, a thing might share the forms of coldness. The thing is only cold when in relation to something that is cold as well. (Phaedo. 102C). The term “relationally” used here is vague in a sense, because there are several ways to interpret it. One way could be, there is a logical way in which all things are similarly related, which answers the kind of forms which they share. Other possible way to interpret the term “relationally” could be because they share the same forms in relation to other things.
On the other hand a thing can share the forms by possessing some of traits of the thing (Phaedo. 105C). In Phaedo, Plato uses in one of his dialogues is that things share in the forms of hotness for instance. Plato believes that things that are hot are this way by rightfully possessing traits of fire, which is necessarily proven hot (Phaedo. 105C).
Now that we have a outline of what forms, things, and the relations they have with each other, Lets look at Plato’s final argument in the Phaedo. Socrates, is the main character in the Phaedo, the scene starts with an example, referring to one of the attendants, Simmias. Simmias is taller than Socrates because Simmias displays tallness, there must be some forms of tallness that Simmias shares in, in order to show he is tall. By looking at this we can say that Simmias is sharing in the forms of tallness because he is in comparison with Socrates. Without the comparison the forms of tallness would not exist. Forms has no relation to Simmias directly considering the fact that if Simmias was short he would still exist (Phaedo, 102 B,C). Simmias can be tall in relation to Socrates and short in relation to some other person (Phaedo. 102B). However, Simmias cannot be both tall and short in relation to the same person at the same time.
Things are capable of changing forms which they share. Things can have opposite forms in it self in various places which is dependent on its surroundings. For example, you could place a stone on a hot stove and ice on top of the stone. In this case, the top of the stone would be cold, sharing the forms of coldness, while the bottom would be hot, sharing in the forms of hotness. It is only scenario where a thing cannot possess opposite forms at the same time, same way and same part. Frede makes the interesting observation that Plato uses military terms to describe the actions of specific things where it deals with forms in which they share similarities and their opposites (Frede 28). Frede claims that Plato uses terms like “approach,” “retreat,” and “destroy” to evade the problem of explaining just how this process works (Frede 34-35) (Stayton, 9).
Things when confronted by their opposites, must either retreat or be destroyed (Phaedo. 103D,E).
Plato talks in a vague manner about what happens to things when they are approached by their opposite
traits. To understand it better things can exist with or without forms but when things come in contact with opposites they change. For example an ice which has a forms of coldness when in contact with fire it now has a forms of hotness.
Socrates shows the relationships between things and forms in a detailed example where, snow displays coldness. When a thing displays the content of a forms, it does so by rightfully sharing that forms.
Hence there exists a forms of coldness in which snow shares. Snow is not cold by being in relation to some other thing that are cold, snow is cold because it is cold. Furthermore, it does not seem that snow is cold by possessing traits of some other things that are cold, because if that was the case then snow would not be snow but something else. Snow must share the forms of coldness to be snow. So if snow were to come in contact with fire it must either retreat or be destroyed and the forms of coldness will no longer exist and be replaced by a new forms.
Because of the Principle of Opposites, when a soul meets its death it must either flee or be destroyed. Just like the example of stone, ice and fire could the soul be alive in one side and dead on the other. I believe that it could be a choice if soul was made up of different parts. This can be interpreted as the soul is not made up of different parts its just a whole entity by itself. (Phaedo. 78B-79B ). I think that this helps Plato establish in the argument that soul is a form that can either be dead or alive.
One can also say that the soul is naturally deathless. In this same way, fire can be said to be naturally cold-less because it is unable to admit cold, so it must retreat or be destroyed when approached by cold. Death is the destruction specifically of all living things. Death is the specific kind of destruction that happens to all living beings. Thus, only living beings can die and there is no other way for living beings to be destroyed, other than by death. (Stayton, 14) It is not possible for a living thing to be destroyed and not die. If we take destruction to mean the end of the existence of something, then death is the only destruction of living things. It is known that death is the only way living things are destroyed does not mean that all living things can die or be destroyed. Rather, when a living thing is destroyed, or continues to exist, it is precisely through death. Therefore, if a living being is deathless, it cannot be destroyed; if a living being cannot die, it cannot be destroyed. The soul is a living being. We have seen that the soul is deathless. Therefore, because the soul cannot die, the soul cannot be destroyed; it must be indestructible. So, when the soul is approached by death, it must either retreat or be destroyed; because it is indestructible, it must retreat, rather than being destroyed. It is in this way that Socrates proves the immortality of the soul. (Stayton, 14).
The argument from recollection is intended to show that the soul exists before coming to be possessed by a human body (Phaedo 76C). In his explanation of how it is possible for the soul to know forms, Plato tries to use a paradox to convince recollection exists. If the soul is alive inside the body, it would be able to determine that all roses are red. So, what we are able to observe with our senses is that all roses are red, we are able to view all roses as red because that is what our souls have learnt (Phaedo 74B). For Plato, the only explanation that makes recollection possible is that the soul had knowledge of these forms prior to coming to be possessed by the body (Phaedo 74A-D). Plato presupposes the existence of the forms in his argument from recollection. If the argument were interpreted as also claiming to prove the existence of forms, this would be circular reasoning and clearly flawed (Dimas 178).
According to Stayton “Plato wants to give an account of how the soul can know Forms. The relation of a particular knowing a Form is a different relation that the ones we have discussed so far—though it is still a relationship between a particular and the Form” (Stayton, 21). For example you fall in love with a person because he gave you a chocolate then every time you see a chocolate you are reminded of your lover. As your soul recalls things you already knew in this case your lover gave you a chocolate.
According to the affinity argument, forms are eternal and invisible, while things are mortal and visible (Phaedo 80A-B). With this distinction in mind, it appears that Socrates holds that all forms are immortal, while all particulars are mortal. The clear concern, for the so-called argument, here is the difficulty of showing that the soul, a particular, is immortal. Overall, the affinity argument is able to give a clearer picture of how the soul fits in to Plato’s ontology. (Stayton, P23).
In the argument, Socrates purports to show that the soul holds many similarities to the forms, and, by contrast, many differences from other particulars. Socrates claims that the soul is similar to the forms in that it is “divine, deathless, intelligible, uniforms, indissoluble, and always the same as itself” (Phaedo 80B). This is contrasted with other particulars that are “mortal, multiform, unintelligible, soluble, and never consistently the same” (Phaedo 80B). According to the affinity argument its the similarities between forms that justifies that soul is eternal.
PART II: My argument to show importance of forms in immortality arguments
As I have given the explanations above about what forms are with reference to Phaedo book and peer review journals. Here I will attempt to show that forms are important by making an argument based on my research in part I. In the first argument also called the “Cyclical argument” or the opposites we have seen examples between hot and cold, tall and short and its different forms.
The Principle of Opposites is the key component of the cyclical argument that Plato needed to introduce and develop for use in the final argument. Plato develops this principle in the cyclical argument, marking boundaries on things which share in opposite forms. The principle is then shaped and centralized for use in the final argument. To begin with what is a form in simple terms, its the visible shape or configuration of something, bring together parts or combine to create (something) – according to the dictionary. All things comes from opposite of states which is a valid argument, for something to become taller it necessarily must have been shorter at some point in time and is also logically correct and proven, babies to adult, seeds to trees etc.. If forms did not exist then there would be no comparison between two different objects. A 6 feet person would be considered equivalent to a 5 feet person. As we can see forms help create that difference between two objects because tallness or shortness is a type of a form.
“The principle of opposites described by Socrates in 103B of Plato’s dialogue is concerned with “things”, and not with the opposite properties themselves” (Barnes 403). Barnes makes a valuable point that the Principle of Opposites concerns particulars what Barnes calls “things”, and how things change between sharing in one opposite forms and the other. Barnes statement lights up the fact that the restrictions the Principle of Opposites puts in place have to do with the things and their ability to share in opposite forms, rather than with forms. For example snow shows the form of coldness or its opposite hotness when in contact with fire but snow cannot show the form of something it cannot possess such as sharpness. Forms are unique to its object, matter or thing. As we can see forms makes it easier to identify objects and when we hear the words such as coldness and describe for example a glacier we kind of get a feeling of what it will be like even if we never go there as forms are good for identifying things.
But to prove there is a form of a soul then we need to look at the argument from recollection which gives a better view. The argument from recollection, ties to show the relationship between soul and things in the material world and how it makes the soul different from other things.
In his explanation of how it is possible for the soul to know forms, Plato gives a description of the phenomenon of recollection. When the soul is possessed by the body, it has a concept of what it would mean for two particulars to be equal in length, e.g. So, when we perceive with our senses that two objects are equal in length, we are able to judge them as equal because of the concept of equality already possessed by our soul (Phaedo 74B). Equality itself is not something we are able to perceive with our senses. Equality is a form that things share, in relation to each other. However, because we cannot perceive this form through our senses, we must have had some kind of prior knowledge of it in order to be able to judge two particulars as both sharing in the form of equality in relation to each other (Phaedo 75A). Plato argues that the phenomenon of being able to think about these concepts that are not perceivable through the senses and have never been taught to us is recollection (Phaedo 73C).
This is a good example from Plato and I agree with it. I believe that recollection is true for instance a young baby who has not learnt anything is playing with a toy is currently happy and the toy is forcefully taken away the baby cries and is unhappy but when the toy is given back the baby is happy, so the forms happy and unhappy exists in the baby even without learning anything so it must be recollection of past knowledge. Forms exists in our souls and it helps create our personality which is unique and different from others. In the case of guitar or other instruments there are people who find it easy to play and some difficult some learn quick by just looking others struggle kind of shows that there are forms which exist in soul and our majority of our knowledge is just a recollection. I think that this shows how valuable forms are how it affects us.
For Plato, the only explanation that makes recollection possible is that the soul had knowledge of these Forms prior to coming to be possessed by the body (Phaedo 74A-D). According to Dimas “Recollection argument aims to establish that our learning in this life consists in recollection of knowledge that our soul acquired before being born into our body” (Dimas, 175) who also supports this claim.
The argument from recollection works on the basis of the fact that we possess concepts. These concepts allow the soul to know what forms are, prior to being possessed by the body. When we see things or certain things we are able to identify them as sharing in some type of forms, as we can see we are just recollecting the knowledge from the soul which already has the knowledge of these forms. This points to a relationship between the soul, a thing, and the forms that is completely different from the relationship between things sharing forms.
Now when we look at the affinity argument it helps prove the cyclical argument and gives a better understanding of forms. Forms are eternal and invisible, while particulars are mortal and visible (Phaedo. 80A-B). This gives a clear idea that forms are immortal and things are mortal. It is a good argument and I would agree with the fact that forms are immortal but only replaced as snow is cold and the form of coldness cannot be killed but only remain hidden if in contact with the opposite. Is a good way to show that forms always exist and are constantly there with us. If forms were to die and never come back then it would create an imbalance in our planet.
It seems possible that the soul can interact with both the world of the Forms and the world of particulars, “at different times and under different conditions” (Apolloni 11). In other words, when the body possesses the soul, the soul acts as a thing, sharing the form of life and interacts with another living things. On the other hand, when the soul is approached by death, it retreats and rejoins the world of the forms, with which it shares many similarities with death, and thus gains knowledge of the forms that the body is able to recollect when later possessing a soul. I like how Apolloni interprets the view
of life and death. If we can agree that life and death are forms and opposite of each other and we are currently in the form of life and interacting with others who share forms of life then there is a form of death and we interact with others who are sharing the same form. Is a strong point to show how important forms are and the degree of complexity in which we can view them in. Without forms we would not know which state we currently are in.
When we look at life, death and our soul and the phrase where Plato mentions (also in part I).“Things when confronted by their opposites, must either retreat or be destroyed”(Phaedo. 103D,E). Also from the affinity argument we know that a soul is immortal and that a soul must go somewhere after death implies that soul has a form and the soul itself is a form.
To conclude, Phaedo is a great dialogue which teaches a lot of things and in particular forms which changes how we view the world. Forms exists in all things but we view them differently according to our taste, personality, experience etc. I might find a rose beautiful but someone might find the rose ugly. Its dependent on our senses but form displayed by the rose is the same to every person. Forms are important in identifying things and creating differences otherwise everything would be viewed as equal or same kind. Forms can help sort things in categories such as snow and ice is part of the from coldness, coffee and fire is part of the form hotness and so on. When we come across such words , terms or phrases we automatically know what behaviour it displays and its all because of forms which helps in identifying things.
References
Primary Source
Grube, G. M. A., trans. "Phaedo." Plato Complete Works. Ed. John M. Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. 49-100. Print
Secondary Source
Apolloni, David. “Plato’s Affinity Argument for the Immortality of the Soul.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 34 (1996): 5-32.
Barnes, Jonathan. “Plato: Phaedo by David Gallop.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy VIII. No 2 (1978): 397-419. JSTOR. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Web. 09 September 2013.
Dimas, Panos. “Recollecting the Forms in the ‘Phaedo.’” Phronesis 48. No 3 (2003): 175-214. JSTOR. Brill. Web. 08 January 2013.
Frede, Dorothea. “The Final Proof of the Immortality of the Soul in Plato’s ‘Phaedo’ 102a-107a.” Phronesis 23. No 1 (1978): 27-41. JSTOR. Brill. Web. 09 Jan. 2013.
Stayton, Julie, "The Immortality of the Soul in Plato's Phaedo" (2014). Philosophy Honors Theses. Paper