Chapter II
Jean-Luc Marion’s Phenomenology of the Gift
In order to understand Marion’s notion of the Gift, it is necessary to first understand his notion of Givenness. For this reason, the researcher will first try to present the notion of Givenness before discussing the main theme of the chapter, the Gift. Furthermore, the researcher will expose the concept of the gift affirming that it does not need any Giver and Givee through the concept of Triple Bracketing. This chapter will also discuss the concepts of Givability and Acceptability of the Gift. Lastly, the researcher will take advantage of other sources regarding the gift to emphasize the concept of Marion.
As much reduction, As much givenness
The act of gift giving is common and widespread throughout the world. It occurs not just within the circle of family but to every relationship there is, positive or negative: from a mother giving her child a token during Christmas, to a stranger giving a beggar food. The significance of each manifestation of the gift differ for every character involved. But for Marion, limiting the gift to a certain authority or idea will prevent it from giving and showing itself.
Marion’s main theme in formulating this principle sticks to the main idea of phenomenology. Since phenomenology deals with what appears within the realm of consciousness, Marion also links his philosophy with this line of thinking. He stressed out the point regarding his main theme in his book, which is “what shows itself first gives itself.” This served as the main theme to Marion’s phenomenological philosophy. Through the giving of the phenomenon, “it accomplishes an act – it comes forward to visibility.” This was the main point that Marion wishes to prove. Before the act of showing, the act of giving must first be. But how can phenomenon give itself, hence, show itself? It is through the reduction of the phenomenon unto which it gives itself absolutely.
In his famous book entitled Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, Marion proposes the principle unto which phenomenology must be understood. He formulated the phenomenological principle “as much reduction, as much givenness.” – As he states it, “the more that that which or the one who reduces reduces radically, the more things give themselves amply to it or him.”
The Reduction Principle
According to Marion, the principles set by the latter philosophers propose such ontic conditions on how phenomenon would appear. But for Marion, phenomenon must be freed from these determinations that limit its self-givenness. The reduction set by Marion himself lets the phenomenon to give itself purely. In his discussion with regards to the reduction principle, he explains decisive points:
(a) It is not the psychological phenomenon in psychological apperception and objectification that is an absolute givenness [Gegebenheit ], but only the pure phenomenon, the reduced [phenomenon: das Reduzierte].” What phenomenologically validates a phenomenon, as an absolute given is therefore not its mere appearing but its reduced character: only the reduction grants access to absolute givenness and it has no other goal but this. (b) Consequently, the concept of phenomenological reduction [phänomenologischen Reduktion] acquires a more narrow, more profound determination and a clearer meaning: the exclusion of the transcendent in general as existence to be admitted in addition, that is to say that is not an evident givenness [evidente Gegebenheit] to the authentic sense, an absolute givenness [absolute Gegebenheit] to the pure gaze.
Through this reduction, the phenomenon can give itself absolutely. It departs from the subjective thinking. Here, Marion pushes forward to the principle of showing, as to what phenomenology will render and going through the principle of giving. It is the self-givenness of the phenomenon. Hence, the connection between reduction and givenness is established. “A phenomenon becomes absolutely given only to the degree that it was reduced… thus making phenomenon appear absolutely”.
This principle is an aid, according to Marion, in order for phenomenon to appear as a pure phenomenon. It can be clearly understood with the analogy of the gift man commonly receives – it is wrapped. Marion’s concept of reduction unravels the uniqueness of the gift. It points to the gift itself rather than other things in which the gift is wrapped (ribbon, wrapper, cards, etc). Reduction detaches the gift from these things to itself in order for the gift to be fully given. He does not disregard consciousness and intentionality in the realm of phenomenology but he insists to go through these concepts. “Reducing givenness means freeing it from the limits of every other authority, including those of intuition”.
The reduction separates what appears from what does not appear, from what renders its apparition deceptive and mimics appearing by fraudulently attaching a fundamental obscurity to it – in short, from what bring into phenomenality that which remains foreign to it – unregulated objectification, ‘absurd theories.
It is the unconditional givenness that phenomenon is freed from any authorities. Hence it gives importance to the horizon, which is the self-givenness of the phenomenon. “What gives itself, insofar as given in and through reduced givenness, by definition gives itself absolutely. To give itself admits no compromise, even if in this given one distinguishes degrees and modes: every reduced given or not.” There is no room for reservation in giving because of the fact that it simply gives itself absolutely. It gives itself absolutely and freely. “Only a phenomenology of givenness can return to the things themselves because in order to return to them, it is necessary first to see them.” One can see the interconnectedness of the reduction and givenness that leads to the manifestation of the phenomenon itself. Once phenomenon is reduced to itself, it unfolds itself, letting itself appear, and give itself absolutely.
One can clearly see this in the perspective of a painting which Marion himself used as an analogy in understanding the concept of givenness. In the Book I of his work entitled Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, The Effect of the Painting, Marion defines it as an example unto which givenness is attained.
The painting is not a being, any more than it belongs among the subsisting or ready-to-hand objects. It is not, yet it appears all the more. How are we to justify the paradox of phenomenality? What then appears in the phenomenon of the painting if neither its subsistence nor its usefulness or beingness reaches the phenomenality proper to it? Let us listen to Baudelaire when, all the while doing them homage, he marks that “the majority of our young colorists lack melody” Why, when colors are at issue, can the absence of melody be something deplorable? In fact, it’s not about music, but the impossibility of using positive terms and pictorial technique to say what is missing in Baudelaire’s eyes, precisely because it does not belong to them – nor to the real visibility of being in general.
Here, Marion wishes to define the phenomenology of givenness through the understanding of the effects of painting. Of course, the painting is a work of art but there still lie some mistakes and errors unto which the painter himself cannot capture the real scenery of what he wants to depict. The painting itself is “inexpressible in terms of real visibility.” Yes, there cannot be a concrete expression of the painting in reality. But the picture, the painting itself, speaks for itself. Hence, “it prolongs or carries out the effect proper to every visible (phenomenon).” It is not the painting itself anymore but the effects that it has given. The effect is understood “as the shock that the visible provokes . . . as the emotion that invades the one gazing, [and] . . . as the indescribable combination of the tones and the lines that irreducibly individualize the spectacle.” One must not only understand and see the painting as a mere being but also thru its effects. It is thru the effects that let itself manifests itself. It is the act of coming forward to visibility which is then established.
Givenness as Self-Hiding Process
Phenomenology of givenness is also a self-hiding process. One might think that it contradicts the main theme of Marion of showing itself since it is a self-hiding process. It does not. Rather, it strengthens the point of absolute givenness. Through the self-hiding process, the giving itself is the focus. It is not anymore the primacy of the giver, but the gift itself. The self-hiding process lets the phenomenon, the gift, appear itself absolutely. What hides is the causal agent of the gift to give rise and emphasis of the gift. The more there is a self-hiding process, the more it gives itself. It presents itself as a gift, the phenomenon in particular. Thus, one can determine that the fold of givenness is “desired at the very heart of the given.” It is inscribed therein unto which it can give itself absolutely, without demarcations and recompense. As Marion would note it in his last words in his Book I of Being Given, it states that:
“Showing itself therefore amounts to giving itself. The fold of givenness, in unfolding itself, shows the given that givenness dispenses. For the phenomenon, showing itself is equal to unfolding the fold of givenness in which it arises as a gift. Showing itself and giving itself play in the same field – the fold of givenness, which is unfolded in the given. What remains is to verify in the details of the phenomenon how its phenomenological primacy is carried out.”
The unfolding event of the phenomenon lets itself manifest itself, thus gives itself absolutely. Through this act, the act of unfolding, it can give itself absolutely, free from any a priori determination, and from any other authority. Through this, one can clearly see that unfolding of the gift lets itself appear and give freely. In the end, Marion has given a great emphasis on the ground of the phenomenology of givenness.
Even in the experience of defeat, deceit and other forms of negation, one can also determine givenness. These events can also be considered as gift for the fact that it is a continuous unraveling of the event. The event does not stop there. It continuously unwrap itself to show itself all the more. The experience of betrayal, for example, does not end in despair. One may take note that it can be taken as bad or evil. But it can also be considered, still, as a gift. As one experiences this, he learns that betrayal hurts other person’s feelings. Therefore, he must not do it to other people. And also, he understands that the one who betrayed him has broken his trust and therefore cannot be considered trustworthy anymore. The phenomenon of betrayal gives a bright example if one can see the light despite the darkness that one is experiencing in this kind of event. One must remember that every event is always in a continuous unfolding. As one experiences these kinds of events, one can still see the goodness behind these things. Thus, one learns different lessons and sees the beauty despite the ugliness within the event.
The Concept of the Gift
In Marion’s Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, he regarded one chapter concerning the gift itself. Hence, he writes in the beginning of Book II concerning the gift, “I have granted givenness the right it exercises over the given, or at least I have hope to have done so.” It is clearly seen that givenness is given without any grounds or presupposition. But what is really given? It is the gift. This gives light to the gift itself.
Here, Marion gives an introduction regarding the deconstructionism presented by Derrida concerning the gift. He wants to make a possible revival regarding the notion of the gift without falling into any metaphysical determination.
Mauss and Derrida on the Concept of the Gift
Jacques Derrida is one of the prominent philosophers who established and gave way to a new avenue of philosophical thinking – Deconstructionism. Derrida strongly claimed the impossibility of the gift. He argues, “not only does this model contradict itself in each of its terms, but it voids the gift of all givenness, and its phenomenon vanishes.” For him, the gift cannot be given because it is self-nullifying. It deconstructs itself because “the gift – more exactly, givenness – disappears as soon as reciprocity transforms it into an exchange.” By simply responding with a ‘thank you,’ there is often, and perhaps even always, a presumption that because of this acknowledgement one is no longer indebted to the other who has given, and that nothing more can be expected of an individual who has so responded. Within itself is a revoke of its mere meaning. This is the gift’s relation to economy. The gift is bound into the horizon of economy. The gift, at all cost, must be reciprocated due to the fact that one owes something of what one receives.
According to Derrida, “For there to be a gift there must be no reciprocity.” There is a deep urge within the recipient to payback what is given to him. Such reciprocity, according to him, will defy the mere essence of the gift. For him, the genuine gift is an absolute forgetfulness between the giver and recipient. But since the gift is related to economy, it cannot be. Both the giver and the recipient will then recognize the gift. Hence, it will not be considered as a gift but something that is expected. Following Derrida’s critique, a soon as the gift is recognized, it can no longer be called a gift.
There is an implicit termination in the concept itself. Thus, even a simple ‘thank you’ would nullify the concept of the gift. For him, once it is recognized, it can no longer be called as a gift. It would fall into what is called the circle of reciprocity. It is an exchange between the giver and the recipient that the gift received must be reciprocated by another gift. It is in circular motion because the recipient will give back in return what he has received from the giver and so on. The exchange between the giver and the recipient will nullify, as to what Derrida insists, the gift.
Marion’s Concept of the Gift
According to Marion, the gift can still be given. Hence, he argues, “To think givenness would thus always be equivalent to thinking the system of exchange between terms, a system regulated by causality and the principles of metaphysics.” One must go out in the realm of metaphysics in order to understand the concept of the gift. He treats the concept of Derrida as a concrete metaphysical understanding of givenness – a system of exchange. “This system is in fact remains thoroughly metaphysical: the giver gives the gift in the role of efficient cause, mobilizing a formal and a material cause (in order to define, reify the gift), and pursuing a final cause (the good of the givee and/or the glory of the giver), and pursuing a final cause (the good of the given and/or the glory of the giver.).” But it does not stop there. He also “voids the gift of the givenness, and its phenomenon vanishes.”
This will set as an authority in which the gift is reduced. It is seen as something expected. But that is not the point. For the gift to be given, it must simply give itself. The gift, Marion argues, does not destroy itself. Hence, he writes in his book:
There’s no doubt that if appearing always implies being fixed in subsistence, the gift, as soon as it has appeared in its presence, disappears as given, since the given according to givenness is precisely nor installed in permanence – gift given as lost and never repaid on the part of the giver, given as never possessed and only conceded by the givee. But in thus disappearing as permanently present, he gift is not lost as given; it loses only the way of being – subsistence, exchange, economy – that contradicts its possibility of giving itself as such.
The gift is not lost but only loses its metaphysical way of being. It is reduced to itself in order for the gift to give itself purely and absolutely. Hence, the economic circle presented by Derrida does not put any harm to the gift itself. Recompense and reciprocity, as Derrida would claim, is null and void because one cannot surmount what is really given to him. Therefore, the phenomenon gives itself as a gift, a pure gift unto which gives itself absolutely.
One can also consider the gift as purely positive in a way that it brings forth happiness every time a gift is given as well as when the gift is received. But can one still consider itself a gift despite a negative effect? Yes, one can still consider it a gift. It must be remembered that a gift does not stop from its unfolding. The gift continuously unwraps itself for itself to be seen and given. A great example would be the concept of betrayal. Again, an individual may seem to consider the act of betrayal as negative. But for Marion, it can still be considered as a gift. It is in the continuous unwrapping of this event that lets itself reveal the goodness within it. Once a person is betrayed, one can understand that betrayal hurts other people. Therefore, one can realize that it must not be done to the other. Secondly, one may seem to consider who and what his true friends are. Indeed, despite the temporary negative effect that inflicts pain and suffering to people, the essence of the gift does not stop there. It unwraps itself until it can give itself fully. As the unfolding of the event happens, one can see a brighter picture within the horizon.
Phenomenology of the Gift
After focusing much on the main phenomenological thinking of Marion regarding the self-givenness of the phenomenon, the discussion shall now focus on Marion’s so-called triple bracketing. “Within his exploration of the gift Marion shows how the gift does not necessarily need both a giver and a givee; each can be bracketed and the gift can still manifest itself through givenness.” It is through the phenomenology of the gift that one can understand the authentic self-giving of the phenomenon as well as the act of giving itself. The conditions of the possibility of exchange will be bracketed to bring about gift in its absoluteness remove it from the circle of reciprocity.
Can either of the three conditions be bracketed without suspending the possibility of the gift? Marion would claim that it certainly is possible, “not only does bracketing the giver not invalidate the givenness of the gift, but it is obligatory in the definition of givenness.”
A gift, can be brought about as a gift without any giver being rewarded, because it can be brought about without any giver at all. To see this, it suffices to analyze the hypothesis of a gift that is received from an anonymous or even nonexistent giver. These two conditions in fact coincide in the case of an inheritance, where death steals the giver, forbidding that anything at all be rendered to him. By definition, I am so much unable to render anything to him that this very impossibility constitutes the condition of the gift that is made to me…Nevertheless, the gift is brought about perfectly. Therefore, it appears fully, even though it is unexpected, undeserved, unpaid, without recognition or return. On the contrary, it takes on its full meaning in the very absence of motive and sufficient reason.
First, the absent, bracketed, giver gives full meaning to givenness. It is through the intention of the bracketed giver that he be absent once the act of giving happens. “I can therefore do justice to his gift only by not paying it back. I accede to his – last – will only by keeping for myself as a gift what is not mine but comes down to me. The economy of exchange is thus suspended perfectly. The gift can appear, precisely because what gives is lacking.” Since the givee cannot reach the giver, by any means possible since the giver passed away already, to reciprocate that which he received there is an impossibility of repayment. “The phenomenological reduction of the giver coincides exactly with the essential character of the gift – that is to be received by the givee to whom it appears. Thus even without giver, the gift is accomplished, for it is enough that it show itself for it to give itself to the givee.”
Second, the absence, bracketing, of a givee does not negate the possibility of bringing about the gift as a gift. Givenness does not necessitate the involvement of a givee. “Marion has argued that the bracketing of the givee does not throw away the gift of givenness, but instead allows the gift to be presented without problem. The gift no longer has any worry about reciprocity toward the giver if there is no givee; givenness can be acted as a pure gift.”
For instance, you can perfectly well describe a fully achieved or given gift without implying any receiver. For example, if you give something to your enemy; this is given up and you will get nobody to receive it. So you have achieved an anonymous gift. And, as we give money to a humanitarian association, we do make a gift, a real gift, that is money, but that gift will go to nobody, at least nobody personally known by us. Nevertheless we have achieved a gift…This absence of the receiver does not forbid describing the gift, but to some extent this absence allows the gift to appear as such. A gracious gift appears precisely because there is no response, no answer, and no gratitude back, all of which is obvious because we can give without any receiver.
Third, the possibility of the gift without an actual material object does not negate the gift nor does it endanger its givenness. “For in giving these nonobjective gifts, which elude being either understood or possessed, which supply no gain or assignable return, and which really provide nothing (noting real: ne rem), I in fact give myself in my most complete selfhood. In giving this nothing, I give all that I have, because I am not giving something that I possess apart from myself, but rather that which I am.” Then again, even in the most important and meaningful experiences in life, it does not necessitate material things. “Each genuine gift happens without any objective counterpart. When we give ourselves, our life, our time, when we give our word, not only do we give no thing, but we give much more.” Such things are so unique that they make a real difference and as a result, they can never be duplicated nor can it be transferred from one owner to another.
It should not be objected that by giving no object, I would give less, or would even dispense with actually giving at all. On the contrary (and here the argument repeats itself), I am excused from really giving – that is, from giving myself, me in person – when I settle for giving an object in place of myself. Thus, I give money in order to be excused from giving my time and attention…What happens, for example, when I give a woman a magnificent piece of jewelry? Two hypotheses: Either I give her this object alone, but in order to admit to her that I am leaving her or that I do not really love her (i.e., to settle accounts); or I give it to her as an indication that I love her irrevocably, thus simply as a sign of the true gift, which remains nonobjectifiable and invaluable – the gift of my time, my attention, my faith, my life – in short, the gift of myself…Every gift that is given – insofar as it implies more than actuality – must become unreal, nonobjectifiable, and invaluable.
To illustrate, fatherhood can be taken as an example of this extroverted provider, absent from the child after procreation and can remain only with the child by doing the opposite, taking a leave away from him to work and provide for the child. “He appears insofar as he disappears.” Thus, bracketed as a giver.
Givability of the gift
How can one determine that the gift is given? More properly, how is the gift decided? Marion answers this question through the Givability of the gift. He states, “It is a fact worth noting that the gift is not accomplished at the moment when the giver transmits, transfers, or transports the possible objects to the givee.” But through its natural ability to give itself, “its gratuity without return.” Therefore, the gift has the capability in order to give itself absolutely. It is through the possibility of the gift, or more exactly, “as givable.” Marion concerning the Givability of the gift raised two important points:
(a) Givability characterizes certain phenomena in certain circumstances of appearing not as a passive potential (this phenomenon susceptible, by its value and its availability, to being chosen from among other comparable ones to become the gift), but as a positive potentiality: this phenomenon appears in such a way that it demands, of itself, passing to the state of gift, of giving itself… (b) Reciprocally, givability is exerted over the giver in the way we have just seen.
In the first point, Marion tries to explain that givability is not only permitting the gift to give itself, it actually demands the gift. Hence, the givability connotes that the gift is given. While the second point sets that the givability is also seen in the act of the giver. It is crucial to find out that there is inseparability in the situation of giving and in the posture of the giver. Yes, it does not only lie in the givability of the gift but also in the exerted givability of the giver himself. Marion ends by saying “it will therefore be concluded that in the realm of the reduction, the lived experience where the gift is given consists in the decision of the gift – the giver’s decision to give the gift, but especially that of givability deciding the giver to give. In deciding the giver to give it, the gift gives itself of itself.” Once the moment of givability is achieved, the gift thus gives itself absolutely.
Acceptability of the Gift
The discussion shall now shift to the process going on between the giver and the givee – the acceptability. What then is the importance once the gift is accepted? Here, Marion writes: “Above all, the act of receiving a gift consists neither in the transfer of property nor in the object received (for obvious reason), but in the acceptance, or rather the acceptability, of this gift.” Man, in his nature, as Derrida claims, sees the act of giving and receiving as a mere transfer of objects unto which it becomes something economical. Marion points out that the reception of the gift does not connote any other exchange and economy, lest it falls into the Derridean critique. Hence, this will reduce the essence of the gift as to that which is economical. But this is not the case. It is thru the acceptability of the gift. “The decision to receive the gift in the role of the givee implies no real effort and yet costs much. It is in effect a matter of receiving an (incidental) object no longer as due or paid for, but as a gift, by definition undue.” The act of receiving lets the gift give itself to the givee fully.