“Sino-Soviet split “;
The actions of the Peoples Republic of China with regards to foreign policy during the 1960s and 1970s were motivated by a whole host of different factors, increasing ideological differences between the PRC and the USSR coupled with subsequent border disputes and economic disagreements. These issues caused a split in the communist led world which brought about the possibility of rapprochement in relations between the USA and the PRC. In order to fully understand the CCPs motivations in its handling of both the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino American rapprochement it is first necessary to understand the two main factors which facilitated this change in global politics which are political realism and ideology. Political realism is defined as a theory of political philosophy which argues that power, which is defined here by professor Joseph Nye who states that power is “the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get a desired outcome” or, perceptions of power, is the crucial core to politics both domestically and on the international stage. With regards to domestic realism all the actions of the political elite are attempts to remain in and consolidate their power over the wider political and civilian population, whereas on an international level states are seen as the primary competitors whose goal in all their actions is to attempt to augment their power on the global political stage. A large factor in international political realism is the idea that nation states, as the sole proprietor of power, are only able to advance their own goals of obtaining power at the expense of another nation state and therefore political collaboration with other nation states are deemed as both a necessity in order to protect national interests and temporary as national interest change over time. Ideology has been defined by Martin Seliger as “A system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of social relationships and arrangements and/or aimed at justifying a particular pattern of conduct, which its proponents seek to promote realise, pursue or maintain.” Political realism, with specific regards to the diplomatic issues faced by China during the 1960s and 1970s is important when addressing specific events which caused tensions between the USSR and the PRC such as the USSR’s support for India during the Sino-India war in 1962, the strengthening of Sino-Albanian relations and the reactions to Mongolia’s request to join the Warsaw pact.
Khrushchev’s speech made during the 20th party congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union on the 25th February 1956 brought to the USSR a policy of de-stalinisation, the condemnation of Stalin’s policies such as state terror, ignoring the Marxism-Leninism ideal of collective leadership and mass deportations created a rift between the USSR and the PRC. For Mao one of the largest issue faced by the policy of de-stalinisation was the lessening of the cult of personality as this threatened to destabilise Mao’s political strength within the CCP. The concerns of Mao regarding Khrushechev’s actions when observed through the politically realist mind set is that his objective of staying in power was threatened by the actions of an allied head of state and this coupled with the popular reaction to Mao’s hundred flowers campaign would have concerned Mao with regards to his position and legacy in the CCP, resulting in the subsequent Anti-Rightist campaign during the late 1950s and a strict implementation of Maoist doctrine. Mao was a critic of Khrushchev’s style of leadership and argued for a more aggressive attitude towards the United States, the ideological differences between the USSR and PRC after the death of Stalin drove a wedge between the two nations as a clash of personalities between Mao and Khrushchev took place.
Political scientist Triska argues that the Sino-Soviet split was a symptom of wider difficulties faced by creating an international coalition of states. The USSR and PRC were the dominant powers amongst the global community of communist-party ran states, with a combined control of 91% of communist controlled geography, 86% of the population and an overwhelming control of natural resources. This dominance over all other communist states and rivalry between the two states added to the political tensions during the Yugoslavia and Albanian issues as it created a rift in the communist controlled states with regards to Chinese support for Albania being seen as an indirect criticism of the USSR. Holsti’s paper “The General Inquirer System Applied to Sino-Soviet Relations” (1964) theorises that relations amongst communist states were directly related to the condition of international relations between the east and west, that during periods of increased political pressure between the communists and the west the Chinese and Soviet agendas would often be aligned in order to promote the unity and strength amongst the communist states, both to the international and domestic stages, however during periods of relative détente between the east and west the attitudes amongst the communist powers were increasingly strained. One such example of this is in 1969, after the end of the Tet Offensive and Operation Rolling Thunder coupled with the creation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968 relations between east and west were at a period of relative détente. Relations between the USSR and the PRC however led to multiple border classes and the redeployment of Soviet bombers from Eastern Europe to newly created airfields in Mongolia in which they subsequently practiced imitation attacks against Chinese targets coupled with a ring of nuclear missiles around much of the Manchurian region of China. A number of border disputes involving China further deepened the Sino-Soviet split including the 1969 Zhenbao Island incident and the Tielieketi incident which were part of a wider Sino-Soviet border conflict due in part to China’s disagreement of 19th century boarder treaties which exacerbated already strenuous relation’s with the USSR.
The conflict between communist states highlights the necessity of political Realism when examining the entire relationship between the two states. The unilateral nature of the Sino-Soviet alliance to begin with ensured that China would be seen, by the USA and USSR at the very least, as the lesser partner due to the very real issues of its limited military capacity, economic strength, nuclear capability and the PRC not being a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The relevance of political realism with regards to the unilateral nature of the alliance is due to stressed importance of power in realism, thus to be seen as the inferior partner of the alliance is counterproductive to the national interests of China due to the idea that alliances between nations are always used as a temporary instrument with the eventual goal of obtaining and securing more domestic and international power. Mao’s attempt to rectify some aspects which limited the international perceptions of Chinese strength in the communist world would further increase tensions between the USSR and PRC, furthermore there was an inability of the Soviet leadership to be willing to consider China as an equal alliance partner, due in part to their understanding of Moscow’s central importance as head of the global communist movement and ‘deeply buried cultural stereotypes and racism from both China and the USSR.’ The CCP’s reaction to the Cuban missile crisis was to criticise the actions of Moscow as Soviet adventurism, the subsequent resolution of the crisis was thus seen as a capitulation against the capitalist forces, further driving a wedge in diplomatic relations between the two countries. The reactions of the CCP were understandable considering the USSR’s refusal to provide aid so the CCP could create the facilities to produce their own nuclear arsenal and after the events of the missile crisis in 1963 the USSR alongside the USA and Britain signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Mao saw the treaty as a direct effort to limit the PRC’s own attempts to produce nuclear weaponry and this, alongside what he saw was a failure on the part of Khrushchev of not following an aggressive stance against the USA led to the multiple letters published by Mao criticising Khrushchev’s leadership. A realist analysis of Mao’s response to improving USSR-USA relations would argue that a strong reaction by Mao was important due to the CCP’s desire for more autonomy within the communist world, in criticising the actions of the supposed leading communist state for buckling under the pressure of their mortal enemy both undermines the legitimacy of the USSR’s claim of dominance of the communist world whilst also improving the CCPs claim by providing other states who are hostile to the USA with a “purer” anti-capitalist state to support.
Two days after the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia, Zhou Enlai, when addressing the Romanian National Day Celebrations in Peking referred to the Soviet actions and thus overall the leadership of the Soviet Union as “social imperialists.” The term social imperialist is defined as a state, people or party who is “socialist in words, imperialist in deeds” and it was used derogatorily to describe the Soviet Union as counterrevolutionary. This label assisted the CCP to legitimize an aggressive stance against the USSR both domestically and internationally and went hand in hand with Mao’s Three Worlds Theory which considered social imperialists to be as a larger threat to the progression of communism as the capitalist imperialist powers of the west. The social imperialist threat to global communism was considered a larger danger by China than the USA as it was a threat from within the communist world itself. Mao and the CCP’s ideology, as shown by the Anti-Rightist campaign and Cultural Revolution, argued it is much easier for enemies of communism socialism to destabilise it from within.
Sino-American relations were initially improved after the United States supported the Beijing government during the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflicts, Richard Nixon viewed the increasingly poor Sino-Soviet relations as an opportunity to threaten Moscow with Sino-American détente and the multitude of issues this would cause USSR. The threat of a Sino-American entente could force Moscow to concede to giving better terms in the SALT negotiations whilst also providing the PRC with a potential superpower ally to face Soviet threats. The “ping pong diplomacy” instigated by the CCP early in the 1970s can be seen as an attempt by China to humanise the Chinese to the USA public whilst doing the same of the American people to their own population. The fact that Soviet athletes were not invited to do the same shows an increasing distain towards the USSR which was to increase steadily over the subsequent years. Nixon’s invitation to visit Beijing “as a tourist or as president” in December 1970 by Mao can be perceived to be as much an invitation to Nixon as a message to the Soviet Union to counter the perceived threat of a Soviet attack, with regards to political realism the invitation was an acceptance that some of the CCP were willing to put aside ideological differences in the face of issues of national security it viewed more dangerous than a capitalist superpower.
The main two issues which brought about the Sino-Soviet split should be seen as the growing ideological differences between the USSR and the PRC, with regards to how approach several issues such as combatting the imperialist west, the process and reaction to de-stalinisation and China’s criticism of the USSR’s so called social Imperialist tendencies. Furthermore the other pressing issue which caused the Sino-Soviet split can be seen as a realist attitude with regards to the inequality of the initial Sino-Soviet alliance and Mao’s inability to consider the PRC as a lesser power when compared to the USSR. Lüthi argues that ‘the Chinese and Soviet leaders’ domestic and diplomatic agendas were driven by ideological concerns.’ The two main causes of the Sino-American rapprochement can be seen as a sense of political realism, an understanding that the beginning of mutual co-operation would be beneficial for both the US and PRC with regards to economics, defence and in order to put pressure on the USSR. The political interactions between the USA and PRC during the 1970s indicates a willingness by both parties to come to compromises with regards to tough issues such as the Taiwan question, although the rapprochement of Sino-US relations failed to come to a solution favoured by either Taiwan or China the US felt secure in their diplomatic efforts to remove the 7th fleet from the Taiwan Straits and for a more political solution. Additionally Mao’s ideological view of the USSR as a social imperialist power suggests that, coupled with political realism, ideological differences between the USSR and PRC created the mind-set that working together alongside the USA was would benefit China both domestically and to further their international aims.