In President Ronald Reagan’s 1982 State of the Union, he affirmed: “In the last decade, while we sought the moderation of Soviet power through a process of restraint and accommodation, the Soviets engaged in an unrelenting buildup of their military forces. The protection of our national security has required that we undertake a substantial program to enhance our military forces.” During the mid-20th century, the United States and the Soviet Union were involved in a desperate nuclear arms race that threatened an apocalyptic war. As their competing ideologies of capitalism and communism continued to add to the tension, exemplified through the Space Race and multiple close military encounters such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the American public started to condemn the buildup of newer, more advanced nuclear weapons. Randall Forsberg’s “Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race” instigated an entire movement dedicated to stopping the stockpiling of nuclear weapons. The core message of the movement spread quickly, prompting debates in legislatures and making tangible political changes. Although current research examines how the movement died and how effectively it promoted international peace, the method by which the movement’s core ideologies spread and gave people a voice in a crucial international issue of the 20th century remains unclear. During the Cold War, the Nuclear Freeze movement gained traction among the US population and influenced national politics primarily because its message was disseminated and popularized through media outlets, both democratizing the issue of stockpiling nuclear weapons and revealing the powerful effect of various media strategies on the opinion of the American people.
With the military buildup of nuclear weapons in the name of nuclear deterrence and the increased tension between the US and USSR, many Americans cried out for policy changes. By 1980, the United States had an inventory of over 24,000 nuclear warheads while the Soviet Union stored a staggering 30,000 nuclear warheads. Thus, it is unsurprising that as the two powerful nations inched toward nuclear war, the Nuclear Freeze became a central topic in American local and national politics. When Randall Forsberg proposed a bilateral freeze in 1980, building on the ideas and the work of previous movements that had also called for the halt of the production and testing of nuclear weapons, she saw the proposed Freeze as a viable step toward the disarmament of the entire world. In her formative publication, “Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race,” she cited the devastating potential consequences of a continued arms race. Underscoring the massive nuclear weapons programs of both nations, she stated that “the weapons program of the next decade, if not stopped, will pull the nuclear tripwire tighter” and predicted that a mere “fraction of these weapons can destroy all cities in the northern hemisphere.” She further proposed that the Freeze be a verifiable agreement between the US and the USSR that would halt the production, testing, and deployment of nuclear missiles and delivery vehicles and would maintain the “existing nuclear parity.” Not only would such an agreement represent the first step to a more stable international foundation, but it would also help all countries economically by diverting resources to improving social services and helping the poor. At the end of the publication, a long list of known endorsers gave legitimacy to the movement and provided the context for the explosive growth of the movement. Immediately after the publication of the pamphlet, the movement gained traction with the support of a wide range of activists, intellectuals, and leaders. As the Freeze movement gained credence and popularity among the American public, the media harnessed the existing momentum of the movement and played a critical part in propagating the message to an even greater audience.
One method by which the media served as a platform for Nuclear Freeze advocacy was its incendiary coverage of nuclear winter, the theoretical result of an impending nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Initial research concerning nuclear winter built off of previous data and was conducted by a group of scientists, including the popular astronomer Carl Sagan. The research concluded that the smoke released from the explosions of a nuclear war would cover the Earth and thus cool its surface dramatically, killing plant life and destroying food sources. Immediately after the publication, the media seized on the topic by interviewing Sagan and showing terrifying computer-generated models of a post-apocalyptic nuclear fallout. Indeed, one New York Times article written by Walter Sullivan in 1983 presented multiple scientific articles and conveyed their findings to the public with certitude. Highlighting the devastation, Sullivan emphasized that “much, if not all, of the world [would plunge] into darkness by a pall of smoke suspended in the stratosphere.” The Times Article also incorporated quotes from high profile intellectuals, such as the leader of a well-reputed journal, William D. Carey: “It has been a very good thing for the integrity of science…that some 40 scientists of high standing have gone public with their considered estimates of the…long-term biological consequences of nuclear war.” Another article published one year later in the New York Times reaffirmed these ideas by warning that reputed authors “had predicted that the combined effects of low temperatures, radiation, disease, and starvation might all but extinguish life on the earth.” Therefore, journalists were able to spread the unnerving message of highly reputed scientists effectively and quickly, pressuring many to support the Nuclear Freeze.
Even intellectuals not involved in the research quickly learned about and recognized the significance of an event as powerful as nuclear winter and the steps needed to prevent it. According to Scott Plous from the Department of Psychology of Stanford University, “one of the most effective ways to reduce the chances of nuclear war is, of course, to reduce the number of operative nuclear weapons, and here rests the central policy implication of a nuclear winter threshold.” Thus, after scientists had concluded the possibility of nuclear winter, the media propagated the possible consequences of the impending threat and included the opinions of intellectuals from diverse academic disciplines. It is therefore unsurprising that according to a Massachusetts survey in 1984, the fear of nuclear weapons and its consequences was the primary reason for which 297 respondents favored a Freeze. Ultimately, with the backing of scientists and intellectuals from diverse academic disciplines and the media’s depiction of a desolate post-apocalyptic world, media coverage evoked powerful emotions from the general public and made it increasingly concerned about the need for a Nuclear Freeze.
In addition to the shifting portrayal of the consequences of nuclear war, the media started to increasingly cover the Freeze movement and its events. At the movement’s height in 1982, the movement was able to mobilize media coverage for demonstrations and cultural events and commanded attention through its large-scale mobilization. Recognizing the power of media to substantially influence public opinion, some Freeze groups engaged in mass demonstrations in order to attract media attention. In one such demonstration, about 500,000 people gathered in Central Park to push for the Nuclear Freeze while the United Nations convened nearby to discuss disarmament. Employing large turnouts to attract the attention of media sources, the movement was able to, therefore, use its existing widespread public support to gain even more followers. Indeed, media outlets described support for the Freeze as broad and predicted that the issue would continually dominate the political atmosphere. Time reported that the Freeze had attracted attention “from the halls of Congress to Vermont hamlets to the posh living rooms of Beverly Hills.” Other media outlets such as television networks arrived at similar conclusions, revealing the extensive coverage of the movement.
As a result of the media’s widespread coverage of nuclear winter and Freeze activities, the media was able to incite widespread public attention and debate, encouraging public support for the Freeze and giving the movement political currency. According to a 1984 Massachusetts survey, 224 (61%) of those polled were more worried in 1984 than in 1980. Of the 224 respondents that were more worried, over 50% stated that the increased media coverage made them concerned about the possibility of nuclear war. According to one person, “I’m more aware of [nuclear war] because of the media coverage. I was a little ignorant about the subject four years ago.” Therefore, it is evident that the media had a strong effect on public opinion, prompting increased concern and public awareness. The idea that the public overwhelmingly supported the measures proposed by the Nuclear Freeze had a heavy role in influencing policy. For instance, the results of polls by major news outlets such as the New York Times and CBS News served as potent weapons for Freeze advocates. With over 80% support for the movement nationally across sociopolitical and demographics groups, politicians were hard-pressed to ignore poll numbers (even if these numbers may have been somewhat skewed because of improperly framed questions). , Going against the prevailing public opinion would put political representatives “at political peril for themselves and for their political parties.” The movement, fueled by media attention, was able to evoke a powerful response at the grassroots level as well. By 1982, 12 state legislatures, 275 city governments and 446 New England town meetings had passed Freeze resolutions. In California alone, the Freeze campaign was a frenzied effort to secure more than 300,000 signatures to secure a ballot. Showing documentaries such as The Last Epidemic to scholarly and community groups and hiring media consultants, the California movement was able to gain the support of over 700,000 supporters, more than enough to put the Freeze initiative on the November ballot.
After media coverage plummeted after the early 1980s and the movement started to focus less on broadcasting demonstrations and cultural events, however, the much-needed public support began to drop. The absence of an extensive public debate on a consolidated Nuclear Freeze movement during the later 1980s contrasted with the explosive growth of the movement during the early 1980s. In the early 1980s, the New York Times wrote about 100 articles per month about the nuclear weapons protest. By the end of the 1980s, however, the New York Times wrote no more than 10 articles per month. Because public opinion is a main determinant of policy and because the success of arms control is dependent on the ability of activists to mobilize resources and support, reduced coverage heavily hurt the movement. With the forfeiture of mobilization and public debate that had been obtained by the extensive media coverage, activists were no longer able to garner the support needed to organize protests and influence political policies. Therefore, the success of the movement heavily relied the media’s public opinion polls and the extensive media coverage to gain even more public support and political currency both on the grassroots and national levels.
Ultimately, the growth and development of the Nuclear Freeze during the early 1980s were highly dependent on its ability to influence public opinion through gaining media attention. With media attention covering diverse topics ranging from the possibility of a nuclear winter to the prominent Freeze events, large numbers of people reacted positively to the campaign. The movement, however, ultimately proved too dependent on the media’s reach, such that the loss of its support attenuated public debate and political response. Therefore, the role of the media proved invaluable in democratizing the issues of the Cold War and giving the people a more informed position in influencing foreign and domestic policy. In multiple points made earlier in the Cold War, the public had maintained a “follower mentality” in which the Presidents and their administrations were able to successfully garner support for otherwise controversial issues. However, with the widespread media coverage of nuclear winter and Freeze events, and the concomitant staunch support for the movement, the public was in fact able to mold Reagan’s controversial domestic and foreign policy in the initial days of the movement. Indeed, Reagan, at first encouraging the development of more nuclear missiles in order to promote nuclear deterrence, later affirmed in 1984 during the State of the Union that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” and that it would be ideal to “achieve real and equitable reductions in the levels of nuclear arms.” Finally, the media and its depiction of a global nuclear winter showed the American public that the Cold War was much more than a bipolar issue between two distant superpowers—it challenged the audience to understand disarmament as a peace initiative with global ramifications. Ultimately, the media provided the context and the information necessary to democratize the issue, establishing a precedent for the role of media outlets in future protest movements as a key mediator of public opinion and of tangible political change.