To understand how Loyalism in Britain’s American colonies began, it is important to comprehend the growing sense of independence within the colonies. Even though the thirteen American colonies were considered to be some of Britain’s most prized lands, Britain remained a distant ruler for several decades, which encouraged a sense of American autonomy. This changed after the Seven Years’ War (1754-1763) and Pontiac’s Rebellion (1763), and Britain became a more dominating presence in its overseas colonies, beginning with the Proclamation of 1763. As a result of heavy taxation to compensate for the wars and increasingly more assertive British governors in the colonies, many colonists began to harbour ideas for American freedom, which led to the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783) and the colonies’ independence with the Treaty of Paris in 1783. However, a proportion of the colonists remained loyal to the British before and during the war, and these “Loyalists” helped aid the British, despite opposition from the American “Patriots,” whom the Loyalists and the British viewed as rebels, not patriotic. Counting on Loyalist support, King George III, the North Administration, and the British generals often incorporated the Loyalists’ supposed aid into their political and military plans.
Unfortunately, many miscalculations occurred involving their size and willingness to help the British cause, resulting in numerous setbacks and defeats for the British army. This error on the part of the British contributed to their defeat, but the Loyalists were also blamed for the defeat. Through the juxtaposition of Patriots and Loyalists, an analysis of British party politics, and an examination of key events and battles, this paper focuses on the degree to which the Loyalists impacted the outcome of the American Revolutionary War.
Even though the main conflict of the American Revolutionary War was the fight between Britain and the colonies for colonial independence, it was also a civil war between the “Patriots” and the “Loyalists.” Ironically, before the war, both sides agreed that the taxes imposed by the British were unfair (Christie 101). Despite these similar feelings, their beliefs about the colonies’ secession from Great Britain differed, as there was an approximately equal percentage of Patriots and neutral colonists, with the Loyalists being in the minority (Brogan 188).
One reason why there was a stark contrast between the two parties was due to different political and economic values. In general, most Loyalists had a professional job, such as holding a public office or being an Anglican clergyman (Jones 48). Compared to other professions like farming, the Loyalists’ jobs had closer connections to Britain, so they believed that independence would be detrimental to their financial well-being. As a result, it can be generally concluded that there was a class division between the Loyalists and Patriots, but this was not exclusive.
While those economic factors tended to sway colonists’ opinions towards Loyalism, intrinsic beliefs derived from their backgrounds affected their alliances more. In Hull et al.’s psychology study of 80 New York colonists’ writings in “Choosing Sides,” the colonists were given a more positive political-economic (PE) score if their writings alluded to a need for order, intolerance of dissonance, intolerance of ambiguity, submissiveness, power, hierarchical thinking, conservativeness, conformity, and tendency to stereotype, and then the results were compared to their true beliefs (360). As seen in Table 1, the more conservative one’s values were, the more likely that person was a Loyalist.
Table 1: Distribution of Scores on Combined Political-Economic Hypotheses
Score Rank Score on PE Scale Loyalists Patriots
“Higher” 5 1 0
4 5 0
3 3 0
2 5 0
1 6 3
“Middle” 0 4 5
-1 10 8
“Lower” -2 1 5
-3 2 16
-4 0 2
-5 1 3
Adapted from: “Choosing Sides: A Quantitative Study of the Personality Determinants of Loyalist and Revolutionary Political Affiliation in New York”
As demonstrated by this study, Loyalists, as a result of their economic background, tended to behave more conservatively and obediently, which were the ideal traits that the British government desired the colonists to display. Yet, the Members of Parliament were split on the topic of American independence. The Tories, who were the majority, favoured retaining and taxing the colonies and fighting the war, while the Whigs lobbied for the colonists.
However, even within the Whigs, there was more division on the treatment of the colonists. In the House of Lords, the 1st Earl of Chatham, William Pitt, “the Elder,” favoured a return back to the pre-1763 treatment of the colonies, and he also proposed that Britain should control their army and the colonies pay a defence contribution in order to maintain unity (Christie 110). In the House of Commons, Edmund Burke generally agreed with Chatham, but he also conceded that parliamentary supremacy was only necessary in general affairs (Christie 110). While Burke and Chatham had differing degrees of leniency towards the colonists, they still believed that the colonies should remain in the empire (Christie 110). Conversely, Charles Fox, another member of the Whig party, would frequently wear the colors of buff and blue to Parliament because of his unrelenting support of American independence, and he also believed that King George III was a tyrant and was openly disapproving of him (Derry 159). This demonstrates that while the Whig party was sympathetic towards the Patriot cause, not even they were completely supportive of American independence.
The Tories, however, firmly believed that the colonists should remain in the Empire and be taxed accordingly. The Prime Minister from 1770-1782 was Lord North, who was essentially a moral prisoner to King George III because the King created a fund of ₤20,000 for him in order for Lord North to forget his financial worries and to focus on winning the war (Ayling 255). As a result, King George III’s strong resolve to retain and punish the colonies was a constant presence in the North Administration. In addition, King George III had a group of followers, including Lord North, who believed in a stronger monarchy, and they were known as the “King’s Friends” (Ayling 72). Influenced by King George III’s ideas, the Tory party held that the American Revolutionary War was attacking the rightful authority of Parliament and that the British government should help the faithful Americans, or Loyalists, overcome the rebels (Derry 117).
One man who stressed the importance of the Loyalists was Lord George Germain, who was the Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1775-1782. Throughout his term in office, he continuously exaggerated the possible support that might be received from the Loyalists (Derry 183). Both Germain and North believed that the Loyalists would become active in the war with the encouragement of the British army (Derry 125). This mistake was made worse by Germain being a faraway and ineffective minister for war (Ayling 251). His miscalculation of Loyalist strength was arguably his greatest mistake as it not only affected British politics in the mainland, but also British war strategies. Even though the war lasted nine years, the poor communication between the generals and also with Germain led to repeated mistakes and lost battles.
For a group that was a minority and faced discrimination, the Loyalists exhibited no aspiration to aid the British army against their rivals. To justify this, they had several logical reasons to remain in hiding, but the North Administration never realized them.
First, the Loyalists distrusted the British army. As quoted by one New York Loyalist in 1779, “I indulge a hope that I shall yet have a chance of seeing a General that’s neither a Rebel nor a Historical Fool,” (Brogan 173). This statement highlights their resentment towards the British army due to their repeating blunders and poor strategy, so they did not want to participate. In addition, Germain, who assisted in the planning of the campaigns, savagely condemned the Patriots in order to hearten the Loyalists (Derry 184). However, this heightened their underlying suspicions of being oppressed by the militant British, which also lessened their desire to fight.
Furthermore, the Loyalists support of Britain was more sentimental than impassioned. While they believed that the colonists should defend their traditional liberties like voting, they should not secede from the Empire (Derry 127). In addition, they also thought that it was acceptable to criticize the British government, though this should not translate into war (Derry 127). These two beliefs illustrated that the Loyalists’ primary loyalty was to the King, but these ideas where not strong enough to fight. When juxtaposed to the zealous Patriots, who knew their futures could only be saved if they obtained the necessary victory against the British, their stances on the war paled in comparison. The North Administration and the generals, however, did not realize this (Derry 127). Thus, they assumed that the Loyalists would provide unending support during the war, and this misconception led to multiple failures on the battlefield.
In addition to these reasons, the Loyalists were also fleeing the colonies due to prosecution from the Patriots. Before the war, the Loyalists were terrorized by mobs, and they were subjected to theft, tarring and feathering, and destruction of property (“The United Empire Loyalists”). After the Declaration of Independence was signed in 1776, loyalism to Britain was seen as treason, and the Loyalists could be forced to relinquish property, be imprisoned, be banished, or even be executed (“The United Empire Loyalists”). The fear of being prosecuted kept many hidden Loyalists from openly supporting the British. However, if there was a British victory nearby, they would recklessly celebrate their presumed safety, but they were crushed by the Patriots as soon as the British army left the area (Christie 112). Therefore, between 80,000 and 100,000 Loyalists fled the colonies and became refugees in Canada and Britain (Jones 48).
Through the erroneous reports about the numbers of the Loyalists, several of the British generals incorporated potential Loyalist support in their campaigns. One of the first battles in which the miscalculation of the level of Loyalist support caused a British defeat was the Battle of Fort Sullivan in 1776. To reassert Royal authority, General Clinton took roughly 2,000 men and a naval squadron to South Carolina, where the local Loyalists would support them (Ayling 251). Theoretically, this campaign should have succeeded because there were more Loyalists in the southern colonies. However, it failed because of the lack of support from the Loyalists (Ayling 252). Since this battle was near the beginning of the war, it was one of the first demonstrations of how the miscalculations of Loyalist support affected the British army in the American Revolutionary War due to their unwillingness to participate.
However, the generals and the North Administration did not learn from their mistakes, especially in the Saratoga Campaign of 1777. This defeat can be blamed on a major miscommunication between Howe, Germain, and Burgoyne, but blame has also been attributed to the Loyalists (Christie 117). During the Battle of Bennington, Burgoyne attempted to obtain rebel supplies through the assistance of the Loyalists, but the Patriots destroyed two British detachments (Christie 117). This deprived Burgoyne’s army of needed supplies, which then affected the Battle of Freeman’s Farm and the Battle of Bemis Heights, resulting in Burgoyne’s eventual surrender.
Once again, the strength and enthusiasm of the Loyalists were overestimated, although this time, the British managed to secure a victory under General Cornwallis at the Battle of Camden in 1780. Despite Loyalists being more prominent in the South, they failed to provide assistance to the British (Christie 121). While Cornwallis was a Lieutenant General and was under Clinton, he somehow did not realize the true extent of Loyalist support despite all of the other battles that have alluded to their inconsistency.
In conclusion, though the Loyalists were small in number, the miscalculations regarding them undeniably impacted the American Revolutionary War. The Loyalists’ lack of action can be explained by a sentimental, yet fruitless, attachment to the Empire, while being fearful of possible destruction to their personal and financial well-being. Despite a small percentage in Parliament advocating for colonial freedom, the Tory government under Lord North desired to retain the North American colonies, while simultaneously protecting the obedient, faithful colonists. Unfortunately, the main advocates for proposed Loyalist support, especially King George III, Lord North, and Lord George Germain, frequently exaggerated their numbers and willingness, thus affecting British military strategy. Even though some battles managed to be won despite lack of planning, several crucial campaigns, like Saratoga, failed in part due to the Loyalists, and this contributed to Britain’s eventual defeat during the American Revolutionary War. Although the Loyalists should have played an indirect role during the war, the miscalculations by the North Administration could have been avoided in the British military strategies if the Loyalists were better evaluated, and this would have potentially changed the outcome of the war.