Divine Command theory is a theory in which the ethical status of an action, that is, whether an action is moral or immoral, is solely dependent on whether God requires or prohibits it, respectively. The following is an argument for Divine Command Theory stated in order to further supplement reasoning behind the Divine Command Theory explanation.
Premise 1: God is the maker of the universe and everything in it, including human beings.
Premise 2: God has absolute claim over our moral obedience because he is the maker of human beings.
Premise 3: We should always obey God's commands, because God has absolute rights over our obedience.
Conclusion: As a result, Divine Command theory is true.
To further clarify, the morally obligatory (impermissible) actions are the ones that God commands, and the impermissible ones are the ones God commands (forbids). Because moral obligation is dependent on the commands of God, and is usually determined by how one understands God or from God’s direct commandments themselves, say, for example, if it were written in the Scripture. An example in which Divine Command Theory acts as an ethical framework for action can be seen in the following scenario:
Thomas decides that killing is wrong because according to the 10 Commandments,
God forbids murder.
According to this example, Thomas holds that the act of murder itself is wrong simply because God commands it so. The ethical response of the act of murder is reliant on a directly stated text, the Ten Commandments. And because in the Ten Commandments, God forbids murder, murder is immoral. It is also important to note that Divine Command Theory acts as a kind of relativism in the manner of which how one determines the ethical framework of an act, whether it is moral or immoral, is dependent on the commandments of God and not whether the act itself is morally or immorally intrinsic. The commandments of God is relative to how one understands the nature of God to be as specific content of divine commands varies according to the particular religion that the divine command theorist abides by or the individual views that the divine command theorist gathers with respects to God. Forwarding back into the example, killing is wrong because God says it’s wrong, and not because the action of killing, independent of God, solely by itself is wrong.
Now, there are a few advantages to be gained if one posits the Divine Command Theory as a moral determinant for action. For starters, it provides a good answer to the question, why be moral? Based on one’s impressions of the relative nature of God, the Divine Command Theory presents a punishment and reward orientation towards morally principled and morally unprincipled behavior. What does this do in turn for the Divine Command theorist? It poses an incentive towards ethically righteous behavior, that is, one must be held accountable for his or her actions, otherwise, he or she will be punished.
Immanuel Kant, a central figure in modern Western philosophy, in his dialogue of Critique of Practical Reason, writes that for morality to come into claim, faith in God is also necessary. In order for one to satisfy the demands of moral obligations, one must believe in the existence of a God, a God of whom will assist with one’s following of moral laws by providing moral incentive, such as an afterlife, or else the requirements of moral laws become too much of a burden to bear. This argument bolsters Divine Command theory because as Kant argues, moral behavior itself does not assure happiness. Rather, the belief of a God, of one who rewards the morally righteous will assure happiness. Kant’s argument can be used for Divine Command theory because it shows that the moral motivation (happiness) for ethically righteous behavior is because of God. And because how one achieves moral motivation is because of God, it is necessary to follow his commandments in order to satisfy him and acquire those rewards.
Another possible advantage to the Divine Command Theory is that it presents an objective footing for the foundation of ethical behavior. God becomes the source for morality; all ethical behavior is directed from his commands. The result of this causes all moral laws to be applicable to anyone, at all times and places. Moral laws are strictly dependent on the commandments of God. In addition to this, moral laws aren’t subjected to what people believe are right or wrong, rather it is strictly attached to whatever God requires or prohibits as morally obligatory or reprehensible.
Unfortunately, there are challenges posed against the Divine Command theory that hinder it from becoming a proper working model of ethical judgment. Germane to the question of why one should be moral and with regards to the advantage posed above by Kant and Divine Command theorists, one form of criticism may be that there is an ethical wrongness to actions driven moral motivation, such as the promise of an afterlife or a punishment and reward. The reason why there is an ethical wrongness to this is because something outside of the action itself, an external stimulus, which in this case, are rewards, are the reason for why the action is being carried out. According to Divine Command Theory, actions should be carried out because they are commandments of God, not because there is a punishment of reward. To further expand the argument against Divine Command Theory as a whole, the following questions should be raised:
1.) Are acts inspired by moral incentive less moral than acts that are not?
2.) Is an action truly even moral, if the intent behind the action is determined by an external stimulus, that is, something outside of the act itself, which in this case is the culmination of a reward, or even the commandments of God (for whom, depending on your understanding of God, might promise reward)?
3.) Shouldn’t actions be determined by their intrinsic quality of being morally ethical?
The last question raised brings us into our most widely held argument that directly refutes the Divine Command Theory – Euthyphro’s Dilemna. Euthypho’s Dilemna, named after a character in Plato’s Socratic Dialogue, raises a binary problem (indicated on premise 1 (a) and (b) seen below) on the subject of goodness according to Divine Command Theory. Euthyphro’s Dilemna states the following argument:
Premise (1): Divine command theory can only true if either:
(a) morally good acts are willed by God because they are intrinsically morally good, or
(b) morally good acts are morally good because they are acts willed by God.
Premise (2): If we assume (a) is correct- that is, that morally good acts are willed by God because they are intrinsically morally good, then morally good acts are independent of God’s will.
Premise (3): However, because it is not the case that (a) morally good acts are willed by God because they are intrinsically morally good, we must hold (b) to be true, that is, morally good acts are morally good because they are acts willed by God.
Premise (4): If (a) is true, and morally good acts are morally good because they are willed by God, there is no reason to place any regards towards God’s status of moral goodness or to worship.
Premise (5): However because there are reasons both to care about God’s moral goodness and to worship him, It is not the case that (b) morally good acts are morally good because they are willed by God is true.
Conclusion: Because (a) and (b) are false, Divine command theory is false.
There are 2 possible remedies that a Divine Command Theorist can use to counter the problems posed by Euthyphro’s Dilemna. The first response recognizes accepting the argument for what it entails, that is, to “bite the bullet”. This means accepting the initial premise that morally good acts are morally good because they are willed by God. The problem with this however means that accepting the commandments or willings of God means accepting that they are indeed arbitrary, that is, based on the random choice or personal whim of God. So, if God commanded us to steal from children then we are morally obligated to steal from children. This response is usually viewed as unacceptable and appalling, because it does not comply to our conventional ethical standards, as believing in something like stealing from children could potentially be morally good is intuitively repulsive.
A second possible remedy in response to Euthyphro’s Dilemna is a modification of the original view initially proposed by Robert Adams. Recall that Divine Command Theory specifies that an act is immoral if and only if it is contrary to the commands of God. A situation that prescribes the following position can be seen below:
God commands that jaywalking on Ives Street is immoral. Ted needs to get to class in 4 minutes and decides to jaywalk on Ives Street to save time. Even though Ted jaywalks on Ives Street to get to class on time, the act of Ted jaywalking on Ives Street is wrong, because God commanded that jaywalking on Ives Street is wrong. Ted’s action runs contrary to God’s commands.
As seen on the example indicated above, Ted’s action runs contrary to God’s commands, and that is why it is immoral. However, there are many challenges to this position. For starters, how and why is jaywalking immoral? Is the immoral nature of jaywalking an intrinsic property, that is, irrespective of anything apart from the act of jaywalking itself or is the immoral nature of jaywalking immoral because it is a command of God. Because the latter applies to this situation, God’s commands, being the foundations of morality, become arbitrary, which then allows for morally reprehensible actions to become morally obligatory.
To avoid this problem, Adams poses an edified version: “Any action is ethically wrong if and only if it is contrary to the commands of a loving God” (132). This argument now resolves the arbitrary argument raised from the original claim because morality is no longer dependent on the mere commands of God. Instead, morality is rooted in the unchanging omnibenevolent nature of God. Take the following example: