“Certain Principles of justice are justified because they would be agreed to in an initial situation of equality”. This statement sets the stage for the rest of John Rawls theory. The implication here is clear; justice – a just society – according to Rawls is based upon what is commonly referred to as a ‘social contract’, an agreement made between autonomous individuals in which laws are decided upon so as to facilitate mutual benefits for both parties.
To be able to identify laws that are just and unjust, according to Rawls, we must look at these laws from an initial situation of equality. Of course, this is nigh impossible to do if we think about these laws in direct relation to everyday life; we are not all economically equal and we may not necessarily be given the same opportunities in life to succeed. Therefore, Rawls comes to the conclusion that we must base the laws in our just society upon a ‘hypothetical agreement’ which we must abstract from the real world; we assume ignorance in terms of our wealth, social class et cetera. Here, we are able to see the influence Immanuel Kant had upon Rawls. The abstract rules bear an uncanny resemblance to Kant’s Categorical Imperative in terms of its abstraction from the real world to create ideals. (However, I agree with Allan Bloom’s criticism that Rawls in unable to actually synthesize the social contract tradition with kantian morality; he leaves out universal ideals which are central to Kant understanding of law and morality; they are the entire purpose of his moral theory). A social contract implies that justice or morality is just a creation of the human intellect, while deontology claims the opposite. Are they, by definition impossible to synthesize?) If we can successfully imagine this, then we will be in a position where we cannot be biased by our own particular interests, these interests being whether we are born into a wealthy family or a poor family, among many other situations which could affect our prosperity as individuals.
Rawls therefore reasons towards the idea of an ‘original position’. What ignorance or knowledge do we need to attribute to the contractors if an agreement about social justice is to be possible? Rawls would argue that we can expect some rich people, for example, to be strongly opposed to taxation, while some poor people will want the rich to be taxed more than they are at present, in order to increase welfare benefits. Hence, we have a dispute, and the point of Rawls’ theory of justice is to resolve this disputes.
Rawls supposes that people’s views of justice are often biased, in part, by their own particular interests. Because they already know what social cards they have been dealt – wealth, intelligence strength and so on – people will often fail to take a proper impartial stance as required by a concern for justice. Rawls’ conclusion here is that while justice requires impartiality, impartiality can be modelled by assuming ignorance. In other words, ignorance spawns impartiality.
People in the original position, the hypothetical contractors, according to Rawls, are placed behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ which makes them unaware of their particular circumstances. Because of this ignorance they do not know how to be biased in their own favour, and they are apparently forced to act impartially. They are ignorant of their social status, their gender, and their race. Importantly, they are also ignorant of their possession of their ‘natural assets’ – their abilities and strengths.
Rawls asks himself the question if this is enough to allow them to come to an agreement. It would be, were it the case that the only thing dividing people on questions of justice was personal interest. However, Rawls considers this to be an over-simplification. Rawls argued that people also disagree because they value different things. They have different ‘conceptions of the good’, different ideas about what makes life worthwhile. People have different moral, religious and philosophical views, and different aims and ambitions. People in the original position however, do not know their own conception of the good, and neither, says Rawls, do they know their ‘special psychological propensities’ or tendencies.
Rawls argues that his reasoning so far is sufficient to explain why people in the original position would agree to the ‘Liberty Principle’ – that each person is to have a an equal extensive set of basic liberties. To choose a different principle to regulate liberty would, in effect, be to discriminate against a certain group, or to accept diminished liberty for all. An objection however, would be that people, as described by Rawls up to this point, would be unable to make any choices or decisions. They do not know what they are like, nor what type of things they like. How, then, can they make any sort of decision about how society ought to be? Without a conception of the good, how can they understand the value of liberty, or even know that they value it?
To respond to this, Rawls assumes a certain type of motivation. The parties in the original position, he stipulates, are assumed to possess a ‘thin theory of the good’. Firstly, people in the original position, according to Rawls, want ‘primary goods’. These are liberties, opportunities, wealth, income, and other mysterious ‘social bases of wealth’. Rawls assumes that these are the things that people should rationally want, regardless of whatever else they may desire. People always want liberty, opportunity and money, assumes Rawls, as all-purpose means to your personal ends in life. Rawls adds that in the original position, people would prefer more of these primary goods, to fewer, and that the people are rational, in the sense that they will take the most efficient means to achieve their ends. Rawls also adds that in the original position, people are not envious, and that they are ‘mutually disinterested’. They take no interest in the plight, whether it be positive or negative, of anyone else. The conditions of the original position, behind the veil of ignorance, are not meant to describe the nature if a person, but to act as a methodological device; a device which helps us come to a view about the correct principles of justice.
Rawls assumes, that in the original position, people are ignorant of certain facts about their society. They do not know its economic or political situation, its level of civilization or culture, or the generation in which they belong. However, they are aware that people – the real people in their society have a sense of justice and are capable of having a conception of the good. Kant’s categorical imperative once again shines through Rawls’ theory of justice here; without any prior knowledge, through reason alone, according to Rawls, we know that our fellow citizens, as well as ourselves, have a notion of justice. They are also aware, that their society is in what Hume called ‘the circumstances of justice” – if we are in a condition of die scarcity, so bad that we cannot even ensure everyone’s survival, then the idea that we should criticize anyone’s actions as unjust seems absurd. If just to stay alive you must take what you can from others, then considerations of justice look completely irrelevant. However, if we were in a situation of such abundance that we could all have what we desired, conflicts about justice would not arise. Accordingly, Rawls concludes that the circumstances of justice are ‘between scarcity and abundance’.
Here, Rawls could be said to be deviating from his neo-kantian roots, in the sense that the universality of justice is not apparent, as the measure of how ‘just’ the action is, according to Rawls, in this case, appears to be based upon the outcome of your action; whether you die or not, rather than on the ‘imperative’ command, the duty, like Kant would say, that you have to not take what isn’t yours.
RAWLS’ PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
Rawls states two main principles of justice which, according to him, we would all choose if we were in the original position:
1) Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
2) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
a) To the greatest benefit of the least advantaged… and
b) Attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.
Principle 1 is the Liberty principle, 2(a) ‘Difference principle’ and 2(b) the ‘Fair opportunity principle’. According to Rawls, the Liberty principle has ‘lexical priority’ over the other two, as does the Fair opportunity principle over the difference principle. This implies that one we have reached a certain level of well-being, considerations of liberty should have absolute priority over matters of economic well-being of equality of opportunity.
An example:
There is no defence of slavery that would make the slaves better off then they would be with their freedom.
The fact is that enforced slavery is inconsistent with recognising equal liberty, and so must give way even if it has an economic advantage for the slaves.
Rawls however, does take notice of a power criticism of egalitarianism (in relation to the difference principle); it leaves no room for incentive. That is, some people will work much harder if they know that they will get extra rewards for doing so. But the hard work of the highly productive is capable of benefiting us all: either through new job creation or taxation. If an inequality benefits everyone, than what can be an objection against it? After all, who does it harm? On these grounds, the egalitarian difference principle could be said to be inefficient and irrational. I think this objections in very weak, as Rawls, specifically states that he holds the view of ‘the circumstances of justice’. He never stated that his principles were universal, and so there it is absurd to assume that he doesn’t allow for exceptions to the rule. Rawls accepts that IF an inequality is necessary to make everyone better off, and in particular, to make the worse off better off than they would otherwise be, then it should be permitted. Rawls doesn’t directly say this, but is the reason for this response that the INTENTION of the, in this case, so called “inequality” isn’t to create inequality, but to actually reduce it by benefiting those who cannot help themselves? It seems a bit too obvious to ask, but seeing as it wasn’t explicitly stated, I’m not certain if the purpose of the response was to convey this idea.
Rawls would argue that from the original position, people would choose his principles of justice in preference to utilitarianism – you would, says Rawls, adopt the Liberty principle, as you do not know which group or groups you belong to, it would be irrational to discriminate against one portion of society. The same goes for the Fair opportunity principle. Rawls also argues the people would give the Liberty principle a lexical priority. According to this view we cannot sacrifice liberty for the sake of anything else. But it could be argued that giving such an absolute priority to liberty is hardly rational. There are times when liberty should be sacrificed for the sake of security – think wartime blackouts and curfews. Or in times of great economic hardship and scarcity we might accept restrictions on political and civil liberties if this is the only way in which we will get fed. I think this objection in very weak, as Rawls, specifically states that he holds the view of ‘the circumstances of justice’. He never stated that his principles were universal, and so there it is absurd to assume that he doesn’t allow for exceptions to the rule. Giving the liberty principle a lexical priority over the DP and the FOP, doesn’t imply that Rawls intended it to be universal, without any restrictions. Rawls gives a very simple, effective response to the criticism; given modern prosperity, liberty should always be preferred to further material advances.
For the difference principle, Rawls would argue using ‘rational choice theory’; here is an example of how it works:
Which would you choose? One theory of rational choice says that we should ‘maximise expected utility/pleasure/value’ et cetera. This means that we should derive an average figure for what each option is worth, and then choose the option with highest average. This average figure is the expected utility. To do this, you multiply the utility of each possible outcome by its probability.
– For the melon, 5 times 1 equals 5.
– For the mussels, 20 times 0.9 equals 18. Then 100 times 0.1, which equals -10. You then add -10 and 18 and you get a result of 8.
If you are to maximise expected utility, you choose the mussels. However, it could be argued that that it is foolish to take such a risk, when there is a perfectly decent alternative. The fact that nothing can go wrong with the melon makes it the rational choice for some people. Those who reason this way are adopting the ‘maximin principle of rational choice’. This instructs us to make sure that the worst possible outcome is as good as possible: maximise the minimum. This is essentially a principle used by pessimists.
There is one last example referred to as ‘maximax’: Caviar: 2% 50 units of pleasure, 98% chance 0 units of pleasure (0 pain).
If you were to choose the caviar, you would be following the ‘maximax’ principle, which tells you to choose the ‘best of the best’ outcome. This is usually done my risk taking optimists. It isn’t however, a serious principle – most maximaxers probably follow the principle of maximax constrained by disaster avoidance. Those who choose to maximise expectations are looking for the outcome with the highest average score. They would look to make the average position in society as good as possible. Maximaxers by contrast have eyes only for the best outcomes. So, Rawls would say that they are likely to choose a highly unequal form of society with a privileged, wealthy and powerful, ruling class. Finally, Maximiners, would look only for the worst off, wanting to make the worst of in society as well of as possible. In other words, they would choose Rawls’ difference principle.
REASONS FOR MAXIMIN
So which of the rational principle of choice do you choose in the original position, according to Rawls? There are of course, limitations to the principle(s). There would of course be principles which society can most probably not sustain; the principle that everyone should live in a Palace would most likely be impossible. Your society is in the circumstances of Justice – between scarcity and abundance – and you must choose a principle that will be suitable for all levels of productivity between the two extremes. Therefore, there are ‘physical constraints’ on your choice. There are also ‘logical constraints’. For example, the principle that everybody should have slaves would just create an illogical cyclical situation.
Rawls states that there are also ‘formal constraints’ which reflect the idea of a hypothetical contract model of justification. The ‘constraint of publicity’ states that the terms must be known, or at least knowable, to every party partaking in the contract. The second formal constraint is the ‘constraint of finality’. If a contract is made in good faith then the parties will not seek to have it revoked just because things turn out badly.
The main idea of the Rawlsian contract is that you would make a decision that you wouldn’t want to go back on if things turned out badly. We are, then, looking for a principle of rational choice which yields a decision which is physically and logically possible, and does not violate the constraints of publicity or finality. However, this is not enough to determine the choice of a single principle, for it seems that choosing either on the basis of maximization of the expectations (average utility), or of maximin (the difference principle), both remain possible.
So now, Rawls would look at under what circumstances the maximization of expectations would be a rational principle of choice. Within economic theory maximization of expectation is virtually taken to the definition of rationality. This is because, in the long run, you certainly do better by being a maximizer of expectations than by following any other policy.
Suppose, for example, at the end of each day’s work you were given wages of £50, but also told that you could gamble those wages for a 50% chance of £150. Thus the expected value of this gamble is £75. If you were offered this gamble every day, and were sure that the person offering it was honest, then it would simply be stupid to follow a regular policy of plating safe. Over the course of 5 days, you would average £375, rather than the original £250. Therefore, in such a long-run series, maximization of expectations is the rational strategy. However, the choice made in the original position is not the first in a long-run series of choices. If things go badly you do not have another chance. So maximization of expectations is not so obviously the rational choice, as it involves taking risks.
On the contrary, Rawls argues, the maximin principle, and therefore the difference principle, is the more rational decision because of the special circumstances of the choice. The main argument is that alternative principles of choice involve taking risks so grave that to do so would be foolish in the extreme. There is no second chance. The original position will not be replayed. There is always the possibility that you will have the misfortune to end up very badly if you are to choose the maximization of expectation principle.
Rawls would argue, and I agree, that the Liberty principle would definitely be chosen; nobody wants to not be allowed to do what they want to do. So would the fair opportunity principle; it just seems intuitive that But you might still end up very poor. Why take this risk if something better can be guaranteed by use of the maximin principle? If you decide to take the gamble and end up in poverty, then you would not consider such a society just, and may well press for chance. You would not be able to bear the ‘strains of commitment’. Accordingly, you have not made the contract in good faith as you would go back on your original agreement, and this violate the constraint of finality. Therefore, Rawls concludes that you should reject the principle of maximization of expectations, and go with the maximin.
One alternative could be said to be the principle of ‘constrained maximization’ – maximize your expectations, but exclude any option which contains a very bad possibility. The problem, according to Rawls, is that from the standpoint of the original position, it would be impossible to set the social minimum in a non-arbitrary way. As we are unaware of the circumstances of our society in the original position, we cannot decide that, for example, everyone should get £100 a week.
A more general principle is needed: one that is applicable however society turns out. Rawls suggests that the contracting parties, in trying to set a social minimum, would finally settle for this suggestion: ‘make the worst off as well of as possible’ but that is simply the difference principle, and therefore, Rawls concludes that the maximin is the rational choice, and therefore that the difference principle would be chosen.
Even if Rawls is right that his principles would be chosen, what does that prove? Why is that supposed to be a justification of the principles? After all, we are not, now, in the original position, and so why should we care what people in such a position would do? It seems not to apply to us. What justifies Rawls methods?