Concerning Libya, as we know, Russia’s abstention from UNSCR 1973 meant that NATO military intervention would follow swiftly. Even though Russia sees its compliance as directly contributing to the fall of Gadhafi, Russia adopted negative views towards the payoff and afterlife. The Russian position also appeared to struggle to identify “how and by whom the measures would be enforced and what the limits of the engagement would be” .
First of all, the Russian abstention was viewed as an agreement made in compliance to the West. Here, speculation gathered questioning whether Russia were abandoning their long held non-intervention principle, in turn damaging their reputation. In response to the military campaign that followed, Russia’s main state-owned television station aired a damming report seeing it as “aggression by the great world powers against a sovereign country” . Likewise, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs added that “our position on this matter is well-known—we are for the inadmissibility of force both in Libya and in other countries, and for the situation’s return to the political level” .
Upon justifying Russia’s position upon Libya, Russia can be seen to have replicated a defensive foreign policy outlook. Within this outlook, Russia insists upon exhausting all diplomatic opportunities for the resolution of conflict before the use of force is contemplated. This position suggests that Russia expects the UN to mediate, not lead. Hereby, Russia views the UN’s association with partial interventions as hindering its very role as a mediator in future conflicts. Thus, this outlook upon the role of the UN in international affairs differs from those of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Within this line of argument, a defensive foreign policy considering Libya also suggests that Russian interests may be protected in international relations, where Russia intends to promote international stability and uphold their principle of protecting national sovereignty. Here, professor Robert Jervis outlines defensive realism as an approach conducted by Russia, which outlines challenges to cooperation in international relations . Jervis further argues that even well meaning states may fall into conflict through uncertainty in international relations .
Viewing Russia’s foreign policy as defensive regarding Libya also highlights Russia’s intentions for the UNSC to be interpreted in a ‘liberal’ manner, to which “interference by foreign powers would infringe on the rights of independent people struggling with its internal disease; hence, it would itself be an offense and would render the autonomy of all states insecure” . Additionally, “Russia advocates full universality of the generally recognized norms of international law both in their understanding and application” . In other words, this translates as Russia viewing the UNSC as critical in order to maintain a stable world order.
Yet, where Russia contrasts to others, concerns the legal goal of the Security Council, which Russia views as a task that should be formed with the intention to maintain world order and prevent international conflict. In supporting this line regarding the Russian abstention in Libya, Russia clearly feels as if external intervention within internal affairs should only be applied if the actor involved poses a serious threat to international peace and security. At this stage, Russia contents that if intervention was to be used, it must be used in order to stabilize and not exacerbate that threat to international stability. Hereby, a defensive Russian foreign policy showcases that Russia does not believe that there are any legal grounds for the violation of state sovereignty.
In Libya, Russia proceeded rather carefully and determined that Libya did not replicate a situation that required international intervention, as neither sides of the conflict approved of such interference, whilst Russia did not see the situation as a real threat to international peace and security. Upon this position, head of the Russian International Affairs Council, Vladimir Baranovsky articulates, “In strictly legal terms, Russia continues to argue that the non-use of force, as formulated in the UN Charter, has an imperative character. The Charter stipulates directly and unambiguously that the only two exceptions concern the right of states to individual or collective self-defence (article 51) and to actions aimed at maintaining international peace, with the Security Council being the only body entitled to decide upon appropriate means, including the use of force (article 42)” . Hereby, one could suggest that out of this defensive foreign policy directed towards Libya, Russia will oppose or abstain on a UNSC resolution when the resolution supports international intervention without the consent of the fighting parties or a threat to international peace and security.
3.2 Humanitarian Concerns
Aside from simply stating that the Russian position upon Libya was formed through a defensive based foreign policy, likewise with Syria, both humanitarian and sovereignty concerns play an instrumental role. Concerning Libya, sovereignty and humanitarian concerns roll into one, as with Libya, Russia opposed any violation of state sovereignty because of the potential for the rise of humanitarian intervention norms to lead to an excuse to violate state sovereignty. Upon these findings, it is articulated that “In the Foreign Policy Concept this approach was elaborated further: ‘Concepts such as humanitarian intervention and limited sovereignty’ are promoted in order ‘to justify unilateral forceful actions circumventing the UN Security Council’, which is why attempts to make such concepts internationally acceptable should be rejected.”
Russia opposes the dominance of humanitarian norms, as Russian fears under geostrategic realism that intervention in Libya, led by the west, would lead to expansionist type intentions, or power-maximizing intentions, which under the guise of f humanitarian intervention, this would provide an excuse for state aggression. For example, had Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had territorial designs on the Kuwaiti government in 2013, all Saddam would have to do to justify his invasion would be to ground it in language of individual rights and recast his mission as a ‘humanitarian intervention.’ While this example offers some degree of overstatement, Russia would argue that the core principle still stands—legitimizing interventions on humanitarian grounds undermines the non-aggression principles of the UN charter.
Therefore, within the Libyan developments in UNSC, Russia strongly contested arguments as they felt as if legal; interpretations of international law were to be skewered in favour of promoting Western interests. Russia used to deliberations within the UNSC in order to reinforce the state sovereignty principle and outlining that they would only legitimize intervention through the UNSC authorization. Hereby, through this angle, one can understand how Russia’s votes have not aligned with the Western countries’ votes as they view normative implications under consideration are inconsistent with Russia’s interpretation of international law stressing state sovereignty norms. In summary, Russia in turn saw the Libyan resolutions as threatening norms of sovereignty; thereby they abstained from the resolutions.
Furthermore, as the authorization of military force came in response to rising violence in Libya that posed a threat to international peace and security, Russia views such actions as examples of sovereignty violation through external military intervention. Concerning Libya, Russia has upheld the state sovereignty principle, with the hope of maintaining the current status quo, thus protecting harmful changes to Russian interests. Russia will be more likely to veto or abstain on a UNSC resolution when it marginalizes the norms promoting the state sovereignty principle.
Additional Contemporary challenges Influencing Policy in the Middle East
Furthermore, when discussing why Russia did not use its veto power to strike down Resolution 1973, Dmitri Medvedev articulates “for the simple reason that [he does] not consider the resolution in question wrong.” Rather the resolution “reflects [Russia’s] understanding of events in Libya too, but not completely” .
Reading into this statement, one could decipher this incomplete understanding would have stemmed from Russian economic interests in Libya, fear of the implication Middle East unrest will have for the Russian North Caucasus, and worries about the unclear line between humanitarian intervention and regime change. In justifying the abstention concerning these issues, it is worth mentioning that the Kremlin’s larger geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East are not driven by the zero-sum terms of Cold War logic, but instead by a dynamic pragmatism that seeks, above all, to avoid instability in the region. When examining Russia’s recent wars with Chechnya, the Kremlin’s economic opportunism, and the lack of any official anti-Western ideology differentiates Russian policies in the Middle East substantially from those of the Soviet Union, a nation that had no Chechen problem and defined its foreign policy according to anti-western ideology rather than economic concerns. The picture that emerges concerning actions taken upon Libya suggest that Russia contends issues of stability in the Middle East as of crucial importance, especially to Putin because it ultimately translates to stability at home.
In Libya, Russia can be seen to have shaped its policies in the Middle East prominently upon the role of the North Caucasus. Putin has recognized the resolution of the crisis in the North Caucuses as his “historic mission” and in the first years of his presidency, where Putin was able to win legitimacy at home by framing the Second Chechen War as a war against internationalist forces of Islamist terror bent on undermining Russian stability. As the United States and Europe became increasingly involved in the global war on terror in the years to come, Putin’s war in Chechnya won western-support and encouraged increased collaboration between Russia and the west, including coordination with the USA and Israel. While improving relations with the west, the Chechen campaign damaged Russia’s relations with Muslim nations and its own Muslim population. Waging a particularly brutal war in Chechnya, Putin’s government also implemented a great deal of “anti-terror” legislation that made it harder and harder for foreign-funded Muslim schools, organizations, and charities to operate within Russia. These policies and the war at large invited widespread disapproval from Russia’s Muslim population and the governments and populations of Muslim states abroad. To counter this dissent, the Russian government enacted an “activist and interventionist policy towards its own Muslim population,” officially embracing the contributions of Muslims to Russian society and providing funding for religious institutions, such as schools and mosques. This can be seen most prominently in the North Caucuses where, much to the chagrin of the Russia’s more nationalistic populace, Putin’s government spent $30 billion dollars between 2000-2010 and set up the Kadyrov government with the hopes of encouraging a Russia-loyal, moderate brand of Islam. Nevertheless, Islamic extremism remains a problem in Chechnya as the Russian military continues operations against terror groups, such as the Caucasus Emirate. Today, Chechen extremists are fighting in jihadist struggles across the Middle East, with allegedly 2,000 fighters of ISIS coming from the Caucuses. Hereby, using the Chechnya example, you could propose that because the Russian government does not take lightly the threat of these jihadists coming home and destabilizing the situation in the North Caucuses, Russia has intent upon defending its alliance Middle Eastern states, where Russia hopes to impose a “bulwark of international and regional order against the threat of state collapse, chaos, and the spread of transnational Islamist networks.”
In addition to the unique contemporary challenges of global terror networks and Chechen separatism, Russia’s foreign policy regarding Libya differs from approaches that may have been taken in the Soviet Union, because Russian foreign policy is focused on the goal of “economic consolidation and the internal strengthening of Russia.” Where the Soviet Union made alliances in the Middle East on a purely ideological basis, often making irrational economic decisions in the process, Medvedev and Putin’s economic opportunism has created a much more nuanced and complex set of alliances and business partners in the Middle East. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, shared economic interest has led to a rapprochement in relations and trade between Russia and Middle Eastern nations as varied as pro-Western Israel, revisionist Iraq, and the oil-producing Gulf states.
3.4 Libya Conclusion
In summary, the Kremlin viewed that the NATO the coalition went too far. NATO went from enforcing a no-fly zone, to actively sponsoring regime change in Tripoli. Russia also felt as if Libya’s collapse meant that they lost a friendly regime as the country descended into hostile infighting between rival militias. Vladimir Putin suggested that Libya was now in “full disintegration, no state at all,” adding that “even the diplomatic service of the U.S. have felt losses.”
Russia clearly showed that with their view of what happened in Libya, that they were no longer willing to act as overseeers, or protectors of regimes that run afoul of the West. Russia indeed were not the closest of friends with Gadhafi, yet he had never actively fought Russia, incuding through Soviet times. All said and done, however, Russia and Putin were not sorry to see Gadhafi ousted, and their sympathy was not for the leader, but for Libya who had superceeded into a civil war and a Western battlefield for regime change. The Kremlin also made it clear that they were intially willing to side with the West, if they were to view Russia in equal standing, accumulating to joint decsions made in the UNSC. Moreover, as discussed above, this was not the case as Russia felt as if the UNSC disregarded Russia’s influencial position, to the point where Russia felt as if they could not trust in the UNSC to protect human life and freedom, stopping with the essence of regime change. When explaining why Russia adopts such a negative stance towards Regime change, this can be said to be a case of Russia’s principles founded upon state sovreignity and noninterference in states interal affairs and or affairs after a leader is deposed. Instead, Russia concerned itself with the profitable arms trades, that would break down with the removal of Gadhafi and worried about the state of chaos that the Western backed regime change left behind.
Furthermore, the events in Libya further reaffirmed Russia’s distrust of the West, coupled with an feeling of disgust, due to Western reluctance to recognise Russia as influencial on the world stage through a lack of respect. Additionally, as Gadhafi was ousted, Western contractors were soon to renew contracts with Libyan companies, instead of Russian ones. This further added insult to injury with Russia’s already confused position, that was in dismay with NATO overstepping the security mandate in Libya through the implementation of widespread miltary operations. Overall, the combination of the above factors certainly accounted for Russian resentment out of the developments and these were soon to be expressed towards Syria, as the Libyan lesson would certainly factor and be remembered. Putin aptly summarised his position stating in an address to the Valdai conference, when "In absence of legal and political instruments, arms are once again becoming the focal point of the global agenda; they are used wherever and however, without any UN Security Council sanctions. And if the Security Council refuses to produce such decisions, then it is immediately declared to be an outdated and ineffective instrument.”